▶ 0:09:13Just heat. Uh we we'll wait for Mr. Garendi. Okay. Today's hearing will come to order.
▶ 0:09:42Pursuant to rule 4B3, members of the House Armed Services Committee who are not members of the subcommittee are allowed to participate in today's hearing and will be recognized after all subcommittee members have had an opportunity to ask questions. Uh, good afternoon and welcome to the Strategic Forces Subcommittee's first hearing of the 119th Congress. And of course, we're probably going to be interrupted by votes, but we're going to power on as much as we can and and pick up as soon as they conclude.
▶ 0:10:08Uh, first I want to recognize the new majority members of our subcommittee. Mr. Van Warden from Wisconsin who's not here yet, uh, Mr. Mesmer from Indiana, Mr. Crank from Colorado, and Mr. Hammed from Arizona. And, uh, also we have Mr. Bell from Missouri, uh, and Mr. Whiteside from California. So, uh, welcome to the best and most important subcommittee.
▶ 0:10:33Uh we look forward to working with all you as we prepare for fiscal year 2026 National Defense Authorization Act. Uh next I'd like to thank our witnesses for appearing before us today. With us we have uh General Anthony Cotton, Commander of Strategic Command, uh General Steven Whiting, commander of US Space Command, General Gre Gregory Guo, commander of US North Command, and Mr.
▶ 0:10:57John Hill, who is currently performing the duties of the assistant secretary of defense for space policy within the office of the secretary of defense. While the uh president's budget request for the upcoming fiscal year continues to be finalized, we look forward to hearing from each of our witnesses on your areas of responsibility and changes you are seeing uh to the threat environment.
▶ 0:11:17I think it's worth noting that the three officers in front of us today represent different combatant commands with different missions and different priorities, but they each face a common problem. All of you are responsible for mission areas where the United States once enjoyed superiority. But we are now increasingly confronted by adversaries. Space and homeland were once sanctuaries for the United States, beyond the reach of our adversaries, and from which our nation could project decisive power.
▶ 0:11:45That is no longer the Nuclear competition, thought by many in this country to be a relic of the Cold War, is back. With adversaries expanding their nuclear arsenals in developing new and destabilizing nuclear systems designed to hold our nation at risk, our adversaries recognize the foundational role that each of these missions areas plays in our defense strategy. They cannot compete with our conventional forces.
▶ 0:12:10So, they have chosen to target our homeland, hold our space systems at risk, and expand their nuclear arsenals to challenge our deterrent. These threats have been building for some time, but the pace is accelerating. I look forward to hearing more from our witnesses about how we are responding to these developments. I'm concerned we have taken too long to come to terms with the new competitive environment. I'm afraid that our response thus far has been inadequate.
▶ 0:12:36These growing threats and how we as a nation choose to respond to them is why I really do believe this is the most important subcommittee in in Congress. Before turning to ranking member Molton for his remarks, I want to recognize General Cotton. As this will likely be his last appearance before the subcommittee, thank you for your 39 years of service to our nation. We are have particularly appreciated your leadership of Stratcom and the cander you have had in your interactions with this subcommittee over the last three years.
▶ 0:13:06You've certainly earned some peace and quiet, but you've got one last hearing to get through first. With that, I'll turn it over to my good friend and ranking member Seth Molton for any remarks he would like to make. Thank you very much, Chairman Dejar, and congratulations on your first strategic forces subcommittee hearing as chairman. I also want to thank you for beginning this session with a very bipartisan series of briefings to bring us all up to speed on some of the most consequential issues before our Congress today.
▶ 0:13:34I completely agree with your assessment of the role of this subcommittee in Congress. Let me also echo your welcome to Representatives Bell from Missouri, Crank from Colorado, Hammed from Arizona, Mesmer from Indiana, Van Orton from Wisconsin, and Whitesides from California. Lastly, welcome to our witnesses and thank you for your continued service to our country during this difficult time when many general officers are under attack.
▶ 0:13:59General Cotton, thank you for your dedicated service to our nation for the last 39 years. Your particular focus on helping us understand the strategic dynamics of deterring two nearpeer adversaries will have lasting impact. As we sit here today, I cannot ignore the fact that this administration has put our national security at risk.
▶ 0:14:20The Secretary of Defense broke the law when he put operational details classified top secret according to DoD guidelines that could not be more clear on an unclassified platform specifically targeted by China and Russia. What a boon it would have been to either adversary had they gotten those time-ontarget details to the Houthis in time to use their extensive anti anti-aircraft missile arsenal against our American pilots.
▶ 0:14:44When Pete Hgsth left Fox and Friends to become the most unqualified Secretary of Defense in history by the narrowest vote margin in history, he said, I quote, "Accountability is back." Any of us who have served know that there is nobody more despised in the military than those who lead by the opposite of example, of forcing rules they don't follow themselves, and having zero accountability for their own actions and behavior.
▶ 0:15:10When Secretary Austin made a mistake far, far less serious by not properly notifying the top of his chain of command about his surgery, I did not hesitate in saying publicly that President Biden should fire him. It's worth noting that Secretary Austin's transgression, while serious, did not put any of our troops in immediate danger, while improper, did not violate the law, and he didn't lie about it. He told the truth.
▶ 0:15:36He answered questions before Congress and he put new procedures in place to ensure it would never happen again. Secretary Hegsth has done none of that. And to be clear about what Democrats are saying publicly and many Republicans are saying privately, he should be fired. Of course, rather than fire a criminal, the president has fired the head of the NSA, who's received tremendous bipartisan praise from this very committee. Don't think for a second, Mr.
▶ 0:16:02chairman that our witnesses aren't sitting here today trying hard to do their jobs wondering if they will be next. While US stocks are cratering, I'm sorry, I wrote that 20 minutes ago and now they're back up. President can't make up his mind. But while US stocks are all over the place, our adversary stocks of nuclear weapons are increasing at an alarming rate. The Chinese Communist Party's ICBM fleet has exceeded US intelligence estimates and they have deployed several hypersonic weapons that can carry nuclear warheads.
▶ 0:16:31Russia is developing a treaty violating space-based nuclear weapon that would destroy nearly all of the satellites we rely on for GPS and communications every day. And despite pro Trump's promise to end the war in Ukraine within 24 hours, war criminal Putin continues his criminal war, using nuclear brinkmanship on the offense for the first time in history. North Korea and Iran are comparative sideshows in the nuclear realm. Yet, they still have the potential to kill millions of people.
▶ 0:17:00We know their leaders would like to be Americans. All that is to say, the mission of this subcommittee is growing in scope, importance, and urgency. I sometimes ask my Democratic colleagues, what is the greatest existential threat to America? Because they often say climate change. I'm no denier of science, but let's be clear. Our greatest, most existential threat is nuclear war. Yet, it's been a long time since most Americans gave it a second thought.
▶ 0:17:27Trump's Golden Dome for America is the most significant change to the strategic landscape the US has proposed since the Cold War, and it merits careful consideration. If he wants to replace the doctrine of mutually assured destruction, he and his team need to propose an alternative. Otherwise, his golden dome could instigate a further a nuclear arms race, bankrupt DoD, and be about as strong as the gold leaf glittering at top various capital domes, which flakes off regularly at great expense.
▶ 0:17:56Missile defense has a mixed legacy. President Bush's withdrawal from the anti-bballistic missile treaty, which Trump thoughtlessly touts in his order, actually helps disprove his case. As a result of that decision, Russia and China began an arms race to get around our interceptors, which is why we are struggling to catch up on hypersonic and other novel delivery methods today. All of which make us strategically less safe.
▶ 0:18:20Perhaps a better timeproven approach is to follow in the footsteps of Reagan and Kennedy and use our economic power to drive negotiations to reduce nukes on all sides. Although it's far in the future and only achieved through mutual agreement, the day when nobody has active nuclear weapons is a day that it is least likely they will be used against us. General Cotton and General Guio, we have discussed privately and publicly how we think how we should think about a world with two nearper nuclear adversaries and how that might adjust your requirements.
▶ 0:18:50We might be strategically stronger by building more new sentinels than interceptors while the administration is proposing the opposite. But the underlying point is that we should only spend hundreds of billions of taxpayer dollars based on serious strategic doctrine, not the whims of someone who always wants the golden version of things his friends already have. Our subcommittee's other major concern is space.
▶ 0:19:15And while we can't say much publicly, I will continue to press the department to make sure that we can explain to our constituents why we must invest billions in space because it could not be more critical. America's strategic defense, the bedrock of our national security, must remain a top priority despite everything else going on in Washington these days. Even the right weapons with the wrong policy can be destabilizing, weakening our national security.
▶ 0:19:41I look forward to working closely with the members of this subcommittee and our witnesses to make America stronger and more secure. We often say that our nuclear arsenal must be safe, secure, and reliable. Our country should be the same. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. and I yield back. Thank the ranking member. Uh we'll now move into opening statements from our witnesses.
▶ 0:20:02I would note that your prepared statements will be made part of the record and because of respect for your time and votes, we're going to reduce the time to two minutes to make your opening remarks and we'll start with Mr. Hill and then we'll just move down the line from there. Mr. Hill, you're recognized. Thank you, Chairman Dj. Ranking member Molton, thank you for inviting me to testify before the uh before you on the Department of Defense's strategic posture. I will omit my threat portion of my opening statement. It's in the record.
▶ 0:20:32Moving straight to the nation strategic posture is the foundation of deterrence and defense against these growing threats to the homeland that you've described in the opening statements and to our enduring interests abroad. Nuclear forces and our nuclear command, control and communication systems remain the centerpieces of strategic posture. While missile defenses make ever more crucial contributions both as complements to nuclear forces and as indispensable denial elements of our conventional defense posture.
▶ 0:21:03No less important, space systems and spectrum enable our nuclear forces, our nuclear command control and communications, our strategic warning, our missile defenses, and indeed the entire joint force. This makes assured access to space and spectrum, the ability to establish superiority in space when needed in the domain, and the means to deny hostile uses of space crucial components of our strategic posture.
▶ 0:21:31Increasingly, the proliferation of chemical and biological weapons adds to this complexity, making our ability to counter such weapons of mass destruction an additional element of strategic posture. The department is firmly committed to making the necessary investments in our strategic posture to deter our adversaries and if deterrence fails, prevail in conflict. This mission requires sufficient and consistent funding and support.
▶ 0:21:58Uniquely within the Department of Defense, the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Space Policy has oversight responsibility for all these interconnected and mutually supporting elements of strategic posture. It has been my privilege and honor to oversee this office since August 2024 and to work with this committee on these matters of strategic importance to the nation. Thank you for the opportunity to testify today. Thank you, Mr. Hill, for your testimony. Uh, General Cotton, you're recognized. Good afternoon, Chairman LA.
▶ 0:22:27Ranking member Molton and the distinguished members of this committee. It's an honor for Sergeant Major Kramer and me to appear before you today with Mr. Hill, General Whiting and Chief Master Sergeant Simmons, General Guio, and Chief Master Sergeant Storms. In my third and final year as commander representing the men and women of United States Strategic Command, it continues to be an absolute ple privilege and I have submitted my final posture statement for the record. First, let me be clear.
▶ 0:22:55America's nuclear forces, the bedrock of our national security, is and continues to be safe, secure, effective, and credible. In today's deteriorating security environment, our mission has never been more critical. To effectively deter in this complex environment, we must maintain both our existing capabilities and accelerate the ongoing modernization of our nuclear deterrent, all three legs of the triad, and its critical nuclear command, control, and communication systems.
▶ 0:23:24Investing in modernization will ensure that US strategic weapons continue to deter aggression, assure our allies and partners, and allow us to achieve national objectives if deterrence fails. Thank you again for your support, leadership, and attention to this mission. And I welcome your questions. Thank you, General Whiting. You're recognized. Chairman Desire and Ranking Member Molton and members of the subcommittee, thank you for your support and the opportunity to represent the war fighters of US Space Command.
▶ 0:23:53At US Space Command, our guiding principle is clear. To secure peace, we must be wellprepared for conflict in space. And if deterrence fails, we will fight and win. US Space Command is upholding this principle in the face of operational threats which continue to expand at a breathtaking pace and which are being fielded deliberately and specifically to challenge the United States, the American way of life, and to hold the joint force at risk.
▶ 0:24:17Despite the growing threats, the United States maintains advantages in space thanks to the unified mission focus of our superb joint war fighters, our unmatched commercial space sector, and our expansive and more empowered alliances and partnerships. That said, these advantages and our ability to deter potential adversaries cannot be taken for granted. Deterrence in space is consistent with other domains. It requires a keen understanding and clear communication of what we are deterring against.
▶ 0:24:46credible acknowledged capabilities to impose costs on those who attack us and resilient architectures to dissuade attack by making any effort feudal. US Space Command requires stable funding as well as effective and efficient acquisition programs, delivering advanced space capabilities to enable a balanced space deterrence force structure.
▶ 0:25:05Most pressing are the delivery of integrated space fires, enhanced battle space awareness, and integrated command and control capabilities to achieve space superiority to defend the homeland and protect and enable the joint force. By investing in space superiority capabilities, we send a clear message. The US has the advantage and we remain committed that space will be safe, secure, and stable. We are ready to repel all challengers and any attempt to defeat the US in space will fail. Mr. Mr.
▶ 0:25:34Chairman, I have submitted my posture statement for the record and I look forward to your and the committee's questions. Thank you, General Guil, you're Chairman Dejle, Rank and Member Molton and distinguished members of the subcommittee. It's a tremendous honor to command and represent the men and women of North American Aerospace Defense Command and United States Northern Command. I'm also pleased to appear alongside General Cotton, General Whiting, and ASD John Hill.
▶ 0:26:01The global security environment is growing increasingly volatile, characterized by intensifying competition among major powers and mounting threats to US national interests. Cooperation between China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea remains significantly concerning to NORAD and US Northcom. To counter such adversary cooperation, the commands rely on realistic planning, targeted investments, and forward-looking policies that ensure the command's ability to detect, track, and defeat potential threats in all domains.
▶ 0:26:32Establishing a layered domain awareness network to detect and track threats approaching North America from seabed to space is critical to immediate and future mission requirements because we can't defeat what we can't see. Specific to this subcommittee, I appreciate the department and congressional support for fielding all domain capabilities such as airborne moving target indicator satellites over the horizon radars, the E7 wedge tale, and an under excuse me, an integrated undersea surveillance system.
▶ 0:27:01These capabilities support long-standing NORAD and Northcom requirements and will serve as a foundation for the Golden Glo Dome construct. The challenges facing our nation are real, but there should be no doubt about NORAD and Northcom's resolve to deter aggression and if necessary defeat threats to our nations and our citizens. Again, thank you for the opportunity to appear this afternoon and I look forward to your questions. We have the watch. Thank you all. And votes were called, so I think uh we'll forego questions for now.
▶ 0:27:31We'll recess till approximately 410 to 4:15.
▶ 1:08:09Committee will come back to order. I'll now recognize myself for five minutes of questioning and uh start with our outgoing General Cotton. As you know, the FY24 Defense Authorization Bill required the Department of Defense to establish a program of record to develop the nuclear sea launch cruise missile or slick amend. I noticed in your written open statement you referred to this as quote muchneeded uh end quote capability.
▶ 1:08:36Can you elaborate on the importance of this system and its relevance to some of the theater deterrence challenges we're concerned today? Chairman, thank you for the question. Um and as it is in my written statement, the the reason I say um it's two pieces to that because I think it has a strategic capability. Um but even more so um there is an opportunity for regional capability.
▶ 1:09:01Um the geographic combat commanders are all in support of being able to hold folks at risk from a regional level as well. Um that's why I think uh that slick them in is something that can fill that void. Thank you. Uh, General Whiting, General Saltzman testified last week that our policy framework hasn't kept pace with the rising threats in space, specifically from China, saying we have to go very to very high levels of approval for testing and training. We do all training and simulation. We don't do live training due to policies.
▶ 1:09:32As the combatant commander, how important is it for you to have people in systems that are supported by accurate training? Yeah, thank you, chairman. Um it's incredibly important that we have well- tested capabilities so that we have confidence on how they will perform under various scenarios and conditions. And then it's important that the uh guardians and the war fighters who uh imple or operate those systems are very well trained on how to use them in those same scenarios and conditions.
▶ 1:10:00So investment in the training and test um infrastructure as well as having the right policies are vital for us. Thank you. And Mr. Hill, how are you and your team working to change these policies? Thank you, Chairman. Um, most of the most of the training does not have to go to high levels. There are a few things that that still do. And so, we're looking to see how as space has become more normalized as part of the joint force.
▶ 1:10:24What are those remaining things that really require because of the sensitivity that they might require something high? But for the most part, we're trying to move things out of that requirement. Okay. Thank you. And General Guio, you discussed the importance of the spectrum with the chairman. You appeared before the full uh committee last month, but I'd like to revisit this issue uh specifically in the president's vision of the Golden Dome for America.
▶ 1:10:48Is it achievable without access to lower three and portions of seven and 8 gigahertz bands the department currently utilizes? Chairman, I don't see how we can have an effective homeland defense system uh without uh full use of the 3 to 35 spectrum and the higher uh numbers you mentioned uh will be challenging as well.
▶ 1:11:11And uh Generals Cotton and Widing, if the department was forced to vacate from these spectrum bands, how would this impact your missions? Well, sir, from our perspective, um you know, missile defense determination and missile warning determination uh would be um something that would close a decision space uh for for the president of the United States in which I'm supposed to protect. And Mr.
▶ 1:11:36Chairman, in the lower three, we have several important tracking radars that we use for space domain awareness and missile defense. And then in the 78 bands, uh we have uh important saccom communications links that we use in those bands. So those are those are again vital for our uh successful mission accomplishment. Again, thank you all for your testimony today and setting a good precedence. I'm yielding back a minute and 20 seconds and and uh recognizing ranking member Molton for 5 minutes. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate your leadership by example.
▶ 1:12:05And without reasking the question, I just want to echo my concerns about the the spectrum. So, thank you very much for for raising that. Uh it's important that we that the rest of Congress hears these concerns as well. Mr. Mr. Hill, based on my math, the Secretary of Defense owed a response on options to implement what the executive order termed the Iron Dome for America program uh uh is on March 28th. What can you share about what that 60-day study period accomplished and what the recommendations to the president were?
▶ 1:12:36Well, in terms of what the recommendations were, that'll be for the secretary and the president to when what the executive order said is provide the president um a reference architecture that the president could incorporate into the president's budget. So when that budget is uh presented, that's when the the specifics would come out. This stage, it's a discussion at the level between the secretary and the president. Okay. So has the secretary provided a response yet?
▶ 1:13:02Do you know the uh as I say that's between the secretary and the president. I'm I'm not going to get into the specifics of of what they're discussing. Do you know if the study will explore the question of how this will affect strategic stability or what our peer adversaries may do? Certainly it it as it said in the executive order we looked at at the issues related to the uh assurityity of our sec our uh nuclear uh second strike response. For example, we looked at the uh protection of the American homeland.
▶ 1:13:31We looked at the the regional aspects. So it's it's the architecture and it's the broader implications for strategic stability all part of that. Thank you. General Guio, what guidance have you received with regards to the overall goal of this proposed system and what threats are you writing those requirements to?
▶ 1:13:50Congressman, we've uh the direct um responsibilities I have are to provide my estimate uh recommended uh way to approach defending the homeland from uh ballistic missile threats uh hypersonic threats as well as cruise missile and air threats.
▶ 1:14:09And in doing so, uh, I I provided our commands, uh, recommendation of a three-doome approach with the first dome being a a domain awareness dome, the second to handle ICBMs, and the third to handle the air threat to include cruise missiles, knowing that depending on what part of the profile, uh, hypersonics would be addressed either in the ICBM uh, dome or in the air dome. Thank you.
▶ 1:14:33And General Cotton, in your role as the commander of strategic command, you spent all day thinking about maintaining nuclear deterrence and strategic stability around the world. Have you been involved in thinking through the potential impacts a golden dome could have on the strategic stability uh that is increasingly precarious because of Russia and China's novel delivery Thank you, Ranking Member Molton. Uh at this time, uh Stratcom actually is looking um as I we had in our office call.
▶ 1:15:02We're looking at some of the things that came from the SDI initiative, some of the talking points, uh some of the opeds and and analysis and theories that happened then just to kind of capture what that looks like. Um and we're still in the middle of doing that. Okay. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back. Thank you. The chair now recognizes Mr. Turner for five minutes. Good. Thank you. Turn Whiting.
▶ 1:15:29Um I um in reading your testimony on uh the issue of the Russian U space anti-satellite nuclear weapon, uh I got to tell you, I was very disappointed in the language that you used and the um the impression I think that people would get in reading it.
▶ 1:15:55Um especially in light of in contrast to your recent remarks at a recent space symposium where you noted the importance of the United States deploying offensive uh space weapons orbital interceptors in Um, specifically your testimony says, "Most concerning with you there, Russia is pursuing the possible placement of a nuclear weapon on
▶ 1:16:25orbit. Detonating a nuclear weapon on orbit would have indiscriminate effects potential potentially disrupting the global use of space for security, economic, and scientific purposes. US Spacecom has prepared our vital national security satellites for such a threat. First off, let's dissect what you've just said.
▶ 1:16:48Um um there's no statement in your in your statement that this is a treaty violation. Um it's not potentially disrupting the global use of space. Um, in this committee, Assistant Secretary John Plum testified the detonation of a nuclear weapon in space would render low Earth orbit unusable for up to a year.
▶ 1:17:17General Saltzman testified and has stated that the placement of a nuclear weapon on orbit in space as an anti-satellite nuclear weapon would be zero because the very next day we would not be able to count on the use of space for for national security, economic or scientific purposes.
▶ 1:17:42the very next day, we would have to assume that the use of space is no longer secure. So trillions of dollars and technology that we don't have would have to be expended assuming that that space is no longer available to us. Now, do you disagree with Assistant Secretary John Plum's testimony that the detonation would render low Earth orbit unusable for up to a year?
▶ 1:18:12No sir, I do not. Then why did you say potentially disrupting the global use of space? What what is does potentially mean? So I mean he says render. So I do agree this is the uh single most threatening um uh potential weapon to our uh space architecture. Right?
▶ 1:18:33Because my belief and I think the belief of this committee and I mean the entire armed services committee not subcommittee is that this cannot be permitted to go into space that our per that our position as a committee bipartisan has to be that this is the Cuban missile crisis in space and this cannot be permitted to be go in space.
▶ 1:18:52So the next portion of your testimony, which is the next part that is most disturbing, is that you give people the impression that US spacecom has prepared our vital national security satellites for such a threat. No, you haven't. It's not possible.
▶ 1:19:08Sorry, I think my link not only have you not by giving people the impression that you have, you've given people the impression that supposedly economic and for scientific purposes that if this should occur that this definition that this detonation should happen that apparently rendering low Earth orbit indiscriminately unavailable for up to a year isn't going to mean that the produce
▶ 1:19:38economically communications and national security that we expect from space on this planet is is is going to be as General Saltzman has has indicated significantly different the next day. Sir, I absolutely agree with you. The two architect or the uh most important space systems I was talking about were our nuclear command and control systems that support General Cotton and General Guio. Those have been hardened against an onorbit nuclear detonation.
▶ 1:20:09Um, and they were specifically designed for what could potentially be the worst day in American history. So those were the specific systems I was referring to with Are they in lower earth orbit? No sir, they are not. So when you're saying that you prepared them for that, they're not in low earth orbit. No sir. So I just want to be clear. You you they you have not taken actions for the vital national security satellites to be prepared for such such a a threat. and we still have to be working so that this never happens. Okay, I yield back. Gentleman's time is expired.
▶ 1:20:37Would you like to I I agree with the congressman's last statement that we need to continue to take actions. Yes, sir. Thank you. And the chair now recognizes the gentleman from California, Mr. Gar Mendy, for five minutes. Mr. Chairman, you and I had a conversation on the floor that was really one of the more purposeful uh that I've had uh on the issue of the Sentinel.
▶ 1:21:04And you suggested that since General Cotton maybe not is retiring that his retirement gift ought to be my termination of my opposition to the Sentinel. Would that make you happy, General Cotton? Congressman Gar, what kind of a going away president do you really want? That would be an incredible going away present.
▶ 1:21:34Well, it ain't going to happen. Uh, we really do value your extraordinary service and your tenacity on making sure that we're prepared in every possible way.
▶ 1:21:47uh in a more uh maybe important way uh I terminated my conversation on the floor with the chairman saying you know we really need to have a full review of our nuclear deterrence all of the pieces of it uh things have changed you just heard from uh Mr.
▶ 1:22:05Turner about some of the ongo actually not new we looked at nuclear weapons in space almost 35 years ago decided it wasn't particularly useful at that time things have changed so what I'm really looking at here is at some in the very near future we take the commission and say guys don't just tell us what we've done for the last 60 years but where are we today uh many many things have changed they've all been talked about here and um so I'm going to push for that
▶ 1:22:35along with the removal of your going away present. So, in any case, we're going to have to to get on with it. Um, there's a whole series of things. I'm just going to let those questions go and we'll come back to them. Um, in your testimony, Mr. Hill, and and thank you. I hope you're sticking around for a while because you do have a lot of experience here.
▶ 1:23:05Um, there's much more to this issue than the nuclear weapons themselves and this committee has talked uh from time to time about arms control strategies. It it may be when it's not maybe it's definitely in our interest that we employ greater attention to arms uh very very difficult international situation right now but nonetheless we need to power through and could
▶ 1:23:35you tell me or tell all of us where we are with arms control efforts uh in your domain so my domain cover nuclear and space and the missile defense pieces um certainly the legacy arms control the new start expires uh next year. Uh don't see anything on the horizon.
▶ 1:24:01The the actual verification activities have have been suspended under that. The real challenge with arms control now as we has been noted in many cases is you really have to deal with three countries in this environment. Um uh China is is a key part of that and and they're they've not shown interest in this. they their trend seems to be achieve parody before even considering the idea.
▶ 1:24:29Uh so the environment for putting together successful talks uh is not good. It doesn't mean you don't try you the the talks themselves can be valuable from a a strategic stability perspective even if they don't produce.
▶ 1:24:47Um, so, so that is definitely part of the part of the considerations of what are the things we can do to create more of an incentive for Russia and China to at least want to have a a constructive conversation. President Trump earlier in I guess a couple of months ago said there's no reason for us to be building brand new nuclear weapons. We have so many.
▶ 1:25:10We're all spending a lot of money that we could be spending on other things that are actually hopefully much productive. Statements like that generally cause the in this case Russia and China to go what is he talking about?
▶ 1:25:28Uh I would take that as an opening to start not at the top but some things that are mutually beneficial to us and to China and and just begin the process. Start at probably the lowest possible level and then go from there. Uh I don't know how long you're going to be around uh in your job. I would hope for some time. Um, but I would recommend that we spend a great deal of our effort on the arms control piece of this.
▶ 1:25:58Otherwise, we're going to continue to build and Cotton will have his sentinel. And question is whether we are safer. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Gentleman's time has expired. The chair now recognizes the gentleman from Nebraska, Mr. Bacon. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I appreciate all four of you being here. We appreciate your leadership. had the honor of working with two of you and I look forward to working with all four of you in the months and years ahead. Our first question, I got two questions for Gerald Cotton and I'll bright widen them out.
▶ 1:26:24I did have Gerald Gio and our here last week, so I've already posed a few questions to you, but I would like to start off with the Looking Glass mission. Uh I was one of the guys who flew on it back in the day and I think a couple of you have done that done the same. I first want to ask, is it still a viable need? And I'm just going to tag on to this. Most people may not know it here on the committee that we used to have this mission for 29 years. It was airborne 247 Air Force aircraft.
▶ 1:26:541991, I think it was, we took it to a a ground alert for 15 minutes. Eventually turned it over to the Navy for the aircraft and flight crew. Still had a Stratcom battle crew. I've been concerned that we don't have a 247 capability. Number one concern. But then number two, now the Navy's walking away with from using their aircraft. And I think this is a concern for the Air Force. The Air Force needs to look at this. Do we need to pick this mission back up? So my question to General Cotton is, is this still a viable need the cup the looking glass mission?
▶ 1:27:25And what do you see as the future here? Thanks for the question, Congressman Bacon. So there is a need and and in the middle of as we look through our NC3 um roadmap um there's an active trade space study that's underway right now um and the conclusions are are are to be released in the June time frame.
▶ 1:27:47One of the options is what is a follow on um to the airborne piece because you also as you also know um part of that mission set um is the air launch um capability for the for the groundbased leg of for the ICBMs with the air launch That being said, the air the E6B of what you're referring to, that's Takamo, um that is uh should be around and it's supposed to be around to the 2036 time frame as the Navy
▶ 1:28:17replaces uh that aircraft uh with their their EJJ or EXX C130 variant. Um you are correct right now that will not have the the ANCAP platform on it. Um, so we're under discussions right now on what does that look like moving forward, but but right now one of the options is to still continue to have a airborne leg. Whether or not it belongs in belongs to the Air Force to the Navy as a services, they they have to fight that one out.
▶ 1:28:45If I could say it with a subliminal suggestion, I think it's Air Force and it off it. Just throw that out there. I got a hyper sonic question for you and then I'll go to our other two generals. We can detect a hypersonic launch. We don't know where it's going and we don't know exactly when it's going to hit. How does that make your mission more hard for nuclear command and control? Well, two things. Because what I'm supposed to do is I'm supposed to maximize the decision space for the president to make a decision.
▶ 1:29:10So, it tightens up the ability to be able to to let the president know when the strike is inbound and when it might hit. Um, which then um really kind of closes the the timelines in regards of having decisions made for the president. General Whiting and General Guillo, what is the one or two things you need to track hypersonic weapons? I repeating this question from last week, but I think it's important. Congressman, thank you for the question.
▶ 1:29:39I in the Golden Dome executive order talks about accelerating the tracking layer from space and and those layers are being built today and that investments have begun and those are vital for us to uh track hypersonic weapons. And then we also want to modernize our groundbased radars that were built really for the traditional ballistic missile threat. And u and um you we've we've identified what those requirements are to improve those radars to be able to track hypersonics as well.
▶ 1:30:07Congressman, and in support of General Whiting, I agree the the most uh uh crucial step I think is to get the HBTSS um robustly fielded. um that would allow us to detect and track uh in ways that we cannot right now. So I got you on the record twice saying that. That's good. Now I want to support you with these efforts. We I want to work on funding and getting this done. This is critical to our national security in my view. One one more question for Gerald Cotton.
▶ 1:30:36What would be your preferred number for the B-21 fielding? I'm on a record to say a minimum of 100, which is the program of record, but I'm on a record saying about 145. Uh that would give us about 220 total bombers um once the modernization of the B-52s uh take place um as well as the the fly out of the B-21. So 145 is what I'm thinking. Thank you. It sounds like a good number and I yield back. Gentleman yields.
▶ 1:31:04The chair now recognizes a gentleman from California, Mr. Carbajal. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And I wasn't kidding earlier when I made that flippant remark that not all panels are created equal. And certainly having such a panel of such qualified individuals is really um confidence building. So I'm really glad you're here. Um General Cotton, thank you for your distinguished service to our country.
▶ 1:31:30I hope you will also continue to find a way to contribute in your retirement. And I don't want you to hold your breath about Mr. Gar Mendy. Uh, you might get some ailments if you hold your breath waiting for Mr. Garmendy to change his position. We need to fully embrace the commercial space industry to maintain space superiority. Space Command's commercial integration strategy is certainly a step in the right direction and sends a strong demand signal to the industry.
▶ 1:32:01But the military needs to really put its money where its mouth is with these commercial integration strategies. To me, this seems seems easier to do from the service perspective since they own procurement acquisitions. General Whitening, can you speak to how you have been implementing your commercial integration strategy and what more specific areas do you want the Space Force to focus on when it comes to leveraging commercial capabilities? Thank you for the question, Congressman.
▶ 1:32:30In our commercial integration strategy, we identified three lines of effort that align to our responsibilities as a combatant command. And the first was to identify and advocate for commercial solutions. So we're out scanning what those capabilities are and then trying to elevate those for the space forces and others consideration. Secondly, we want to incorporate and operationalize those commercial capabilities as they come online. And then third to inform and protect our commercial partners.
▶ 1:32:54And as you're aware, Congressman, at Vandenberg in the commercial integration cell, we have 17 commercial companies there that we share classified information with to help them protect their constellations as well. So, the area I I think I'd like to continue to make progress in, and I think we're going to see that this year is in the Space Force's uh commercial augmented space reserve, the CASER, as they now are starting to initiate the first pilot contracts um of being able to leverage capability faster in a conflict or crisis.
▶ 1:33:23And we now are beginning to write what those triggers are for when those contracts would be uh initiated. And uh that's modeled on a transcom effort called the Civil Reserve Airfleet. And uh that's an area I want to make progress in this year. Thank you. Our entire military, every combatant command relies on space to carry out their functions. Our nation's launch range infrastructure is fragile, expensive, and aging.
▶ 1:33:48General Whiting, as a combatant commander, how are you working with the entire Department of Defense to ensure we will have the ability to have responsive launch in the Thank you, Congressman, for that question. We think this is one of the elements of victory of how the United States continues to be uh ultimately successful in space is we have to have the ability to rapidly regenerate and reconstitute our space capabilities. So we are identifying those requirements uh with the space force and with commercial industry.
▶ 1:34:17Um and to to look at our capacity on our launch ranges to make sure that as commercial industry ramps and this is an area we have a massive lead over our competitors that the launch ranges themselves never become the choke point and and limit the United States in that regard. Thank you General Cotton. I want to extract some wisdom from you before you leave us. As you know, minimum three tests happen out of Annabbrick Space Force Base in my district.
▶ 1:34:43As this system continues to age, you can discuss the role that test launches play in establishing confidence in Minat Minaman 3 systems and what is the calculation you make in continuing test launches versus conserving the supply of test bodies? Thank you for the uh thank you for the question, Congressman, and you're absolutely right. So the western range is incredibly important for us. Um especially when we're talking about legacy systems with the Minute Man 3.
▶ 1:35:11Um that test um the results and analysis that test is for Stratcom. Um for us to understand the reliability of that weapon system. Um we are in the midst of trying to figure out how do we balance continuing since we know that there is a delay of sentinel um um of how we can balance u making sure we have enough missile bodies um to still um have testing um in the future um until we find uh sentinels sitting
▶ 1:35:42in the holes as a replacement for the minute man. Thank you. Mr. Chair, I yield back. Gentleman yields back. Uh gentleman from Colorado, Mr. Crank is now recognized for 5 minutes. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Appreciate that. Uh, I want to start by asking each of our witnesses to quickly answer the following question. In your opinion, is the space-based threat from Russia and China greater, weaker, or the same compared to four years ago? Mr. greater.
▶ 1:36:11General Cotton, greater. General Whiting? Sir, it's greater. General, sir, it's greater. Great. Uh, General Guio and General Whiting, uh, can you tell me how Northern Command, Northcom, and Space Command work together to defend the homeland?
▶ 1:36:30Congressman, in a wide variety of ways every day, uh probably the most uh relevant for this subcommittee would be the fact that uh US Space Command uh operates and manages the systems that give us the earliest and and you know first detection of uh intercontinental ballistic threats uh to the United States uh that we use to assess and determine if one if it's a threat to the United States and two uh to predict predict where
▶ 1:37:00it will go. And three, they have systems that help us guide our groundbased interceptors to defeat these threats if it comes from North Korea or uh potentially Iran. Okay. And quickly, General Whiting, uh that was a great answer from General Guio. Uh, Congressman, I just would add uh that that in addition our satellite communications and the GPS signal we provide to provide positioning, navigation, and timing are also uh foundational to many of the uh efforts uh that we know northern commands executing every day to to defend the homeland.
▶ 1:37:30And do you both feel like you have clear and efficient lines of communication between the two commands to fulfill the mission and defend the homeland? I I absolutely think so, sir. And I agree, Congressman. And do you believe that this will collaboration helps you ensure that Golden Dome will be successful uh successfully deployed? Uh we are partnering with Northern Command Congressman to uh to write the requirements document and we have a very close partnership on that. Thank you.
▶ 1:37:57Uh you know honestly I'm perplexed by discussions of combatant command realignment of any kind. Uh this week as HA has uh we've had the combatant commanders for Europe, the Indo-acific, North America, our strategic forces, and our space forces all testify that the space-based threat from Russia and China are more dangerous after four years of President Biden's weak rule. And we know that the China 2027 date is ridly approaching.
▶ 1:38:27We've also heard how important it is that Northcom and Space Command have maximum collaboration and communication with each other to make Golden Dome successful. President Trump very boldly proposed Golden Dome. And we must do as a Congress and as a nation, we must do everything we can to make it successful.
▶ 1:38:50This maximum collaboration is only possible and it is currently occurring at Peterson Space Force Base where Northern Command and Space Command literally share a parking lot together. Uh we need to give the president the most capable and lethal military to meet the Chinese threat. Space Command has achieved full operational capability at Peterson.
▶ 1:39:16We cannot afford to weaken the president's hand and to risk delaying Golden Dome while our adversaries are moving at full speed. This is a matter of great national security and importance. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back. Gentlemen yields. The chair now recognizes the gentleman from New Mexico, Mr. Vasquez. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and to the witnesses for your service and your time today. Uh, General Cotton, thank you for your legacy of honorable service to our country.
▶ 1:39:44I represent New Mexico's second district, home to White Sands Missile Range, the Department of Defense's premier research development test and evaluation facility and the department's largest open air test range. I also have the privilege of representing Halman Air Force Base, home to the Halman high-speed test track, the world's longest test track of its kind. From birthing the atomic age in World War II to cutting edge testing for hypersonic weapons today, our state has been an integral part of the department's test and evaluation capabilities.
▶ 1:40:13I can confidently say that without New Mexico, our military strength would be nowhere to where it is today. General Cotton and General Guillo, over the past 80 years, the uh the department has made significant investments in New Mexico's test and evaluation infrastructure. Would you agree that those investments have paid dividends and are critical uh have paid critical returns for national security? Yes, Congressman, I would agree. And I second that. Absolutely. Thank you, General Cotton and General Guio.
▶ 1:40:44Given the unique and advanced testing capabilities that are located in my district, what would be the strategic risk to Stratcom and Northcom if those resources were diminished or lost? Congressman, the first thing that uh would concern me would be the uh lack of development and uh confidence in systems that we're trying to employ to defend the homeland.
▶ 1:41:08It would absolutely stall research and development on trying to figure out what we're going to what we're trying to do as far as uh new capabilities moving Thank you so much. Uh and for General Widing and Mr. Hill, uh beyond our invaluable testing capacity, New Mexico hosts some of the most advanced and innovative small businesses that today are leading the charge on the next generation of space technology.
▶ 1:41:31New Mexican businesses can be credited providing power for a significant portion of satellites currently deployed in space and for designing the next generation of space-based assets to ensure that we have the best strategic advantage over our adversaries for decades to come. Would you agree that the Department of Defense depends on innovations of small businesses to advance US space capabilities at the rate necessary to compete with our adversaries like China and Russia? Congressman Vasquez, we we depend on that. and more and more.
▶ 1:42:02And Congressman, I agree. I think uh US commercial space industry is one of our nation's most massive advantages, and we need to continue to to foster that innovation. Thank you. And I highlight that because of the importance of making sure that small businesses are included in our defense industrial base, I think, at much higher levels that we've seen them in the past. And so, Mr. Hill, how does the department plan to more effectively tap into the innovative ideas of small businesses like those in New Mexico?
▶ 1:42:28Congressman, I think one of the the ways that's been most uh emblematic has been through the defense uh innovation university. They they reach out with many companies uh that are doing many innovative things. That's probably the most well-known example. There are others to the acquisition system, but yes, thank you. We would like to count on you as advocates to make sure uh that those small businesses get a chance uh to both commercialize their technology and of course support our national security efforts of the modern age.
▶ 1:42:57Uh like everything in the 21st century, military and space technology is advancing exponentially. No state is better equipped to support that technological advancement than New Mexico. We're innovative and I've always said it that if we can design it and test it New Mexico, we can also build it in New Mexico. And so as we discussed today, every dollar the department spends and invests in our state pays off dividends to strengthen uh to strengthen American security.
▶ 1:43:21So I remain committed to supporting the integral work being done by our brave service members at Whit Sands Missile Range and at Hollowman Air Force Base and I implore the department to harness the full potential of New Mexico's small businesses that are working to ensure that we are the that we remain the premier military power in the world. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back. Gentlemen yields back. Chair now recognized a gentleman from North Carolina, Mr. Wilson. No, no, South Carolina. I did that just to pick up. No, but I'm going to say something nice about General Cotton. So you're right. Okay.
▶ 1:43:51But hey, um I I'd like to begin by thanking the chairman also uh thanking each of you for your service. It's so uh important and it's so important important at this time in history. And I am very grateful to represent the second congressional district of South Carolina uh which is the home of Savannah River site in the future Savannah River plutonium processing facility. Uh we're looking forward to supporting contributing to the congressionally mandated goal to produce 80 plutonium pits per year in 2030.
▶ 1:44:21And General Cotton indeed we appreciate uh your uh service uh from our sister state of North Carolina uh and your ROC background and 39 years of service. Um how meaningful that is uh to our country. Thank you for that. In your testimony, you mentioned that reestablishing a credible plutonium pit manufacturing capability remains the top stockpile priority as we look at to sustain our long-term strategic deterrence.
▶ 1:44:50With that in mind, what is your assessment of the importance of a two-sided strategy for the plutonium pit production and how does it provide for resilience to mitigate the impact of possible production outages at either Los Alamos National Laboratory or the Savannah River site. Congressman Wilson, uh first of all, thank you for for the uh compliment. Um incredibly important as you know.
▶ 1:45:16Um, so I I I look at Savannah River as being kind of the cornerstone um of pit production moving forward. Um, it's going to be the cornerstone for NNSA. Um, and we're as well as what we're seeing at the lab on their on their diamond stamp uh pit that they've uh were able to accomplish last year.
▶ 1:45:34But um being able to have two sites as opposed to one um just uh betters the opportunity for us to get to the numbers that we need and it also provides uh an ability to have uh different locations where we're not you know we're not yielding to one if something was to happen to one location and we can still produce and it I'm really grateful that I just last week was meeting with so many other site personnel and they are so enthusiastic about the progress they're making on plutonium pit.
▶ 1:46:03production and it's important to me because I'm the only member of Congress who's ever actually worked there. So, I know of the capabilities of the personnel. Additionally, the American people need to know uh why it's so important to fund nuclear modernization and recapitalization efforts to all components of the US nuclear enterprise. And so, General C, why is this so Because yeah, nuclear deterrence for us is foundational to national security.
▶ 1:46:33It's foundational to everything that every other combatant commander that would be before you in a committee would uh actually have a a conversation. Um being able to be able to continue to hold um our adversaries at risk, I think is paramount. The only way we do that is one, we sustain the legacy systems that we currently have. What's even more important is to be able to modernize the three legs of the triad to ensure that we can continue to do that in the future, especially with um two nuclear peer adversaries. And indeed uh we appreciate your success.
▶ 1:47:04Uh and General Whiting in your testimony, you mentioned that Russia's use of electromagnetic warfare systems to disrupt services to the Baltic Black and Black Sea and Mediterranean regions. Also, Russia is uh desirous of developing a capability of a nuclear weapon in orbit.
▶ 1:47:22Uh with that in mind, what we're into is a conflict we didn't choose between dictators with rule of gun invading democracy's rule of law and Russia in particular, war criminal Putin is trying so hard to recreate the failed Soviet Union. And so with that in mind, uh does the United States possess or do we currently have an ability to mitigate such threats uh as we have seen with electromagnetic warfare? Congressman, thank you for the question.
▶ 1:47:51There's been a lot of work to develop tactics, techniques, and procedures to mitigate uh those threats and and indeed we work to uh to execute those each and every day. And additionally, what what about the um potential of a nuclear weapon in orbit? It's our it's the most concerning threat we potentially face. And uh so absolutely uh Congressman uh we are looking at all options uh on the table to how to make sure that uh that such a device would not threaten our space capabilities.
▶ 1:48:19And indeed, it's so serious because Warren Putin is trying so hard uh to recreate his uh nuclear, excuse me, Soviet uh uh union back again. Uh as we see the invasion of Ukraine, as we see fixing the elections in Georgia, the legitimate election, President Salom Zili, sadly uh the uh Putin rigged that election. And so over and over again, we see the threat. And so, thank you for what you're doing. I yield back.
▶ 1:48:49gentleman yields back. The chair now recognizes the gentleman from California, Mr. Whitides. Thank you, Mr. Chair. And uh thank you uh generals for being here today. General Cotton, I'm glad to have you here for many reasons. Um but not least because it gives me a bit of an opportunity to brag about my district. Uh as you probably know, I'm extremely proud to represent Plant 42 in Palmdale, California, home of the P21 Raider. in something that is perhaps rare for some DoD programs uh and their development.
▶ 1:49:18The Raider program is currently meeting expected cost, schedule, and performance criteria. That puts me in the welcome position to credibly argue that we could actually move faster and save money on the program without sacrificing quality or lethality by potentially investing at the front end uh in an increased production capacity. Sir, can you describe the ways in which the ability to move more quickly produce to more quickly produce the necessary 100 aircraft and potentially more as you state in the fleet could act as an effective deterrent to our adversaries?
▶ 1:49:49Sir, thank you for that question because you're absolutely right. Plant 42 is building the world's only sixth generation aircraft at this moment and um and u and the things that North of Grumman is doing with that aircraft is uh absolutely remarkable. Um so to your point and how I have stated to be able to have more than 100 um in the fleet um is is my desire. Um moving that to the left to increase increase production rates um as a combatant commander is is is only goodness for me. Yeah.
▶ 1:50:20Thank you, sir. General Guio, it's uh good to see you again. Uh I've really appreciated your cander with me and the committee this uh with me and the committee. Last week, we discussed the necessity of a layered approach for domain awareness. Combining robust Earth, air, and space-based sensing capabilities, and I couldn't agree with you more on this point. Robust and comprehensive domain awareness is absolutely critical if we're going to maintain projection force capabilities, lethality, and cover our war fighters backs.
▶ 1:50:46Sir, could you discuss why that layered approach is essential to the national security of our nation, and what do we gain by tackling that program uh or that problem first? Congressman, I think the Thank you. And I think the uh domain what I call the uh domain awareness dome uh is the most important because uh no matter how capable our interceptors or defeat mechanisms are, they can't defeat what they can't see.
▶ 1:51:12And so they have to have a domain awareness layer that detects, tracks, cues, and feeds the defeat systems. And that uh domain awareness layer is is uh um a a dome is a series of layers starting with the undersea uh with undersea uh detection to ensure that we can detect uh submarines that are becoming more and more quiet each day uh as they approach our continent.
▶ 1:51:38uh to a landbased layer with probably over the horizon radars to give us long deep looks, an air layer with aircraft like the E7 uh that can take uh uh targets like a cruise missile and feed that information directly to a fighter or a defeat mechanism and then into space with uh space-based AMTI, for example, uh the HBTSS that we previously discussed as well as the warning systems.
▶ 1:52:04All of those need to feed the uh defeat mechanisms to defeat ICBMs, cruise missiles, and aircraft. Thank you, sir. Um and uh General Whiting. Um I don't have too much time, but uh last week it was reported publicly that the three Russian Cosmos satellites launched earlier this year released an object into orbit. In March, it looked like satellites were conducting proximity or uh operations. Um we have a bunch of different uh things going on and the PRC is doing stuff as well.
▶ 1:52:33Um, can you discuss in brief as much as you're able to in this setting the threats posed by our adversaries space capabilities to our space domain awareness and the ways in which the department can better leverage commercial capabilities to overcome overcome that threat? Yeah, thank you for the question, Congressman. We continue to see Russia invest in their counterpace capabilities despite the challenges that they've had in Ukraine. and uh you identified some on orbit testing that that we have found problematic and that we're um you know making sure that we understand as carefully as possible.
▶ 1:53:03We do think commercial space domain awareness data is a key part of us understanding um what is happening on orbit and through a through a initiative we have called the joint commercial office we take data from 17 different companies and uh and fuse that in a way that we can uh tip and queue even our government systems to help understand those uh unique events and circumstances that are happening on orbit. So we think those commercial uh systems are vital for us sir. Thank you. Uh Mr. Chairman I yield back.
▶ 1:53:33gentleman yields back. The chair now recognized the gentleman from Wisconsin, Mr. Van Orton. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Um, I would like to uh recognize the e dogs in the back there. So, thanks for coming out. You, you and you, Sepri, and aim high, I think. What What your aim high? What do you guys do? What? Okay, we'll do that. Thanks for coming. Appreciate it. Um, hey, so we have to um a couple things.
▶ 1:54:00We got to we got to use we got to use knowledge here, right, about stuff to make these very critically important decisions. I'm going to read my headline to you. Senate Dems RIP Space Force. No Republican is willing to tell Trump it's a dumb idea. Democrats file bill to abolish flagrantly wasteful Trumpformed Space Force. Now, sir, I don't think you're wasteful. I don't think you're dumb.
▶ 1:54:26I think you are the cutting edge of defense and we've clearly identified that your service and the fact that President Donald J. Trump established it and was openly mocked by the Democrats in the House and the Senate needs to be remembered by people in the House and the Senate and people wearing uniforms because I've found that when people make such incredibly grievous errors, maybe we shouldn't weigh their opinions as high as others.
▶ 1:54:51I'm just saying that that Star Wars program that that shut down the Soviet Union, right? And it didn't work. We didn't have the technologies to do it. Didn't work. And so this can work. I've been to Israel several times and they have the Iron Dome and I think it's incredibly important that we work for the Golden Dome. And I I don't share some of my colleagues concerned that this will start a nuclear war.
▶ 1:55:18I think that will will prevent it and it'll also help bring down as my friend Mr. Wilson um calls the war criminal Vladimir Putin and he's absolutely right. Uh I would like to say one thing. So being in Israel they have these these Iron Dome batteries all over the place. Um at one point if you remove the Golden Heights, Israel is like 8 miles across the entire country. Obviously the continental United States is much bigger. So I would like to tell you right now when you're working on this golden dome and I trust that you will.
▶ 1:55:48I have Vulfield and I also have Fort McCoy in the state of Wisconsin. And if we're going to be talking about putting these batteries, which are going to have to be around the country, I would like to encourage you to come look at that. Voltfield is amazing, as is Fort McCoy. So, I'm I'm offering probably should asked them first, but if we're going to put these around, I'd like them there. Okay. Um, what in your opinion, sir, uh, General Cotton, is the most effective uh, leg of the nuclear triad? All three.
▶ 1:56:18Which one has the greatest potential to get um warheads on foreheads without being detected? Well, it would that would be either the um SLBM leg or the ICBM leg. Okay. Not the air leg. Correct. And so the the Ohio class is supposed to be um replaced by the Columbia class. Correct. That is correct. All right. So that's what I'm talking about.
▶ 1:56:46That is the most stealthy uh leg of the nuclear triad and I think has the greatest chance of survivability of a first strike against us and then a retaliatory strike which is how this should go down. I don't think we should be doing preemptive nuclear strikes. So what is the status of our Ohio fleet and the the Colombia is replaced? Where are we at?
▶ 1:57:08So right now we we have 14 uh SSBN's Ohio class boats uh still uh in that are Um we're about 16 months delayed on the Colombia class. Okay.
▶ 1:57:21Uh so right now what the Navy owes me is a project in which um they will take what is known as PYRA and and and that is an acronym um that basically what we're really talking about is how do you um do a SLEP or a life extension program on the five, you know, best holes to extend out to cover down the the shortfalls of high income. Offer you or your replacement by the way. Thank you for your service. have fun retiring.
▶ 1:57:51It's going to take you two years to figure out you're retired. It took me that long. Um I'd like like to offer you my letter head and my loud mouth to talk to the Navy if they're not getting those responses back to you immediately because this is critical. And then what is the status of the AUS agreement right now? Well, I'm I'm not part of the the AUS agreement though. Sir, well so that that is providing some nuclear submarines to Australia, right? We're pairing with UK and Australia. So it it's in the same realm. It is.
▶ 1:58:21It's true, but it's not SSBN. Those are SSNs Virginia class. So that might be more relevant for Mr. Hill to answer that. Okay. So Mr. Hill, my time is expired here and I will get you after about that because these are critical uh critically important weapon systems. So thank you very much, gentlemen. I yield back, Mr. Chairman. Gentleman yields back. The chair now recognizes Mr. Bell from Missouri. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and ranking member. Hello to the witnesses. Thank you for being here.
▶ 1:58:47Uh, General Whiting, uh, low Earth orbit hosts thousands of satellites, offering benefits like reduced costs and easier access. However, the growing congestion and space debris in low Earth orbit increased the risk of satellite collisions. Additionally, the competition between the United States, Russia, and China exacerbates these problems.
▶ 1:59:11Can you outline the steps space command is taking to protect critical infrastructure and address these challenges? Yeah, Congressman, thank you for the question. We think this issue is so significant that each and every day we have a space force unit that's assigned to US space command that looks at all active satellites from all countries and we run predictions to see if we think it's going to run into any pieces of debris, any of those satellites. And if we see that that is a potential, we notify the owners of those satellites.
▶ 1:59:40that includes satellites from Russia or China because we don't want any satellite to hit a piece of debris and create more debris. So, we think it's vital that all countries act responsibly in space uh not to generate additional debris. In your testimony, you specifically mentioned examples of China's use of international partnerships and advanced projects to challenge US leadership in space.
▶ 2:00:03Given recent concerns from our allies about a perceived retreat of US global leadership under the current administration, what additional steps can the US take internationally to counter China's expanding influence in Congressman, thank you for the question. On the military side, I think we we will continue to build um enduring relationships with our closest partners in space.
▶ 2:00:28Yesterday at a space conference, I announced that our operation Olympic defender, which is our named operation in space, that includes six other countries, that we've achieved initial operational capability, and we will continue to look for those opportunities to uh to bring uh other allies closer to us as they develop uh additional space capabilities. Okay. and General Cotton. Um, thank you again for your service. It was great meeting your team. Um, I don't think Rep.
▶ 2:00:55Garen is moving on that gift, so maybe a tie or something you could settle for. Uh, but in your testimony, sir, you mentioned the importance of US allies and partners being a critical component of deterrence, providing an advantage that our adversaries cannot match.
▶ 2:01:13Given that our biggest adversaries, Russia, China, Iran, and North Korea have formed closer, more integrated relationships, what more can Stratcom do to enhance combined forced interoperability and promote US global presence? Congressman, thank you for the question. So, you know, we're doing it right now. We have bomber task forces right now that are that are showing assurance and and extended deterrence missions.
▶ 2:01:40um bringing together our allies and partners that actually befuddle the the you know the Russian Federation as well as um as the CCP. So I I think continuing those relations are are incredibly uh healthy for us.
▶ 2:01:54Um there's opportunities for us um to continue to have collaboration in joint exercises uh from a Stratcom perspective um that I think really does still um show the the commitment to um assurance and extended Uh General Guo, sir, uh can you expand on the threats posed by Iran in the cyber domain?
▶ 2:02:22Congressman, um, at this time, uh, North America, the United States, uh, is threatened in all domains, from all avenue of approach. So, the air domain, the the the sea, the land. Uh, but the most present and persistent threat that we face every day is from the in the cyber domain where we have thousands upon thousands of attacks or attempted attacks on our networks uh, across the entire department of defense.
▶ 2:02:51uh Iran is a big part of that. They have uh significant presence in in uh cyber warfare and I'm very grateful that uh through cyber command and other efforts in the inter agency uh FBI DOJ have some great capabilities as well that keep them out of our networks.
▶ 2:03:10And additionally, given that many of their terror prox terrorist proxies have been significantly weakened in the past year and a half, do they possess similar capabilities that might impact our cyber Well, I I I think they have capability to uh threaten our cyber security and it requires the utmost vigilance by all members. Thank you. I yield my time. Gentlemen yields. The chair now recognizes a gentleman from Indiana, Mr. from Esmer.
▶ 2:03:40Uh, thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I'd like to thank all the witnesses for your service and for being here today. Uh, General Cotton, it's good to see you again. It was nice to to meet with you yesterday. Um, I appreciate your support that you mentioned earlier about support of the Slick Amend program. How how are you approaching the various design options to meet Stratcom requirements requirements specifically with respect to survivability versus time to field?
▶ 2:04:08Congressman, thank you for um the the question and it was great uh talking with you yesterday. I think part of that is some of the work that that we're actually seeing in your state um and the work that's being done when it comes to slick amend and the work that's being done by crane for example is a is a good example of that. Um as far as uh being able to outline and continue to to flush out um ttps uh for the department of navy is going to be incredibly important.
▶ 2:04:34I think that's part some part of the shortfalls that we've been facing so far in regards to having something move forward that's a little more than program of record. Um so that's what we're that's what we're tackling this year um for my last year here is to make sure that we can get those um moving along um as I mentioned to you yesterday. I really want to see that um accelerate and and and not you know languish to the right. Do do you think the Navyy's moving fast enough to implement that program? I would always love to see them move faster. Okay.
▶ 2:05:04Thank you. Also, I uh General Cotton, I wanted to follow up on our conversation about convent conventional prompt strike CPS. This program is currently planned to be deployed on the Zoom Walt destroyer and V Virginia submarines. Given the rapidly deteriorating security environment we face, do you think we can afford any delays to CPS deployment on a Navy platform? Absolutely not. Okay. If the Navy were to decide not to deploy CPS on on Zumalt, how important would it be to get to get it deployed as quickly as possible on a Virginia class sub?
▶ 2:05:34It would be incredibly important. Okay. Uh also, General Cotton, in my district, Crane Naval Surface Warfare Center is the largest Navy installation in the world or in the country, third largest in the world and a leader in hypersonics in order to combat our adversaries, specifically China, who has a functional hypersonic vehicle. How important is the investment, production, and eventually delivery to the war fighter of a hypersonic weapon? I think it's incredibly important. It can complement uh the weapon systems that we currently have. Okay. Thank you.
▶ 2:06:04Um as a followup with with hypersonics, Crane, Crane is also a leader in micro micro electronic testing. Can you speak to the importance of micro micro electronic testing capabilities and how they're a key to enabling technology for missile defense, nuclear modernization, and space missions? Well, Crane, as you know, sir, are doing incredible work for us and um and and my Navy component at this very moment when it comes to micro components.
▶ 2:06:28So, as we see the modernization, to be frank, of all three legs of the triad, um they're they're be they're key to doing that work. Thank you. Uh General Whiting, as a follow-up to the Golden Dome for America executive order, how how important is it for the DoD to expand the number of space interceptors in our arsenal to effectively to effectively implement this executive order? Uh thank you, Congressman.
▶ 2:06:50For a global dome or golden dome to truly be global, um and if you're going to be able to hold at risk missiles in the boost phase and midcourse, uh you're really going to have to have space-based interceptor capability to do that on the timelines that'll be necessary. So, we think it's an important part of the layered approach of the Golden Dome. Okay. Thank you. Uh that's all my questions. I yield back my time. Gentleman yields back. Thank you all for your testimony in the open session. We'll now move upstairs for the close session. Uh the hearing is