▶ 0:22:30order. Without objection, sharers authorized to declare recess at any time. I apologize to everyone for starting uh a little over an hour late. Uh we had votes that kind of took up more time than we thought. We welcome everyone to today's hearing on the rising threat of malicious drone use in America. And I now recognize gentleman from Texas, Mr. Nells to lead us in the pledge of allegiance.
▶ 0:22:50If you please stand and join me in honoring our nation's flagg to the flag of the United States of America and to the republic for it stands one nation under God indivisible with liberty and justice for all.
▶ 0:23:08Thank you.
▶ 0:23:15I now recognize myself for an opening statement. I appreciate everyone being here today. In this hearing we have before us, we're focusing on unmanned aerial systems and how these systems are being exploited by criminal elements. This issue is no longer confined to science fiction or battlefield environments. It's now increasingly disrupting daily life in America. Over the past several years, UAS technology has rapidly advanced, becoming more affordable, more accessible, and more capable.
▶ 0:23:44While this has fueled innovation in commerce, public safety, and emergency response, it has also led to opportunities for abuse by criminals and adversaries alike. The threats we face today from drones are not theoretical. They're real, and they demand urgent attention. Between January and June of this year, the FAA recorded more than 1,000 UAS incursions near US airports, a nearly 13% increase from the same period last year.
▶ 0:24:09Each of these incidents represents not just a violation of restricted airspace, but a potential catastrophe for passenger safety. Despite some progress, like remote ID, our response architecture is fragmented. Remote ID helps with accountability, but it does not yet integrate into real-time air traffic management or provide automatic alerts to airport security. Additionally, most of our airports lack dedicated counter UAS systems. Legal restrictions further complicate matters limiting who can respond in real time.
▶ 0:24:39The problem does not end with aviation safety. Criminal networks are adapting UAS technology for nefarious purposes. Dropping contraband into prisons, smuggling drugs and weapons across the US Mexican border, surveilling law enforcement, and in some cases experimenting with weaponization. Correctional facilities are continuing to face surging drone drops of drugs, phones, and weapons.
▶ 0:25:03The stealth speed and GPS guided precision of modern drones make it difficult for correctional officers to detect or intercept them without specialized training or technology. These drops enable organized criminal activity within prison walls, disrupt inmate discipline, and threaten the safety of staff and inmates alike.
▶ 0:25:21US Northern Command leadership reported that over 1,000 drones cross into US airspace from the Mexican border each month with CBP agents noting that in Texas along the Rio Grand Valley alone, over 10,000 drone incursions and 25,000 drone sightings occurred in 2024. Unlike conventional smuggling methods, drones offer cartels a cost-effective and low-risk means to deliver small payloads while avoiding direct encounters with US law enforcement.
▶ 0:25:51CBP and DoD recently recorded 70 incursions in 11 days around around Laredo, prompting the deployment of striker units to bolster surveillance. Equipped with features like night vision and the ability to operate below radar thresholds, these drones present a stealthy and persistent challenge to border security. Despite this growing threat, CBP lacks the authority to disable or intercept UAS in most circumstances, limiting its ability to respond effectively in real time.
▶ 0:26:18National special security events, NSSE such as presidential inaugurations, political conventions, high-profile sporting events, are increasingly vulnerable to drone based threats due to their symbolic value, dense crowds, and media visibility. While federal agencies like the US Secret Service, FBI, and DHS are authorized to deploy counter US capabilities at national special security events under the Preventing Emergency Threats Act of 2018.
▶ 0:26:47These efforts are intense and confined to a limited number of events each year. DOJ officials testified that in that counter UAS protections are typically planned months in advance and require substantial coordination with the FAA to ensure legitimate airspace operations are not inadvertently affected. As a result, thousands of public events that fall outside the NSSE designation like NUS mitigation coverage even as drone incidents rise nationally.
▶ 0:27:16The expanding use of drones in public spaces also introduces new risk for first responders in active shooter protest or hazardous material scenarios. The presence of unauthorized drones can obstruct airspace, delay delay medevac or surveillance operations and even be used to track responder positions or deliver harmful payloads. Many of these tools are restricted under federal law and cannot be used by state or local entities without explicit authorization.
▶ 0:27:43Additionally, these systems must be miniaturaturized, cost-effective, and interoperable with existing emergency response infrastructure to be viable at scale. The dominance of Chinese manufacturers, particularly DJI, in the global drone market raises significant espionage concerns.
▶ 0:28:01Under Chinese law, companies are legally obligated to cooperate with Chinese national intelligence authorities, which amplifies the risk that drones supplied by these firms can transmit sensitive data back to foreign As of today, DJI holds nearly 90% of the consumer drone market and approximately 75% in commercial sectors.
▶ 0:28:24Multiple policy reviews and commentaries warned that adversarial actors may exploit these supply chain vulnerabilities to gather intelligence on US critical infrastructure, military bases, research facilities, and emergency operations. The threat is persistent and accelerating, and it will take a coordinated alignment of resources, technology, and authorities to contain This hearing serves an important step to confront and combat malicious drone use across the country and beyond.
▶ 0:28:53I look forward to hearing what our witnesses say and a lively discussion. And now without objection, I want to enter into the record an article entitled increasing drone incidents near US airports stadiums prompt alarm officials say and drones lifting inmates out of prisons. UK inspector says it's a theoretical possibility. Without objection. And now I yield back and recognize the ranking member of the entire committee, Mr. Raskin for his opening statement.
▶ 0:29:24Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, for holding this hearing on the rising threat posed by unmanned aircraft systems, commonly known as drones. The FAA reports that over a million drones are now registered in the US for a broad range of commercial and recreational purposes. Government agencies also use them to improve diverse public safety operations, including search and rescue, disaster response, crime scene investigation, even traffic enforcement.
▶ 0:29:49But like any technology, including AI enabled technology, which the subcommittee uh discussed earlier in the summer, drones can also be used for unlawful purposes like delivering contraband to inmates in prison or fingel across the northern and southern borders of our country.
▶ 0:30:092023 in my home state in Maryland, 15 people were indicted as part of a criminal network that used drones to smuggle fentanyl and other drugs, cell phones, tools, and other contraband into the Roxbury Correctional Institution in Hagerstown. I'm sure that many of my colleagues have similar stories from their own states.
▶ 0:30:29The DOJ is one of five federal agencies with drone detection and mitigation authority, which allows the department to detect, track, and even destroy drones that pose a credible threat to federal courouses, prisons, and large gatherings. The FBI and the Federal Bureau of Prisons are also able to utilize some counter drone detection systems.
▶ 0:30:48In fact, earlier this year, BOP reported the agency has deployed such systems at 64 facilities which have helped detect malicious drone use, better inform law enforcement of incoming threats, and locate suspected criminal drone operators.
▶ 0:31:04Today, as we discuss law enforcement efforts to respond to malicious drone activity and the use of drones to enhance public safety, we must be mindful of the risks associated with the detection and mitigation of drones, as well as the need to respect the privacy interests and civil liberties of the public. In the process, we must make sure that law enforcement uses both drone and counter drone technology correctly, safely, and always within the bounds of the law.
▶ 0:31:30That's why I was pleased to join the chairs and ranking members of the transportation infrastructure committee and the homeland security committee to introduce HR5061 the counter UAS authority security safety and reauthorization act.
▶ 0:31:43The bill, which was reported favorably by the Transportation Infrastructure Committee by a remarkable vote of 60 to zero, would reauthorize, reform, and expand the existing counter unmanned aircraft system or counter UAS authorities of the Homeland Security Department and the DOJ. Among other provisions, the bipartisan bill would for the first time expand these authorities to state and local law enforcement through a carefully calibrated pilot program.
▶ 0:32:12The bill would also establish training standards for these agencies to meet before they can operate counter UAS systems and minimum performance requirements for counter UAS technology before it can be deployed, ensuring these systems are used safely and solely within the structures of the law. I trust today's hearing will convince my colleagues of the need to support this bill and that we will see swift unanimous pass passage of it. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thanks to all of our witnesses for being here. I look forward to hearing from you and I yield back.
▶ 0:32:40The gentleman yields. Thank you. Without objection, all other opening statements will be included in the record. And now we will introduce today's witnesses. We will begin with Dr. Katherine Cahill. Dr. Cahill is the director of the Alaska Center for Unmanned Aircraft Systems Integration, ACUASI, and the Geophysical Institute at the University of Alaska Fairbanks.
▶ 0:33:02ACUASI leads one of the seven FAA UAS test sites, heads the FAA's Alaska Beyond site, and is a core university in the FAA center of excellence for UAS research. Dr. Cahill has served as a member of the FAA's drone advisory committee and advanced aviation advisory committee. Thank you for being with us today, Dr. Cahill. Dr. Ryan Wallace is a professor at Emery Riddle Aeronautical University. His research focuses on UAS safety, security, human factors, and public policy.
▶ 0:33:32Dr. Wallace has conducted training seminars for federal agencies on the topics of UAS safety, operations, and counter USA techniques. He also serves as a representative on the FAA's drone safety team and served in the US Air Force. Thank you for being with us, Dr. Wallace. Mr. Brett Federson is the vice president for strategy and government affairs at Defend Solutions, a manufacturer of counter drone systems for the military, law enforcement, and others.
▶ 0:33:58He also serves as the chair of the security industry association's drone security subcommittee. He previously served as the executive director for national security programs and incident response of the FAA and in various roles at the Pentagon, the White House, in the US Army, and as a Pennsylvania state trooper. Thank you, Mr. Federson for being with us today. And next is Sergeant Robert Douly.
▶ 0:34:23Doc Sergeant Douly has served for more than 22 years with the Florida Highway Patrol where he is currently the UAS and CUAS program coordinator. He developed and has led the FHP's UAS program since its inception. Sergeant Douly is an expert in law enforcement UAS operations, disaster response operations, and special event and highv value target UAS security operations. Thank you all for being with us today.
▶ 0:34:51Uh we will begin by swearing you in and ask that you would each rise and raise your right hand. Do you swear or affirm under penalty of perjury that the testimony you're about to give is true and correct to the best of your knowledge, information, and belief? So, help you God. Uh the the record will reflect the witnesses have each answered in the affirmative. Thank you. Please be seated.
▶ 0:35:17You each of you should know that your written testimony will be entered into the record in its entirety. Accordingly, we ask that you summarize your testimony in five minutes. And we're going to begin today with Sergeant Douly. So, you're recognized for your five minutes. And I'll just tell you, um, you should see a clock in front of you. And when you're about 10 seconds before you hit five, I will start tapping like this. And then, um, that means please wrap it up.
▶ 0:35:47And uh we'll try to be a little bit lenient because uh we appreciate you being here, but we would ask you to stay for five minutes because we all have your testimony. We've all read your testimony. So, Sergeant Julie, you're
▶ 0:36:01Thank you and good afternoon. Again, I'm Sergeant Robert Douly, Florida patrol. I'm our statewide coordinator for our unmanned operations. uh the critical importance of drone detection and mitigation for public safety. As unmanned aircraft systems continue to proliferate across recreational, commercial, and malicious domains, the ability of public safety agencies to detect and mitigate unauthorized or threatening drones has become a national imperative.
▶ 0:36:24This statement outlines the growing threat landscape associated with drones, discuss the current challenges in detection and mitigation, and advocates for urgent integration of counter UAS capabilities within a broader uh spectrum of public safety The rapid evolution and accessibility of drone technology have transformed industries and revolutionized emergency response and public safety operations. However, with this growth comes an increasing threat of misuse, whether intentional or negligent.
▶ 0:36:52From contraband drops over prison yards to surveillance of critical infrastructure and interruptions of emergency scenes, public safety agencies now faced a complex airspace risk. The ability to detect, track, identify, and when necessary, mitigate rogue drones is essential for protecting lives, preserving critical infrastructure, and ensuring operational integrity. Drones present a unique set of challenges to public safety. Um, as you spoke earlier, criminal exploitation.
▶ 0:37:17Criminal organizations increasingly use drones to smuggle drugs, weapons, and contraband into correctional facilities or across the borders. uh terrorist use, adversarial, state, and non-state actors have experimented with drones for surveillance and weaponization, creating lowcost and low detection threat vectors. Privacy violations and harassment. Drones can be used to stalk, harass, or violate privacy of civilians and law enforcement officers, often in ways that are uh difficult to detect and um interference with public safety operations.
▶ 0:37:46Unauthorized drones flying near traffic crashes, fire scenes, disaster zones can impede emergency response, creating hazardous conditions for both responders and civilians. The need for detection and mitigation capabilities. Public safety agencies must be able to detect, identify, and if authorized, mitigate UAS threats in real time. Without this capability, agencies operate blindly in shared airspace, increasing risk to both responders and the public. The key benefits of these capabilities include situational awareness.
▶ 0:38:14Drone detection systems enhance airspace awareness, allowing agencies to monitor aerial activity near sensitive locations or active scenes. Threat identification, identifying type, intent, and operator of drone is essential for appropriate response and legal action. Incident mitigation in critical scenarios. Stopping or redirecting a drone may be necessary to prevent harm or disruption, especially during mass gatherings, dignitary protection, or major disasters. Current limitations and legal barriers.
▶ 0:38:42Despite the urgent need, most state, local, tribal, and territorial public safety agencies lack the legal authority to mitigate and often face limitations even detecting them. Only federal agencies currently possess this broad CUAS authority under 6 USC 124N, leaving a gap in homeland security at the local level. Additionally, technology access. Uh, CUAS systems are costly, complex, and often limited to military or federal use. Inter agency coordination.
▶ 0:39:11There's a lack of real-time data sharing and standard operating procedures that could hindif uh hinder unified responses and policy gaps. Existing federal laws, including the FAA's preeemption of airspace regulation, complicate the roles and responsibility of our SLT agencies. Um, legislative reform is needed. granted limited controlled UAS authority to vet vetted and trained public safety entities under federal oversight as proposed in several legislative efforts.
▶ 0:39:40Uh training and standardization create a standardized CUS training and certification programs ensuring safety, accountability, and legal compliance. Technology deployment fund and deploy scalable non-kinetic drone detection systems to local agencies, particularly those uh responsible for critical infrastructure and mass events. Public and private collaboration encourage partnerships between technology providers, law enforcement, and federal agencies to pilot CUS tools under lawful frameworks and community engagement.
▶ 0:40:11Educate the public on the responsible use of drones and build awareness of the risks associated with unauthorized operations. The ability to detect, mitigate uh rogue drones is no longer a futuristic concept. It's a present- day necessity. Public safety professionals stand on the front lines of both natural mid-made crisis and lack a CUAS capability which leaves a critical vulnerable uh a vulnerability in our national preparedness.
▶ 0:40:36With federal agencies uh play a vital role empowering state local responders with tools, training and authority to protect their communities from aerial threats is the next essential step in securing the homeland. And I thank you and I wait your
▶ 0:40:49Thank you Sergeant Douly. Chair now recognizes Mr. Federson for his five minutes. Mr. Mr. Federson, please.
▶ 0:40:55Good afternoon, Chairman Biggs, Ranking Member Raskin, distinguished members of the subcommittee. Thank you for the honor appearing before you today. My name is Brett Federson. I am the vice president of strategy and government affairs at Defense Solutions, a leading counter drone manufacturer. Also serve as the chair of the security industry association's drone security subcommittee, a group compromised of leading providers and endusers of counter drone technologies available in the world.
▶ 0:41:22I commend the subcommittee for its proactive focus on the threat that has quickly gone from a distant concern to clear and present danger to our national security, to our critical infrastructure, and to our public safety. The illegal use of drones has evolved from simple nuisance akin trespassing to sophisticated criminal malicious activity. The accessible affordability and adaptability of this technology have given us new capabilities most often used for good.
▶ 0:41:50However, they alo they also have created significant vulnerabilities that we as a nation are not yet prepared to face. We can categorize these threats into three primary domains. First is criminal and illicit activities. The use of drones by criminal and terrorist organizations is no longer a hypothetical scenario. Incidents of drones being used to deliver contraband like drugs and weapons into correctional facilities are a daily occurrence across America.
▶ 0:42:17The weaponization of drones has been occurring for United in the United States for years. The internet has brought battlefield tactics to North America through shared lessons learned in conflicts in Europe and the Middle East. We continue to see rival cartels repeatedly conduct indiscriminate carpet bombing attacks against other other cartels using explosive explosive legging drones. In 2021, the Haliscoco New Generation Cartel created a dedicated unit of drone operators to attack rival groups in Mexico.
▶ 0:42:48Today, Mexican cartels are reportedly using one-way attack drones alongside the more traditional explosive carrying And last year, US federal authorities detected approximately 60,000 cartel drones near the border. The second category is physical and cyber attacks on critical infrastructure. The potential for drone attacks and critical infrastructure is alarming.
▶ 0:43:12A drone with a small payload could cause widespread disruption and economic turmoil by damaging power stations, water treatment plants, communication towers, or data centers. US critical infrastructure is not often protect is often protected by trained security professionals, not law enforcement.
▶ 0:43:30Any assumption that state and local law enforcement could fill the private security gap is a gross underestimation of reality of police The third category is surveillance and Drones offer a lowcost, low-risk platform for persistent surveillance. They can be equipped with sophisticated cameras and sensors to gather intelligence from a distance without the need of physical access. Drones can bypass traditional security perimeters, making them favored to a favored tool for illicit trade.
▶ 0:44:01Domestically, drones are being used to stalk, harass, and spy on people in their own homes. This invasion of privacy goes unchecked as police watch the drones fly away without leaving a physical footprint for them to follow. Our current legal techn and technological frameworks have not kept pace with these clear and growing dangers. The authority to detect and mitigate malicious drones is fragmented across the federal agencies creating confusions and gaps in response.
▶ 0:44:28While safe and effective counter drone technology exists today, it is its use is severely restricted by current laws. To address these challenges, I respectfully offer the following recommendations to the subcommittee for A comprehensive federal counter drone legislation. We need clear and cohesive framework of nationwide counter drone operations. Year after year, Congress continues to introduce introduce counter drone legislation, but never passes it.
▶ 0:44:58This legislation should immediately expand the legal authorities to detect, track, and identify drone threats to all federal agencies, state, local, tribal, and territorial law enforcement, and trained security professionals protecting our critical infrastructure.
▶ 0:45:12This leg legislation should also expand the existing 2018 federal pilot program for the mitigation of drone threats to those same federal, state, and local entities and trained security This pilot program must be must be launched in a robust manner to enable the rapid scaling of capabilities ahead of the World Cup, America's 250th anniversary celebration, next year's elections, and the 2028 Olympics.
▶ 0:45:41If these authorities are not granted by Congress quickly, then these math ga mass gatherings will go unprotected and will require federal resources to be diverted from the border and other critical national infrastructure In conclusion, the threat from malicious drones uses in real, immediate, and growing. We must take decisive action now. I thank you for your time. Look forward to your questions.
▶ 0:46:06Thank you, Mr. Federson. Chair now recognizes Dr. Wallace for his five minutes. Dr. Wallace.
▶ 0:46:12Chairman Biggs, Ranking Member Raskin, and other distinguished committee members. Thank you for the opportunity to testify on the important issue of protecting our nation from the misuse of unmanned aircraft systems, sometimes referred to as UAS or more colloquially as drones. My name is Ryan Wallace and I currently serve as a professor at Embry Riddle Aeronautical University. And for the past 10 years, my research has focused primarily on UAS safety and security threats through the use of UAS detection equipment.
▶ 0:46:39The misuse of unmanned aircraft is not fundamentally a technology problem, but rather a people problem. What makes this problem particularly challenging is the unique aerial capabilities that UAS provide to their operators. Capabilities previously limited only to those with the resources and training to operate manned aircraft. The accessibility, affordability, and automation have now placed these capabilities within the reach of anyone with a few hundred dollars. This creates a disproportionate force multiplier for bad actors.
▶ 0:47:09The destructive potential of consumer drones recently came to global attention in Ukraine during the famed operation spiders web where small drones were used to conduct rapid, surprising, accurate, and devastating attacks. These attacks were executed with near impunity, highlighting the critical vulnerability gap posed by UAS threats. The remote nature of these attacks left no one to arrest or hold accountable. Today, these tactics and technology are being employed both domestically and near our borders.
▶ 0:47:36The FA estimates there are currently more than 2.8 million drones in the United States, nearly double the number of drones than in 2018 than when the Preventing Emerging Threats Act was signed into law. Today, UAS outnumber manned aircraft by nearly 13 to1. The agency estimates that within 5 years, this number will grow a further 10%. Presently, drones are causing three major domestic problems. One, creating a collision risk with aircraft operating in the national airspace system.
▶ 0:48:03Two, contraband delivery into prisons and correctional institutions. And three, incursions along our borders. The potential consequences of a mid-air collision with a drone erode the safety of our skies. As the record uh as of the second quarter of 2025, the FAA recorded a total of 1,022 sightings, approximately 170 per month, with air crew reportedly taking evasive action in 2.8% of those cases.
▶ 0:48:28In January this year, a Canada Air CL415 conducting suppression operations struck a small drone operating at low altitude within a temporary flight restricted zone near the Palisades fire. Air operations were suspended, allowing that fire to expand unabated, further enhancing the destruction and risk to response personnel.
▶ 0:48:47According to Michael Torphy, the FBI and Christopher Hardy at the Department of Justice, drone activity has proliferated to more than half of the Bureau of Prison Federal Facilities with incidents climbing to more than 479 in 2024, nearly 20 times the number since the agency started tracking in 2018.
▶ 0:49:05Similarly, Steven Willoughby from the Department of Homeland Security highlighted the extent of the poorest UAS activity along the US border, stating, "In the last 6 months of 2024, more than 27,000 drones were detected within 500 meters of the southern border. To effectively address these challenges, I offer several observations. Foremost, that all drone incidents are local incidents first.
▶ 0:49:27Often, first responders to these incidents will be sworn officers from one of the nation's nearly 18,000 state and local law enforcement agencies. Most of these agencies lack formal training for dealing with drone incidents, and even fewer are equipped with tools to support the detection, tracking, and identification of UAS. Currently, no state or local law enforcement agencies are equipped and authorized to forcibly take down a UAS threat without the compliance of the operator who may be positioned miles away from the aerial vehicle.
▶ 0:49:57Testimony by Michael Torphy from the FBI underscored resource limitations in providing counter UAS protection, highlighting the agency was only able to cover .005% of the more than 240,000 special events eligible for counter UAS protection. Ultimately, the widespread immediate need for counter UAS protection should be a part of the calculus used to determine future authorities. Training is a vital element in protecting our public safety personnel to respond effectively to drone incidents.
▶ 0:50:27Foremost, it is essential to ensure both UAS detection and mitigation efforts do not create or exacerbate hazards within the national airspace system through spectrum interference with navigation or communications infrastructure or impede air traffic management functions. Training is also necessary to educate officers on how to effectively respond, investigate, document, and charge these incidents in a manner that leads to successful prosecutions.
▶ 0:50:51Moreover, such training ensures reinforcement of appropriate procedures designed to protect the rights, expression, privacy, and other civil liberties. There is no magic bullet technological solutions to this problem. Each type of technology has its own inherent capabilities and limitations. Finally, I would like to highlight the vital importance of continued research and development.
▶ 0:51:12Research consortiums like the Alliance for System Safety of UAS through research excellence assure and its accompanying trading arm are experienced, equipped, and ready to address these challenges affecting the national airspace system.
▶ 0:51:25Thank you, Dr. Wallace. And now the chair recognizes Dr. Cahill for her five-minute opening statement.
▶ 0:51:30Thank you. Um, Chairman Biggs, Ranking Member Rascin, Ranking Member McBth, and esteemed members of the Subcommittee on Crime and Federal Government Surveillance. My name is Kathy Cahill, and I am the director of Aquazi, the Alaska Center for Unmanned Aircraft Systems Integration. Aquazi leads one of the seven FAA test sites when we are a key player in many other FAA, DOJ, and DoD programs.
▶ 0:51:56We also partner with a variety of commercial and governmental entities on cuttingedge UAS and counter UAS technologies required to safely integrate UAS into the national airspace system. These facts uniquely position me to discuss the topic of malicious UAS. This written testimony is provided to you through my personal capacity as a private citizen is based on my professional experience. It does not necessarily represent the views of the University of Alaska.
▶ 0:52:23Aquasi uses uh UAS for good, such as conducting medical supply delivery, cargo delivery to isolated communities and emergency response. However, our team is very aware of how they can be used maliciously. I live in Alaska, but even in this remote location, our team has seen the malicious use of UAS. We have seen flights of unauthorized UAS in the flight path of Ted Stevens International Airport, one of the top five cargo airports in the world.
▶ 0:52:51Simultaneously, we have seen multiple UAS entering the restricted airspace of our military bases. We have observed the flight tracks of UAS dropping contraband into correctional facilities. I personally have seen UAS crossing the southern border uh bringing drugs from Mexico. All of these examples show that malicious UAS activities are widespread and we need policies, procedures, training, and technologies to allow law enforcement to stop these activities with without creating a hazard to people and property.
▶ 0:53:21The first question I always get asked when I talk to the public about the issue of malicious UAS is why can't we shoot them? The United States Code section 49 defines UAS as aircraft and all of the laws codified for traditional manned aircraft applied to them. Therefore, shooting a UAS is a federal offense with applicable jail time and fines.
▶ 0:53:42uh only five agencies DoD, DOE, DHS, DOJ, and to a limited extent FAA have relief from the United States Code sections applicable to shooting down or jacking hacking or jamming UAS. So most law enforcement operators dealing with unauthorized UAS do not have the legal authority to do so. Also, it's unsafe to mitigate a UAS without knowing what is under it and what might get hit when the UAS falls.
▶ 0:54:07Additionally, the operator of a counter UAS system needs to know if the UAS under observation is authorized to be flying in that location. These facts point to why we need highly trained professionals with appropriate statutory relief and good information making the risk benefit calculations about whether and how a UAS should be mitigated. As the malicious use of UAS spreads, state and local law enforcement officers will be on the front lines for combating the threat from the rogue UAS.
▶ 0:54:34Because federal agents with counter drone capacities cannot be everywhere, the Aquasi team has been studying the willingness of local law enforcement officers to engage with systems to design to detect, track, and identify malicious UAS. In Alaska, we have had trouble uh getting state and local law enforcement officers to address rogue UAS because they're overworked, understaffed, dealing with more urgent situations and feel it is not their responsibility to do so.
▶ 0:55:03Additionally, many of the law enforcement participants in our study are unsure as to what laws are applicable to malicious UAS and do not know what they can legally do to build a case for the misuse of UAS. We need to provide our law enforcement officers with clear guidance on how to address rogue UAS and that that as the risk from malicious UAS increases the potential to mitigate the UAS in certain circumstances.
▶ 0:55:29We cannot afford to allow criminals to use UAS maliciously or our adversaries to use UAS to endanger our military bases or personnel and conduct espionage. In my opinion, HR5061, the counter UAS authority security safety and reauthorization act is a good first step toward safely and amending implementing counter drone technology in the US.
▶ 0:55:53However, more needs to be done to accelerate our testing and implementation of these technologies and the required risk benefit decision calculations needed before a UAS is mitigated. These investments will not only help our law enforcement organizations here at home, but also our military overseas as they deal with the malicious UAS threat. The UAS, the US should be a world leader in the development and deployment of these technologies.
▶ 0:56:19If we do not move fast enough, the criminals and our adversaries will win the UAS war. This ends my prepared statement. I'd be happy to answer any questions you have.
▶ 0:56:29Thank you. Now I now recognize the ranking member of the subcommittee, Miss McBth, for her opening statement.
▶ 0:56:36Thank you, Mr. Chair, and thank you to our witnesses. I have read your testimonies and I apologize that I'm just getting here, but thank you for convening today's hearing to provide us with an opportunity to learn more about how Jones can be used to commit crimes, how law enforcement can respond to those crimes, and what we might do here in Congress to adapt our laws to meet the challenges that drones pose to our society and the challenges that you have expressed here today.
▶ 0:57:05As with the internet, artificial intelligence, and so many other technologies, drones can can really be a valuable tool. They can help first responders survive or survey a disaster area to search for survivors, or they can give law enforcement another vantage point from which to monitor a special event or a very sensitive location.
▶ 0:57:29and they can keep officers safe by allowing them to remotely investigate a dangerous situation or location. The rapid proliferation of drone technology has ushered in a new frontier of crime and many many public safety challenges in the wrong hands. Drones can be used to invade privacy, smuggle contraband, as you just mentioned, or provide bad actors with information that can help them avoid detection.
▶ 0:58:00I've heard firsthand about these harms from many law enforcement officers, uh, in particular in my district, in the state of Georgia, um, as they're working to keep us all safe. Um, for example, Georgia prison officials have informed me that they are increasingly battling the use of drones to smuggle contraband into our prison facilities.
▶ 0:58:25Drones have been used to deliver illegal drugs, weapons, and cell phones, which can each pose a threat to the safety of our inmates and also the staff. Just last year, the Georgia Department of Corrections seized drones, dozens of them, that could be used to smuggle and contraband.
▶ 0:58:45And recently, officials at Washington State Prison in Davisboro, Georgia, they worked with the Washington County Sheriff to track drones that were being used in an attempt to smuggle and heroin into prison. By tracking the drones and using a K-9 unit, they were able to locate the drone operators, arrest them, and prevent the drugs from reaching the prison.
▶ 0:59:13While law enforcement succeeded in this effort using traditional tools, additional law enforcement tools may be uh we may be needed to respond to the rising challenges that are presented by the As with any new technology, we must exercise caution and proceed thoughtfully to avoid unintended consequences of detecting and mitigating drone activity.
▶ 0:59:42Disabling or intercepting drones presents very unique challenges. For example, an intercepted or disabled drone could fall, as was stated, and injure innocent bystanders on the ground or damage objects or property in its path. Similarly, many of the technologies used to combat drones rely on disrupting their communications systems of planes or emergency.
▶ 1:00:12I mean, these communication systems could disrupt aircrafts uh or emergency responders. Testing, planning, training, and targeted deployment can all help that counter drone technologies are used in a way that promotes public safety, but also strengthens our national Um, I'm so thank thankful to each of our experts today for your expert testimony and thank you for coming here
▶ 1:00:42today to discuss how we can work together to respond to these challenges and opportunities that have been presented uh by drones and counter drone technology and our everchanging technological landscape. Thank each of you for sharing your expertise.
▶ 1:00:59Gentle lady yields back. Um, and now we'll go to questions from members of the sub subcommittee. We'll start first with the gentleman from Texas, Mr.
▶ 1:01:07Uh, thank you, chairman. Uh, you spoke so well about the issues that we see down at our southern border related to drones coming across with all the drugs killing our people from the bad ombres we have on our southern border. We have to stop it.
▶ 1:01:23Um I'd like to talk a little bit about drones in the airspace specifically you know uh airports concerned about the airports right a bad actor with bad entering restricted airspace over one of our airports and Sergeant Duly I'm looking at you I'm thinking about Florida you know you got about 400 airports your responsibility so what does a medium-size airport do you detect the airport at the airport,
▶ 1:01:54drone comes in, restricted airspace. What's your
▶ 1:02:00So, normally I'll give you an example. Um, we've done some some some really different things in South Florida, especially Miami International Airport, uh, as an example, has a drone problem, and we've partnered with our FA partners, DHS, etc., entities that are allowed without question to detect or mitigate, um, because we recognized it was an issue. and we incorporate a lot of our our our public safety in the area, Miami date, etc. And we were involved as well, and we're able to go out there and start intercepting.
▶ 1:02:28But from a perspective of an airport that simply has the ability to detect, I mean, there's really nothing they can do other than watch it. Honestly,
▶ 1:02:36do you see how stupid that sounds?
▶ 1:02:37It does.
▶ 1:02:38It's stupid.
▶ 1:02:40So, I I like the idea we can detect.
▶ 1:02:44We can detect all these airports. We can
▶ 1:02:47a drone. Well, if it's being operated by a individual with some bad intentions, you'll just catch it on video. The destruction of the I mean, you're going to have it on. You can detect it, but there's nothing to mitigate that drone. And this is airports. And correct me if I'm wrong, sir. Do but this is airports across the entire country.
▶ 1:03:08Yes, that's correct. There may be some that have specialized, but but no.
▶ 1:03:11Well, I think Miss Cahill brought up a few of the agencies that have the ability to to mitigate a drone. Uh, Dr. Wallace, is there I I hear these arguments. I'm on the transportation committee. I hear all these arguments about, you know, you can't mitigate the drone because it could interfere. It could interfere with commercial aviation, the you know, all this.
▶ 1:03:35Is there technology available out there with with that could mitigate a drone without interfering with our commercial
▶ 1:03:43There there are certainly several technologies that are available for mitigation. Sure. Each of those technologies have their own benefits and
▶ 1:03:50Sure. Sure. But but that's an excuse that that I hear over and over again. It's going to interfere with the aircraft that are coming in. I said interfere with the aircraft coming in. The damn drone could take down one of our aircraft. You you talked a little bit about what we're seeing in Ukraine with the complex missions that some of these drones are taking. I'm kind of I'm appalled over the fact that I was in Milwaukee and I went to visit the airport.
▶ 1:04:16We were talking about drones and I was inside there and I said, "Well, what happens if a drone gets into this red airspace here, this restricted airspace?" Well, uh, we, you know, we know it's there. I said, "What do we do?" Well, we try to call somebody when Yeah, we try to find a guy. He could be, you know, a couple blocks, couple miles away in the backyard and we'll knock on the door.
▶ 1:04:37I said, "Well, what if that guy has bad intentions?" But then when we have a significant we'll bring in the co uh bring in the Coast Guard and the Coast Guard would have the ability to mitigate the drone and send it out to Lake Michigan or set it down. So the idea to say that well we have to be careful here that we don't the drone doesn't fall down and hit somebody in the head.
▶ 1:05:01I think the technology is there to take control of the damn drone and get it out of the the restricted airspace. And the idea that we have to be worried about not offending somebody, it's in restricted airspace. And at some point in time, Mr. Federson, we're going to have a drone operated by some bad ombres over here interfering with some commercial airliners running into the engines and causing problems.
▶ 1:05:28But then, maybe then is when we will actually get serious about mitigating the risks of these drones because there's going to be millions of them out there. And the bad guys are understanding these are pretty I mean you can put some pretty good payload on some of these drones. They're relatively inexpensive, right? And so I I am deeply concerned, Sergeant Douly, about the US government's position on this. Whether it's section 49, it's a federal offense.
▶ 1:05:57That just makes me sick to think this is a federal offense for state individuals, state officials to protect their own airports in their own state. We must change. We must change. I yield.
▶ 1:06:10Gentleman yields. We appreciate that. And uh
▶ 1:06:16chair recognizes now the gentle lady from Georgia, Miss McBth.
▶ 1:06:21Thank you so much, Mr. Chair. Uh we know that drones, as I've stated and many have stated uh in this hearing, drones have been used to smuggle drugs, weapons, and phones into prisons and across our borders. And as I mentioned in my opening remarks, this is already happening in Georgia. Uh, drones present a significant risk to the safety of inmates and staff. Dr.
▶ 1:06:42Cahill, your written testimony notes that your team has worked with Alaskan correction facilities to detect and to track and to identify the drones that are being used to smuggle contraband into the prisons.
▶ 1:06:58So, but you also, you know, you said this is a widespread problem, but can you talk about, you said that you've had difficulty in getting law enforcement to address the rogue UAS and so including at correctional facilities. So, could you explain the the the source of the hesitancy?
▶ 1:07:20So, ranking member, the the reality is when we have dealt with our law enforcement, they they're skeptical of a new technology until it's proven because they have so many things on their plate that it's a a challenge for them to learn something new and be able to work with it. So, we had hesitancy in our correctional facilities for installing one of these systems.
▶ 1:07:42The moment we did and were able to confirm some of their intelligence that there was a contraband drop occurring and we were able to track the drone, identify where the hand controller for the operator was. We changed their opinion as soon as we gave them that briefing. The answer was, could you please train us this afternoon? And we did. And they've spread that story to additional correctional facilities and they've accepted it.
▶ 1:08:09So they they have a very targeted very limited area that they need to protect the police who are and the Alaska state troopers who have much wider ranges for them. They're we are severely understaffed and so a malicious drone doesn't mean anything compared to a wife beating or um you know a major traffic accident in the middle of nowhere.
▶ 1:08:31So the priority is not there to be able to do these additional duties associated with monitoring the technologies and determining how to interact with them.
▶ 1:08:42Could you kind of explain to me when when the drones are seized in these crimes, what type of digital forensics can be per performed on them and what data can be extracted or recovered uh from a seized drone? So, uh, ranking member, we don't actually do the forensics on the drones. Um, people do, for example, the Pacific South Palisades case where the drone hit the Super Scooper firefighting aircraft.
▶ 1:09:10They were able to do a forensic analysis because the drone was stuck in the wing of the aircraft. Um, but in a lot of these cases, all we see are the tracks and we may know if it's a group one or a group two, which is a size category, but we don't know a whole lot about that aircraft because we have to obey title 18 and title 49, which means we cannot break into the communications link for that aircraft without permission. Um, the the 124n authority, for example.
▶ 1:09:39So, we as a state university do not have that. Um but the partners we have who do they are able to get more information in terms of what the serial number is you know what type of aircraft it is so they can say it's a DJI Mavic for example so it really is a function of what you have what we are doing when we're using passive RF for triangularization is we are looking for basically somebody yelling and we have a a network of sensors and we determine
▶ 1:10:09the direction from which the yelling is coming
▶ 1:10:12and lets us find the drone and the operator and we will be able to track where the drone is and where the operator is. And in the recent case with the Juno glacial outburst flooding, we set up a system. We were able to determine where the controller was, where the drone went and landed. Local law enforcement went to that location and knocked on doors and found the perpetrator.
▶ 1:10:34So then would you say that local law enforcement is able then to kind of um build a criminal case from the data that they're able to extract but you can't do it but they can.
▶ 1:10:46Okay. Thank you. Sergeant Douly. What are the greatest legal and technical hurdles in actively countering a drone in real time?
▶ 1:10:55So just to the doctor's point again, we do have legal constraints. we would violate about 15 different US codes by simply uh frequency jamming or mitigating all kinds of FA rules, regulations, FCC, etc. Um, and most of those carry jail time and significant fines as well. And a lot of our colleagues would say like, oh well, we're public safety if we have to do what we have to do. The problem is is uh to your point earlier, mitigating a drone and it may have had a legal right to be there and they made an honest mistake.
▶ 1:11:23There's still a tremendous amount of consequence that comes with that. But our biggest hurdle are all the existing codes. Our laws just simply do not keep up with the rate that technology progresses and the way that it can be manipulated for bad. Um, so those are some of the biggest hurdles we have is title 18, pen trap, wiretapping laws, etc. that are of huge concern when we do want to not only detect that a drone is there, but be able to mitigate it away. We would be violating about 15 different title codes um and also uh title 18 and 49 as well.
▶ 1:11:53Thank you. Appreciate it.
▶ 1:11:55Thank you. Chair now recognizes the gentleman from Wisconsin for five minutes, Mr. Tiffany.
▶ 1:12:00Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Um, as we heard um over the last few years, every state became a border state um with the previous administration and cartel members openly stated that they used our northern uh border to smuggle in narcotics. Mr. Federson, uh, do you think it's equally important to implement these drone enforcement programs at both the southern border and the northern border?
▶ 1:12:28Yes, sir, I do. And they are being implemented at the federal level, uh, particularly CBP on both the north and the southern sides. However, the lack of authorities for detection, track, identify, or even the mitigation piece uh does not extend to those local departments that are shoulder-to-shoulder with CBP uh taking action to address these issues. Uh we're severely um overmatched by the criminal element when it comes to it.
▶ 1:12:56Um how should that change in your
▶ 1:12:59I I think it's actually quite easy, sir. Uh detect, track, and identify authority is our title 18. uh they're very vague, they're antiquated, and they honestly uh add a lot of confusion to law enforcement and commercial sectors and critical infrastructure that want to be able to see what's flying in their airspace. The information that goes from there into the counter drone systems like ours uh are nothing more than remote ID data. It's just data that is coming directly from the drone.
▶ 1:13:28The most personal information you may get from it is the serial number, which is akin to a license plate on a vehicle. Law enforcement still has to call the FAA in order to get the registry information from uh the FAA and then from there be able to take the leagues. Uh I think DTI should be a blanket open authority for critical infrastructure security, law enforcement, and honestly all federal agencies because they don't all have the authority right now.
▶ 1:13:55So with that authority they could accomplish the mission that you were referring to that they're not able to fulfill at that at this point. Is that correct?
▶ 1:14:02Correct. Most of it because you at this point you can figure out where the drone is, where it took off from and where the pilot is in real time.
▶ 1:14:09And the cartels and others are light years ahead of law enforcement at this point in part because of that.
▶ 1:14:14Honestly, the rest of the world, sir. I mean, we're a global company in 33 countries. We do airports and law enforcement and military everywhere else. And they use our system quite a bit to mitigate. So mitigation looks much different in other places around the world than it does here in the United States.
▶ 1:14:30It's only the policies and legislative piece. They have given authorities to their law enforcement and security
▶ 1:14:37Do you think China may have had a hand in the drone activity around some of our u military sites?
▶ 1:14:43Yes sir. Absolutely. I believe that uh you know it it's drones are a tool. They're a tool by criminal networks and they're a tool for federal foreign adversaries. So absolutely they're being
▶ 1:14:56Sergeant Julie, are you familiar with the Guangpan Cape Canaveral incident that happened earlier this year in
▶ 1:15:03Vaguely. Yes.
▶ 1:15:05Uh in the case of Chinese-born Canadian citizen, Guang Pan was found to be using a drone to take unauthorized photographs at Patrick uh Air Force Base, a submarine warf in Cape Canaveral. Um, have you seen increased activity of drones around US military bases in
▶ 1:15:23So, military bases, uh, not so much. We don't support them as often. Um, it's normally during large scale events, but we do, we went from literally detecting a few hundred per month in those general areas where they're restricted airspace like a DoD site or military base to thousands um, in particular when uh, DJI in particular drones turned off their geo fencing for the most part. So, our principal workhorse years ago in the state of Florida, which we used was DJI drones. That's how we got started. Now, we're not allowed to use them anymore.
▶ 1:15:51But back then, you had to have special permission. The drone told you, I you're not allowed to fly here or take off from here. Now, that's not the case. Now, it's simply a checkbox where you turn on your drone and it could be right next to an airport runway and before it would say you can't fly here. Now, it says you're taking responsibility. You touch a check box and it takes off and flies wherever you want it to fly.
▶ 1:16:13Now, so we've seen a dramatic increase over the past, I'd say 8 to nine months of going from a handful of detections to in the thousands of detections in these areas or within range of our detection equipment because there's no more geo fencing. So yes, it is increased dramatically in a lot of these areas, not just our critical infrastructure, but our military sites and other places.
▶ 1:16:33And isn't it correct that we do not produce a lot of drones in the United States, principally produced in China? Is that accurate?
▶ 1:16:40That's correct. The principal ones that are produced here are normally purchased by DoD or law enforcement or areas like Florida where we restrict the type of drones we're allowed to purchase.
▶ 1:16:50For national security purposes, do you think that we should make that a priority to um be able to produce them in the United States?
▶ 1:16:56I'm a proud American for sure. I would love to to be prideful of us producing those types of things here. Yes. But I also don't want to stifle some of the things where people need to buy a certain product because it's the correct tool for the correct job. If that makes sense. But buying American should be preferred. Yes.
▶ 1:17:10Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield.
▶ 1:17:12Gentleman yields back. Before we uh go to the next one, I want to submit for the record um documentation called uh entitled cartels drop bombs from drones near southern border. Um so ordered.
▶ 1:17:28Great. I recognize gentleman from California, Mr. Swallwell, for five
▶ 1:17:32Thank you. And there's no doubt that drones, particularly for law enforcement, have changed the game uh for uh surveillance, for search and rescue, to assist in active SWAT operations. Uh they can save uh not only civilian lives, but also uh protect our men and women uh in law enforcement.
▶ 1:17:55Uh and the sergeant just alluded to a problem that we've run into, which is that um cheaper Chinese components have made it uh much more affordable for law enforcement agencies to have these capabilities.
▶ 1:18:10And we all know the risk that comes along with having Chinese components in our drones, which is that uh they could be pinging back uh to mainland China and affecting our own national security in the way that they could be gathering intelligence on behalf of the Chinese government. And certainly no law enforcement agency wants that.
▶ 1:18:30But Sergeant Douly, I I imagine you would tell me that when you're making decisions to protect the people who work with you and to protect the public, um, you have to think about like what can bring public safety and how you can stretch your dollars the best. Is that right? I mean, is that kind of some of the tension you have to deal with in making a decision like
▶ 1:18:55Uh, not anymore. uh the state of Florida legislated that so we we don't have to worry about we just pick what we need um and they also supply funding uh now to help us reach those goals of transitioning everything away
▶ 1:19:08and my goal just as yours stated earlier is that we would have entirely an affordable Americanmade uh supply chain in fact in California there's a company I think it's made up of former Navy Seals called Inspired Flight, which is Americanmade components. It sounds like you're familiar with Inspired Flight.
▶ 1:19:31Oh, yeah. They're good people. I like
▶ 1:19:32Yeah. Um, same. So, my my question for Dr. Wallace, um, is knowing that 86% of the drones um I'm sorry, knowing that a high percentage of drones are are made in China and that the overconentration can affect our national security.
▶ 1:19:55um what can we do in the near term to make sure that law enforcement has affordable drones, but on the manufacturing side that uh we're able to expedite our ability to produce Americanmade
▶ 1:20:12That's an excellent question. I I I can tell you I'm not a manufacturing expert. Um, I can tell you that from a capabilities perspective, um, currently Chinese-made drones have a capability that can't be matched at the same dollar value. Um, I do think that given that limitation, the choice that ultimately has to be made with regards to especially public safety is one of lives.
▶ 1:20:41Because at the end of the day, if a public safety agency doesn't have access to the tool they need to protect that public at the capability they need to accomplish what they need to do, uh the ultimate price will be either law enforcement member's life or potentially member a citizen's life. And so I think that is a a metric that should be taken into account.
▶ 1:21:05Agreed. And and Sergeant Douly, are there any examples that you've not given the committee as to how a drone saving life or uh protecting the officers who work with you that you think could animate the need for giving law enforcement more resources in this
▶ 1:21:23For the counter site or just a success story from from having drones in public
▶ 1:21:29Okay. So, from a success side, I'll give you an example and I give it all the time. Um, I work very closely with the Palm Beach County Sheriff's Office in South Florida and um, there was a deputy and I were eating lunch and we get this call of a stabbing inside a home and everybody fled and unfortunately the person that was the criminal in this particular case was off his medication recognizing that we may have had some type of mental episode and we approach it differently and as soon as we arrived there the deputy gets permission to put his drone and I supported him by by making sure everything was squared away.
▶ 1:21:57Um but I he put his drone into the house and within 3 minutes he located the suspect. We recovered the the suspect. They're in custody. No one got shot. No one got dog bit. Um everybody went on about their day and the person who had been stabbed was getting medical attention. And this was solved in minutes versus like an hour standoff with a SWAT team without this type of technology.
▶ 1:22:18And from the other side of not having detection or counter UAS that that's been hindering is a bulk of what we get is like careless and clueless individuals where they're just as dangerous at times as someone with bad intent. For example, the person in California, they gave the example of of hitting the the um the sea plane that was um I forget the name of it. Um that person didn't do it on purpose. They were just careless and clueless. Same thing in Texas during the flooding. We had someone strike a helicopter. They didn't do it on purpose.
▶ 1:22:46sometimes careless and clueless individuals are just as dangerous as those that have those negative intentions. Um, and I think that having this technology both for public safety provides a tremendous value uh of being able to save lives and protect lives, but more importantly having the ability to detect and potentially mitigate if needed. Also could provide those values where we can keep manned aviation safe.
▶ 1:23:08You know, we harp on that that that terrorist side and okay, the careless and clueless can be just as dangerous as those individuals that intended and planned something versus someone just popping up trying to make a YouTube video and they accidentally hit an airplane or violate airspace and we locked something down.
▶ 1:23:24Thank you for your service, Sergeant. And uh to the men and women that you serve with, I'll say what we say in our law enforcement family. Uh be safe. So, thank you.
▶ 1:23:31Gentlemen's time's expired. I have two more documents that I'm introducing into the record. Uh, drones in the wrong hands. How criminals use UAVs to threaten prisons and jails. And another one entitled, "New state drone laws set strict operational boundaries." Without objection, it's ordered. And now recognize gentle from North Carolina.
▶ 1:23:52Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Uh, to the witnesses, thank you for being here. And I'll piggyback on one of those uh submissions as a uh when I was working in law enforcement. The problem has already arrived in many respects. You know, we would we would send some of the most dangerous people in the country away to jail for sometimes 20, 30, 40 years, but there would be no interruption in the criminal enterprises that these folks led in large part because of devices and capabilities that made it into the Bureau of Prisons
▶ 1:24:22because of the drones. And um it seemed like just a lumbering bureaucracy and inefficiency that it could not keep up with the technology. And um I am curious um Mr. Federson, you you mentioned that that the United States seems to be overwhelmed at this particular juncture.
▶ 1:24:43And is the is the posture of being overwhelmed is that from uh just a volume standpoint of all of the drones that are in circulation is it a technology standpoint or is it just the layers of bureaucracy that prohibit effective deterrence?
▶ 1:25:01Thank you for the question. So it is a policy, legislative and bureaucracy
▶ 1:25:06Technology is out there today u from many companies that have been tested by the FAA, tested by TSA, deemed safe to use at airports.
▶ 1:25:15Uh but the confusion over detect, track and identify has hesitancy across the across the land. Uh and the fact that the mitigation authorities haven't been expanded in a quick enough manner is
▶ 1:25:26what what makes sense to to remedy this because u a drone is not an airplane. The fact that they're being regulated as such in many respects does not make much sense in terms of placing the same value on a drone as it does an airplane. So should we have a facility specific code for unmanned aircraft?
▶ 1:25:46I don't think so sir. I disagree that uh labeling it an aircraft uh hinders anything. It actually gives both operators and those that are op working around drones uh more protection and coverage into what they're doing.
▶ 1:26:00And it gives better regulatory understanding of what these drones can and cannot do when they're flying because honestly as as it's been said before I mean there are drones that are as small as the coffee cup but some that are as big as a car and so you have to be able to safely manage that and aircraft is a right designation for that. In terms of fixing the issues that we see though, how can we fix the bureaucracy uh and the I would say the the ineffective legislative posture we have with drones?
▶ 1:26:30Yeah, sir. I'm going to have to uh point the finger back to all of you on the panel. Um
▶ 1:26:34Well, you're the expert. I'm just I'm
▶ 1:26:36No, that's that's exactly what it is. We had a 5-year pilot program for a very small sect of federal law enforcement that started in 2018.
▶ 1:26:43We're now in the eighth year of that 5-year program. No authorities have been expanded. We've seen that that technology can be used safely and without issue. We've had those departments and agencies asked for an expansion of authorities to get them some relief off of their responsibility. And honestly, especially from being a former state trooper, uh to say that an FBI agent is smarter and more apt at using this equipment than a state trooper or local law enforcement isn't the right isn't the right way.
▶ 1:27:12So the delay is simply understanding the technology and giving trust back to the process and the system.
▶ 1:27:19And what does the technology do
▶ 1:27:21Uh so it gives you the basic remote in remote ID information. Tells you where the drone is, what the drone serial number is, where it's flying, which way it's heading, and where the pilot is in real time. That information can be used for a ground interdiction without even having to worry about the airspace to talk to the pilot and have them bring it down.
▶ 1:27:40There are technologies like ours which is cyber takeover which takes control of the drone and lands it safely where it needs to be which then allows for the officer to either give it back to the child and parent with a warning undamaged no collateral damage or go ahead and submit for a search warrant to get the information out of the drone.
▶ 1:27:58Do you think there is a is a space in the legal construct to have emergency authorization to remove a drone whether it's shooting it down taking control of it or or some other means? No sir. I I mean these drones are flying at 30 60 mph. The decision cycle for law enforcement or a security individual is literally seconds and minutes. It's not weeks or hours.
▶ 1:28:21If it is to be that type of system, then I think it has to be preemptively done to say that a search warrant's going to cover a large area for a large period of time.
▶ 1:28:30So like ju the emphasis of my question is let's say a drone is flying over an airport or over a bureau prison facility. Should there not be the authorization to remove that drone?
▶ 1:28:41Um immediately
▶ 1:28:42and do we lack that currently? Is that
▶ 1:28:44We do.
▶ 1:28:45Okay. And the technology is there to remove that drone.
▶ 1:28:48The technology is available to remove the drone and remove it safely. And the technology has been tested by the FAA and TSA. A prime example though is federal air marshals who are using the Chinese equipment at our major airports to assess what the situation is, but they don't have authority to use other equipment or use mitigation. Mr. Chairman, I have more more room, but that's I'll yield back the
▶ 1:29:11Thank you. Gentleman's time is expired.
▶ 1:29:13Now recognize this. Thank you. We've got lots of questions, don't we?
▶ 1:29:17Gentleman from California, Mr. Kylie is recognized for 5 minutes.
▶ 1:29:20Thanks, Mr. Chair. Clearly, the problems being discussed at this hearing are extremely serious when it comes to the malicious and authoriz unauthorized uses of drones. Of course, there are a lot of good and authorized uses of of drones as well. uh you know for uh agriculture, for hobbyists, for security uh and so forth and increasingly actually for delivery.
▶ 1:29:40Uh if you look at uh companies like Walmart and Amazon have actually been expanding their use uh of drones to do almost instantaneous or very quick uh deliveries at least of smaller parcels uh at this point and I think that many believe this will become uh quite widespread in the coming years.
▶ 1:29:57Uh but this sort of uh problem of the uh unauthorized uses of drones I think sort of threatens uh the ability to uh have that process go uh smoothly both from the perspective of uh of having the regulatory uh process or framework work correctly and in terms of sort of public perception and support for these sort of things. So uh maybe I'll ask Dr. Wallace and if any of the other panelists want to uh add to this.
▶ 1:30:24Um how do we uh sort of address the the malicious uses of drones in a way that does not uh threaten the productive and uh you know valuable uses of them?
▶ 1:30:35It's an excellent question. I I think the initial challenge is there's a misperception that it's easy to identify uh the misuse of a drone at least initially. So, uh, if you're looking at a radar screen, for example, you're going to see a dot in altitude. That doesn't really give you the ability to immediately distinguish that someone is doing something improperly. Um, typically, we leverage information contextually with other kinds of information to try to make some um, assertions about what is actually happening.
▶ 1:31:05Is the drone operating above the altitude that the FA would permit? Are they operating at an unusual time? Are they operating near a facility that would be questionable? So you never really know definitively if this drone is a threat or not. You only have
▶ 1:31:21Thank you. Did any of the other panelists want to weigh in?
▶ 1:31:25Yeah, I I I think that the question is uh is is a very good question, but it comes back into the fact that when we look at our our nation's airspace, we look at it through two lenses, safety and security. And so air domain awareness, which would allow you to see all the drones, is an essential part of the safety aspect of things. Uh, it's akin to telling police officers they can't look at certain vehicles that are flying around or driving around in areas that are off limits and not being able to react to it. It's the same.
▶ 1:31:53You either drive a car legally or you drive the car illegally. It's the same with a
▶ 1:31:59Um, when we do large scale events, we do have to do a lot of deconliction. To your point, like how do you know which one is good and which one is bad? Um, so we have briefings prior to to like large scale events of our public safety professionals, Amazon, Walmart, if they're doing deliveries in those areas. Um, and make sure that we understand that those are already authorized and we can get a list because again, it's all about communication and reaching out.
▶ 1:32:21we reach out to our FAA partners and say who has been authorized to fly in this area because we're going to be their eyes and ears so that if we do have something that is authorized to be there where to their point we're not accidentally intercepting or mitigating with our federal partners um we know that they're supposed to be there or we already have those clearances ahead of time but communication is key and getting out of your silo and talking to the other entities that can do that is key.
▶ 1:32:45Yeah, I think that's uh very important and you know if this is going to become more common uh deliveries being done in this way um you know we want folks to have the assurance that these drones are supposed to be there and that they're safe and that they're doing uh you know just a routine delivery as opposed to uh some of the other uh encounters that people might have in other contexts with drones. So appreciate the the work you're doing and appreciate the chair for uh bringing attention to this issue. I yield back.
▶ 1:33:11I'd be happy to yield to my colleague uh Mr. Kn.
▶ 1:33:14Thank you, Mr. Kylie, Sergeant, I noticed that you weighed me down when I was talking about uh the ability to shoot down drones in e situations that's not currently within the legal construct. Do you have any insight into how we can best achieve that across um I would say the sensitive areas whether they're airports, bases, bureau of prisons, what what have you.
▶ 1:33:34Well, the idea means would be non-kinetic. You don't want to like accidentally a projectile goes up, it comes down. Um but there are some scenarios which we've seen overseas where people don't care that you're mitigating or jamming or GPS denying they're using fiber optic and other things to cross these barriers and be very successful and that may be something that we have to deal with at some point and we don't want to box our public safety into just non-kinetic um issues which basically uh radio frequency jamming etc.
▶ 1:34:01We want to be able to give them a full spectrum of what they feel is necessary to do or based on their personal experience of what they've encountered or maybe the intel that they're getting be able to handle the situation accordingly. U that's my biggest fear is that we're going to authorize this but box them in so much that they can't respond and they can't they're like I wish I could do something. It'd be like me standing on the side of the road with a radar gun and I clock someone going 100 miles an hour but they didn't give me a car to go chase them down and stop them from that dangerous speed. This is the same thing.
▶ 1:34:29We want to have multiple options available to us without being boxed in, but be doing it responsibly with a high level of accountability. Um, I do think that if we do make a mistake, we should be held accountable. If we mitigate a drone that wasn't supposed to be mitigated, we figure out what went wrong and how we can fix it. But more importantly, document and justify to our federal partners if we mitigated a drone why we made that decision and what was going on at the time. Not just I hit the button, he's not supposed to be there. Have a nice day. We have to have some level of that, too.
▶ 1:34:58And I think that that will help with the trust part as well and allowing committees like this to approve those type of authorities because we're going to be able to explain when, where, and why we actually did some form of mitigation versus just hitting a button and trusting that everybody's doing what they're supposed to be doing.
▶ 1:35:12Sergeant, thank you. I yield back.
▶ 1:35:14Thank Thank you. Gentleman yields back. I was this was going to be like the last question I had if I had time but you kind of touched on this here and that and that is um has a framework and and I know the answer I think has a framework been um that clarifies indignification and liability provisions for law enforcement interacting with drones. And my guess is no.
▶ 1:35:43I mean you other than just general qualified
▶ 1:35:49So from um an FA perspective um there is a a law enforcement toolkit that you're it gives you things that you're allowed to do if you have to interact with a drone pilot um that you can ask for their registration, you can ask for their trust certificate or part as far as the mitigation side and the detection side. Now
▶ 1:36:05that's that's I guess that's really my question is regarding mitigation detection that there really is nothing right now for
▶ 1:36:11other than you can't do it unless you're one of the four federal entities
▶ 1:36:13right and this leads to the to the next question and and you've kind of addressed it Mr. Federson and and uh so I may I ask may may I ask all of you what what is the current framework under the the U pilot program? What agencies are given authority? What kind of authority are they given? And um how do we effectively expand that nationwide?
▶ 1:36:39Yes sir. Um so in DHS there's only a small number of them uh small components. There's components out there like HSI and ICE the FAMs TSA that don't have any authorities uh that probably should. Uh they're on the DOJ side US Marshalss BOP. You've got DEA and FBI. uh all federal components that have authorities are using our system because of the methodology that it has.
▶ 1:37:04DoD also has it and you've got on DOE uh falling short of how they're going to go ahead and use things because it's private contractors that particularly take care of power plants and nuclear plants. The authorities in 124n I think are fine because they actually go ahead and do the notwithstanding aspect and wave title 18 and the title 49 piece. I think the issue is training.
▶ 1:37:26As long as we have a good solid training program, those authorities in 124n should be broadly spread across the rest of the federal agency, state and local law enforcement and critical infrastructure security officers.
▶ 1:37:37So we have uh for instance in uh immigration law, we provide provide status for training for departments, sheriff's departments, etc. So they could then uh enforce certain aspects of immigration law. Is that the kind of thing that might be uh be helpful? And I'm just going to go down be very quick. Start with Dr. Cahill and go all the way down and finish. Sergeant Julie.
▶ 1:38:01So, I think that that would be very useful, Mr. Chairman. Um, in terms of getting it to the people who need it,
▶ 1:38:08by the way, I did and when I read your your your statement, I I got a kick out of the people that are operating these things while they're drunk. I shouldn't get a kick out of that, but that you reported that kind of made me smile. Uh, Dr. Wallace,
▶ 1:38:19I would generally agree.
▶ 1:38:21Yes, sir. very helpful.
▶ 1:38:23Yeah. In fact, a lot of our federal partners have asked, but unfortunately that's not an authority they can delegate under those programs like a TFO program. So, that would have to change to allow us to receive those
▶ 1:38:34right? I mean, that would be new new legislation we'd have to pass and and to to get get those authorities in place. Um, and so right now I want to make sure everyone knows, if I understand correctly, if there is a drone, whether you know it's malevolent actor or benign and it's operating in a restricted airspace, use local law enforcement, you can't do anything effectively to mitigate
▶ 1:39:03mitigating. No, that's it. You can make a phone call and say, "Hey,
▶ 1:39:07yeah, we can go try to find the operator or try to deal with it, but if we're unsuccessful, that person gets away, and we have no record of being able to go back and and track it down of where it took off from, who was flying, etc."
▶ 1:39:19And so, we've got major events coming up. We've got Olympics, we've got World Uh, and I guess the question is, uh, are we prepared? Are we prepared? any we'll just go down this way now douly
▶ 1:39:34no and I would say public safety could significantly fill those gaps within a I'm not talking about moving fast and breaking things but moving with a purpose and start filling those gaps pretty quickly
▶ 1:39:45no sir we're not prepared I think the crux of the issue is that in order to get systems and people trained and in place before the World Cup and the 250th anniversary you have to be able to do an evaluation determine what you want to buy secure the funding And then manufacturers have to get the equipment out and on time for the training. At that point, we're honestly Christmas, I think, is the deadline for us to be able to do that.
▶ 1:40:09If we don't put the authorities in place and expand that to state and local law enforcement, then federal entities are going to have to do the job, but they're going to have to let something else go.
▶ 1:40:18Yeah. And and gosh, I'm I'm out of time because um I wanted to get to the next point, which is and you kind of touched on it. What is the time lag to get equipment and train enough personnel to actually be effective for some of these big events coming up? Go ahead. Go ahead. I my time is up, but you can answer Dr. Wallace, Dr. Ko, real quickly. I
▶ 1:40:43I would agree with my colleagues. We're not prepared and part of that critical need is the ability to detect, track, and identify.
▶ 1:40:50I agree. We're not prepared. And one of the challenges, of course, is some of these events are very, very spread out. So, the number of people and assets you need is going to be significant.
▶ 1:41:01Thank you. Um, well, it sounds to me like we need to get on our horse and get a piece of uh legislation passed very quickly, as quickly as we possibly can. Maybe maybe Representative McBth and I can work together and maybe designating that um im just I would say correlative to the immigration authorities that we give. So with that, I thank all of you for coming today.
▶ 1:41:27Appreciate appreciate your testimony and again bearing with us as we we we started late. So thank you very much. With that, we're adjourned. Thank you.