▶ 0:18:25An energy will now come to order. The chair recognizes himself for five minutes for an opening statement. Welcome to today's hearing, and thank you to our witness for appearing before us to inform our legislative efforts to secure and strengthen the nation's energy systems. The reliable delivery of energy through our critical infrastructure is fundamental to the modern economy and the health and welfare of all of our communities.
▶ 0:18:50At a time of tremendous growth in our nation's energy demands, the need for effective security cannot be overstated. During a recent hearing examining cyber and physical threats, we heard directly from operators and experts about the capabilities of adversaries and the work to safeguard against efforts to exploit vulnerabilities to disrupt the everyday lives of hardworking americans. Addressing cyber and physical threats is no easy task.
▶ 0:19:17The avenues for malicious activity only widen as digital digitalization, communications and linkages of gas pipelines, new generating resources and transmission take root to meet energy demands.
▶ 0:19:31The interconnected nature of our energy system requires constant intelligence sharing, clear visibility into threat landscapes, and sufficient resources to fill gaps in security protections for rural and small utility services alike. That is exactly what the legislation before us seeks to accomplish. Importantly, the energy emergency leadership act strengthens the department of energy central energy sector security mission.
▶ 0:20:01It does so by requiring that that it's well established. Energy emergency and cyber functions are led by an assistant secretary confirmed by the senate. This will ensure the department has the focused and accountable, accountable leadership to more fully protect the public from fuel and electricity, fuel supply disruptions, including emerging threats from our foreign adversaries to the nation's electric grid.
▶ 0:20:28As the sector risk management agency for the energy sector, doe requires visibility over the whole system and actively collaborates not only with the power sector, but also the oil and gas sector to prepare and respond appropriately to emergencies. Doe central role in federal coordination and providing technical assistance as needed is critical for a secure energy system.
▶ 0:20:57The pipeline cybersecurity preparedness act will enhance and formalize doe's work in this area, so we will have a stronger, more resilient energy sector. Alongside this bill, the energy threat analysis center act would formally authorize a valuable program that improves information sharing and coordination on threat analysis.
▶ 0:21:20The energy threat analysis center, or itac, brings together he public and private partners, including the intelligence community, to address vulnerabilities in critical infrastructure and provide operational support for energy sector resilience.
▶ 0:21:38The rural and municipal utility cybersecurity act will improve cybersecurity protocols and equipment for small utilities, electric cooperatives, and public power agencies by providing targeted funding and technical assistance. These small entities typically serve our most rural and remote communities that do not have the same resources as their larger investor owned counterparts.
▶ 0:22:06States to play an essential role in protecting energy infrastructure within their borders. Last congress, this committee held a hearing in north carolina to examine the attack on a substation in moore county that left 30,000 people without power.
▶ 0:22:21The secure grid act, which I plan to sponsor with my colleagues from california's seventh congressional district, builds upon the existing state emergency energy security plan framework to expand the visibility of potential threats to local distribution and supply chain networks. Altogether, this package of security bills comes at a critical time.
▶ 0:22:44Our adversaries remain close on our heels to overtake the united states as the leading technological superpower on the world stage. Our communities cannot afford to endure disruptive, large scale attacks that can be prevented with common sense solutions and collaborations. The bills before us today present a bipartisan opportunity to secure our nation's energy system so we can fuel economic growth and job creating industries across the country.
▶ 0:23:13Today, we'll hear from the department of energy, which has been helpful, providing technical assistance to our bipartisan work today. Alex fitzsimmons, acting undersecretary of the energy, will provide a broad view of doe's important energy sector work and how this legislation may advance our work. Our second panel of witnesses will also inform our work from their perspectives on the front lines of cyber and physical threat protection. I look forward to the discussion today and at this time, yield back.
▶ 0:23:40And the chair and the chair recognizes the gentlelady from florida's 14th district, the subcommittee's ranking member, for five minutes for an opening statement. >> well, thank you, Mr. chairman, and good morning. Uh, I look forward to learning from our panels today about the ways we can make our grid more resilient and safe. This is an area where the committee has a history of bipartisan success, and we should build on that however we can.
▶ 0:24:06We cannot ignore that right now, the greatest threat to grid reliability and security is the president and republican policies. The arbitrary project cancellations, higher costs and uncertainty have driven the country into an electricity crisis. Nearly a year after donald trump took office. The latest inflation data, released this morning shows across the board that prices are higher than ever.
▶ 0:24:31The chairman asked every panel that appears here, uh, does american need need more electricity? Uh, the answer is always yes. And we agree with that. But over the past year, the president and republicans in congress have senselessly gone out of their way to ensure that america will have less electricity. And that comes at an unfortunate cost to everyday americans.
▶ 0:24:57In december, the president terminated five offshore wind projects, which could supply six gigawatts of electricity. He did not care that federal courts had previously ruled that he acted unlawfully when he arbitrarily revoked their permits. After years of planning and investment, sunrise wind and empire wind, both off the coast of new york. Vineyard wind one off the coast of massachusetts and coastal virginia.
▶ 0:25:24Offshore wind off virginia represented $25 billion of investment and about 10,000 jobs to power more than 2.5 million homes and businesses. Revolution wind is roughly 80% 87% complete, with 58 out of 65 wind turbines installed.
▶ 0:25:44It was scheduled to be fully operational by the second half of this year, delivering power to more than 350,000 homes and businesses in connecticut and rhode island by the end of the year. Well, thankfully, yesterday, a federal court again rejected the administration's actions, deeming them arbitrary and capricious. But trump sabotage is very costly.
▶ 0:26:07Another court yesterday ruled that the administration illegally canceled numerous federal clean energy projects in a number of states just because they voted democratic in the last election. That's not right. Doe also canceled what would have been the largest U.S. solar energy project in the nevada desert, seven connected solar farms that would have produced 6.2gw, which is three times the output of the hoover dam.
▶ 0:26:35A number of energy companies have been working towards approval since 2023, and members utahs republican governor spencer cox said, this is how we lose the ai energy arms race with china, because solar with batteries can now be close to baseload power, and we should keep these projects rolling until we get the gas, nuclear, geothermal plants we need.
▶ 0:26:59Some of the most damaging and costly sabotage to america's electric grid at the hands of the trump administration have come to major transmission projects, especially the grain belt express transmission line across kansas, missouri, indiana and illinois.
▶ 0:27:14It has been in the works for 15 years to deliver power to homes and businesses, and expand economic opportunity across that region, and midwesterners will tell you that their aging energy infrastructure is struggling to keep pace with growing demand. But the trump doe arbitrarily canceled that transmission project last year. The administration is miring scores of other projects with additional red tape.
▶ 0:27:40So at a time that we need more energy that is affordable and reliable, trump and republican policies are sabotaging america's electric grid all together. That's 266gw of planned electricity generation projects, grid resilience and upgrades canceled in 2025.
▶ 0:28:01And that number does not include the perspective, higher costs and harm inflicted through the republicans big, ugly bill that ripped away savings to provide massive tax cuts to billionaires. The us has never faced this kind of self-inflicted energy crisis. We need a grid that can meet electricity demand and lower costs, which is under this committee's jurisdiction.
▶ 0:28:27That means policies that help us build out significant transmission infrastructure. So I hope our colleagues will work with this on this. Unfortunately, the only republican response to the energy crisis they've created is to turn to more expensive sources. When republican policies get in the way of the cheapest, fastest, most reliable sources of energy, our grid is less secure. And that means that energy is more expensive for our neighbors. That's not right.
▶ 0:28:54The american people deserve a whole lot better. I yield back. >> thank you very much. The gentlelady yields back. The chair now recognizes the gentleman from kentucky, the chair of the full committee for five minutes for an opening statement. >> thank you. Thank you, chairman latta. And thank to our witnesses. We have two panels, so we'll think of our witness and then our witnesses for being here today. Uh, we appreciate you coming before our committee to discuss these these legislative issues.
▶ 0:29:19Energy underpins our entire economy, which makes it a key target for nefarious actors and adversarial nations. We've witnessed cyber attacks and russia's invasion of ukraine, uh, ai driven attacks in europe and relentless attacks on taiwan from communist china. At home, we experienced chinese probes of critical infrastructure, cyber attacks on the colonial pipeline and physical attacks on the grid in north carolina and washington, among other events.
▶ 0:29:47The proposals before us, uh, come at an especially critical moment because of the growing power of advanced technologies to enable even more sweeping and sophisticated attacks than we've seen. The notion of large scale threats on american energy infrastructure is no longer if, but when. As as we seek to reaffirm our nation's energy and economic security, we must secure our energy systems to protect the nation's from efforts to sow chaos and cause harm.
▶ 0:30:16Legislation before us will ensure the energy and power providers and federal partners alike remain vigilant and prepared to respond to potential attacks while energy supplies grow to meet those demands. Effective cybersecurity measures require constant information sharing, clear leadership protocols, and key collaboration from operators across the energy sector to fill gaps in the threat and threat detection, prevention and mitigation.
▶ 0:30:42I, by our bipartisan bills, bolster the department of energy's role in sector specific risk management agency and enhanced state and energy sector visibility into the vulnerabilities of energy and power systems. Importantly, legislation before us today will fill critical gaps in cybersecurity protections in areas of the country that do not have the resources of larger investor owned utilities.
▶ 0:31:08And altogether, the work of this committee will equip government and industry partners with necessary cybersecurity protections and establish more effective ability for the entire energy sector to prepare and defend against potential attacks. I look forward to the discussion and I yield back the balance of my time. >> thank you. The gentleman yields back and the chair now recognizes the gentleman from new jersey, the ranking member of the full committee for five minutes for an opening statement. >> thank you, Mr. chairman.
▶ 0:31:37America's energy system is under increasing threat. Russia and china have developed sophisticated offensive cyber weapons and the proliferation of artificial intelligence technology means that every day, those those offensive cyber weapons grow stronger. It also means that less sophisticated adversaries, terrorist organizations without the backing of nation states, will be able to pull off devastating cyber attacks, whether it's against the federal government, utilities, or directly against energy infrastructure assets themselves.
▶ 0:32:06So that's why I'm pleased to see a suite of draft legislation in this hearing, including some bills reauthorizing important cybersecurity programs created by the bipartisan infrastructure law. I'm encouraged to see my republican colleagues now acknowledge the importance and benefits of some of the provisions of that law. Others, like the energy threat analysis center act, are completely new and are based off valuable testimony that the subcommittee received last year.
▶ 0:32:32I look forward to hearing from our witnesses about these bills, because it's critical that we work in a bipartisan fashion to secure our nation's energy infrastructure from cyber and physical threats. And as we consider the cybersecurity of our energy systems, we also have to recognize the importance that energy reliability plays in our way of life. But unfortunately, I'm concerned that secretary rice's actions at the department of energy are undermining that reliability.
▶ 0:32:57In october of last year, the trump administration and secretary rice illegally canceled 300 energy projects across the country, stealing $8 billion in grants for energy projects when we desperately need more energy. In july, the administration put out an analysis desperately calling for every available megawatt of power. But secretary rice is directly responsible for killing projects that would have added enormous amounts of clean power to the grid. These projects were authorized by congress and funded through bipartisan laws.
▶ 0:33:26Thankfully, just yesterday, a court reversed the termination notices for a number of the illegally canceled grants, and I'm hopeful that more projects that that more projects sue the department for its actions and get their funding restored. Now, the problem is, it doesn't end there.
▶ 0:33:43Since trump took office, the department of energy has shed roughly 3500 staff and is so understaffed in some areas that its office of nuclear energy is asking for volunteers from universities to help them review novel nuclear reactor designs. And that doesn't really sound like energy security to me.
▶ 0:34:00And late last year, the department of energy underwent a reorganization, closing important offices like the grid deployment office, the office of clean energy demonstrations, and the office of manufacturing and energy supply chains throughout the entire process. Secretary rice has refused to answer questions, leaving congress with zero information and no opportunity as to what is happening at the department. So I'm hopeful. Mr.
▶ 0:34:24Fitzsimons, a number of your colleagues have appeared before us in the last year but have given us unsatisfactory answers or claimed to not have any information to share. So I'm hoping that you will be more responsive today. And let's also not forget the big ugly bill or the republicans call the beautiful. I say it's the ugly bill, which is slated to increase electricity prices by 61% and endanger more than 300gw of reliable, clean generation just when we need it most.
▶ 0:34:53Electricity prices are up 13% just since trump took office, and companies have either delayed or canceled over 53 billion in investment in the energy sector. And we've lost over 165,000 jobs in the sector. So these actions and the big, ugly, beautiful bill are going to seriously undermine energy reliability. I'm hopeful that these cybersecurity bills will be helpful. But to be honest, and I'm not taking away from they're really just a drop in the bucket.
▶ 0:35:22When you look at the energy reliability problems that republicans are creating for the american people, and those problems are just getting worse every day. In new jersey, the electricity bills are up over 20%. So, you know, this is a major problem for the public. And I hope we can deal with it more effectively on a bipartisan basis. With that, Mr. chairman, I yield back. >> well, thank you very much. The gentleman yields back the balance of his time. This concludes member opening statements.
▶ 0:35:52The chair reminds members that pursuant to committee rules, all members opening statements will be made part of the record. The subcommittee wants to welcome our first witness for appearing today, and also taking the time to testify before the subcommittee. Uh, you have the opportunity to give an opening statement, followed by a round of questions from our members. Mr.
▶ 0:36:12Alex fitzsimmons is our as our first witness on our first panel, and he's the acting undersecretary of energy and director of office of cybersecurity, energy security and emergency response at the department of energy. We appreciate again you appearing before us and before you start your opening statement. Uh, just a quick, uh, uh, tutorial on the lights in front of you. You'll have five minutes for your opening statement.
▶ 0:36:36It'll be green for the first four minutes, turn yellow for the last minute, and then turn red so you can finish up. We'd appreciate it. And if you can pull the mic up close, we would also appreciate that. And Mr. fitzsimmons, you are recognized for five minutes for your opening statement. >> all right. Thank you. Chairman latta, chairman. Guthrie, ranking member. Pallone, ranking member. Castor. And distinguished members of the committee.
▶ 0:37:04I'm alex fitzsimmons, and it is an honor to testify before you today as a representative of the us department of energy under president trump and secretary wright's leadership, the department of energy and the office of cybersecurity, energy security and emergency response, caesar, for short, have been hard at work restoring american energy dominance, lowering energy costs for americans, and strengthening our national security.
▶ 0:37:30Secretary wright has conveyed that ensuring the security and resilience of our nation's energy infrastructure is a top priority. This vital work falls under the caesar office. As the acting undersecretary of energy and director of caesar, I am honored to help lead this critical mission. At caesar, we ensure that americans can count on a secure, affordable, and reliable energy supply under every circumstance.
▶ 0:37:56This means providing timely and actionable information to the energy sector, developing world class security technologies, hardening us infrastructure, and responding to and recovering from incidents. The us energy grid faces persistent threats from nation state threat actors with campaigns that target our economy, military readiness and public health and safety.
▶ 0:38:20The energy threat analysis center is a public private partnership that convenes experts from the federal government and industry to identify, analyze and mitigate threats to america's critical energy infrastructure.
▶ 0:38:36The etac reauthorization act of 2025 promotes improving operational collaboration between the government and industry, securing critical energy infrastructure from cyber threats, and protecting information sharing, thereby strengthening the nation's energy security.
▶ 0:38:51The energy emergency leadership act aims to clarify the leadership required to carry out the department's energy, emergency and energy security functions and improve the coordination performed with relevant federal agencies. This language amends the doe organization act to include the department's energy, emergency and energy security functions as those assigned to one of the eight assistant secretary positions.
▶ 0:39:16In addition, this legislation will permit the department to provide technical assistance to energy sector entities and local governments upon request to protect against, detect and respond to energy security threats, risks and incidents. The rural and municipal utilities cybersecurity reauthorization act will enable caesar to strengthen cybersecurity in electric, public power, and cooperative utilities.
▶ 0:39:45These utilities are targets for cyber attacks and can struggle to defend against advanced capabilities of nation state adversaries, often due to a lack of funding and personnel. This legislation helps to ensure small, rural utilities have access to the resources necessary to protect national security and provide reliable energy to residents.
▶ 0:40:07The secure grid act will help states mitigate risks posed to the electric grid by empowering them to fully assess and respond to cyber and physical threats, severe weather and other vulnerabilities. State energy security plans enable states to examine and respond to weaknesses in their own energy infrastructure.
▶ 0:40:28This legislation formalizes the inclusion of additional data to these reports, requiring states to consider threats posed to local facilities, as well as factors like increasing grid demands and vendor maintenance, authorizing the department to continue to implement csp duties will institutionalize the support for states to maintain, implement and advance these important plans.
▶ 0:40:52As automation drives pipeline owners and operators to rely on an increasingly complex web of interconnected devices, they must also implement security measures to protect their pipeline operations from evolving and emerging cyber risks. The pipeline and lng facility cybersecurity preparedness act authorizes doe to coordinate a voluntary approach to make the nation's pipeline system more reliable, resilient, and secure.
▶ 0:41:21Bless you as the sector risk management agency for the energy sector, doe already works closely with all parts of the energy sector to prepare for, respond to and recover from incidents. Doe coordinates closely with other agencies for an all of government response to emergencies.
▶ 0:41:39Doe is adept at deploying innovative solutions to complex problems, and will continue to do so in service to the american people, ensuring the us energy sector becomes more secure and resilient as this legislation continues to be refined, caesar and the department stand ready to provide technical assistance to ensure the legislation meets congressional intent and rises to the challenges posed by today's threat landscape.
▶ 0:42:04I appreciate the opportunity to appear before you today, and I look forward to working with you and your respective offices so that we can continue to strengthen american energy dominance and lower costs for hard working american families. I look forward to your questions. >> well, thank you very much. And this concludes our witnesses opening statement. And we'll move now to our members questions. And I'll begin with, uh, asking, uh, the first questions. Mr.
▶ 0:42:34Fitzsimmons, many of the bills before us today would involve the department hearing out requirements to secure our energy systems. We discussed whether the department has sufficient staff and resources to carry out its energy security responsibilities, including any responsibilities in this legislation that we have before us today. >> I believe we do. So, yes. >> thank you. D.o.e. Is the sector risk management agency for the energy sector.
▶ 0:43:01When the colonial pipeline attack occurred, shutting down this critical artery for fuel to the mid-atlantic into new york, doe played a critical role coordinating industry and state partners to support response efforts. Why does doe's deep expertise and institutional knowledge of the energy industry make it the appropriate agency to lead our nation's energy response efforts? >> that's a great question, chairman.
▶ 0:43:30Thank you for asking it. I think, as you pointed out, because doe is a sector risk management agency for the energy sector, and we have great technical resources both internally and at the doe national laboratories. Uh, it allows us to collaborate productively with the private sector. We all we are also not a regulator. So everything that at least in this space. So everything we do with the energy sector in the caesar office is done on a voluntary basis. So we've been able to build trust with the energy sector over time.
▶ 0:43:58And as a result of that, we host, uh, subsector coordinating councils with the power sector, with the oil and natural gas subsector, with our interagency partners. That convening authority, combined with our technical expertise, helps us collaborate productively with the energy sector. >> well, thank you. Other agencies have responsibilities over transportation systems. The doe has that role over the whole energy sector. Isn't that correct? >> yes.
▶ 0:44:26>> will you work with the committee to make sure that doe has the appropriate clarity to work to improve how the government supports our energy sector? >> absolutely. >> thank you. State energy security plans are a key opportunity for states to comprehensively address vulnerabilities in their interconnected energy systems.
▶ 0:44:47The secure act, of which I have sponsored would ensure that states are holistically incorporating local distribution supply chain risks that are critical to secure to a secure and resilient energy system. How might this secure grid act enhance the existing cept, uh, framework to ensure states address potential gaps in security protocols?
▶ 0:45:11>> yeah, I appreciate your leadership on this issue, because the state energy security plans are a vital component of the caesar mission. And it's one thing for us to sit here in washington and talk about energy security and resilience. But a lot of the work happens on the ground in local communities at the state and local level, combined with the efforts of the private sector and 80% of us energy infrastructure is owned and operated by the private sector, state and local governments that are on the ground working with these energy companies every single day.
▶ 0:45:40So that is why the the state energy security program plans and programs are an important part of our mission. And so this focus on the distribution system, I think is important because it allows us to take a comprehensive view. I mean, caesar's mission is to strengthen the security and resilience of the entire energy sector. And so our foreign adversaries, threat actors, are targeting the entire system.
▶ 0:46:07And so we need to make sure that the work that we do prioritizes the entire energy system. >> thank you. The trump administration has undergone an extensive review of financial assistance awarded under the previous administration. These efforts were undertaken to ensure that federal dollars aligned with national and economic security goals, and to ensure the viability of potential projects using finite taxpayer resources.
▶ 0:46:30We discussed the department's process to review financial assistance to ensure federal dollars fulfill the goals of the trump administration. >> happy to do so. Thank you for the question. So doe continuously reviews all of the projects within our portfolio. We have a responsibility as stewards of taxpayer resources to do so.
▶ 0:46:51We continuously review all the projects in our in our portfolio to make sure that they are consistent with national security and that projects that we fund with taxpayer resources have a pathway to technical, financial and economic feasibility, and that work will continue. >> thank you. Well, my last 22 seconds. Give me a quick answer to this one on the information sharing is really important because especially when you're talking about a lot of the smaller utilities out there, is that information timely shared.
▶ 0:47:22So if there's threats to the system out there, my last seven seconds. >> yes. And I think there's more we can do in that department to strengthen our ability to share information with the private sector. It's one of the most fundamental parts of the caesar mission. >> thank you very much. I want to follow up with you on that. And I yield back. And at this time, I recognize the gentlelady from florida, the ranking member of the subcommittee, for five minutes for questions. >> well, thank you, Mr. chairman. Thank you for appearing here. Mr. fitzsimons. Good to see you. Thank you.
▶ 0:47:50Um, you know, while the trump administration and the department of energy has been very busy canceling energy projects across the country, last year, doe had, uh, forced, uh, six old broken down coal plants in michigan, pennsylvania, indiana, colorado and washington to stay online.
▶ 0:48:14This includes plants that were days away from retirement and some that have been offline for months because they're broken. Um, these decisions already have cost customers over $163 million. And if the department of energy continues down this path, it estimates it would cost customers nearly $6 billion a year.
▶ 0:48:37Did you have a role in drafting the emergency orders under section 202c, to keep these six coal plants online last year? >> thank you for the question. As the director of caesar, yes. >> uh, on november 25th, doe ordered the eddystone gas and oil fuel generation facility in pennsylvania to delay its scheduled retirement for a third time based on a potential shortage of electric energy.
▶ 0:49:04Do you believe that pjm, the pjm region, faces a potential energy shortage? >> thank you for the question. Yes. >> um, for the record, pjm itself determined that closing the eddystone plant would not hurt grid reliability.
▶ 0:49:23And if you believe there is a an energy shortage in pjm, why did you take the what the federal court described as an arbitrary and capricious action to cancel offshore wind projects that were permitted and ready to go? >> I appreciate the question. I think it's important to clarify that pjm requested the 202 c order that you just referenced, and I think it's also important to recognize.
▶ 0:49:51>> you didn't you're not answering the question about canceling the offshore wind projects. >> sure. And I'm happy to get to that. But I think it's important to clarify the facts. And the facts in this case are that pjm requested that order and that those units that you referenced in pjm. >> you're. Still not answering, answering the question, uh, in a large swath of the mid-atlantic region, offshore wind has one of the highest resource adequacy scores among all energy types.
▶ 0:50:18In other words, when it comes to lowering the probability of blackouts, uh, offshore wind outcompetes all of the other sources of energy and is even on par with gas fired power plants right now. Pjm, uh, in pjm six hour, six hour battery contributes more to reliability than a gas fired combustion turbine thanks to the batteries reliability during winter.
▶ 0:50:45So what's coming out of doe just simply doesn't make any sense when it comes to cost. When it comes to reliability, um, you're you're still not. I think folks across the country and businesses, large and small, want to know why. Why the department of energy is, is like making life so much more expensive and canceling these projects. What is it? What is your how do you justify this? >> well, thank you for the question.
▶ 0:51:14Offshore wind is some of the most expensive energy that exists. I will say the energy system is designed to meet peak demand. And this is what the grid operators, you know, operate expensive. >> Mr. fitzsimmons, you know what's expensive? When a project and a business has invested billions of dollars, they've gone through and they've gotten permits, they've hired a bunch of people.
▶ 0:51:33And then at the 11th hour, uh, a, a president who is focused on retribution, uh, who what the court said acts in an arbitrary and capricious manner, comes and takes a hatchet to it, and it's costing people a lot of money and they're angry about it. There are petitions online saying mercy.
▶ 0:51:55And then when you add into it what the republicans have done and the big ugly bill to rip away savings, that's not making us more secure. It's not making the grid more reliable. It's not serving the best interests of this country. How do you answer that? >> well, I think on the specific issue of the offshore wind permits, those are doi permits. And so I'm sure that they would be happy to answer your question.
▶ 0:52:20What I would say about the resource adequacy more generally is that on day one, president trump declared a national energy emergency and that. >> are we in an energy emergency now? And they've made it worse. You've made it worse at the department of energy and the trump administration, because you've sabotaged it every step of the way. I hope you'll listen to the federal courts that are calling your actions arbitrary and capricious, and they're costing folks a lot of money, and it's got to stop. People are concerned about their bottom line. Thanks. >> the gentleman yields back.
▶ 0:52:52The chair now recognizes the vice chair of the subcommittee, the gentleman from texas, for five minutes for questions. >> thank you, Mr. chairman. Mr. chairman, thanks for being here. The fast act of 2015 designated in law that the department of energy is the sector risk management agency, which allows it to coordinate with federal and state agencies in identifying vulnerabilities, mitigating those vulnerabilities and responding to incidents that may impact the energy sector. This is critical for a cohesive government response to energy sector critical infrastructure. Wouldn't you agree?
▶ 0:53:24>> yes, sir. >> I want to be a little philosophical, if I can. I like to tell people that the things that make america great are the things that america makes. Now, how do we do that? We do that with a reliable, dependable power system. Electric grids included all of those things that we need, everything that we need to make this country great. And I would say it's the president's aim.
▶ 0:53:48It's the presidents of reason for doing all of the things he's doing that continues to make america great, so that we have a dependable, reliable, affordable energy supply. Would you agree? >> yes, I would, sir. And I would add to that that the energy system has to be built to meet peak demand in the summer and the winter, when electricity is needed most or people die. And quite frankly, you look at what newark has said.
▶ 0:54:17The head of newark has called the situation facing the grid due to the disastrous energy subtraction policies of the previous administration. As a five alarm fire for the grid, and that is simply because of the premature retirement of too much reliable, dispatchable generation. That is what is needed. That is what grid operators accredit.
▶ 0:54:39Capacity non-dispatchable resources do not get much capacity accreditation, so you can build as much non-dispatchable electricity generation as you want. It does not obviate the need for more reliable dispatchable generation, and that includes resources like nuclear and gas and coal and yes, batteries and geothermal and hydropower. All of those resources are needed to meet peak demand.
▶ 0:55:04We were unfortunately saddled with premature closures. We've had to come in and stabilize the energy system, and that's what we're doing right now. Now we're focused on optimizing and growing the energy system so that we can have an affordable, reliable and secure energy system for the american people. >> well, we appreciate you all doing that. And I'd have to add that pipelines are one of the most important components of that energy sector or energy systems, are they not? >> yes, sir.
▶ 0:55:34>> so we appreciate that doe and homeland security already work on the oil and natural gas subsector coordinating council, the authority for security standards over pipelines, already resides with the tsa, transportation security administration. Do you see any reason why multiple agencies cannot work together on important elements of our energy systems to make sure that we get the kind of energy you just described?
▶ 0:56:01>> now, of course, we can work together, and we already do work together through the oil and gas sub-sector coordinating council, as you mentioned, sir. >> so given doe's role as the sector specific authority for energy, would you think federal, state and stakeholder work would benefit from doe's efforts to improve and advance coordination, technical assistance, and other analysis consistent with its energy sector authorities? >> yes, I do. >> you're committed to working on that. >> absolutely. >> y'all are doing a great job. Mr.
▶ 0:56:30Fitzsimmons, do you believe that any guidance or regulations issued by the federal government should be implementable, implementable, say that ten times by private industry without imposing an undue burden? >> yes, absolutely. >> that's what energy needs. They need reliable. They need to know what the government is going to do and exactly how to do it.
▶ 0:56:50So how does the office of cybersecurity, energy security and emergency response work with industry to ensure that any rules issued by doe are practical and feasible to implement? >> yeah, I think in my capacity as caesar director and the role of the caesar mission, as I mentioned, is a is a voluntary one. I think that helps us build strong partnerships with the private sector because we know, you know, we are within the caesar office. You know, we are not a regulator.
▶ 0:57:16Of course we we partner with, you know, the interagency partners who who do have that, um, rulemaking authority. But our role is to partner proactively. We do that through information sharing. You know, as was mentioned with the itac, we do that through unity of message. Unity of of effort calls through the subsector, um, councils, as I mentioned, and I think we can always be doing more to strengthen our partnership with the energy sector.
▶ 0:57:45>> we appreciate that you're working with industry, and I guess I don't know if you have some training seminars. Maybe we need to teach our friends across the aisle that, uh, the dependable energy that we need is, let's face it, it's nuclear. Fossil fuel. Yes. It's wind. It's some wind energy, some solar. But I try to explain to them that the sun goes down at night, right. So the solar panels aren't producing, then. And have you ever noticed on the hottest day of the year, the wind doesn't blow. That's why it's the hottest day of the year. Mr. chairman, I yield back.
▶ 0:58:17>> the gentleman yields back. The chair now recognizes the gentleman from new jersey, the ranking member of the full committee for five minutes for questions. >> thank you, Mr. chairman. Uh, Mr. fitzsimmons, you heard me in my opening, expressed my concern over the cancellation of grants to democratic states. On december 23rd, the department of energy stipulated in court that the primary reason for its grant termination decisions in october was whether or not the awardee was in a democratic state.
▶ 0:58:45Uh, and in case my republican colleagues have any doubt, I'll just ask unanimous consent to enter the court filing. In the record, Mr. chairman, if you will. Thank you. So, Mr. smith, do you believe that the that the energy projects that receive government grants or loans should be the ones in states that voted for president trump? >> thank you for the question. No.
▶ 0:59:12We continuously review all of the projects in the doe portfolio to ensure the projects are consistent with us national security, and that they have a path to technical, financial and economic feasibility. That is a responsibility that we have as stewards of taxpayer resources, and that work will continue. >> well, again, I appreciate your saying no.
▶ 0:59:34Um, but I do want to read what it says in the in the court filing, it says the primary reason for the selection of which doe grant termination decisions were included in the october 2025 notice, tranche or tranche was whether the grantee was located in a blue state. So kind of contradicts what's said. But thank you. I'm glad you said no. So unfortunately, it appears that the secretary of energy and the president disagree with you.
▶ 1:00:01But if you believe that was wrong, then shouldn't all those awardees have their grants restored? >> our positions are entirely consistent because the process is, as I just explained it, we continuously review all of the projects in the doe portfolio. That is our job. That is our fundamental responsibility because we are stewards of taxpayer resources.
▶ 1:00:23We look at projects on an individualized basis, and we make decisions about whether they have a path to technical viability, economic and financial feasibility. That is our responsibility. >> well, I appreciate that, and I appreciate you saying that, um, that it's wrong to to make the primary decision whether or not you're in a democratic state. But I think it's quite clear that it is different from what, uh, what you're saying is different from what the president and secretary have been saying.
▶ 1:00:51Um, but, um, let me get to the second question. Um, because the other thing that keeps bothering me here is that my colleagues on the committee constantly say that they believe in an all of the above energy strategy. But I wanted to ask you, uh, whether yes or no, you don't have to get into it. Yes or no? Do you believe in an all of the above energy strategy? >> yes. For resources that can compete on a level playing field. >> okay.
▶ 1:01:21Well, the secretary energy right was very clear with us when he came before the subcommittee last year. And he said he does not believe in an all of the above energy strategy. I asked him a question. He said he doesn't. Um, so again, you're saying something different. I, I'm glad because I agree with you. I don't believe what the secretary and I certainly don't think that the secretary or the president have followed an all of the above energy strategy because they continue to deny anything that involves clean energy.
▶ 1:01:50Uh, and then and they keep stressing, uh, that they're, um, you know, that they want what I call dirty energy, prioritize, uh, fossil fuels. And they've moved the goalposts. They're canceling every single clean energy project they possibly can, no matter how helpful it might be to keeping electricity bills down or or keeping the lights on. I guess I'm hoping that maybe your comments today have moved.
▶ 1:02:16You know, maybe, maybe you can influence the secretary and the president to, uh, have in all above policy, uh, and to bring back these grants and not continue to prioritize grants that that only go to, uh, to republican states. But with that, Mr. chairman, I yield back. >> well, thank you very much. The gentleman yields back the balance of his time. The chair now recognizes the gentleman from kentucky. The chair of the full committee for five minutes for questions. >> thank you. I appreciate that.
▶ 1:02:46And and I remember, uh, secretary saying that and and I'll let him clarify his own words. But to me, they're not mutually exclusive. I'm for all the above, but I'm also for best of the above, as we say, all the above. Do you say, well, in in kentucky you need to have wind, solar. You have to have all of it. Or is natural gas is coal. Is that the best for your area in in arizona? Is it different?
▶ 1:03:08So I think all the above is the right policy, but I think the best above, depending on when you implement the where you implement the policy, uh, is is consistent. I just believe that. So Mr. fitzsimmons, during the first trump administration, secretary perry, uh, prioritized energy security, created seizure, uh, the office of cyber energy security emergency response. Would you agree?
▶ 1:03:31The current administration is also prioritizing energy security, which is reflected in how you align department functions with seizure. >> yes, absolutely. >> so it's no secret that our grids are under extreme distress. And so one of the the things that we've talked about is all the above is, is don't cancel projects that are take take production that's already out of this already. If it's in production, don't take it out of production.
▶ 1:03:57And so the seizure office under your leadership has issued several 202 c orders in high risk areas to ensure baseload and dispatchable power are available to keep lights on at an affordable price. Can you discuss the reason behind these 202 c orders? >> I'd be happy to do so, and I'd like to clarify. >> the impact on the bills. Utility bills by these orders. Okay. >> yes, chairman.
▶ 1:04:18I'd I'd like to first clarify and say that our positions are entirely consistent with the secretary and the president, as you know, as, as you described, I think the the energy system needs affordable, reliable and secure energy. But, you know, certain things work in certain circumstances. And I think we had we have a strategic rebalancing of the, uh, of, of our priorities on the energy side.
▶ 1:04:47Secretary rice calls it bringing back common sense to energy policy. I think that is because we had disastrous energy subtraction policies that led to what newark has called a five alarm fire for the grid, where we have prematurely shut down reliable, dispatchable generation that is needed to meet resource adequacy and with load growth, uh, resource adequacy and reserve margins are shrinking in all of the major rtos and
▶ 1:05:18Isos. It is a it is a serious concern. And so I think the secretary has rightly pointed out, is that, you know, some forms of energy enjoyed 30 years of preferential tax treatment, and at some point it is time to let those sources compete. And I think, look, you look at what eia has said and the secretary has said this, you will see more solar and storage capacity being added into the system. That is what eia tells us.
▶ 1:05:43At the same time, in order to meet the reserve margin requirements that are necessary for future load growth and to win the ai race, we need capacity that gets accredited by the grid operators and that is dispatchable capacity. So you can build as much non-dispatchable capacity as you want. It does not obviate the need for more always on electricity. Um, and so the secretary has exercised his authority under the federal power act.
▶ 1:06:11202c because president trump declared a national energy emergency on day one, that's been validated by what? By what newark has called a five alarm fire for the grid. It was also further validated by doe's resource adequacy report from last year, which found that on the current course set by the previous administration, the us was set to lose 100gw of dispatchable generation by 2030.
▶ 1:06:37At the same time, we may have to build around 100gw of new generation and supporting infrastructure to win the ai race and onshore manufacturing, the result of which would have been 100 times more blackouts 100 times, not 100 times more blackouts by 2030. That is an obviously unacceptable outcome to the president and to the secretary and to me and should be, uh, for all of us.
▶ 1:07:03And so that is why the the secretary has exercised his authority under 202 c to prevent premature retirements of dispatchable resources that the grid operators have said are necessary to meet future load growth. >> thank you. So today we're also dealing with ai and the need of energy, but by adversaries like china and what ai china be able to use ai to disrupt our energy systems? I have 20s left. Could you talk about ai and how you're preparing for them? Disrupting our energy system?
▶ 1:07:34>> yeah, yeah. We need, you know, way more than 20s to get into that. But yes, it is, um, increasingly sophisticated threat actors are investing in ai enabled offensive cyber weapons. That is a real serious and growing challenge. We've seen a lot of that coming out into into the public now. So, uh, that is a core mission of caesar in the fy 26 budget request.
▶ 1:07:56We have talked about this ai force program, ai for operationally resilient technologies and systems, that is prioritizing ai for cyber defense because as as threat actors invest in ai enabled offensive cyber weapons, we need to be doing everything that we can to use ai and the technological advances of ai to protect the. >> energy on my 20s. So I appreciate it and I yield back. >> thank you, thank you.
▶ 1:08:21The gentleman yields back the balance of his time, and the chair now recognizes, I believe, the gentleman from california's 50th district for five minutes for questions. >> thank you, Mr. chairman. >> I just want to say I heard the phrase level playing field, and I, I had to chuckle myself because we could argue about whether you want to subsidize mature energy technologies or not, but the notion that you would have to approve 69 separate steps, uh, personally by the secretary of the interior, that's what's happening with wind projects
▶ 1:08:52Now. Uh, that would never happen to any other energy source. The notion that that's some sort of level playing field is kind of a joke to me. And, um, I think the other thing I'd point out to you, you talk about dispatchable power as if it's, um, as if it's, um, self-explanatory. But, you know, it's interesting to me that what texas did when its natural gas system failed in their superstorm and people died from cold, what did they do to reduce their risk of blackout? They did not add more natural gas.
▶ 1:09:21They added solar and batteries to reduce the risk of blackouts and brownouts from 10% to 1%, because batteries are how the grid is moving. And around the world, other countries are moving toward solar and wind because it's the fastest to get on the grid with batteries to help around the clock. So, um, this notion of the level playing field, that's bs. It's just not what's happening at all. Uh, we're also told in california that blm is not even processing solar permits.
▶ 1:09:47So I'm, I'm, I'm willing to join you in a real level playing field where technology is get to compete. And around the world where there are competing, um, places like china are adding a lot more renewables in, I think. I think I'd like to do that, but what you told me is just not right. There's not a level playing field in this administration period. But I wanted to talk about something else. And that's wildfires.
▶ 1:10:09You know, the the hearing was supposed to be about, um, about physical and cyber threats, wildfire related costs, including proactive investments in post-disaster recovery, make up 40% of california's utility rate increases. And it's clear we have to do more to work on that. Um, we need to do more coordination and information sharing between federal agencies and states that would unlock the full potential of any money and effort the federal government spends on wildfire mitigation.
▶ 1:10:37We have to fix our forest acts, which passed the house, which I did with chairman bruce westerman of natural resources. I hope that will become law this congress and the house version of this bill, um, created something called the fire shed center. The senate version calls it the wildlife intelligence center, but the goals are the same. It's a national one stop shop for wildfire intelligence coordination and response.
▶ 1:10:58It would be empowered to work with states, utilities and communities to mitigate fire threats, consolidating real time information on wildfires and wildfire risks through this federal hub will will promote preparedness, real time decision making, and wildfire response. Um and the national science foundation, national labs and other departments, potentially including caesar, would be involved in the governance priorities. So I wanted to see if you would talk a little bit about that. Mr. Mr.
▶ 1:11:25Fitzsimmons, um, can you talk about how that energy threat analysis center, or itac, would help reduce the risk of wildfire to utility infrastructure and make the utility infrastructure less subject to that kind of risk? >> yeah. Thank you for the question. I think one of caesar's fundamental missions is to provide timely and actionable information to the energy sector. Itac is one of the mechanisms that we have to do that. I think the benefit of itac as a capability is that we are it's in a physical place.
▶ 1:11:54We're able to co-locate cleared industry partners who are operating the energy system on a day to day basis and get them working collaboratively with doe staff, with staff from the from the ic community, and working on analyzing threat information, cyber and physical threat information in real time, figuring out what's real, what's not, how big of a problem a specific threat is, figuring out how to mitigate it, and then getting that information back out to the
▶ 1:12:25Private sector in a timely manner. >> well, there's something we agree on. This is bipartisan legislation, I think, uh, widely supported. I think we have enough democrats now in the in the senate to get this passed. We appreciate the administration's support and look forward to working with you, uh, to mitigate wildfire risks to the grid, but also the tremendous pollution impacts that result from not managing our forests correctly. And I yield back. >> thank you. The gentleman yields back the balance of his time.
▶ 1:12:50The chair now recognizes the gentleman from alabama sixth district for five minutes for question. >> thank you, Mr. chairman. Um, I wonder sometimes about the advocacy for renewables is more about the radical climate change agenda and the science on that's changing daily.
▶ 1:13:11But in regard to, to china and some of the other countries, china is building coal fired power plants at a rapid, almost record pace. And they're also building, uh, nuclear small modular reactors, but particularly on the coal fired side of things. One of the claims is, is that they're doing it to provide grid stability and security to back up their intermittent renewable grid. So I just think that's that's interesting.
▶ 1:13:40Um, I would like to try to get us back on topic somewhat, but, um, part of the the issue with, with grid security offices, the risk of cyber attack, we saw that in alabama in 2021 with the colonial pipeline ransomware attack. It's all part of that, um, that that we need to harden our systems against that. But it's also going back to this displacement issue.
▶ 1:14:09Uh, the miso, the midcontinent independent system operators were predicting brownouts and blackouts because of of the shutting down of hydrocarbon, uh, power plants and not making up the power generation that was needed. And as a matter of fact, back last summer, there were 100,000 customers in new orleans, went without power for a whole day. Uh, and that's one of the reasons why secretary. Right. Uh, kept the power, the coal fired power plant.
▶ 1:14:40Michigan, uh, open. I think it was, um, the the j.w. Campbell facility. So that that didn't happen, uh, to other customers in the midcontinent region. Can you comment on that? >> yes, I'd be happy to do so. I think it's an important issue and an important question. So thank you for asking it. Absolutely.
▶ 1:15:00I mean, what you are talking about, the ability, the necessary, uh, ability to provide to keep the lights on, to provide electricity to people when they need it is something that we, frankly, take for granted here in the united states. And we are one of the lucky 1 billion that have access that enjoy the the way of life that we do, um, that that are energy abundant. The energy grid works the vast majority of the time.
▶ 1:15:28There are many, many more billions of people around the world who are not as fortunate as us. But unfortunately, we are. We are putting that at risk if we do not prioritize the right forms of power that are necessary to meet resource adequacy. And the nonpartisan grid operators are are telling us they're practically yelling at this point. They're saying, we have a five alarm fire on the grid.
▶ 1:15:56Our reserve margins are shrinking, energy demand is growing, and we need resources that that they will accredit capacity for. It means resources that work when you need it, when they need it to meet peak demand, because that is what the system is built for. There's a lot of slack in the system. The the vast majority of the time. But energy is needed most during summer and winter peaks, and we're increasingly getting more winter peaks in the united states.
▶ 1:16:24And so that means we need the resources that are reliable and dispatchable because they are higher value to the system. So it doesn't matter how much non-dispatchable resource you build, you still have to build non-dispatchable. You still have to build more dispatchable resource. And otherwise if you don't and you're overbuilding in one and you're shutting down the other, you're going to result in higher energy prices. And that's what we've seen.
▶ 1:16:53Energy prices rose 20% and a lot higher. And a lot of places under the previous administration, because even if you shut down those reliable base load dispatchable units, you still need them. It doesn't matter how much non-dispatchable. >> you need to point this out to that, uh, that cold weather is more dangerous for people than than hot weather. That and they found that out in europe because they didn't have the the power bills are so high, people couldn't afford to keep their homes adequately warm.
▶ 1:17:24And I think it was reported 67,000 people died. But the main thing that I want to say about, uh, grid reliability is and the arms race that we're in with china, with ai, we will not be able to compete in that arms race if we do not have reliable, dispatchable power. And the demands for that power are enormous. It's going to be one of the greatest national security challenges that this country faces, not just on the supply chain for rare earth elements, critical minerals, but being able to provide the power that will allow us to compete. And if he has time, he can respond, I yield back.
▶ 1:17:56>> well, thank you very much. The gentleman yields back the balance of this time. The chair now recognizes the gentleman from new jersey's eighth district for five minutes for questions. >> uh, thank you, chairman. Uh, Mr. simmons, yes or no, would you agree that cybersecurity threats from malicious actors are on the rise and worsening each year? Yes, I think that's fair to say. And would you agree that they represent a serious threat to the reliability of our energy grid? Yes or no? Yes, I think that's fair. Thank you.
▶ 1:18:22And would you agree that the department of energy has a vital and irreplaceable role to play in using its subject matter expertise to ensure energy stays reliable in the face of cyber threats? Yes, I would, and can you confirm that since the start of this administration, there have been 3500 firings or layoffs or terminated roles at the department of energy? >> thank you for the question. There have been a number all across the department. Yes. >> roughly 3500. >> sure. That's a fair number.
▶ 1:18:51>> that'd be about a 20% reduction. And the staff at the department of energy, which brings me to my next question. So last week, president trump announced that the united states will run venezuela and control sales of venezuelan oil indefinitely. The department of energy and secretary right, are heavily involved in this process, and secretary rice has already said that revenues would be used to stabilize evansville's economy and repay major oil companies. That's a massive undertaking, especially given that doe has no special expertise in these areas.
▶ 1:19:18Can you briefly explain the extent to which the doe is involved in the running of venezuela? >> thank you for the question. We have a lot of extensive expertise in the energy sector, as you just mentioned. >> of course, because the department of energy. Yes. What is the extent to which you are involved? The doe is involved with the running of venezuela. >> thank you for the question. Under president trump's bold leadership, the people of venezuela are now going to have a more prosperous. >> I'd really I only have five minutes. What is the dose role in the running of venezuela?
▶ 1:19:49>> I think what you have seen president trump say is there is now a historic energy deal that secretary rice is helping to implement. That will be a win, win win. It'll be a win for the people of venezuela. >> historic. Historic means unprecedented, right. So the doe has never been involved in anything like this. Is that correct? >> anything like what? >> anything like the historic deal that you just mentioned in terms of venezuela and its oil program? >> we've never run venezuela before. Yeah. That's correct. Safe. That would be a safe thing to say. >> I agree.
▶ 1:20:18That's why it's unprecedented historical. So my question to you is the doe's involvement with venezuela putting a strain on the department's capacity to address the number of domestic issues, including cyber issues? >> no, no. >> okay. I find that hard to believe because this undertaking comes at the same time as massive staffing cuts across the department. You said it's about 3500 people, which is a 20% reduction compared to what the staff was in september of 2024. I think it's easy to say that the president is already asking the department to do more with fewer resources.
▶ 1:20:49So it seems that we're diverting attention from our domestic issues to address what he wants to do in venezuela, and doing so with a 20% reduction in the workforce. You have no concerns about the doe's capacity and ability to run venezuela and a deal with the issues that we here have we have here domestically in the united states. >> more staff does not mean more success.
▶ 1:21:13Under the previous administration, you saw 20% increase in staff at doe. And we are executing our mission. We're doing it well and. >> you have no concerns. >> I'm sorry. >> you have no concerns about being able to do all of these things with the current staff levels that you have at the doe. >> as I said, the historic energy deal that president trump. >> yes or no, do you have so you have no concerns? Is that correct? >> I think we are executing our mission. >> all right. So you said that staff's not important.
▶ 1:21:41If the administration's focus was on better protecting our country from cyber threats, why then did the trump administration cancel more than $2 billion worth of funding for communities to harden their energy infrastructure against severe weather? >> thank you for the question. As I have said, he has a responsibility to conduct a rigorous review process. We are continuously reviewing all of the projects in the portfolio.
▶ 1:22:04>> isn't there a sense of urgency to make sure that communities and our country has the resources that have been appropriated by congress to go to work to harden our infrastructure and protect our communities. >> and we have a responsibility to make sure that the projects that we're funding with taxpayer resources advance national security and have a path to technical, economic and financial viability. I'd be happy to discuss. We'd be happy to discuss any specific projects in a separate setting.
▶ 1:22:31In a separate briefing with you today, we're here to talk about your important cyber bills and the work that we can do together to strengthen the security and resiliency. >> yeah, and that work is critically important. Right. But I'm I'm concerned about a deviation of mission from the doe to address those issues here domestically. When the doe's tasked with running venezuela, as you confirmed earlier with the secretary rice involvement in doing, as you said, historic, unprecedented involvement in a foreign country.
▶ 1:22:58As you said, we've never run venezuela before, and now we are. So it strikes me as we have an immense amount of work to do here in this country. And the administration is not focused on that work, not focused on driving down the cost for all american consumers. It's focused instead on venezuela and the decision that the president made. I think it's ill advised I yield back. >> thank you. The gentleman's time has expired yields back. The chair now recognizes the gentleman from georgia's 12th district for five minutes for questions.
▶ 1:23:29>> uh. Thank you, Mr. chairman, for holding this important hearing on securing our energy infrastructure. Um, I come from the construction industry. Um, I have a small townhouse here in D.C. and, uh, had to replace, uh, both of the heat pumps. I questioned why heat pumps were in the home in the first place. Because heat pumps don't work below 30 degrees.
▶ 1:23:55You cannot heat a home with a heat pump below. So you have to go to, uh, uh, direct electric, uh, heat, which is very expensive and requires a lot of power on your emergency heat side. So I asked about gas, and I got a gas line. I found a gas line. They marked it in front of my townhouse, and obviously it used to be heated by gas and, um, uh, a price to gas unit.
▶ 1:24:24It was much less expensive than this. Uh, and with a higher cr rate on the air conditioning side and, uh, but I couldn't get it permitted. That's what we're up against, sir. Um, I mean, these people don't know what they're talking about.
▶ 1:24:43I mean, uh, you know, and I just use that as, you know, the people of america need to understand what the heck is going on right before our eyes. And they're going to be people that are going to freeze to death because we don't we can't get gas pipelines in certain areas of this country.
▶ 1:25:05So with that, um, I'm proud to say that adjacent to my district is the savannah river site located in south carolina. Uh, there we have the savannah river national lab. It plays a critical role in grid security. Uh, how do you view the role of a of the national labs in general in grid security, and how you working with them? >> thank you for the question.
▶ 1:25:34I think the national labs are play an important role in doe's mission and caesar's mission to strengthen the security and resilience of the energy sector. Caesar, in particular, partners with a lot of the doe national laboratories to do everything from, uh, sharing energy threat information with the private sector to supply chain testing.
▶ 1:25:54We have a program called citrix where we will procure grid components and test them for, uh, cyber vulnerabilities, figure out how to mitigate it, and then get back, get that information back out to the to the private sector. That's only possible because of the of of the expertise at, uh, at the national labs. So they're, you know, they play an important role. >> well, uh, I'm glad that you've got them involved. Obviously.
▶ 1:26:22I hope we have also those who are responsible for generating this power and this incredible need. We're going to need. We we have before us in this ai race, and that you're talking with them about what they need to meet these demands, because china is, uh, is is producing and providing production facilities, uh, that are lapping our capabilities currently.
▶ 1:26:50Uh, and these ai facilities, if they're not built here, guess where they're going? They're going to china. Mhm. Uh, and that is uh, that is a big problem. Um, in talking about this strategy of the previous administration, I challenge my colleagues. This the previous administration was not an all out energy, all in energy.
▶ 1:27:17It was the transition of energy from the traditional process to a sustainable process. Um, and obviously we know what that has done to us because like I said, again, I know people who have homes in certain areas of this country that cannot use, can't get permitted gas, heat. And, uh, here's the deal.
▶ 1:27:40From 8:00 to 4:00 under very cold weather, they were told that their power would be cut off. So all those folks had to run out and buy a generator that's using lp gas. This is this is what's nuts. And, you know, and here today y'all are talking about this. You're an expert. What's the plan? We got 22 seconds. >> thank you for the question.
▶ 1:28:12I think it is important that we preserve a wide range of options and consumer appliances, energy choices for the american people, especially from a regulatory standpoint. We should make sure we're not regulating products out of the marketplace. If people want to have a natural gas appliance, they have that right. I think. And, you know, as as a us citizen. Yes. And I think your important focus on the facts is right, because we need to make sure that we are paying attention to the facts.
▶ 1:28:41Say the congressman knows that. I know that, uh, we are not running venezuela, and we're happy to have a discussion about, uh, the historic energy deal that president trump brokered in venezuela. >> but I'm out of time, I yield back. Thank you, sir, for your service. >> the chair recognizes the gentlelady from virginia's fourth district for five minutes for questions. >> thank you. Chairman and ranking member castor, for holding this very important hearing today.
▶ 1:29:09Um, we all agree we must strengthen the security and reliability of our electric grid to ensure that it can weather a growing number of challenges and threats that can impact its operation and inflict devastating harm on the american people and the american economy.
▶ 1:29:24And that's why I've frankly been alarmed by many of the actions of the trump administration has taken to undermine our grid security, sabotage clean and renewable energy sources that would have increased energy capacity and reliability, and coddle outdated technologies whose persistence, as part of our energy strategy creates more opportunities for risk. And as we see demand increase, uh, energy prices have surged, rising 13% in 2025.
▶ 1:29:54So I'm very concerned not only that we get grid reliability reliability, right, but that we are managing our demand so that we can meet it affordably. So Mr. fitzsimons, you told Rep. representative castor, ranking member castor, that you believed that pjm faces a potential energy shortage? Uh, yes or no?
▶ 1:30:21Do you agree that efforts to mitigate the impact of data centers will have on regional and local grids will also help mitigate a potential energy shortage? >> I think that's a question of supply and demand, and that is what the resource adequacy challenge boils down to supply and demand. >> so yes, you would agree that if we can help mitigate the impact data centers have on the grid, that will help to reduce an energy shortage, that's a good thing. >> yeah.
▶ 1:30:51As I said, anything we can do on on the load side as well as the generation side to balance supply and demand in the energy system is a good thing. >> thank you. I agree with that. So you have overseen the cancellation of hundreds of previously awarded grants under the inflation reduction act and the infrastructure investment and jobs act.
▶ 1:31:08One of those cancellations was in virginia, the cancellation of an over $233 million in grants that focused on everything from energy efficiency to grid reliability, and one of those grants was an $85.4 million grant awarded to the virginia department of energy to study ways grid enhanced technology could be used to reduce the impacts of data centers on local and regional grids.
▶ 1:31:37Virginia is the data capital center of the globe and growing, so you can imagine how critically important it is to manage exploding energy demand resulting from the growth of data centers, which will only get worse as ai use continues to grow. And as you have heard, one of this committee's priorities is to make sure that the united states wins the ai race with china. That means more and more demand is going to be put on the grid, and we have to take efforts to mitigate it.
▶ 1:32:05And so I'm very concerned by those actions of the administration. Now, do you, Mr. fitzsimons, yes or no? Do you agree that improved grid flexibility and efficiency will help mitigate energy demand? >> yes, it can under the right circumstances. >> okay. Your office is also canceled or virginia grant to develop and deploy a pioneering set of sensors and other devices to monitor and control grid transmission and distribution.
▶ 1:32:33This technology would have increased grid flexibility, allowing for utilities to improve efficiency and mitigate the effects of localized outages. This is exactly the sort of technology that witnesses in prior hearings have told this committee, uh, that that would be necessary to improve the overall security and resiliency and reliability of our grids. So I'm concerned about that cancellation. Um, Mr.
▶ 1:33:01Fitzsimons, witnesses in prior hearings have also told this committee that the hodgepodge of old, outdated technologies and modern cyber tools that comprise our grid create gaps that contribute to vulnerabilities in the grid security. Do you agree with that? >> uh, with, uh, uh, can you ask that question again, just the end part.
▶ 1:33:22>> do you agree that the hodgepodge of old, outdated technologies and modern cyber tools that comprise our grid creates gaps that contribute to vulnerabilities to the grid security? As other witnesses have told this committee? >> yes, I think it's important that we invest in upgrading energy infrastructure. >> 30s, thank you for that.
▶ 1:33:40So, um, I also just want to say that you've played a role in the recent reorganization of the department of energy that has led to 3500 experienced career staffers departing the agency, and given the increasing complexity of the threats, especially cybersecurity threats that face our grid, this does not make sense. It doesn't make sense to pile an expanding and increasingly complicated and sensitive workload onto a shrinking and ever more stressed out workforce.
▶ 1:34:10With that, I yield back. >> the gentleman's time has expired and yields back. The chair now recognizes. >> Mr. chairman, I'd like to entertain something to the record. >> oh. Gentleman's recognized. >> I have a report here from the department of energy in regard to my colleague and friends concerns about personnel changes at the department of energy points out that there's over 95,000 contractors that work with the department of energy. I think it verifies what Mr.
▶ 1:34:40Fitzsimmons was saying about their ability to do their job. I yield back. >> without objection. So ordered. The chair now recognizes the gentleman from ohio's 12th district for five minutes for questions. >> thank you, Mr. chairman. Mr. chairman, thank you for being here today. Um, I'd like to briefly start off and discuss the reliability insight report on the interconnected gas electric systems posted by newark last year.
▶ 1:35:02While this report focuses on the physical and operational threats and concerns to the interconnected gas and electrical systems, the paper notes. Ensuring the reliance of natural gas storage pipelines, compressor stations and liquefied natural gas facilities is essential for the electric industry to meet its reliability obligations. Mr. fitzsimmons, can you expand on the cybersecurity risk specific to the production and delivery of natural gas to end users?
▶ 1:35:33And then I'll follow up with furthermore, what do you think these threats mean to our constituents and the reliability of the bulk power system? If bad actors take out or reduce the delivery of natural gas? >> yeah. Thank you for the question. I think there there's only so much you can say about specific threats in this setting in an unclassified setting.
▶ 1:35:53But I would say that the threats facing our our energy infrastructure, growing energy infrastructure, natural gas infrastructure included is, is significant and is important, especially as we are using more abundant, affordable, reliable natural gas in our energy system. You know, we know that. And that's a tremendous resource that we have. And threat actors also know that.
▶ 1:36:17And so threat actors will target the most critical subcomponents of of the energy system, um, because they know that that's where they can do damage. >> thank you, Mr. fitzsimmons. We live in a world in which major cyber threats can have far reaching implications for the entire sectors. The discovery of significant advanced persistent threats such as salt, typhoon and typhoon and volt typhoon requires rapid information sharing and immediate mitigation.
▶ 1:36:45Doe's energy's threat analysis center, or itac, is relatively new program, but a critical one for the electric sector to enhance cyber threat coordination across industry and government. As etec continues to expand and mature, what are your strategic goals for the program in the coming years? >> yeah, thank you for the question. As I've mentioned, I think fundamental responsibility of caesar is to provide timely and actionable information to the energy sector.
▶ 1:37:13I think that is an asymmetric capability in the sense that as federal as the federal government, we have access to classified information that the majority of the private sector does not. And yet we know that 80% of us energy infrastructure is owned and operated by the private sector. So it is ultimately their responsibility to own and operate that infrastructure.
▶ 1:37:36And but we have access to threat information about the specific vulnerabilities and threats that our energy operators face on a day to day basis. And so itac is one of the important capabilities that we have to reduce the amount of time and latency in when threat information comes in.
▶ 1:37:54In a classified setting, getting tear lines that can be declassified, getting that information that is highly technical in front of cleared industry partners who work every day to operate the system in partnership with doe staff, figure out what the most severe threats and vulnerabilities are, and then develop ways to mitigate that and get that out to the private sector as rapidly as possible. >> well done. Thank you. Uh, my last question.
▶ 1:38:20The secure grid act would ensure that state energy security plans consider threats to local distribution lines, as well as supply chain and weather related vulnerabilities. Can you discuss why it's important that these plans consider threats to local electric distribution? Absolutely. >> I think it's incredibly important both on the cyber and the physical side. As I've mentioned, caesar's mission is to strengthen security and resilience of the entire energy system.
▶ 1:38:49And so the state energy security plans need to reflect the entire threat landscape. And so not just the generation and transmission system, but all the way, all the way down to the, uh, uh, to that, to that system level, you know, at, uh, at that level where, um, power and electricity is getting transmitted directly to homes and businesses, that is often the, the front line in, in, in, in the fight, it's often some of the least secured
▶ 1:39:20Part of the, uh, you know, of the energy system. And so I think it's incredibly important as we're taking a comprehensive approach to security and resilience, that the state energy security plans include that as well. >> thank you very much, Mr. chairman, I yield back. >> thank you very much. Gentleman. Yields back the balance of his time. The chair now recognizes gentlelady from colorado's first district for five minutes. >> thank you so much, Mr. chairman. Um, Mr.
▶ 1:39:44Fitzsimons, I've been listening with interest to your testimony today, and I heard you say, first of all, you agreed that, um, that the department has an all of the above energy policy in general, correct? Yes or no? >> that's not necessarily what. >> I don't believe in. All in all of the above policy. >> I said, I believe in in all of the above policy, under the right conditions, a level playing field. >> one of the issues you look at is cost. Is that correct?
▶ 1:40:14>> of course. >> and one of the issues and why we're here today is you look at the issue of national security. Is that correct? >> absolutely. >> now in in looking at what the department's policy is on an energy system and a grid, one of the criteria you look at is not political retribution in your policies. Is that right, or is political retribution one of the factors you use when you determine grants and so on? >> it's certainly not a factor we use, as I talked about.
▶ 1:40:45>> now as thank you, sir, as acting undersecretary of energy, you oversee the office of energy dominance financing, formerly known as the loan program office. Is that correct? >> yes. >> and are you aware that doe canceled over $600 million across 38 awards in colorado? Yes or no. >> I don't know the exact numbers. But they did. >> those projects right.
▶ 1:41:13Uh, were you aware that one of the canceled grants was for a project creating a zero emission, cooling, heating, and power system with the specific intent of enhancing flexibility and resiliency during grid outages? >> thank you for the question. I'm not. No, you. >> don't need to thank me for the questions. Just answer them yes or no. >> I'm not familiar with that. >> you're not. >> familiar project. >> now developing a more secure grid requires making the grid more resilient. Is that correct?
▶ 1:41:44>> I'm just trying to be nice. >> is that. >> correct question? I'm sorry. Can you repeat the question? >> developing a more secure grid requires making the grid more resilient. >> certainly. >> and yet, doe canceled grants awarded from the grid development office to a colorado utility for supporting rural electric co-ops and upgrading upgrading grid infrastructure. Were you aware of that?
▶ 1:42:13>> if you'd like to discuss any specific projects, I'd be happy. So you're not a follow up discussion with you and your staff now. >> you told Mr. allen that national labs pay and play an important role in developing your policies. Is that correct? The research? >> certainly. >> okay.
▶ 1:42:32Were you aware that the administration canceled grants to colorado universities and targeted energy efficient and renewable energy funds, which accounts for the majority of nrel district? Um, and let me just give you the specifics. It accounts for 64% of nrel budget in fiscal year 24, but the president's budget would have reduced the funding by 74%.
▶ 1:43:00And under the proposed budget, it would see it's 2025 year funding zeroed out in 26. Does that help us with the research that we're doing? >> well, first, I'd like to say it's a national lab of the rockies and rock. And I think it has an important. >> oh, I'm sorry. >> right. You changed. >> the name of it to take the renewable energy part out. You are correct. So go ahead. >> and that was done to recognize that expansion of the mission. >> do you think those cuts to the budget are going to help with the research that you need?
▶ 1:43:31>> I think that more money does not necessarily mean more success. You need to look at priorities and you don't think how the money is being used. >> okay, I have one more question. And that's about the coal plant that at the end of last month, the administration offered to stay open in western colorado. And that is the, um, uh, what is that plant called, craig? Unit one. You know about that? >> yes. I'm aware.
▶ 1:43:59>> were you aware that the tri state, uh, the tri state power, um, association had been planning for five years to take that plant off offline? >> I'm aware of the growing resource adequacy needs in the. >> region, aware that they had been planning to take that offline. >> I'm aware that we need as much dispatchable. Reliable. >> you're not. >> answering my question.
▶ 1:44:24>> are you aware that tri state, in conjunction with the colorado public utilities commission, had determined that the grid would not be affected by taking it offline? >> I just don't agree with that assessment. >> but you know. >> that you've seen about the the growing resource adequacy challenges that our nation is facing. The grid operators have called it a five alarm fire. >> so you know more than they do about their plant. Did you know it's going to cost them $21 million to bring that back up open?
▶ 1:44:56>> I'm citing the nonpartisan grid operators who have said that. >> you know, it's. >> going to. >> cost $21 million. >> well, it's an incredibly valuable resource. >> thank you. I yield. >> back, and if you'd like, you could submit the question in writing. >> Mr. chairman, I appreciate that, and I will. >> thank you. The chair now recognizes the gentleman from texas 11th district for five minutes for questions. Thank you. >> Mr. chairman. It's nice to have an administration who believes in reliability and reality, uh, and not butterflies and unicorns and things that are pie in the sky.
▶ 1:45:27Um, I want to ask about the supply chain risk to the electric grid, particularly risk tied to foreign manufactured equipment. Recent reporting has indicated that certain chinese manufactured solar and battery inverters deployed to the us grid contained undisclosed communication devices that could potentially allow remote access or disruption of grid operations. And in response to those concerns, I led a letter with my colleague, Mr. balderson, to the department of commerce urging action to protect the grid from high risk foreign technologies. Mr.
▶ 1:45:55Chairman, uh, with unanimous consent, I'd like to enter this letter for the record. >> without objection. So ordered. Thank you. >> uh, and given doe's role as the energy sector risk management agency, I'd like to, uh, to ask how the department views and responds to these types of risks. I'll start with, from doe's perspective, do foreign manufactured grid components with undocumented communications or control capabilities present a legitimate cybersecurity and national security concern for the energy sector? >> yes.
▶ 1:46:24>> how does doe through caesar access and monitor risk associated with inverter based resources and other digitally enabled grid equipment that may be manufactured or programed abroad? >> yeah, that's a great question. I share your concern. I think it's a very important issue.
▶ 1:46:41I mean, you know, as, as I've mentioned, uh, country of origin matters, but I think what matters even more is our ability to test critical supply chain components, especially as more of these, uh, more of these fiber resources are growing and being added to the energy system every day. And so I think there's only so much we can talk about specific vulnerabilities in this setting in an unclassified setting.
▶ 1:47:04But I think suffice to say that caesar has a robust supply chain testing program that's called citrix, where we can procure grid components. We have looked at some of the technologies that that you're focused on.
▶ 1:47:18We can get them in front of experts at the doe national labs, tear them apart, find the, uh, find the cyber risks, find unknown or known issues with them, figure out how to mitigate it, and then figure out how to get that information back out to the private sector. I think we need to be doing a lot more of that work as we look on, as we look to build out more, uh, components to meet load growth. And when the ai race and onshore manufacturing. >> well, that's a perfect segue into my next question.
▶ 1:47:45So when a potential vulnerability is identified and widely deployed equipment, uh, how does doe coordinate with the various agencies, including dhs and commerce, um, and anyone else, in order to share that information, those vulnerabilities and what, you know, in the appropriate setting with the private sector and with the utilities. >> yeah, I think that is incredibly important because other agencies are involved in looking at specific cyber risks.
▶ 1:48:16They have intel that we may not have that intel gets shared with doe. And then, uh, when it's energy specific, we'll get brought in to figure out, well, how severe is the risk and what can we do from an engineering standpoint to test and mitigate it. So we're focused on looking at looking at various risks in context to figure out how we can best inform and mitigate those risks. >> is that happening on a regular basis?
▶ 1:48:43Is there a regularly scheduled meeting with stakeholders that are pre-identified? Can you kind of walk me through what that looks like? >> yeah. Our citrix program is led by caesar. It's a multi lab effort. Uh, that is that that is funded every year and they meet on a regular basis and also on an as needed basis. So I think that's one of the and I think we have to have that flexibility.
▶ 1:49:07So we have programs just kind of trying to look ahead at what the threat landscape is saying so we can figure out, well what kinds of grid components should we be procuring for testing. But then we also are able to respond rapidly if we get specific real time threat information about an active situation, we're able to go to cleared industry partners. We're able to to find specific components and and do some rapid testing on them. So I think having that flexibility is important.
▶ 1:49:34>> um, would the legislation or consideration today help the department of energy improve coordination, information sharing and response to emerging threats that cut across cybersecurity, supply chains, grid operations, etc. >> yes, I think it would. >> are there any needed changes to that, or is it in the form that we're we're looking at refine to meet the challenge and meet the vulnerabilities?
▶ 1:49:58>> I think, uh, certainly, uh, I think that the on a conceptual basis, I think it makes sense. I know we're providing specific to and we're happy to follow up with you about it. >> we've got 40s left. Um, are there previous questions, uh, that you didn't get to that you wanted to expand on? Uh, either on our side of the aisle or, uh, on the other side of the aisle. >> uh, thank you for the opportunity.
▶ 1:50:22I would say there were there were comments made about, uh, the, uh, situation in venezuela. And I think the congressman is no longer here, knows that we are not running venezuela. I think what president trump has said is he has brokered an historic energy deal. That president right, that secretary right is now implementing. And that deal will be a win win win. It will be a win for the people of venezuela.
▶ 1:50:51It will be a win for us energy companies, and it will be a win for the american people in the form of lower energy prices. That's what we're focused on at doe. >> we will be taking a look at that and I yield back. >> the gentleman's time has expired. Pardon me. And yields back. The chair now recognizes the gentleman from new york's 20th district for five minutes for questions. >> thank you, Mr. chair, and welcome, Mr. fitzsimmons.
▶ 1:51:12Um, do you agree that utilities all across our country are facing threats, whether that's cyber threats or physical threats, extreme weather events that can cause energy emergencies? >> yes, I'd say that's fair. >> and do you agree that utilities can make sensible investments in resilience to help prevent or mitigate some of those threats that they are facing or will face? >> yes, I think they should.
▶ 1:51:39>> well, I agree with your assessment, and it's why I'm very excited that some smaller utilities, um, in upstate new york, have been taking steps to improve the resilience of their systems. One municipality, uh, one municipal utility in upstate new york in particular, had been pursuing a microgrid project that will help ensure that the local hospital, first responders and other essential services can continue operating during a grid disruption.
▶ 1:52:05This project was being made possible by a $17.4 million department of energy grip grant. Unfortunately, this was one of those 321 awards terminated by your agency in october, according to doe's own documents, essentially 100% of the terminated awards, representing 7.56 billion in funding, were led by a primary applicant located in a state that did not support president
▶ 1:52:36Trump in the 2024 election. That seems like more than just a coincidence. And on december 23rd, the department of energy confirmed to a federal court that, and I quote, a primary reason for the selection of which doe grant termination decisions were included in the october 2025 notice tranche was whether the grantee was located in a blue state. So, Mr.
▶ 1:53:03Fitzsimmons, we agreed just a minute ago that the potential for energy emergency is a serious risk all across the country. Can you explain the logic behind exclusively canceling awards with applicants located in states that did not vote for president trump, even for projects that support grid resilience, like the one that I previously described? >> thank you for the question. We do not agree with the courts filing. As I have stated, we have an ongoing review process.
▶ 1:53:31We are continuously reviewing projects in the doe portfolio and the criteria we use our national security than we need to see. Make sure that projects that are funded with taxpayer resources have a path to technical, economic, and financial viability. That's the criteria we use. >> but in the case of the upstate new york situation, do you believe that that investment would help with the resilience. >> for the sake of the applicants involved?
▶ 1:53:58I'm not going to comment on a potential project. I'd be happy to discuss any particular project with you separately. But as I said, our I as I said, those are the factors that we use in our portfolio. >> well, let me just say that this particular microgrid project was awarded to a small, not for profit public utility.
▶ 1:54:18So if they want to continue to pursue this project without federal assistance, they will need to raise funds entirely from their ratepayer base, which is fewer than 20,000 customers. So Mr. fitzsimmons, at a time of rising utility bills across our country, what message does it send for the trump administration to yank a previously awarded multi-million dollar grant, necessitating local ratepayers to fully foot the bill if they want to improve the reliability and the resilience of their system?
▶ 1:54:49>> as I said, for the sake of that particular applicant, I'm not going to comment on the particulars in this setting. Would be happy to discuss separately. I will say we have rescoped many projects, and the criteria that we're looking for that are consistent are national security and pathways to technical, economic and financial feasibility. >> well, I want to be clear that the october grant terminations were not done haphazardly.
▶ 1:55:15They were clearly part of an effort to exact political retribution against entities located in states that didn't support the president. So the department of energy funds a very important work, including making certain that americans can stay safe and operational during energy emergencies. It's going to be innocent people in upstate new york that suffer the consequences of republicans score settling and take a hit to their wallets.
▶ 1:55:43And you know, with that, Mr. chair, I thank you for the opportunity. But, you know, this sort of logic is hard to, uh, legitimize and rationalize, rationalize. So with that, uh, I want to get that concern expressed on the record here. With that, I yield back. >> gentleman yields back. And the chair now recognizes the gentlelady from iowa's first district for five minutes for questions.
▶ 1:56:10>> uh, thank you, chairman and ranking member castor, for holding this legislative hearing on grid security last week. Arson attacks on berlins power structure left 27,000 homes without electricity for days and freezing temperatures. A far left environmental group called vulcan claimed responsibility for planting incendiary devices under cable bridges. Simple, effective. Devastating.
▶ 1:56:33This attack illustrates an uncomfortable truth the threat to our grid isn't just sophisticated nation state actors, it's also ideologically motivated domestic groups willing to destroy critical infrastructure as energy prices rise and grid modernization costs mount, we see more radical actors attempting to take us back to the stone age, literally leaving families freezing in the dark. The bills before us today recognize that defending the grid requires partnership across all threat sectors.
▶ 1:57:03Federal agencies cannot do it alone, and rural cooperatives can't compete with foreign hackers or defend against physical attacks independently. This is a team effort in iowa. I see this challenge daily. Dairyland power and rural cooperatives serve massive rural territories with limited resources, upgrading systems and hiring cybersecurity staff means cost fall directly on families already struggling with bills. It's why I'm focused today on the rural and municipal utility cybersecurity program.
▶ 1:57:31Our embassy has demonstrated results, but 80 million in awarded funds still hasn't reached grantees, and there's over 160 million to be disbursed. We've learned that the competitive application processes create barriers for the smallest, most vulnerable utilities. Today's reauthorization fixes these problems, and I particularly want to thank you, acting undersecretary fitzsimmons and the team at cesar, for their work on these programs.
▶ 1:57:57I know that you're managing complex threats while trying to get resources out as quickly as possible. And we appreciate your partnership and commitment to getting this right. Um, recent intelligence assessments have identified that the people's republic of china has pre-positioned cyber exploitation and attack capabilities in us critical infrastructure. We're seeing tremendous growth in battery energy storage systems being deployed across our grid to support reliability and integrate renewables.
▶ 1:58:26However, many of these systems, particularly the battery management systems, rely on components manufactured in china. How is caesar working to assess and mitigate these supply chain risks? As we rapidly deploy bs across the country? >> thank you for the question, and thank you for your partnership and leadership on this issue.
▶ 1:58:46As you mentioned, it is incredibly important that we understand the supply chain risks that we're facing, especially as we look to build out our energy infrastructure to win the ai race and onshore manufacturing. That is a top priority for president trump and secretary. Right. And so cesar's mission is squarely within how do we work collaboratively with the energy sector to strengthen security and resilience? And the supply chain is incredibly important.
▶ 1:59:14And so the first step is acknowledging that you have a problem. And there clearly is a single point of failure in many supply chains that we're facing, whether it's on the battery side, the solar side, critical minerals, we are actively working to build out the supply chains for those technologies here in the united states, while simultaneously recognizing that a lot of these systems are in the field today.
▶ 1:59:43And so we need to be doing continuous testing of these systems to understand what the cyber vulnerabilities are so that we can equip the private sector, energy sector owners and operators with the tools they need to mitigate threats. >> um, Mr. fitzsimons, there's approximately 160 million remaining in the rural and municipal utility cybersecurity program, with less than a year left in its current authorization.
▶ 2:00:09Many cooperatives and municipal utilities have told us, while they appreciate doe's creative efforts with programs like the act prize, the competitive application process for technical assistance has created barriers for smaller, resource constrained, constrained utilities. Um, how do you, uh, expect to obligate the remaining 160 million in rumc funds before the program expires? And then I'll have some, um, questions for the record.
▶ 2:00:35>> yeah, it's a great question because, as you pointed out, these resources are incredibly important. Small rural munis and co-ops might have one person working on it, let alone a dedicated cybersecurity staffer. And yet they're expected to defend their networks against nation state threat actors on a day to day basis. I would point out, and I think the timeline is very important here. The iija was enacted by congress in 2021.
▶ 2:00:57It took the previous administration three years to get any selections made for the rmcc program. That was three years that they that that those organizations could have been elevating their collective security and resilience posture. We're moving forward with completing those contracts. For the first batch of selectees.
▶ 2:01:21We've appreciated our partnerships with nreca and apa, uh, to to make sure that those rural munis and co-ops have the resources they need. And, and, and we're trying to do it as rapidly as possible. >> thank you. Gentlemen, time has expired. The chair now recognizes the gentleman from texas is 33rd district for five minutes for questions. >> Mr. chairman. Thank you. Um, true energy security comes from resilient, uh, diversity and a modernized grid.
▶ 2:01:51And I'm worried that with the canceling of all the contracts at the department of energy is doing, uh, it really is forcing the us to rely on aging and outdated infrastructure that will make us more vulnerable to physical and and physical failure in cyber attacks. Um, in texas, we know that we are the energy capital of the world. Uh, but this administration has literally targeted our state's future. Uh, it's canceled $250 million for the texas solar all star program.
▶ 2:02:19Uh, that's going to be something that directly impacts low income communities and the district that I represent. And all across dallas and fort worth. Uh, we also are seeing a retreat from carbon capture, uh, hydrogen grid resilience. And all of this leads to texas. Uh, this wasn't just pie in the sky spending, uh, these are projects that were partnered with with companies like exxonmobil and and eastman chemical.
▶ 2:02:45Uh, the bottom line is that you absolutely cannot protect the infrastructure, uh, unless you modernize, uh, and maybe the most damaging aspect of this dough is the destruction of the regulatory certainty. We know that investors like to work on 10 to 20 year horizons for these massive infrastructure projects. And when doe pulls the rug out from signed contracts, it signals to the world that america is a high risk environment for energy investment.
▶ 2:03:12For every $1 federal funding canceled, we're seeing about 3 to $4 of private cost share go up, uh, into limbo overseas and texas alone. Now we have billions in private sector commitments that are now paralyzed. And so, uh, Mr. fitzsimmons, uh, I wanted to ask you if we're going to sort of, you know, tear up legal contracts just because the political winds change.
▶ 2:03:35Um, you know, that that worries me because it will be the type of thing that you would expect to expect in some place like venezuela, but not here. But I want to ask you, why would any rational investor put their capital into an american project if our word is now as unreliable as a dictator's, it just doesn't make any sense. And let me give you a perfect example of that.
▶ 2:03:56You signed off on terminating $331 million for the exxonmobil project in baytown, and 375 million for the eastman chemical project down in east texas, in longview. How does gutting the manufacturing base of texas protect our infrastructure? >> thank you for the question. You know, the as I mentioned, we have a responsibility to effectively steward taxpayer resources.
▶ 2:04:2460% of the loan volume, whereabouts, uh, that closed under the previous administration, closed between election day and january 20th of last year. So we had to conduct a comprehensive review of all of those projects and all of the rest of the doe portfolio, because we have a responsibility to make sure that the resources that taxpayers are providing meet certain criteria around national security and that they have a pathway to technical,
▶ 2:04:55Economic and financial viability. That is the work that we have been doing since day one, and that work will continue. >> yeah, but I don't I don't understand how going backwards and not, uh, investing in new technology is, is is is makes you a good steward of the money. Um, um, how can you claim to be pro-energy while dismantling, actively dismantling the tools that make energy more affordable for the people that need it the most?
▶ 2:05:21And I talked a little bit earlier about the, uh, some of the projects in dallas fort worth for low income families. >> as secretary wright has said, doe is open for business. We have closed loans within this administration. We have rescoped and moved forward with lots of grant projects. We're doing a lot of exciting things in the nuclear area, in natural gas, in coal and critical minerals, next generation geothermal.
▶ 2:05:45We are investing in a wide range of energy resources to make this country more affordable, reliable and secure. >> uh, Mr. fitzsimmons, I wanted to ask you to, with the rest of the of the of the world, let's take the united states and our market share when it comes to to energy and the innovation behind a lot of the energy that people use for their everyday lives.
▶ 2:06:05If you look at places like india, you look at places like europe, a place like norway, where they have invested so much in their, um, electric vehicle, uh, programs there. For instance, how do you think america is faring when it comes to the advancement in leading in the area of renewable energy? Because we know that the rest of that, these countries that I just named, they want more and more renewable energy products.
▶ 2:06:32So regardless of how we may feel about it here in this country, how do you think we're doing when it comes to the competitiveness of us leading and innovation of in the renewable space? >> I think you also, the gentleman has 10s to answer that. >> look, I think you'll you'll see more resources getting built. You look at eia's assessments, you'll see more solar and storage capacity. But I think, as I've said before, the most important resources are the ones that can help grid operators meet peak demand, and that is reliable and dispatchable generation.
▶ 2:07:02That's what we've lost too much of in this country, and that's what the trump administration is working to fix. >> thank you, Mr. chairman. >> the gentleman's time has expired and yields back. The chair now recognizes the gentleman from oregon second district for five minutes for questions. >> thank you, Mr. chairman. And thank you, undersecretary, for being here today.
▶ 2:07:22Um, I'm always interested in, in, uh, how much is left out of these five minute conversations and the concept of all the wind power off the east coast suddenly being available is an interesting one. And I ask the mayor of new haven years ago, uh, where the transmission was that would manage all of that, uh, wind power that was at one point planned. Uh, have you have you studied that? Because the answer is there isn't there isn't transmission available for that wind power?
▶ 2:07:51And that would appear to be the case also in my state of oregon, where there's there was literally hundreds of of, uh, megawatts, if not gigawatts of, of solar planned and on the drawing board. But there's no way to get it to where it was going to be used. Yeah. And so it gets us back to the incredible frailty of our grid. And but give me I'm just curious about the eastern seaboard for just a moment.
▶ 2:08:20What kind of shape is that grid in? >> I think you raised an important point, which is that there are seen and unseen costs in the energy system. And so you look at like the levelized cost of electricity and comparing dispatchable and non-dispatchable resources is not an apples to apples comparison, because you have to look at the value that those resources provide to peak demand, and you also have to look at the incremental cost of connecting non-dispatchable
▶ 2:08:51Resources via transmission that is not factored into the lcoe, which can appear low. But if you do a balancing of cost and value, you will see that reliable, dispatchable generation is by far the most valuable generation that we have. And we know that because the nonpartisan grid operators tell us that. And so the we we are in the the largest, uh, iso in the country at pjm.
▶ 2:09:14And this region, as with many others, is facing severe resource adequacy challenges due to the energy subtraction policies that we've seen over the years at both the state and federal level. Trump administration is fixing those problems. We're stabilizing the existing energy system by preventing premature closure of generation. We're optimizing it.
▶ 2:09:37So we're upgrading in new transmission in key congestion areas where you can actually reduce costs for consumers and get more out of the existing system. We're uprating generation nuclear and natural gas and coal, and then we're going to be building and growing our overall energy system to meet future energy demands.
▶ 2:09:55>> as a lifelong resident of oregon and having spent 12 years in oregon legislature, I've heard lots of discussion about, uh, I'm going to say wishful thinking about how if we just have all of this intermittent power, then the rest of our problems will take care of themselves.
▶ 2:10:11And I saw it most clearly, um, recently in, in going back and looking at the, at the year, uh, that we're supposed to be all renewable in oregon, which would be 2040 and, and then moving back this direction, it's 90% in 2035 and something like 80% in 2030. That's just a few years away. But right now we're using about 30% natural gas.
▶ 2:10:38And if you're going to use renewable, you've got to go to where it is. And that requires transmission. So why people think that suddenly transmission is going to spring into place so that they can bring that renewable power in is unclear to me. And I raised this issue many times, but it always seems to be, well, don't worry about it. Somehow someone will step up and, you know, fix this. But transmission, because of all of the environmental laws and protections we now have, takes forever to build.
▶ 2:11:08So tell me, how do we overcome this? What the problem that I just called out with with avoid avoiding the wishful thinking we've been hearing a lot of today. >> it's a great question. I think we need more transmission, but we don't need unconstrained transmission buildout. We need to be strategic about where it's being built. Otherwise we're going to continue to put upward pressure on electricity prices. And electricity prices rose 20% under the previous administration and a lot more in some areas. We have to be very strategic.
▶ 2:11:37There are real system congestion costs in certain regions of this country that have sufficient generation, but just don't have enough capacity on the wires to move the electrons from where they're generated to where they're needed. Those are imposing that system. Congestion is imposing billions of dollars of costs on american families. And so we can strategically upgrade. And we are starting to do that now. We have used our loan program to do that.
▶ 2:12:03We're looking at grant and grant making to do that not in unconstrained transmission buildout, but in strategic conducting, grid enhancing technologies in areas of high system congestion costs, where you can increase incremental load serving capability, because that's what the system operators need to keep the system. >> I want to thank you for your time and for your work. Yield back. >> thank you very much. The gentleman's time. I'm sorry. >> could I be recognized for unanimous consent request? >> unanimous consent? Yes.
▶ 2:12:33>> well. Thank you. Since we've had a lot of discussion about offshore wind and p.g.m, which is the mid-atlantic operator, I just wanted to submit for the record their amicus brief in the federal case where the the federal court ruled yesterday rejecting the trump administration's cancellation of the offshore wind projects.
▶ 2:12:54In part, they say they advise that the extended delay of construction and operation of the coastal virginia offshore wind project will cause irreparable harm to the 67 million americans served by ppm. >> without objection. So ordered. >> thank you, Mr. chairman. >> the chair now recognizes the gentlelady from washington's eighth district. Five minutes for questions. >> thank you. >> Mr. chairman.
▶ 2:13:24Thank you, undersecretary fitzsimons, for being here. Um, like my colleagues mentioned, we are very disturbed by the choices this administration is making regarding grant cancellations, pauses or stop work orders on clean energy projects that are nearly complete and indiscriminate staff reductions and more.
▶ 2:13:45Um, most recently, secretary rice has brought uncertainty and delayed energy generation in washington state by blocking the planned closure of the centralia coal fired power plant, forcing it to stay open for a supposed emergency. Um, but 15 years ago, the state and the power plant owners struck a deal to convert from coal to natural gas. The transition is in the works. Uh, the coal plant is not generating any energy right now.
▶ 2:14:14And yet it is now being forced to stay on standby. So time is ticking and costs are rising and energy production is stalled. And I just want to say that it is insane. Uh, and I hope you will change that immediately. But of course, this is not the first time the administration has meddled in washington state energy reliability. The first was dodging the bonneville power administration, which is the largest power provider to the northwest united states.
▶ 2:14:42And it functions, by the way, at no cost to taxpayers. It is self-funded. We pay for it in our own utility bills. Um, you fired staff and put our grid at risk when we called you out and reminded you that this does not cost the government anything, you backpedaled, uh, tried to rehire fired employees. Some came back, some didn't. Last month, finally, you also stopped the hiring freeze.
▶ 2:15:07But, uh, under secretary, do you happen to know how many people bonneville's actually hired since you lifted that freeze about six weeks ago? >> I'd be happy to get back to you with specific numbers, but they have a hiring plan in place, and they're actively working to execute it. >> you actually don't have to get back to me. I will tell you the number is zero.
▶ 2:15:28So having a plan in place is nice, but I would like you to commit to me that you will work with me and my staff and my state to expedite this hiring process, because we're talking about keeping the lights on in the northwest. >> I fully support that. I agree with you. We are. We have a hiring plan in place and happy to work with you to execute it. >> thank you, I appreciate that we will be in touch. I also have two 2.5 minutes remaining.
▶ 2:15:55So I'm going to dive into another topic that we've been talking a lot about during this hearing, which is venezuela. And you just said, I'm going to quote you, I think I got this down right. Uh, that doe has responsibility to carefully steward taxpayer dollars. So I'm just going to jump off from there.
▶ 2:16:11Um, there's a lot to say about venezuela, but we just saw, uh, oil executives, uh, despite the president saying we're going to bring us oil companies into venezuela, we're going to get the oil. And he said, you know, we're going to put it in this offshore account, the money. And he's unclear about where that money is going. We just heard oil executives say they don't really see that as a positive move. We have plenty of oil here in the united states.
▶ 2:16:41It's an unstable place to be right now. It will require the us military, uh, which is funded by taxpayer dollars to stabilize that area. And oil is at about, I believe, $57 a barrel right now. So this is not profitable for oil companies. And it does not seem like your quote.
▶ 2:17:00Again, careful stewardship of taxpayer dollars to invest in oil infrastructure and to put young lives at risk by putting our military there and to spend taxpayer dollars in that way. Can you please elaborate on how you think this is good for national security?
▶ 2:17:21>> I think you see a lot of enthusiasm from the energy industry to execute the historic energy deal that president trump brokered, which will be a win win win for the people of venezuela, who will rebuild their infrastructure for the us energy industry that is interested, I don't think we're. >> seeing that enthusiasm. I don't think we're seeing it from the industry. And frankly, I'm not convinced, based on this administration's track record, that the people of venezuela are going to see benefits from that.
▶ 2:17:51Um, he has been very careful and sneaky in his wording about using that money to also compensate, uh, countries that have been hurt by this. That could mean compensating the oil companies. It could mean compensating the united states. I do not trust this administration to have the best interests of the venezuelan people in mind, or they would be arranging for upcoming elections. So, um, again, I'm going to ask for accountability to the people of the united states and our taxpayer dollars to not throw them away. I yield back.
▶ 2:18:25>> gentlelady's time has expired, and the chair now recognizes the gentlelady from florida's 15th district for five minutes for questions. >> thank you, Mr. chairman, for holding this important hearing. During my tenure as florida's secretary of state and now my time as congress, strengthening the cybersecurity of our critical infrastructure has been a priority of mine.
▶ 2:18:48Cyber security is a crucial component of our national security and state sponsored cyber threats such as volt typhoon continue to target us critical infrastructure. It is important for this committee to continue our work bolstering the cybersecurity of our electric grid.
▶ 2:19:10I appreciate you being here, and I appreciate the opportunity to discuss further the department of energy's role in protecting our grid, especially through the office of cybersecurity, energy security and emergency response. The tools and resources available for information sharing on threats, and the role congress can play in strengthening the security of our energy infrastructure.
▶ 2:19:32I am particularly interested in the energy emergency leadership act, which would update the department of energy organization act to include energy, emergency and energy security functions assigned to an assistant secretary. Mr. fitzsimmons will elevating the doe's emergency response to an assistant secretary, elevate the level of communication and coordination with other agencies?
▶ 2:20:03>> thank you for your question, and thank you for your interest in this important topic. And thank you for asking a topical question, because the subject of the hearing is protecting our critical energy infrastructure, and there's a lot we can do on a bipartisan basis to strengthen the security and resilience of the us energy sector. So thank you for that. I would say over caesar's relatively short history, caesar was started under secretary and then secretary rick perry in the first trump administration. And obviously I am the caesar director now.
▶ 2:20:30I think history has proven that the caesar office can function either way. So I think what's more important than the particular title that the head of the office holds is, is the mission of, of the office. And and that is incredibly important. We've been working on refocusing and clarifying the caesar mission because it is so important, and it's a new office, and sometimes new offices can kind of struggle to figure out where they fit.
▶ 2:20:55But what we've said is caesar's mission is to provide timely and actionable information to the energy sector. That's then used to inform to develop world class cyber and physical security technologies. That information and that technology is used to harden and secure energy infrastructure, that hardening and security helps us prepare to respond and recover from cyber and physical incidents, the lessons learned from which help us provide timely and actionable information to the energy sector. That's a continuous, virtuous cycle.
▶ 2:21:25And that's the that's the caesar mission that I'm so excited and honored to lead here at the department. >> you just touched on a couple of really important concepts when it comes to cybersecurity awareness, prevention and growth. Now, I understand the doe is the sector risk management agency for cyber within the energy sector.
▶ 2:21:43And I would appreciate if you could elaborate on why timely and secure information sharing on cybersecurity threats, as you just mentioned, is important for us, both government infrastructure, private sector. Why is that information sharing important? >> it's a great question. I think that is the foundation of what caesar does. We have an asymmetric capability with the private sector, despite the fact that private sector owns and operates more than 80% of us energy infrastructure.
▶ 2:22:12We're the ones that have the clearances. We're the ones that have access to classified information. The vast majority of the private sector does not. And so we get real time threat information about the threats that the energy sector owners and operators have to deal with on a day to day basis. And so we need to make sure that we have capabilities in place to strengthen our ability to rapidly share. And I use these words with meaning timely and actionable.
▶ 2:22:42So it has to be done rapidly and it has to be the information has to be delivered in a usable form. And so that's why capabilities like itac are so important, where we're co-locating cleared industry partners with the government. It's one thing for us to analyze information rapidly. We can do that. If we have cleared industry partners in the room, they can bring the actionable part and figure out, well, how do we address this specific vulnerability? How do we make this make sense to the rest of the industry?
▶ 2:23:09And how can we get that mitigation back out to the private sector as quickly as possible to strengthen our collective security and resilience? >> thank you, Mr. chairman, I yield back. >> thank you. The gentleman yields back the balance of her time. The chair now recognizes the gentlelady from new york's 14th district for five minutes for questions. >> thank you so much, Mr. chairman. Under secretary fitzsimons, um, you served at the department of energy during president trump's first term, correct?
▶ 2:23:39>> yes, I did. >> and you've also held a number of positions in this term, including chief of staff to energy secretary. Right? Correct. >> I did, yes. >> um, great. I'm hoping if I'm hoping that you could help me understand more about the agency's decision making process. Um, you know, we've talked about how there have been many clean energy, um, projects that have been canceled over the last year.
▶ 2:24:05In fact, since january of last year, over 170,000 energy jobs across the country on clean energy projects have been lost or impacted due to the policy changes from your department. Um, one company canceled plans for battery manufacturing facility in buckeye, arizona that cost 6400 jobs.
▶ 2:24:28So local community glendale, kentucky has lost over 150,000 jobs due to another manufacturing facility closure. Um, as chief of staff to secretary, right. And as acting under secretary, were there assessments done on how many jobs would be lost due to these decisions?
▶ 2:24:55>> well, my understanding is that when an applicant submits an application, there is a comprehensive assessment because we. >> need to know. >> what the. >> jobs I'm talking about, you know, policy changes around tax credits, around other sorts of I mean, it can include applications as well. But do did you do an assessment on how many american jobs would be lost prior to you making your policy conclusions?
▶ 2:25:24>> I think we're always continuously assessing the impacts of decisions assessments. >> have you did you do the assessment on how many jobs would be lost before making a choice, or did you not do the assessment? >> we review the applications as they come in, and part of that can be the jobs.
▶ 2:25:42>> that sounds like a no to me under secretary, that 170,000 americans have lost their job due to the policy changes implemented by you and your department, and you didn't even think about it. There was no assessment. 170,000 americans out of a job, out of health insurance, out of any opportunity.
▶ 2:26:10Battery manufacturing plants in georgia, arizona, kentucky. And you are telling me that there was not an assessment done on how many americans were going to lose their job before you made your decisions and before this administration made decisions on revoking tax credits, manufacturing credits that were going to affect these facilities. That is what I'm being told today. Is that correct? >> no.
▶ 2:26:38As I mentioned, we have a comprehensive review process for all applications. >> does that process include how many jobs would be lost. >> job numbers are. >> sounds like. >> you know, in the applications. >> like a no to me under secretary fitzsimons.
▶ 2:26:56Now I want to move forward in newnan, georgia, a company planning a a battery manufacturing facility walked back a $2.6 billion investment in the state of georgia.
▶ 2:27:13The company cited the clean energy tax credits that were critical to its decision to invest in the project, and the trump administration's reversal and decimation of these tax credits ended a $2.6 billion energy investment in the state of georgia alone.
▶ 2:27:29You must be aware that under president trump, the united states in just a year has lost $53 billion in clean energy investment in our infrastructure.
▶ 2:27:47So what I am trying to understand, since you have described yourself as spearheading the department of energy's dominance agenda, is why. And under president trump's energy dominance executive order, it talks about good paying jobs. So how are we?
▶ 2:28:10How is this administration and how are you assessing these projects when we have resulted in a net loss of 170,000 jobs? >> as I've mentioned, we have a comprehensive review process. President trump is focused on restoring american energy dominance after years four years of disastrous energy subtraction policies. And so we're investing in an affordable, reliable and. >> that by cutting american.
▶ 2:28:41>> jobs and then trying to invade venezuela to compensate. Thank you I yield back. >> gentleman, time has expired. The chair now recognizes the gentleman from new york's 23rd district for five minutes for questions. >> thank you very much, Mr. chairman. I'd like to start off under secretary to offer you some time to respond to us in any way you want. >> thank you. I, I think that it's important to recognize we have a real bipartisan opportunity here.
▶ 2:29:10If we can focus on the purpose of the hearing, which is how we can work together. These important cybersecurity bills, which I understand will be introduced on a bipartisan basis, and how we can work together to strengthen the security and resilience of the us energy sector. That's what I focus on as caesar director. And of course, in my other position as as the acting undersecretary, I have a much broader remit over the entire energy dominance agenda.
▶ 2:29:38And you see, after years of energy subtraction policies that rapidly drove up electricity prices under the previous administration, we are stabilizing the energy system. We are optimizing it, we're investing in the future, and we're growing it because grid operators have warned we're facing shrinking reserve margins all across the country because of a lack of reliable and dispatchable power.
▶ 2:30:01At the same time that we have growing energy demand, and we know that we need to invest in the most valuable resources that we have, and those are the resources that the grid operators can count on day or night, any time. Because the energy system, as I mentioned at the beginning, is designed to meet peak demand during the summer and increasingly the winter. And if we cannot do that, people die. And that is our fundamental responsibility.
▶ 2:30:27And we have a real bipartisan opportunity here to work on policies that will strengthen the security and resilience of the energy sector that we rely on every single day. >> well, thank you very much. And it's music to my ears. I mean, my signature piece of legislation is the energy choice act, which should hopefully be coming to the floor soon and has been reported out of this committee so that states and localities can no longer ban safe and reliable forms of energy in this country.
▶ 2:30:53I represent a largely rural district with long transmission lines, significant agricultural production, and energy intensive manufacturing. When energy systems fail in rural america, the impacts are immediate farms can't operate, manufacturers shut down, and families lose heat in very dangerous, cold winter conditions. Uh, undersecretary, how does your office work with smaller utilities, especially in rural areas, to help strengthen defenses and improve resilience before an incident occurs?
▶ 2:31:21>> yeah, I think this is one of the most important things that we do. I mean, it's one thing to work with larger companies and we do we have strong partnerships all across the energy industry. But 56% of americans are served by smaller rural munis and co-ops. We have strong partnerships with apa and the nreca. The rmcc program is is is crucial to cesar's mission to to elevate the collective cybersecurity of small, rural munis and co-ops.
▶ 2:31:49As I mentioned earlier, a lot of these companies might have one person working on it, not even a dedicated cybersecurity person. And yet they're expected to defend their energy systems on the it and the ot side from increasingly sophisticated threat actors and nation state threat actors. So fortunately, there's a lot you can do with basic cyber hygiene.
▶ 2:32:11You can solve around 80 to 90% of most cyber vulnerabilities with basic cyber hygiene, multi-factor authentication, network segmentation, basic things that you can do on the it and ot side. And you just need to have the tools and resources to do it. And I think that's one of the most exciting parts of of this job being seizure directors, that we have an opportunity to work directly with those utilities who need the help the most. >> well, thank you very much.
▶ 2:32:39Not only is my district rural, but we also experience severe winter storms that can threaten grid reliability, fuel delivery, and emergency response for days at a time. During winter storm elliot in 22, a prolonged cold and high demand strained the electrical grid. It disrupted fuel supplies, and it complicated restoration efforts. The storm underscored how weather alone can pose, uh, exposed vulnerabilities across the entire energy system, even without a cyber or a physical attack.
▶ 2:33:04Uh, under secretary fitzsimons, how does doe evaluate and plan for severe weather risks, and what steps does your office take to incorporate lessons from past severe weather events into preparedness, response, and coordination efforts? >> that's a great question because as I mentioned, the energy system is built to meet summer and winter peaks. That is our fundamental responsibility to keep the lights on. And so, um, one of the core capabilities that caesar has is a capability that's called eagle eye.
▶ 2:33:33It's it's run in partnership with oak ridge national laboratory. And that what that allows us to do is we have real time situational awareness, whether based on power outages all across the country that are happening in real time. It's updated every 15 minutes. And so we have our we have our, our, uh, we have a war room essentially, you know, at the department where we have this eagle eye capability.
▶ 2:33:57And when there are, uh, you know, severe weather events or cyber incidents, and we activate because we are the sector risk management agency, we are the esf 12 function when we do a fema activation, when and, and, uh, you know, when there is severe weather, we have this capability that we can review in real time with the, with the industry, uh, in areas, you know, where the energy infrastructure is impacted, we will do unity of effort, unity of message calls to make sure
▶ 2:34:27That the owners and operators in the impacted areas know what we know as quickly as part of it, and then we can all work together. >> I mean, the gentleman's time has expired. The chair now recognizes the gentlelady from texas seventh district for five minutes for questions. >> thank you so much. Uh, chairman latta and undersecretary fitzsimons. Um, I want to follow up on a few of the things that have come up previously.
▶ 2:34:50And you were just testifying in response to questions about caesar's ability to monitor real time threats, uh, which is certainly important to the people that I represent in houston and to people across the country. And, um, one of the things I want to know is whether, uh, those threats to our energy grid and to our energy security have increased in 2026. >> in 2026. >> in the last two. >> weeks, like within the last two weeks. Yeah.
▶ 2:35:19Um, I think that would be difficult to say in this setting. I think we we could I mean, most of that would be, would be classified. I'm not sure, you know, directionally if compared to last year to this year, I wouldn't uh, I'm not sure specifically. >> can you tell us and can you tell us, uh, in another setting, whether the threats to our energy security have increased since the, uh, military action in venezuela?
▶ 2:35:49>> I think we'd be happy to discuss that. >> in another setting. >> yes, in another setting. >> well, and has caesar analyzed, uh, cyber vulnerabilities in venezuela? >> caesar has not. No. >> okay. Because one of the things that, um, you were saying in response initially, I think, to some questions in response to Mr. menendez's questions, um, and then I think, again, in response to congresswoman schreyer's questions, you mentioned there's a historic energy deal, right?
▶ 2:36:17Um, that was your words, not mine. Um, and I guess I'm trying to wrap my arms around what exactly that is in your understanding. What is that deal? >> well, as the president has said, and as he convened, energy industry leaders at at the white house, this energy deal is to bring, uh, a win win win for the people of venezuela who will be able to rebuild their infrastructure that suffered for years.
▶ 2:36:44It will be a win for the us energy industry that's looking to invest in country, and it will be a win for the american people in the form of lower energy prices, with more oil in the market. >> okay, so but what I'm hearing you say is that's I mean, who are the parties to the deal? >> well, I just described the parties. The parties are the people of venezuela and the government and the us energy industry. I'm sorry.
▶ 2:37:11>> I mean, you're saying there is a deal for the united states to be involved, and the department of energy and cesar in monitors risks to our grid security, to our energy infrastructure, to energy investments. Um, and you're describing a deal. But as far as I know, I mean, is this a trade deal? >> I wouldn't describe it as a trade deal in the. >> what kind of deal is it when you describe it as a deal?
▶ 2:37:38I mean, there's been testimony under oath in this hearing that there is an existing deal, and I don't know what it is. >> I would refer you to the comments that president trump and secretary rice have made about working collaboratively with the people of venezuela and the government, the us energy industry, and that is going to bring tremendous benefits both to the people of venezuela who will rebuild their energy infrastructure. >> I'm sorry, just reclaiming my time because we have very limited time here.
▶ 2:38:05And I've heard you describe it as a win, win win. I'm not sure who the winners are. I'm not sure that that has been defined, but usually with a deal you have parties who are negotiating. Um, we saw a televised meeting last week that congresswoman schreier referenced. But, you know, if it's a trade deal, it has to come to congress. If we're talking about increasing trade with venezuela relating to crude oil exports or other things, trade deals come to congress.
▶ 2:38:33Uh, as I understand it, you're talking about statements the president has made, but we've seen no deal, no terms, no parties, no documentation. So how is the department of energy? It sounds like this is sort of a potential deal, a potential agreement. But are you currently devoting any of your resources or efforts in your role at the department of energy to anything related to this quote unquote, deal.
▶ 2:39:05>> under president trump's leadership? Secretary rice is working with the interagency. Yes. And if you'd like to know more about this issue, we would be happy to talk to you in the right setting about it. >> well, I think a lot of people want to know a lot more about this issue. And, uh, certainly the parties to the deal, the terms of the deal, uh, the structure of the deal, the duration of the deal, all of those things are questions that are for the people of venezuela in a democratic society.
▶ 2:39:33Um, and certainly there are questions that emerge that are questions for the united states congress, not the least of which is whether to send our our fellow citizens, our sons and daughters into military action. Um, but certainly there are a lot of questions relating to our priorities for our own energy security as well. And those come in the jurisdiction of this committee. So I look forward to continuing that conversation and appreciate, Mr. chairman, the opportunity to raise these issues. >> thank you, thank you. The gentlelady's time has expired.
▶ 2:40:04The chair now recognizes the gentleman from colorado's eighth district for five minutes for questions. >> thank you. Of course, Mr. chairman, to the ranking member and to our witness for coming today for this important conversation. And I just want to clear up a couple of things. Earlier, you were asked by one of my colleagues on the other side of the aisle some specific questions about a coal plant in colorado. Um, and I think the question was asked you, do you know that this plant has been scheduled for five years to go offline?
▶ 2:40:29Um, and I just want the record to reflect that is because seven years ago, the state of colorado fell under complete and total control of my democrat colleagues at the state level, who passed a law requiring that coal plant to go offline. So it's been scheduled to go offline for five years because seven years ago, not due to the science or anything due to a political agenda, the folks that control the state of colorado, uh, passed a law that said that it have to go offline.
▶ 2:40:55And if, you know, a plant's going to go offline, of course there's going to be deferred maintenance, uh, to the tune of a couple of million dollars for a plant that's scheduled to go offline. Uh, but I think that a couple of million dollars, I think my colleague said $21 million is pennies compared to the $17 billion that the colorado energy office found.
▶ 2:41:15Uh, that was going to be charged additional to my constituents in colorado for the 100% variable with battery power resource plan, which is what the the state of colorado is pushing. Um, so 17 billion more. That's not my number. That is the number that the democrat controlled colorado energy office came up with. The most expensive resource mix. Uh, and that's all going to be passed on to my constituents when things like the natural gas ban for residential heating is implemented.
▶ 2:41:43Uh, when I was a state representative, I asked a question, what would it cost to backfill all of the lost energy from natural gas with electricity? The answer I got was billions to the utility, and somewhere around 15 to $25,000 per household to upgrade their electric panel and all the wiring and appliances on their side of the meter. Uh, so I think it's very clear from, uh, studies commissioned by my colleagues on the other side of the aisle that they are pushing the most expensive form of energy. And what's that costing?
▶ 2:42:12Well, in addition to higher cost to my constituents, that is costing a lack of focus on resilience. We recently had to turn off the electric grid for 100,000 coloradans. Just a few weeks ago because of a windstorm. Why? Because billions of dollars are going to the most expensive resource mix in, really, in the state of colorado that can't go to hardening our grid. And that's actually the topic before us today.
▶ 2:42:39So, uh, in my life, before I came to congress, I was a cop and a us army and colorado army national guard soldier, uh, responded to countless state emergencies, served as the intelligence officer for my organization. And so in that world, we had an entity called a fusion center. That was where we had the analysis to counter persistent or emerging threats. And in the energy world, um, the excuse me, the energy threat analysis center serves a very similar role.
▶ 2:43:08Uh, and so my question to you is, can you discuss the role that national laboratories, specifically the national lab of the rockies, play, uh, in that energy threat analysis center and in other things like the office of cybersecurity, energy and emergency response. Caesar, as we've been talking about today, can you talk about the benefits that that itac and caesar, uh, working with national labs like the national lab of the rockies provide to hardening our grid? Absolutely. >> thank you for your question.
▶ 2:43:36And thank you for your service as well. So I and your leadership on this important issue, I would say the national labs play a key role for the reasons that you just mentioned. We have a lot of important capabilities on the information sharing side, because we have access to classified information that the vast majority of the private sector doesn't have. We need to figure out the best tools and mechanisms to get that information, that actionable threat information, into the hands of private sector owners and operators.
▶ 2:44:05That is what the itac capability does. And I think it's it's an important one, because it's one thing for us to work with the ic to analyze threat information, but it's another thing to actually do something about it. And I think that's what that's what we're starting to change now. And do it in a, in a timely and and actionable way and in a way that is collaborative with the private sector. And so I think partnerships like, like itac are very important way that we're doing that.
▶ 2:44:34>> so with my remaining 35 seconds here, as congress considers reauthorizing itac, are there particular things that you see that we need to address to be able to enhance that public private partnership, to make sure that our grid and our energy resources are hardened? 23 seconds. >> yeah, it's a great question. I would just say with the time remaining that, you know, we've we've we've done a lot of important work on itac. It is operational. It's an important capability. I think part of it was figuring out what itac is and isn't.
▶ 2:45:02I think there may be a tendency in government programs to have mission creep. So it was important to clearly define the itac mission. And from our perspective, the itac mission is to provide timely and actionable information to the energy sector. And if they can do that and do it effectively, it will be a great success. >> thank you. Yield back. >> thank you. The gentleman's time has expired. Yields back. The chair now recognizes the gentleman from texas is 12th district for five minutes for questions. >> thank you, Mr. chairman. Uh, Mr.
▶ 2:45:31Fitzsimmons, uh, thank you for being here. Texas leads the nation in liquefied natural gas export capacity, making it a strategic national asset. How does the department of energy assess the risks of cyber physical attacks on liquefied natural gas terminals by state sponsored actors like china? Uh, those risks are fully integrated in federal energy emergency planning. >> thank you for the question. It's it's an important risk factor that we need to consider.
▶ 2:45:57These are important national assets for our national security, for our economic security. I'd say doe is a sector risk management agency for the energy sector. Our mandate is to increase security and resilience for the entire energy sector. We have a series of sub-sector coordinating councils. We have one with the oil and gas subsector that represents the entire value chain upstream, midstream, downstream. I think it's important and it's only growing.
▶ 2:46:25And more important as the united states becomes and has been the number one producer of oil, natural gas, exporting our liquefied natural gas all around the world and keeping electricity prices low for american families and for manufacturers. It's a real competitive advantage that the united states has our ability to to produce abundant, low cost natural gas.
▶ 2:46:45Our electricity prices, even today, even after four years of energy subtraction policies, our electricity prices are still three times cheaper than germany and the united kingdom, who have been actively industrializing their country because they have not had common sense energy policy. And that's what secretary rice and president trump have brought back to this country. Common sense energy policy. >> yeah. Thank you for that. Um, you're absolutely right.
▶ 2:47:09It makes no sense what those other countries have been doing as a border state with major energy corridors. Does texas face unique physical or cyber risks related to transnational, criminal or state sponsored actors targeting infrastructure? >> I think that's always something that we need to consider. I think if we were to have a more in-depth discussion about specific risks and challenges at the border, we would probably have to do it in a separate setting, and we'd be happy to provide that for you.
▶ 2:47:39>> that'd be great. Thank you very much, Mr. chairman. I yield the balance of my time. Thank you. >> thank you. The gentleman yields back the balance this time. The chair now recognizes the gentlelady from tennessee's first district for five minutes for questions. >> thank you, Mr. chairman. And thank you for being here today. Um, as we've seen from both typhoon and salt typhoon, cyber attacks can span across multiple states and federal jurisdictions.
▶ 2:48:01Uh, can you provide more details on how the energy, um, emergency leadership act can help implement predefined communication paths between lead agencies and our partners? >> um, >> yes, I think doe's the sector risk management agency for the energy sector, that's a role that we take very seriously. Uh, caesar leads that.
▶ 2:48:22We lead a series of sub-sector coordinating councils, uh, you know, with the with the power sector, with the oil and natural gas subsector, that's the primary mechanism through which we coordinate and collaborate actively, uh, with the entire energy sector. And I think that is fundamental to what caesar does. And that and that mission will continue. >> yeah. >> um, the energy sector also faces threats from a variety of actors and a variety of threat vectors.
▶ 2:48:50Um, this includes nation state threats, directed attacks on energy infrastructure, attacks against vendors, and vulnerability with supply chains, criminal actors and a whole host of things. Um, and the doe's energy threat analysis center has been a key asset for industry and government. And compounding these threats, um, what's the value of the intelligence community hearing from industry about how equipment may be used in the grid and in its energy systems?
▶ 2:49:20>> I think it's incredibly important that we collaborate proactively with the ic and, and and we do. And itac is one of the ways through which we do it. Uh, you know, we have access to classified information that the vast majority of the private sector does not. We need to figure out how to close that gap, because, as I've mentioned, the vast majority of U.S. energy infrastructure is privately owned and operated, and they're the ones on the front lines every day facing these risks.
▶ 2:49:48And so we need to make sure, as the government, that when we have access to threat information, we can get that to the private sector as rapidly as possible. And so with itac, as I've mentioned before, we have cleared industry partners working right alongside cesar staff, doe, office of intelligence and counterintelligence staff so that we can work collaboratively to identify threats, quickly, figure out how to mitigate it, and then get that information back out to the private sector. >> how does itec help facilitate that two way collaboration?
▶ 2:50:18>> because we are physically co-located together, working on it in real time with cleared industry partners, so that are supposed to represent the entire energy industry. And so obviously not everyone from the energy sector can be there with us, but we get certain representatives from companies, companies that are volunteering their their time and their resources to this important mission.
▶ 2:50:39And so they hire people full time to reside at itac and be there and work alongside our staff, because that is the only way we can do it. It's the only way we can get. We can develop that information in a timely basis and get it out in an actionable way. >> you know, when I was on homeland, when I first came here, we had a hearing on colonial pipeline, and they were really beating them to death because of the cyber hygiene protocol that fell under, um, tsa, that they did not do that.
▶ 2:51:07But people are reluctant to give you that information a lot of cases, because if it's not required, uh, you know, and that would have been devastating to us because the operational side and, you know, they don't own the gas or that they transport, um, we just have issues that we need to collaborate on. Um, well, this, uh, helped defense critical electric infrastructure security as well. >> yes, I think it well, I think it absolutely will.
▶ 2:51:35I mean, as a you think of the energy sector is a subsector of critical infrastructure. There's 16 critical infrastructure sectors that have been designated by dhs. Energy infrastructure is, in my view, the single most important because it is the foundation of every other critical infrastructure sector. If you don't have energy, you don't have health care or transportation or manufacturing. It is essential to everything we do.
▶ 2:52:00And then, uh, dci or the, the, the privately held energy infrastructure that supports the d o w mission that supports our important national security missions is a particular subsector of the energy infrastructure that's under increasing threat. >> well, I visited ornl, you know, in the last year, and it's it's really exciting to see eagle one and what they do to bring those comprehensive threats, especially with tva being located there. So thank you for your time today. And, Mr. chairman, I yield back.
▶ 2:52:31>> thank you. The gentlelady yields back. The chair now recognizes the gentleman from michigan's 10th district for five minutes for questions. >> thank you, Mr. chairman. Uh, and thank you, sir, for your time and your stamina. Um, grid security is national security. The lights go out. Everything else follows public safety, hospitals, manufacturing, water systems, our military readiness, cyber threats are real and growing, but they are only a part of the risk. A fragile grid is an easy target. Whether the threat is digital, physical or policy driven.
▶ 2:53:00In michigan, we are seeing what happens when ideology outruns reality. Last year, the department of energy was forced to issue section 202 c emergency order to keep the j.h. Campbell coal plant online. That plant was scheduled to close under michigan's rush to meet politically driven net zero mandate. Doe stepped in because closing it would have threatened grid reliability for millions of people across my region. Let's be clear about what that means.
▶ 2:53:28The federal government had to declare an emergency to keep the power on in michigan. That's not a success story for energy policy. That's a warning sign. Governor whitmer's green new deal mandates are forcing reliable base load generation off the grid while championing unreliable, intermittent sources. As a result, miso is operating dangerously thin reserve margins. When reserves are tight, operators have fewer options.
▶ 2:53:55That makes the grid more vulnerable to extreme weather, cyber attacks and cascading failures. You cannot secure a grid that you have intentionally weakened. Energy security requires an all of the above approach, and we must ensure it's the strategy that actually works. We should be adding reliability before subtracting it.
▶ 2:54:16Instead, michigan families and manufacturers are paying the price for policies that look good from university ivory towers, but fail in the real world. Mr. fitzsimmons, the department's section 202 c order cites nrc's reliability assessment, warning that the miso region faced elevated risk of operating reserve shortfalls, particularly among peak demand, and that the retirement of dispatchable thermal generation increased that risk.
▶ 2:54:44Is it true that the planned shutdown of j.h. Campbell coal plant, driven by michigan's net zero mandate under governor gretchen whitmer, was a factor that forced doe to declare this emergency? >> thank you for your question and your leadership on this issue. I think you nailed the crux of the issue, which is, you know, on day one, president trump declared a national energy emergency. As I mentioned before, that declaration has been validated by the nonpartisan grid operator nurc.
▶ 2:55:13As you mentioned, they have called the current situation created by the disastrous energy subtraction policies of the previous administration, a far a five alarm fire for the grid. And that is because any time you prematurely close reliable, dispatchable generation and do not replace it adequately with reliable dispatchable generation, you will see shrinking reserve margin, growing resource adequacy challenges.
▶ 2:55:40At a time when we are trying to build the infrastructure that we need to meet future load growth and win the ai race and onshore manufacturing. So it makes absolutely no sense that you would subtract reliable, some of the most valuable electricity that we have is that which the grid operators can accredit to meet peak demand, because that is what the system is built for, to meet peak demand in the summer or the winter time. >> that's exactly right. We all want clean air and clean water.
▶ 2:56:11We all want safety, but we also need affordability. We also need advancement and making sure that we're operating in the realm of reality, our essential to doing so. Last question, Mr. fitzsimmons. Again, um, doe extending this emergency order because, uh, miso continues to operate with dangerously thin reserve margins, limiting flexibility during extreme weather or cyber attack.
▶ 2:56:32Um, from a grid reliability standpoint, grid security standpoint, do these net zero agenda items prioritizing the shutdown of thermal baseload power directly increase the likelihood of future emergencies that make grid more vulnerable to cyber attacks and physical threats? >> I would say absolutely.
▶ 2:56:50If you are prematurely retiring, reliable, dispatchable generation and you're not replacing it with reliable and dispatchable generation, the net result of that will be a weakened energy system and higher costs for the american people. >> thank you. We want affordability and we want reliability as well. Thank you for your time, Mr. chairman, I yield back. >> thank you. The gentleman yields back. The chair now recognizes the gentlelady, the at large member from north dakota, for five minutes for questions. >> thank you, Mr. chairman.
▶ 2:57:20Well, I'm so excited I got here for that great exchange, because that is exactly the reason why I ran for congress was because of my concern over what representative james just outlined, this five alarm fire that we have in our country of being at dangerous risk of not having enough power to meet demand today. And we're still retiring.
▶ 2:57:42Um, we're still pursuing these, uh, mandates at, you know, at a rate that isn't supported by technology, uh, today. And, and we need to correct that policy. And we're working hard to do just that. You are working hard to do just that. So thank you, Mr. fitzsimmons, for all your work there. Thank you. Today's discussion about cyber security is one that as a utility regulator, I always dreaded because it feels so, you know, like impossible. It's tough.
▶ 2:58:13This is a tough, tough issue. So, um, I want to thank you for all that you are doing to try to minimize the risk that we face on this side of the aisle issue of reliability, which is the cyber risk.
▶ 2:58:26So can you tell me, um, how is doe preparing the energy sector, particularly our grid operators, for a scenario where we have a cyber attack and it escalates alongside geopolitical conflicts? >> that's a great question, congresswoman, and thank you for your leadership on, on, on this and other important issues for the security and resilience of the grid.
▶ 2:58:51I think that your question is an important one, and it is something that we take very seriously. So I think part of caesar's core mission is, uh, you know, uh, we have to do blue sky training and exercises with relevant stakeholders, many of which you just mentioned, states, grid operators, local communities, and of course, the energy sector. And we do that every year. So we have an annual exercise series that's called clearpath.
▶ 2:59:19And I was honored to attend last year's clearpath session. It was it described the exact kind of scenario that you're that you're talking about. It was based in, uh, the meeting was held in boston. It looked at the northeast region, which, as you know, has, uh, dangerously constrained natural gas pipeline capacity, that, you know, due to political decisions is not only raising costs for people in the northeast and, and that region, but it's also resulting in a
▶ 2:59:51Dangerously precarious situation during winter peak demand. And so, um, this scenario that we focused on and the types of scenarios that we need to focus on are, are just that. What happens if you have a severe weather event in a region that's known to get a lot of snow, the northeast and you have constrained pipeline capacity, and you have an opportunistic cyber attack from a nation state threat actor. How do you deal with all of that, that cascading challenge all at once?
▶ 3:00:19Uh, you can only figure that out when you get in the room with all of the key decision makers at the federal, state, local level, and then the energy owners and operators and work through that in real time, you figure out, well, this system goes down, what impact what second and third order effects does this have on the rest of the system?
▶ 3:00:36And I think some of the challenges we find are around, how do you, uh, how do you ensure effective use of communications when you're operating in a, when you're operating in a, after a weather event and a cyber attack? So you're not running on on all cylinders now all of a sudden your main communications infrastructure goes down.
▶ 3:00:58So I think the interconnectedness of the energy sector with telecom and water and transportation are also a key component of this. I think you only start to understand all those contingencies and second and third order effects when you do blue sky training and exercises like we do, and get all the stakeholders in the room together to work on it. And so I'd, I'd invite you to come to a future session if you'd like, because I think it's really valuable. >> I would love to do that.
▶ 3:01:26Um, so you do the exercises, are there, um, rule changes or requirements or standards that need to be set or are being set as a result of those exercises? And can congress help in any way, um, to make sure that the proper standards are being set and those then pushed down through the system to the, you know, even just the small rural electric providers? >> yeah. I mean, I think as as you know, caesar's mission is not regulatory.
▶ 3:01:56We, we, uh, voluntarily, proactively collaborate with the energy sector. Uh, but I, you know, I would say there are existing standards that it that are in place at, at newark, as you know, uh, a lot of states handle this issue differently. I think it is growing in importance. I think there there's more work, at least in in my purview as the caesar director. I think there's definitely more work we can do on our side, always more work that we can do to collaborate productively with the energy sector and those that have to make these key decisions.
▶ 3:02:28>> excellent. >> well, consider me a partner in that effort. If there's anything I can do to help, I'm here for you. Thank you for your work. >> thank you. >> the gentleman's time has expired and yields back. The chair now recognizes the gentleman from pennsylvania's 13th district for five minutes for questions. >> thank you. Chairman and ranking member castor, for holding this important hearing. And to you, Mr. fitzsimmons, for testifying. Since taking office, president trump has focused on american energy dominance.
▶ 3:02:57While bringing new generation online is certainly a critical component to establishing the dominance that we need. It will be equally important to upgrade and protect any new and existing infrastructure against threats. As you have outlined in your testimony today.
▶ 3:03:13We cannot maintain energy dominance over our adversaries if we fail to address vulnerabilities that leave our infrastructure exposed to attacks from outside sources that you have mentioned again today, like china and russia, iran and north korea.
▶ 3:03:32Upgrading both the physical facilities and the cyber security measures throughout our electrical grid will also ensure reliable and affordable energy, especially during this period with increasing demand, taking the necessary steps to protect our infrastructure now can help us to avoid the large costs that will be incurred in the event of a major disruption in the future.
▶ 3:03:55The area of pennsylvania that I represent is rural and features many smaller utilities and rural electric co-ops. And while it is equally important to guard the infrastructure under their control, these groups often do not have the same resources that larger utilities have to make those necessary investments. That's why I'm happy to see the rural and municipal utility cybersecurity act under consideration today.
▶ 3:04:24This bill would reauthorize a program providing technical and financial assistance to these smaller rural groups to help protect them against the threats that we've outlined. Mr. fitzsimmons, how does a program like this help ensure that rural areas don't lag behind? Don't fall into that really vulnerable stage that you have outlined. And how do these necessary cybersecurity improvements protect this critical infrastructure? >> I think that's a great question.
▶ 3:04:54So thank you for asking it. I mean, this is one of the most important programs that I think we have at caesar, because more than half of americans are served by small rural munis and co-ops. And as you mentioned, they are under-resourced. They just do not have the same types of resources to devote to it or to cybersecurity. They typically don't have, like large security operation centers.
▶ 3:05:17They don't have a big group of people working on cybersecurity, and yet they face the same threats that better resource companies and organizations do. They are under threat just the same, and perhaps opportunistically even more so because nation state threat actors understand that they operate critical infrastructure and they don't always have the resources. They're under-resourced. And so I think it's incredibly important.
▶ 3:05:42And I think what's promising is that there's a lot that we can do with the rmcc program to elevate the collective cyber security posture of rural munis and co-ops, you can solve 80 to 90% of basic of of most cybersecurity intrusions and vulnerabilities with basic cyber hygiene. And so this is an area where a relatively small amount of federal resources can have a huge impact.
▶ 3:06:10>> do you feel that the federal government can identify areas of need and leverage public private partnerships and programs like these that will ultimately lower costs and provide that protection that you so eloquently outlined? >> I certainly do, sir. Yes. >> I thank you. This has been a revealing and illuminating discussion today. I thank you for allowing me to wave on, Mr. chairman, and I yield the balance of my time. >> well, thank you very much. The gentleman yields back the balance of his time.
▶ 3:06:38The chair seeing no further members, wishing to ask questions of the witness. We want to thank you very much for appearing before us today and giving us your testimony. Members may have additional written questions for you.
▶ 3:06:50I remind members that they have ten business days to submit additional questions for the record, and I ask our witness to do the best you can to submit those responses within ten business days upon the receipt of the questions at this time, we will now transition to the second panel of witnesses for today's hearing. And again, thanks very much for appearing.
▶ 3:07:35>> and.
▶ 3:08:09For all.
▶ 3:08:41That.
▶ 3:09:22You.
▶ 3:10:35>> well, thank you very much. We will convene our second panel and want to thank our second panel again, witnesses, for appearing today and taking the time to testify before the subcommittee. Each witness will have the opportunity to give an opening statement, followed by a round of questions from our members. Our second panel of witnesses today are Mr. scott aaronson, the senior vice president of energy security and industrial operations at the edison electric institute. Thank you, doctor.
▶ 3:11:03Nathaniel melby, vice president and chief information officer at dairyland power. Thanks for being with us. Miss rebecca o'neill, research principal in the energy and environment directorate at the pacific northwest national laboratory. Thank you and miss adrian loto, the senior vice president of grid security, technical and operational services at the american public power association.
▶ 3:11:30And before we get started, if you didn't hear the just real brief, uh, just pull the mics up close when you speak and also you'll see the lights. You have four minutes, uh, in your first minutes, green then will turn yellow for the last minute and then turns red. So we'd like you to finish up, if you could, with your statement when it goes red. And again, we appreciate you appearing before us today. And, Mr. aaronson, you are recognized for five minutes for an opening statement. Thank you. >> chairman. >> vice chairman, uh, weber. Ranking member.
▶ 3:12:00Castor, thank you so much for the opportunity to testify before the subcommittee on this important on this important topic, protecting america's energy infrastructure in today's cyber and physical threat landscape. My name is scott aaronson, and I am senior vice president for energy security and industry operations at the edison electric institute. Eei is the trade association representing all of the nation's investor owned electric companies. Eis members provide the energy of every day to nearly 250 million americans, operating in all 50 states and the district of columbia.
▶ 3:12:28The services these companies provide are critical to both national and economic security, ensuring the resilience of this most critical infrastructure is responsibility. The industry takes very seriously, and it's a responsibility that's only growing with the proliferation of data centers for artificial intelligence and our digital economy, more advanced manufacturing and industrial processes relying on electricity, electrification of other sectors like transportation and electricity increasingly used for home heating.
▶ 3:12:54America's electric companies are more important than ever to our nation's security, economic competitiveness, and the lives and safety of our customers and your constituents. In addition to extraordinary growth, the grid is also changing with more distributed resources, two way flows, grid scale batteries, broad digitization, enabling customer control and better visibility into this increasingly complex energy grid. This is an exciting time to be part of the electric power sector, but these changes also can bring new risks and an evolving attack surface.
▶ 3:13:22As the director of national intelligence worldwide threat assessment has said publicly since 2019, near-peer nation states are targeting critical infrastructure to hold the united states at risk at a time of their choosing. To address these threats, the electric power sector uses a defense in depth approach. This seeks to protect our most critical assets from compromise, while also understanding that defenses are never infallible. So resilience, redundancy, and the ability to recover are integral to our defenses.
▶ 3:13:49To this, resilience comes from a diversity of resources and systems that limit single points of failure. It also comes from the development and exercising of plans to operate degraded or to restart systems known as blackstart, and perhaps most importantly, a culture of mutual assistance that supports response and recovery against all hazards. This is most apparent when storms hit, but has grown to include cyber mutual assistance capabilities and spare equipment sharing programs. The energy grid is one big machine with thousands of owners and operators.
▶ 3:14:19This community has found common cause to work together and with government partners to address the risks posed by mother nature and man made threats. This is why today's hearing and the legislation the subcommittee is considering is so important. Public policy has helped to shape the sector and its readiness from congress, codifying mandatory, enforceable security standards.
▶ 3:14:37The energy policy act of 2005 to the fast act, designated the department of energy as the sector risk management agency for the electric power sector, to the cyber information sharing act of 2015, to several funding bills that have prioritized grid security. Congress has helped advance regulations, industry, government partnerships, information sharing regimes, and resilience initiatives. Ea and its members are grateful for this committee's bipartisan focus on helping industry and government continue to advance our security and resilience posture.
▶ 3:15:05Industry can't do it alone, and the bills being considered today, as well as other bills that have passed in recent years, cyber sense and the enhancing grid security through public private partnerships act, specifically, are further examples of the work congress can do to improve preparedness and enhance coordination across industry and government at all levels. The value of these partnerships can be seen in the response to the chinese state sponsored cyber threat known as volt typhoon, the work done to secure us infrastructure at the beginning of the russia ukraine war and responses to the pandemic.
▶ 3:15:33Any number of storms, substation shootings and other threats to grid reliability. Fortunately, the electric power sector is able to address these risks collectively and proactively thanks to initiatives like the energy threat analysis center, which is being considered today as well. Etac has allowed a small but growing subset of companies to work side by side with government to understand threats and to develop mitigation strategies with intelligence analysts and grid security experts.
▶ 3:15:58Together, these lessons and then shared with the broader sector through the electricity information sharing and analysis center, or isac, showing a commitment to collective defense that will serve us well as the electric power sector adapts to the new threats and challenges facing critical infrastructure operators.
▶ 3:16:15Other programs that are similarly leveraging government and industry expertise for a common good through national partnerships with the sector include the cyber risk information sharing program, or crisp and cyber testing for resilient industrial control systems, or citrix. Again, eei and its members are deeply committed to these programs, partnerships, regulatory constructs and resilience strategies, and working together as both the energy grid and geopolitical risks continue to evolve, and we are deeply appreciative of the focus this committee brings to these issues and for the legislation before the committee today.
▶ 3:16:44Thank you again for the opportunity to testify, and I look forward to your questions. >> well, thank you very much. And, doctor melby, you are recognized for five minutes for your statement. Thank you. >> thank you. Chairman. >> ranking member castor and members of the subcommittee. Good afternoon. Thank you for this committee's diligent and comprehensive work to provide the tools that electric cooperatives need to stay ahead of an evolving cyber threat landscape and strengthen our nation's grid security.
▶ 3:17:07I appreciate the opportunity to discuss the draft legislation before the committee, particularly the reauthorization of the rural and municipal utility cybersecurity program. My name is doctor nate melby, and I serve as the vice president and chief information officer at dairyland power cooperative in la crosse, wisconsin. I'm testifying today on behalf of dairyland and the national rural electric cooperative association, our national trade association that represents america's nearly 900 electric cooperatives. Dairyland is a generation and transmission cooperative.
▶ 3:17:37We supply the power that 24 distribution cooperatives and 27 municipal utilities deliver to more than 750,000 people across 44,500mi of the upper midwest. The cyber threats facing our grid are real, sophisticated and growing as private, independent businesses operating without profit incentives and owned by the people that we serve. Electric cooperatives are dedicated to protecting the 42 million americans in critical military assets, relying on our power. But securing this infrastructure is difficult.
▶ 3:18:06We operate in resource constrained rural areas, defending lines and substations that are often remote and difficult to access. We operate on thin margins without profit incentives or shareholders. We must balance costly security needs against the financial reality of our members. Every dollar we invest in cyber defense comes directly from our members pockets. This is a difficult balance to strike when 1 in 4 cooperative households has an annual income below $35,000 per year.
▶ 3:18:31For electric cooperatives, the most effective cyber policy is the one that helps us overcome these fiscal hurdles. This is why the rural municipal cyber utility cybersecurity program is so critical. It provides the federal resources necessary to close the rural resource gap, not just by purchasing much needed technology, but by building strong partnerships, collaboration mechanisms, and voluntary information sharing practices that keep our grid safe. We're already seeing the impact of this program in two specific ways.
▶ 3:19:01First, through direct investment. Last fall, the department of energy announced $80 million in awards that will benefit over 400 cooperatives. This includes a $3.5 million award for dairyland. This funding will allow us to deploy advanced security technologies across 20 of our distribution cooperatives, raising the baseline of defense for our entire system. Second, through shared resources, separately, our trade association, nreca was awarded a $4 million cooperative agreement to launch project guardian.
▶ 3:19:29This initiative is developing shared tools, tabletop exercises, and workforce training frameworks that allow smaller cooperatives to access expertise that they could not afford individually. However, to fully realize the potential of this program, we need to address two specific hurdles. First, the full implementation has been delayed. A portion of the awarded funds, including dairyland, have not been released yet. We encourage doe to move more quickly so we may put these resources into action.
▶ 3:19:57Second, the application process is burdensome. Current law requires cooperatives to compete not just for funding, but also for basic technical assistance. Technical assistance should be about building capacity for those who need it, not rewarding those with the resources to write the best application. We strongly support the draft reauthorization bill before the committee, because it addresses these concerns by giving doe greater flexibility to distribute the funds more quickly, and ensures that support reaches the most under-resourced utilities beyond the rmcc program.
▶ 3:20:27We commend the committee for the comprehensive approach reflected in the other measures before us today. These efforts underscore the importance of a holistic strategy to protect our critical infrastructure across every segment of the energy sector. In conclusion, securing the grid is a shared responsibility. We are committed to doing our part, but we can't confront these threats alone. We urge you to advance the reauthorization to ensure that we have the resources to keep the lights on for 42 million americans. Thank you, and I look forward to your questions.
▶ 3:20:58>> well, thank you very much for your testimony. And, miss o'neill, you're recognized for five minutes for your statement. You want to just turn the mic on there, please? >> rule number one. Thank you. Chairman, ranking member castor and members of the subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to testify today. My name is rebecca o'neill. I execute and oversee research projects on energy security and infrastructure at the department of energy's pacific northwest national laboratory, or pnnl.
▶ 3:21:27And I'm here today because one of the proposals under consideration, the secure grid act, discusses state energy security plans. And since summer 2023, I have led a team of researchers at pnnl to support caesar and all 56 states and territories to deliver complete energy security plans that meet all requirements of the law, and this milestone was achieved in december 2024.
▶ 3:21:49States have a critical role to play in the energy security of the united states due to the complex, interdependent character of energy infrastructure, services and ownership. States have visibility at a very unique scale and understand the relationships and the operational realities to build energy security from the ground up. As my state colleagues said to me last week, we are all safer and more secure because of these plans and the planning work that we did together. So how did a national laboratory come to be involved here?
▶ 3:22:20Caesar tapped pnnl to review the state energy security plans, and we did two rounds. And when we tallied it up, it was 14,000 pages of energy security plans. We provided direct and specific recommendations in our reviews on steps to meeting requirements in the law. In between the two reviews, pnnl offered technical guidance through training, data and tools, all in an essential partnership with the national association of state energy officials. Also called nascio.
▶ 3:22:46This team even built state cohorts with monthly exercises on risk mitigation and risk assessment, and capped it with an in-person energy security event in minnesota in june 2024. And I brought props because I couldn't help myself. We have workbooks here on this topic, and these are the kinds of materials that we're talking about when we work directly with states to exercise the plans and the practices of risk assessment. So I want to share a little bit more with you generally about what our state energy security plans.
▶ 3:23:15Unfortunately, they're not public, but I can share some broad themes with you. And in particular, what energy security plans are not. So energy security plans are not just about electricity. Energy security plans are also about fuels. They're about home heating fuels, industrial fuels, transportation fuels, as well as natural gas and electricity systems. But some of the most difficult and valuable assessments in these plans are about those relationships between the sectors.
▶ 3:23:38As you might be able to tell, energy security plans are not a piece of cake by the law, the plans are required to meet multiple elements. They have to provide an energy profile of all energy sectors and inventory of threats and hazards, man made and natural or man made, like what we're discussing today, and a risk assessment that puts all of that together hazards, threats, energy infrastructure, and then a responsive mitigation approach and a plan to collaborate across agencies and the private sector to respond.
▶ 3:24:06Energy security plans are not a template of energy security. Excuse me? Emergency response protocols. They're not a one for one. As my colleague says, if you've read one plan, you have read one plan. Each state is unique. Energy security plans are also not the same as an infrastructure owner's plan. States have a different perspective. They do not own or operate the assets. They have a wider outlook on consequences, and they imagine different strategies to respond.
▶ 3:24:34So now that the states have these secure plans, energy security plans that are complete, we've learned these gaps and challenges in our review, and we're taking the next step with the plans. So under the continued leadership of caesar, which the undersecretary described in his testimony, our research program supports regional risk guidance, technology assessments, mitigation and in-depth technical studies.
▶ 3:24:54For example, we produced studies on refinery markets and fuel supply chain effects for oregon and worked with the tennessee energy security leaders to document energy system performance in east tennessee after hurricane helene. So a particular interest to this committee, we want to empower state roles and expertise in cyber and in physical security of energy systems. And to this end, we've held a state focused cybersecurity conference in utah. And we hope again in wisconsin this spring. And I have another prop from our last conference.
▶ 3:25:24So once again, you can see that this is this is a deep technical work that we do with the states. Uh, and we've also initiated a working group on cyber and physical security and developing reference guides as we go. So in closing, we cannot have national energy security without state energy security. And we look forward to advancing this important mission through the leadership of caesar and in partnership with the states. Thank you for your attention, and I look forward to answering any questions you might have. >> well, and thank you very much for your opening statement.
▶ 3:25:52And this, uh, you are recognized for five minutes for your statement. >> chairman, ranking member castor, members of the committee, thank you for inviting me today to testify. My name is adrian lotto, and I'm the senior vice president for grid security, technical and operations at the american public power association, or apa. Apa is the voice of not for profit, community owned electric utilities that power 2000 towns and cities nationwide.
▶ 3:26:18Apa represents public power before the federal government to protect the interests of more than 55 million people that public power utility serve in 49 states and five territories. Public power utilities are load serving entities with the primary goal of providing the communities they serve with safe and reliable service at the lowest cost. Reliable grid is the lifeblood of the nation's economic and national security and public power utilities. Take that and their responsibility very seriously.
▶ 3:26:49The three key pillars to grid security are first, mandatory and enforceable standards. Second, information sharing and public private partnerships. And third, defense in depth and sector wide exercises. To effectuate this, apa strongly supports first, the reauthorization of the rmcc program or the rural and municipal utility advanced cybersecurity grant and technical assistance program.
▶ 3:27:13Second, the replacement of cpac or the critical infrastructure partnership advisory council by dhs and third, regulatory harmonization. The electric power industry works closely with the federal government and including newark, ferc, dhs, and doe. Caesar as the sector risk management agency on matters of critical infrastructure protection. One important venue for this collaboration is the electricity subsector coordinating council, or the esc.
▶ 3:27:39The esc serves as the principal liaison between the federal government and the electric power sector, with the mission of coordinating efforts to prepare for and respond to national disasters or threats. Apa and public power utilities play a leadership role in the esc, which includes ceos and trade association leaders. Their counterparts include senior administration officials from the white house, relevant cabinet agencies, federal law enforcement, national security and director fitzsimmons, who leads the caesar portfolio.
▶ 3:28:07It must be noted that rescinding cpac protections in which the esc previously operated within without any replacement, hinders the ability of industry to engage fully with the federal government partners, and this includes information sharing program areas like itac.
▶ 3:28:26A matter before this committee today, industry was apprized by dhs that the administration proposed cpac replacement is ready for publication in the federal register, and public power encourages the administration to finalize it quickly. Public power utilities also work very closely with state officials in the states in which we operate. As such, apa is supportive of including distribution utilities in state energy security plans and in the grid secure act, and turning next to the rmcc legislation in detail.
▶ 3:28:54Enacted in 2021, the rmcc program was authorized and appropriate $250 million in grants and technical assistance over five years to rural and municipal and small investor owned electric utilities to enhance their security posture. Apa believes that this program is a once in a generation opportunity to improve cybersecurity of under-resourced, not for profit utilities that should be extended and expanded through rmcc.
▶ 3:29:21Apa received a four year, $4 million cooperative agreement to establish the cyber pathways program. This program is designed to support public power utilities with cybersecurity assessments, training, and a new cyber designation program to recognize utilities implementing cybersecurity best practices. The cyber pathways program focuses on resource limited public power utilities, connecting them with resources and improving their maturity and incident response capabilities.
▶ 3:29:50In addition, apa has also been selected for negotiation of another financial assistance award of $2 million over four years to test and improve cybersecurity incident response capabilities at 19 public power utilities. Pa believes there is much more work to do to build on the successes achieved thus far in the program, and as such, we strongly support the armonk armonk act, which would reauthorize the program through 2030.
▶ 3:30:18We believe this funding will yield dividends to the nation's security, far exceeding the initial investment. Thank you again for your leadership and holding this hearing. We appreciate the bipartisan support and look forward to your questions. >> well, thank you very much for your testimony, and we will be moving into the question and answer portion of the hearing. But I know in a couple of minutes here they're going to call votes. I think we can do we can probably get two sets of questions in here real quick. So I'm going to recognize myself for five minutes.
▶ 3:30:44And miss o'neill, uh, my bill to secure grid act ensures state energy security plans take a holistic approach. And securing interconnected energy systems in the potential for supply chain disruptions that cause vulnerabilities and security protocols. The growing digitization of energy systems will only require more collaboration between all parties. Ensure a secure and resilient network.
▶ 3:31:12In your view, how does the secure grid act ensure states are considering all potential vulnerabilities and increasing interconnected and digitized energy systems? >> thank you for the question. Chairman latta. The states through the energy security plans that they have just completed, had to address cybersecurity by law. They had to address the risks, and they had to profile sort of the state of knowledge.
▶ 3:31:38I'll say that they, um, they worked in close partnership with caesar, as the undersecretary outlined, understand some of those risks and the shape of those risks, and that state roles in cybersecurity are still variable. I believe representative fedorchuk referenced that. So there's still in a very much a state of learning and emerging understanding, the, uh, that's part of the work that we were describing before about having more working groups and more trainings. And this is this is a state of growth right now for those communities.
▶ 3:32:08So the secure grid act makes it very clear that congress would like to see the states pay more attention. This clarifies some of the roles for the states that this is imperative for them. And it also clarifies over which part of the system that additional work should occur. So I believe the secure grid act does clarify congressional intent for these plans going forward. And that should increase the security of those systems. >> well, thank you.
▶ 3:32:33Uh, doctor melby, um, I have quite a few, uh, electric cooperatives in my district. And in fact, I think I have more electric cooperatives than anybody else in the state of ohio and a congressional district. You were talking about the, you know, the money that's going to be needed out there. And I know when I go through my electric cooperatives for visits, the amount of money that's being invested just to make sure they're cyber secure and protect them.
▶ 3:32:58But a couple of things that always come up when you're talking about the sharing, the expertise and the dollars they have to two things always come up. You need the personnel. You have to have the training. So could you touch on those two points? >> sure. >> so as you mentioned, sir, uh, we are not for profit at cost utility providers. And so, uh, it is challenging for us, uh, because we need to be very discerning with the money that we spend. And we are committed and focused to securing the grid.
▶ 3:33:27And so in order to be able to effectively do that, uh, we need to have advanced training. We need to have, uh, developed skill sets. And we also need the process and tools and technologies necessary for cyber hygiene so that we can provide that collective defense.
▶ 3:33:43And so although electric cooperatives are committed to that, the best pathway for us to achieve that is through partnership, partnership with federal agencies, partnership with our national trade association to help not only develop those skill sets, but to have the additional skill sets available to back us up when we need them. >> okay. Thank you. Uh, Mr. aaronson, uh, in this new era of rapidly increasing electricity demand growth, we need to ensure that pipelines that fuel power plants are secure.
▶ 3:34:10How might efforts of the doe to enhance visibility over the supply and delivery of fuels for power inform pipeline and informed on the pipeline security? >> so I'm going. To evade the question a little bit. I'll say it on the front end to say how government wants to organize to handle these issues is very much the prerogative of all of you and the government.
▶ 3:34:34I will say the interdependency and reliance on pipelines for power generation shows a, uh, we, the edison electric institute, and we, uh, the electric power sector have a vested interest in their success. Uh, as director fitzsimmons mentioned, the electricity subsector coordinating council and oil and natural gas sub-sector coordinating councils are both firmly over the department of energy.
▶ 3:34:58And so, from an operational standpoint, with respect to sharing of intelligence, uh, with coordination with exercises, in fact, we conducted an exercise with our gas partners, uh, just this past august, the edison electric institute did, uh, there's a lot of really good coordination happening there from a regulatory and oversight standpoint. Again, that's that's going to be the prerogative of government. But at this point, we're very comfortable with how effective the partnership has been between electric and gas sectors. >> well, thank you very much.
▶ 3:35:28And I know I have about 20s left, but I'm going to submit my other questions to you all in writing. And I will now recognize the gentlelady from florida, the ranking member of the subcommittee, for five minutes for questions. >> thank you, Mr. chairman. Thank you. Thanks to all of you for your testimony and advice to the committee. Miss o'neill, your, um, your testimony relating to the state energy security plans is is very interesting.
▶ 3:35:52Uh, states don't have all the resources in the world, however, so I imagine they're having to make certain determinations on where they're going to invest to keep the the grid safe and their systems safe. In your experience working with the states, what do they rely on from the federal government when it comes to their their security plans? Are there talk talk to me about the grants or the, uh, technical expertise from the department of energy. Uh, what else?
▶ 3:36:26>> pardon me? The states have, uh, deeply interconnected relationship with the department of energy across all fronts. Um, across all parts of the agencies. I've worked in my capacity at pnnl in technical assistance for states that support, uh, you know, good regulatory decisions or technology assessments. So in this particular piece of energy security, um, caesar has a division that is explicitly focused on state, local, tribal and territorial relationships. I believe that's addressed in a different bill in more detail.
▶ 3:36:56And that program is dedicated to those relationships and and bringing states what they need, leveraging the power of the federal complex. So in my, uh, program, what we focused on mostly was everything from helping states have good data to baseline their information on and again, across all sectors. And the sectors are, are, uh, really different, right? Very different ownership structures, very different levels of visibility and interaction. Um, so the states already know quite a lot.
▶ 3:37:23I'll say the states already have really deep expertise, and some of the work we were doing was providing more of a, an opportunity to share that knowledge and put it in a comprehensive framework so that they could learn something new, right, so that the exercise becomes possible. The federal government supports, uh, not just the the work of building the plan. Right. But everything that comes after building the plan.
▶ 3:37:47So, uh, there's a deep investment in states being able to resource effectively to have, um, you know, adequate, uh, tools, techniques, even software systems. Right. There's so many things that the federal government will do. Director. Excuse me, undersecretary fitzsimmons mentioned, for example, eagle eye, which is a capability that the federal government funds so that states can have access to real time outage information at oak ridge national laboratory. So there's a very large range of ways that the federal government provides direct resources to the states. Yes.
▶ 3:38:18>> okay. Thank you. You're also the principal investigator for pnnl connecting transmission corridors initiative. Um, looking at public benefits that can be enabled through investments in power line corridors. Here we have a very our transmission infrastructure is aging. Um, Mr. aaronson talks about the greater complexity with virtual power plants, digitization, uh, different distributed sources.
▶ 3:38:45How can transmission infrastructure and more grid connections enhance the state's energy security and overall grid reliability? >> um, thank you for the question. It's it's an interesting one because states, states actually are the dominant entity that authorize transmission. So, uh, so every state in the country, um, has a different strategy. It's, uh, it could be consolidated authority. They could have a separate board that determines authorizations.
▶ 3:39:11And so a lot of state policy for transmission is executed through the regulatory authorities over transmission. Um, the part about planning or oversight, that would be some of my other colleagues here that could talk more about the ways that utilities, um, sort of recognize reliability and economics and do the technical work of planning for new transmission.
▶ 3:39:32>> and in the when we were working on crafting the inflation reduction act in the bipartisan infrastructure law, um, expert told us it was a good idea to give states and energy providers the tools they need to do the advanced planning, choose those corridors in advance, focus on them, and that would save customers and providers a lot of money. Is that the case? >> certainly. Transmission, uh, development takes a long time and costs a lot of money. Right.
▶ 3:40:02And, um, I think no one enters into transmission permitting lightly. It's challenging. We've seen states, um, flex some of their, uh, requirements, let's say, around, uh, whether or not to be create kind of fast track. Some states have that for if it's a minor update to a line or reconnecting or something that's relatively small in scale, they might. That's some of the ways that the states do it. The other ways are to create more understanding around what is a transmission line look like in your community.
▶ 3:40:31By our analysis, I mean millions and millions of americans live within one mile of a transmission line. It's a pretty ubiquitous piece of infrastructure in the united states. Most people know exactly what it is and what it does. So the work of the pre-planning is more to help people understand what it would mean to have a transmission corridor, feel more confident in the science, understand the purpose of the line, those kinds of things. And that's part of the research project that that you mentioned before. >> thank you very much I yield back. >> thank you. The gentleman's time has expired yields back.
▶ 3:41:00And what we'll do right now we're going to take a brief recess because we have about nine minutes left in this vote series. And so uh, we'll be back. We'll reconvene ten minutes after the second vote is called. So we'll take a brief recess and be right back. Thank you.
▶ 4:13:23The subcommittee will come to order and will now resume the business of the subcommittee hearing. And at this time, we will recognize the gentleman from texas, the vice chairman of the subcommittee, for five minutes for questions. >> miss laura, I'm going to come to you. In your testimony, you raised the importance of natural gas for us electricity generation.
▶ 4:13:49Can you please elaborate on how enhancing collaboration and coordination between the natural gas pipeline regulating agencies can improve not just what they're producing in terms of energy safely, but can also improve both cyber and physical security practices. >> thank you for the question.
▶ 4:14:10Uh, certainly we enjoy a really robust collaboration with doe and the onc on natural gas, uh, owners and operators, together with um, electric power utilities. So anything that we can do to enhance and share threat information, vulnerability information, um, that will ensure that our members, the utilities are, uh, working and understanding those threats across the full generation fleet, including natural gas, is something that we're supportive of.
▶ 4:14:40So, um, it's definitely something that's a system of systems from generation transmission to distribution. Seizure plays an important role, as do the electric utilities. >> glad to see you shaking your head. Yes, Mr. doctor melby, I'm going to come to you next. Electric cooperatives, because what we call co-ops are not for profit utilities, uniquely governed by their members and customers. I know I'm telling noah about the flood, right?
▶ 4:15:08Question is, how can co-ops balance the need for cyber and physical security upgrades without placing undue financial burden on their members, particularly in rural communities? You know, I'm from texas. You can always tell a texan you just can't tell him much. But I'm from texas and we have some of those in my district. But how do you do the upgrades without placing undue financial burden on members, particularly in those rural communities?
▶ 4:15:31And what role does the rural and municipality municipal utility cybersecurity program play in supporting that kind of delicate balance? >> yes, sir. So I'll share one thing that maybe not everybody knows about electric cooperatives, and that is that 92% of the nation's persistent poverty counties are served by electric cooperatives. And so the fiscal reality of the costs and the challenges of the cost to serve our members is very real for us.
▶ 4:16:01Uh, the answer to some of those challenges is in shared services, where generation and transmission cooperatives collaborate more closely with distribution cooperatives, or maybe with statewide organizations and of course, with our national trade organizations.
▶ 4:16:16Uh, and we see that through programs that nreca has, like the threat analysis center program, uh, or the cyber goals program, and also with uh, program like the our embassy, where we can fund and elevate and collectively raise the bar together for cybersecurity. >> Mr. is it a ronson? Is that how you say that? Aaronson. Aaronson. That was my next guess. Um, what would you add to that?
▶ 4:16:45>> so I've been called worse, by the way. Um, first of all, I would say that we are very supportive of, uh, things like rmcc funding. I think the fact that the energy grid of north america is, has thousands of owners and operators, some of them investor owned electric companies that represents the cooperatives, municipals, independent power generators, our friends in canada, given that it is the north american grid, we need a rising tide that lifts all boats.
▶ 4:17:08And because of that interconnectedness and interdependency, uh, having the resources and sophistication of all players, whether it's industry or government working collectively, uh, for that common defense is is invaluable. >> I'm sorry. I'm going to come to you. What would you add to that? >> thank you. But I have nothing to add to my colleague's comments. >> thank you. How about those houston texans? No, no. Look, miss lauder, I'm going to come to you.
▶ 4:17:37What would you add to that? >> I concur with everything that was previously said. Enhanced coordination makes the most sense and continuing to enhance that coordination between industry and government is just common sense. Good legislation. >> absolutely. And you all know this. In the rural area of the united states, that's where our farmers and ranchers live. And so, so much of this is so important because basically they feed america. You probably heard me say in the previous panel that the things that make america great are the things that america makes.
▶ 4:18:03And how do they do that with a safe, reliable, affordable, dependable power supply? So what you all do and what we're working on today is very, very important. Mr. chairman, I yield back. >> thank you. The gentleman yields back. The chair now recognizes the gentleman from new jersey's eighth district for five minutes for questions. >> thank you. Chairman. The infrastructure investment and jobs act was a historic investment authorized several key cybersecurity programs, some of which we're discussing today.
▶ 4:18:32Miss o'neill, can you briefly highlight how the requirements, I.e. Provisions on state energy security plan strengthen state's preparedness? >> yes, sir. Thank you for the question. So, uh, the exercise that I was describing in my spoken and written testimony is that states not only have to gather the entire, um, profile of all of the energy sectors, including the suppliers of energy.
▶ 4:18:58So they have to kind of know their names, where they are based, how much energy they're supplying to where in their state, across all sectors. But then they have to do an inventory of hazards and threats, which includes cyber and physical threats, manmade threats. Um, and then they have to analyze the relationship between the energy sectors and those risks, those hazards. I'm sorry, the analyze the risks. And that is a complicated exercise. So just the work of planning is a big deal.
▶ 4:19:21Um, so the gathering of information, the analysis of information, and then the conclusion around what priorities do you want to place on which risks and then what kinds of mitigation. And again, these are states so they don't fix the infrastructure directly. Right. But they can enact policies. They can do studies, they can convene working groups. All of those things can be done in response to those risks. Um, we saw states that were able to secure more staff for energy security because of the production of the plans.
▶ 4:19:51We saw legislatures investing more because they could read a plan and understand what the issues were. Uh, one of the big things that we saw is the that the state agencies work together because, as you know, energy security is multi-agency. And so for the states, this was involving new partnerships across emergency response regulation, environmental regulation, as well as utility regulation. And then some of the more traditional operators, like the state energy office, who might be the esf manager for certain things like fuels.
▶ 4:20:20>> so it would be fair to say that it's it's a lot of work for states, especially when threats that we see on a daily basis that you all deal with on a daily basis. We're seeing an evolving landscape. It's resource intensive. I think everybody would agree, requires coordination. Um, across even within a state, state agencies, across different state lines and with the federal government.
▶ 4:20:42And my concern is with this administration, we're seeing a rollback of support from this administration with respect to states and operators, and that's deeply concerning. And I'll touch on that in a minute. But for all of our witnesses, would you characterize the rural municipal advanced cybersecurity grant and technical assistance program as a success? Just a simple yes or no, and we'll go down the line. >> I don't have a ton of experience with it, but my understanding of the value to the rural dean. >> yes. >> leaning. Yes. There you go. >> yes.
▶ 4:21:14>> I'm not involved. >> yes. Absolutely. >> okay, great. And you know, there's many successes of of the infrastructure investment and jobs act. And we want to see those be the foundation to continue to grow in all the work that you're doing. But are you all aware of how many republicans that were in congress at the time of the law, uh, voted to pass it, that serve on this committee? Because the answers none of them did, uh, which is concerning because we've seen this administration, republicans try to roll back, I think, because it was signed into law by president biden.
▶ 4:21:43And they don't really like acknowledging the good work that that administration did unless there is funding. So did you know this, that every single congressional district has a project that's been that's been funded by the infrastructure investment and jobs act? Did you all know that? So even in districts where the member of congress didn't vote for it, those districts and those constituents still benefit from this incredible law despite republicans trying to undermine it and wind back its successes.
▶ 4:22:08And I want to build on this because we talked about the resource intensive nature of the work that you're all doing in this evolving threat landscape. Do you think it's helpful to what you all are trying to do, and what communities are trying to do? When this administration canceled more than $2 billion worth of funding for communities to harden their energy infrastructure, would you say it's a good thing or a bad thing? And we're going to go down the line again. >> you'll notice I'm not very good at yes or no questions, but. >> this actually is a good or bad.
▶ 4:22:38>> or good or bad questions or or binary questions. I will simply say, I think. >> it's $2 billion. Right. And we said it's resource intensive. >> and and security is a team sport. And the more that we can be funding those that team work, the better. >> I agree. >> I agree with Mr. aronson, and I also believe that we are focused on securing the grid, and we'll use the resources available to us to do that. >> right. And listen, I know that you go you people stretch their dollars a long way, but the more dollars, the more resources you have, especially again in an evolving threat landscape, uh, good or bad, to have $2 billion canceled.
▶ 4:23:10>> does not have a position on that. I'm sorry. >> well, I'll just put you down for very bad. >> um, it's my understanding none of the funding was involved. Cyber and physical security. Um, so from an epa position. >> dollars are fungible, right? So when you're thinking about all these agencies have to figure out all the different threats that they have, whether it's cybersecurity, whether it's, uh, to changes in environmental patterns, etc. Like the money needs to be there to prepare our communities to take on these threats.
▶ 4:23:37>> certainly the federal funding, particularly our the funding, has been utilized by public power utilities and has been very helpful. >> I appreciate all the work that you guys do. Thank you so much I yield back. >> the gentleman's time has expired. The chair now recognizes the gentleman from alabama sixth district for five minutes for questions. >> thank you, Mr. chairman. I thank the witnesses. I want to focus a little bit on the fiscal security of the grid.
▶ 4:24:01And some I think all of you may remember there was an attack on, um, on, uh, transformers in north carolina. There's two different facilities, um, where someone who is obviously an expert marksman also understood exactly where to place the shots. Took down, um, several transformers. My concern about this is, is, um, our supply chain issues.
▶ 4:24:26Um, I mean, this wasn't like you just go out and open up a garage somewhere and start pulling transformers out and put them back. And one of the things that that I've been looking at is the delay now in getting transformers. Um, on the procurement side, it's about four years. Mr. aaronson, I'd like for you to comment on this, because I I'm I'm very concerned.
▶ 4:24:49And we had attacks and I think 15 or 16 maybe more than that, attacks in the months leading up to to the successful attack in north carolina. Uh, do you have the same concerns that some of us have about supply chain issues? >> it may surprise you to hear have less concern about the supply chain, but more concerned about, uh, the proliferation of those attacks. Uh, you go back to 2013, there was the metcalf substation shooting. You had the two in moore county, north carolina. There were a couple others that I could refer to.
▶ 4:25:18Um, first of all, I think what's interesting about those is the metcalf substation shooting did not result in any power outages. I think that shows the resilience of the system. The moore county incident with two separate substations, 40,000 people lost power for four days. That showed the extraordinary work to respond and recover. Given these are soft targets that are all over the communities, it's going to be very hard to defend everything from everything, all of the time. From a supply chain standpoint, what I would say is, um, the electric power sector has built out some spare equipment sharing programs.
▶ 4:25:47Uh, I specifically started something called step, the spare transformer equipment program, and also built on that something called spare connect. So we have the capacity to move material and equipment to support response to these incidents while we then, uh, buy or procure these longer lead time assets. So I do have some concern with the supply chain standpoint, just given all of the growth that we're seeing across the industry and the need for these very hard, long lead time, the hard to build, long lead time pieces of equipment.
▶ 4:26:16But from a response to physical incidents perspective, we're pretty well spared. >> if all of those attacks that took place that year had been successful, we would have been in a really bad place because you call it equipment sharing programs. I call it scavenging for parts. That's basically what they had to do in north carolina. And it was they did a remarkable job in restoring power in four days.
▶ 4:26:39Uh, but the other thing about it is, is and I keep saying this over and over again, we're in an arms race for artificial intelligence with china, and whoever wins this will not be a superpower. They'll be the superpower. And they have an inordinate amount of control over the supply chain for the very for the things that we have to have to build out our power grid. Um, as o'neill, would you like to comment on that?
▶ 4:27:06>> uh, thank you for the for the question there I was nodding my head because it's a it's trade offs, right? I mean, there's more accessible, cheaper materials in certain places, but they introduce new risks. Right. So we talk a lot about how to build a more cyber aware system. You sort of have to start from the ground up, right. You have to build with security in mind and resilience in mind. But there's always these trade offs you're managing between efficiency and security.
▶ 4:27:31>> you we're dependent on things though for, for our own for even on the cyber side, uh, refined rare earth elements. For instance, china had said that they were going to impose an embargo that would have started december 1st. We cut a deal with them, and they postponed that for a year. Uh, if we do not secure own supply chain, uh, our grid is in peril, as is as will be a number of other, uh, our military, our economies.
▶ 4:28:01Uh, it's not just a us problem. It's a, it's a western hemisphere problem. So those are some of the things that, uh, that we're trying to address through this committee that we think are paramount importance. Obviously, as I mentioned in the first panel, the attack on the colonial pipeline, the cyber threats. Um, but we've also talked about the potential for an emp event, which pretty much put everybody out of business.
▶ 4:28:28I just think we're not paying enough attention to the supply chain issues in the event of, um, successful attacks against our grid and the ability to get things back up and running in a timely manner. Uh, and also in overall efforts and the data centers that we've got to build to compete in this artificial intelligence arms race. Mr. chairman, I yield back. >> thank you. The gentleman yields back the balance of his time.
▶ 4:28:55The chair now recognizes the gentlelady from california, seventh district for five minutes for questions. >> thank you very much, Mr. chairman. I want to thank all the witnesses for being here with us today. And I want to thank chairman lott also for holding this hearing and for working with my office to advance the secure grid act. Our nation runs on electricity, our economy, our standard of living, and sometimes our lives depend on a reliable electric grid.
▶ 4:29:21But our electric grid faces growing threats from cyber and physical attacks, and from severe weather and wildfire exacerbated by climate change. The secure grid act would reauthorize a section of the bipartisan infrastructure law that requires states to develop state energy security plans to identify, assess and mitigate risks to the electric grid and make contingency plans for grid emergencies.
▶ 4:29:47States can use the state energy program funding to develop, revise, and implement these plans. It's crucial for the federal government to continue to support states in preparing for and hardening their electric grid against all cyber and physical threats.
▶ 4:30:04However, this section of the law lapsed in october 2025, so I'm glad to work with chairman latta to reauthorize the state energy security plans and continue to support states efforts to maintain the security and reliability of the electric grid. Miss o'neil, um pnnl helps states in developing their state energy security plan. Do you think this program has been effective in helping states to improve their risk, awareness and readiness to respond to emergencies?
▶ 4:30:38>> yes, representative. I do think it has been effective. We see that in the way that the states are using the plans and the fact that by a certain time of after two rounds of review and two years of effort, uh, that they have all have completed plans, they did not start two years earlier with those plans being at that level of rigor. And after this review and this effort and the federal investment, they all have 56 plans.
▶ 4:31:03>> so you and you really do think it'd be helpful to extend this program and to require states to maintain and regularly update their energy security plans? >> so the states, um, you know, as I mentioned, it took a lot of work to do this plan. Um, and so the regularity, you know, is, is a good question. Most states commit in their plans to revisiting them within five years because of this rate of change of energy information, among other things.
▶ 4:31:28Um, and there also are anticipated, you know, through the plans, they, they determine what trends that are of greatest concern to them. Right. And so they do want to look again and make sure that they're tracking correctly. Or there might be other reasons why they need a more current plan in order to make a decision. Absolutely. A lot of need for regularly revisiting the plans. >> thank you. Um, miss lado, much of my district is served by public power. The sacramento municipal utility district, whereas we called smud.
▶ 4:31:55From your perspective, what value do state energy security plans provide for public power utilities? >> they provide a tremendous amount of value. So, um, the system is a system of systems right from generation to transmission to distribution. And so ensuring that the full community, the full, uh, all of the utilities that serve that area, including smud, um, have a seat at that table.
▶ 4:32:21When state energy security plans are being drafted, is critically important. >> absolutely. Um, states have a particularly important role to play in protecting local distribution systems, which are not regulated by the federal government. Miss o'neil, how do cyber threats to local distribution systems differ from threats to the bulk power system? And what threat do cyber attacks on local distribution systems pose to the bulk power systems?
▶ 4:32:50>> thank you for the question, representative. Um, well, the transmission infrastructure is really very different in a lot of ways. Yes, it conveys power, but of course, the bulk power system is, um, is a network that is managed very closely and has very tight oversight, um, distribution systems. I think this was described earlier by the undersecretary. Uh, might have fewer points of oversight in them and obviously carry um, you know, sort of they don't they don't aren't the backbone of the nation's electrical grid.
▶ 4:33:19However, that doesn't mean that they aren't an important piece of the puzzle, as you point out, for cybersecurity. And so that's why we're revisiting some of the the legislation today. Um, one of the things that we're we're aware of is that distribution systems also represent a really diverse, you would say, a tax base. Um, so there's a lot about distribution systems that vary where transmission systems might be a little bit more homogeneous. And so that's why you have models like our site. >> thank you very much. I have a quick question here for Mr.
▶ 4:33:47Aronson about, um, after disasters, Mr. aronson, how can utilities ensure they have enough spare equipment to rebuild after disasters? >> so the industry, as I mentioned earlier, with respect to physical threats, does have a robust spare equipment sharing program.
▶ 4:34:04Uh, many companies who operate in high risk areas, whether it's wildfires or hurricanes or ice storms, will maintain storm stock, uh, with the anticipation that they're going to have to rebuild their system under duress. And so there is an extraordinary amount of planning that goes into that kind of emergency response. >> thank you very much. And I ran out of time. So I'll yield back. >> thank you. The gentlelady's time has expired.
▶ 4:34:29The chair now recognizes the gentleman from kentucky, the chairman of the full committee for five minutes for questions. >> great. Thanks to have you guys here. Appreciate you being here for the afternoon. Um, so this is I'm going to ask each of the panel, but Mr. I'm going to give you a specific way to address it when you when he gets to you. Okay. But we can just start from left to right. So, you know, we're having a race with china. It's critical for economic, national security.
▶ 4:34:54And we must confront the use of ai by adversaries like china to be able to attack and disrupt our critical energy systems are able to do that. And these are fast moving, evolving threats. So would each of you briefly talk about your work with doe and other agencies to stay on top of these threats, and how the bills today help advance energy sectors? How do we stay ahead of the threat of china using ai to attack our grid or other, uh, other adversaries?
▶ 4:35:20And how do you work with energy and what other things would you and miss o'neill, when you get to you, if you would, just what role the national laboratories play to share information about ai, risk and energy sector. All right. >> so I'll start by saying that supply chain risk, uh, is is a risk to national security. And I agree with the statements that have been made. Uh, we have a national security imperative to win at ai. Ai needs data centers. Data centers need electricity, electricity needs, infrastructure and infrastructure needs supply chains to support that. I will very ironically borrow a chinese proverb.
▶ 4:35:49Uh, the chinese proverb is the best time to plant a tree was 30 years ago. The second best time is today. The best time to combat chinese industrial policy was 30 years ago. The second best time is today. So when I think of security, of supply chains, it is security. It is things like the citrix program, which has been referenced today, which is looking at material and equipment to make sure it does not have backdoors or other latent malware that could potentially put us at risk. But I also think of it in terms of availability.
▶ 4:36:16Should china choose to stop sharing rare earth minerals, for example, that puts a strain on our ability to operate the grid. So we need to be thinking holistically about manufacturing capacity to support electricity, support data centers to support ai as a national security imperative. >> doctor riley. >> uh. >> your answer on this. Yes, sir.
▶ 4:36:41>> um, so from the perspective of electric cooperatives, uh, we are not for profit at cost providers of electricity. And our partnership with doe is very valuable to us because it helps us, uh, gain access to information sharing coordination at multiple levels. And it helps us to take a holistic approach to manage the risks, threats and opportunities, uh, that it takes to be able to manage something like this in this threat environment. But we're indifferent to where the threat comes from. It's all threats. It's all nation state actors.
▶ 4:37:12Everything that we face, it helps us maintain a more resilient posture. >> and again, the role national laboratories can play in this. >> thank you for the question. Um, the national laboratories have been working in artificial intelligence for a very long time. Right. Um, the supercomputers that we have, this is ai has been a kind of a cornerstone bedrock. We've had a center for ai at pnnl for a very long time. Uh, I'll say that we are following the lead of the department of energy.
▶ 4:37:39The department has, I think the undersecretary mentioned the ai forts program that's recently been initiated, which is specifically about using ai in order to address energy risk and advance energy security. Pnnl also operates programs that were mentioned, like citrix, and we do reviews of supply chains to representative palmer's point. And then again, we provide technical assistance to states because it is impossible to have that level of expertise in computational skill everywhere. And so it's important that the national laboratories be made available to others that need that information. >> okay. Thank you, miss lado.
▶ 4:38:12>> thanks for the question. So, um, a couple of things to mention here. First, in terms of the esc. The esc, um, regularly gets threat briefings. And, uh, for the last two years now that's included a threat briefing as it relates to artificial intelligence, to keep the ceos apprized of the risk and to stay ahead as they're making risk informed decisions in their utilities.
▶ 4:38:33Um, we're also in regular communication with doe and the doe national labs on what work is being done in ai from the electric grid perspective, both offensive and defensive, to see if there's opportunity for partnership. And then certainly last but not least, programs like the muc, um, enable utilities to protect against all threats and hazards, which also include supply chain risks. >> thank you. And I have another one for the panel, but not enough time for you all to answer.
▶ 4:39:02But so all the bills today reflect measures that would support constant learning and improvement, whether through improved leadership assistance, ensuring coordination. How would these bills be useful to strengthen your work, to safeguard and respond to threats? Mr. aaronson and doctor melby, if we can, I'll be. >> I'll be super quick. They're all very valuable. In particular, the energy threat analysis center. Codifying that particular, um, function has been really it's already shown value and I think, uh, giving it resources and and that codification is only going to help. >> okay. Doctor melby. >> yeah. I'll also be brief.
▶ 4:39:33Anything that helps us have better information more quickly helps us respond faster and better and more broadly to the threats that we face. >> okay. I don't know if the indulgence for a couple more seconds. My time is expired. I'm hopeful we get the answers. We go, I yield back. >> thank you. The gentleman yields back. The chair now recognizes the gentlelady from washington's eighth district for five minutes for questions. >> thank you, Mr. chairman. Thank you to our witnesses today for this really important discussion.
▶ 4:40:02Um, also, I have to say, miss o'neill, thank you for being here. Thanks for making the trek from washington. And I want to tell you just how impressed I was when I had the opportunity to visit pnnl and see the work that you do. And I think it is, um, one of the greatest investments that our nation makes. So thank you.
▶ 4:40:19Uh, just last month, this committee had a hearing on the status of us grid security and resilience and heard from experts about how the level of energy security varies not just from state to state, but from utility to utility, and how that presents vulnerabilities. And we really need to kind of get everybody up to the same level.
▶ 4:40:43And so I wanted to ask about these federal efforts to ready states in the face of increasing cyber threats and physical threats, and possibly now even more coming up. We had a question about that in our last panel. Um, thanks to the bipartisan infrastructure law, the states developed the state energy security plans to establish an energy security and resilience blueprint, which included a path to secure energy infrastructure against these kinds of threats.
▶ 4:41:11And that initiative just sunsetted, uh, this last september and the secure act, which is what we're discussing today, would reauthorize the program. Um, miss o'neill, uh, you have extensive experience. You talked about helping states do this. I'm super happy to hear you just answer a question that this has been really successful, and it's really illustrated a lot of what states need to be prepared for. Um, so that's getting to the plan part.
▶ 4:41:39Next, of course, is the implementation. And I was wondering if you could talk about maybe some hurdles there and how the federal government can help move this from a plan to done. Or to on the path to that. >> yeah, right. I mean, energy security, you're never done. Right? Always. The threat landscape is changing.
▶ 4:42:03And of course, um, the nature of hazards when they occur in the west, wildfire, um, everybody's paying a lot of attention to to the threat landscape and the hazard landscape. And that's why we have threat sharing and so forth. Um, the energy systems, uh, that the states are very focused on. Of course, also, one of the things that, um, that is really technically difficult is to think about the interdependencies. But of course, that's one of the things we need the states to pay attention to because no one else does.
▶ 4:42:31So some of the work that we're doing is to look at the seams. So, uh, because the asset owners themselves have a very good understanding of their own systems. So the kinds of questions that the states are interested in have to do with what is a cascading consequence, or what is the relationship between the water and the telecommunications sector and the energy sector that I need to be paying attention to. So some of those interdependencies are actually very technical, um, in nature. And some of the studies that we've done are everything from helping.
▶ 4:42:57Um, I mentioned before, the state of oregon is dependent entirely on washington for its refining capacity. And so we've done a study with the state of oregon to look at the supply chain limitations, transitions and refinery business situations, and just how to be more aware of not only whether something could happen, but what are the downstream effects, and then what is the kind of response that the state needs to take. So all of those have you can paint a picture in your mind.
▶ 4:43:22I think about all the ways that the federal government can support and enable some of those outcomes. >> and actually this is not theoretical. We just had an issue with getting jet fuel to seatac airport and that it was very dependent on one pipeline. And, uh, it took a lot of effort to get it together. Um, my other question and I talk about transformers, uh, a lot here, just because we have such a shortage. And, Mr.
▶ 4:43:46Aronson, you just talked about the kind of sharing program that one area needs it. Another area can send. But we could have attacks in multiple places, and we have this shortage. And, um, it turns out it's not as simple as just saying, oh, we're just going to invoke the defense production act and make a whole bunch because it turns out, as you know, there's thousands. And these are all individualized to each independent utility.
▶ 4:44:14And I was wondering, I only have 39 seconds left. But could you talk about like, have you have you thought about how we could address this in a way that could help nationwide? Should we should we be working towards standardizing this issue? And I can have both of you comment. But, Mr. aaronson. >> so a couple of things from a standardization standpoint, there's some value to standardization because then sharing is a little bit easier. But with standardization comes a lack of biodiversity.
▶ 4:44:40And biodiversity in and of itself actually creates some resilience. So it's not as simple as that. Um, you hit on something really important, moving these things around like these things. So interdependencies, typekit interdependencies with, uh, transportation infrastructure, these things are the size of a school bus and thousands of tons that it's not as simple as it sounds to move them around.
▶ 4:45:02So we have spared to n minus one, minus one, which means that you can lose one, share it, and still lose another part of your system and still be able to operate. Another thing to think about is on that really bad day prioritization of who gets that resource. So there was an exercise many years ago. I'll just make one up, pretend that pittsburgh. >> I'm sorry, the gentlelady's time has expired and she yields back the chair. >> I know what you're going to say though. Yeah, yeah. Highly populated, less populated. >> who makes. >> the decision for my.
▶ 4:45:32In the conclusion I'll also bring up about we're going to have a lot of written questions for you all, but thank you. Uh, the gentleman from georgia is 12th district is recognized for five minutes. >> uh, thank you, chair atlanta. And for continuing this important hearing. I want to thank the witnesses for testifying on this second panel. Uh, I mentioned the first panel, how critical it is to secure our energy infrastructure from cyber and physical threats.
▶ 4:46:01Obviously, we, uh, we're going to have a tremendous demand for electricity and the growth of electricity in this country. If we're going to continue our efforts at, uh, uh, national security and safety of the american people. Uh, we are considering many bills here today to ensure our energy infrastructure is protected against these threats. Mr. aaronson, uh, talk about industrial control systems.
▶ 4:46:28How can the government work to assist in securing industrial control systems? >> that is a question. We do not have enough time to completely answer. But, uh, look, the industry already has mandatory, enforceable cybersecurity standards for the bulk electric system, which includes many industrial control systems. And what I would say are probably the most valuable industrial control systems.
▶ 4:46:53Uh, there's sort of a theory in, uh, in security, you protect diamonds like diamonds, you protect pencils, like pencils. Uh, there are aspects of the bulk electric system and some of the control systems that operate it that are those diamonds. Those are single points of failure that are the most important. And so our companies recognize that and already are working or already have secured them extensively. I will also say that this goes to there aren't single points of failure. Mistletoe hit it really well. It's a system of systems. And so there are a lot there's a lot of redundancy inherent.
▶ 4:47:22And then the last thing, as far as what government can do to support its all of this information sharing, it's all this intel sharing. Uh, undersecretary fitzsimmons hit it as well. Um, the the private sector is really good at operating the grid. We don't have intelligence gathering capability per se. And so having government have that visibility and sharing it with us and us being able to tell government what works and what doesn't to mitigate those threats has been an invaluable partnership that's grown up over the last decade or so. >> well, the cyber center of excellence. Uh, it is located at fort gordon in my district.
▶ 4:47:55So they've got an eyeball out there on everything. So I hope that, uh, you know, the government is cooperating with all of our, uh, operators to make sure, uh, that we secure this, uh, Mrs. lotto and Mr. melby.
▶ 4:48:10Uh, my district is home to many rural communities and, uh, municipal utility, advanced cybersecurity grant and technical assistance program and other programs help their work on protecting industrial control systems. Uh, tell me how we are working together to get that done.
▶ 4:48:35>> so through the use of the funding from that program, uh, dairyland power cooperative is working with 20 distribution cooperatives to implement advanced security protection capabilities. Uh, those collective capabilities help us raise the bar for defense of those utilities. And it brings us additional visibility and situational awareness. Okay. >> to follow up on that. >> yes, sir. Thank you for the question.
▶ 4:49:00So in addition to the work that nreca is doing, apa likewise is doing work to protect, uh, the grid against cyber threats, including through the funding that the rmcc program has provided. So we have cybersecurity threat assessments that are taking place. This will enable our public power utilities to understand what areas of the grid are most vulnerable, and then aligning them to resources that resources, those resources could be in the form of, uh, training. It could be in in the form of technical deployments.
▶ 4:49:28Um, or it could be just helping with the cyber incident response playbook. So to the point that was raised earlier, it should enable all boats to rise. >> um, it miss o'neill and Mr. aronson, miss lotto, the savannah river national lab, uh, is adjacent to my district. Uh, as I mentioned in the first panel, national labs play a critical role in grid security. Uh, how can national labs be leveraged to use their trained cyber operators to enhance security?
▶ 4:49:57Operating technologies? Ladies first, I guess. >> sure. Um, thank you for the question. So I think the most important part for the doe national labs, whenever they're funding a particular program, is to continue to work with industry and so that industry can have a voice at the table. Um, oftentimes research can turn into a bit more of a research project, but when industry is at the table, we can ensure that the voice of industry is well known, it's well heard, we can bring our problems.
▶ 4:50:27And then the doe national labs bring those that technical assistance and that expertise to bear, so that we have the most impact to solve and mitigate risk. >> okay. I am, uh, I got nine seconds. Uh, could you all submit that in writing to me the answer to that question so we can continue on? Thank you so much. And I yield back. Mr. chairman. >> thank you. The gentleman yields back, and the chair now recognizes the gentleman from ohio's 12th district for five minutes for questions. >> thank you, Mr. chairman.
▶ 4:50:56Thank you all for being here today. Um, my first question is for Mr. harrison. Harrison, I, we talked a little bit about this with the first panel. Mr. fitzgibbons, um, the department of energy's energy threat analysis center, or itac, uh, serves as a central hub for analyzing threats to america's critical energy infrastructure. Yet only a small number of energy companies are direct participants in itac.
▶ 4:51:21Can you elaborate on how itac provides value to the energy sector as a whole, even for those utilities who don't directly participate in this program? >> thanks for that. So a couple of things to say. It started with four pilot companies. I believe it's up to about 17 participating right now. Uh, I don't know what its growth prospects, what its uh, what the plan for growth is.
▶ 4:51:43But already with those four and 17 companies, uh, who maybe have more resources and the ability to participate have found extraordinary, uh, information, have been able to then socialize it through the electricity information sharing and analysis center.
▶ 4:52:00So it's actually a great sort of model where those who have the capacity to support itac are participating, and the things that they find are then able to be socialized to the rest of the industry so they can take action on those findings. >> thank you. That was going to be my follow up. So you answered that. Thank you. Um, switching gears here just a little bit, um, because I wanted to get this question in because there are many co-ops in the congressional district that I represent. Uh, so, doctor wellby, um, this question is for you.
▶ 4:52:29Rural cooperatives face unique challenges as your infrastructure can cover thousands of square miles with few customers per mile. Can you discuss the difficulties co-ops might face protecting your rural and remote infrastructure? Which one? And then. And how can congress and relevant federal agencies support your efforts to protect against physical and cyber attacks to your infrastructure?
▶ 4:52:53>> so when you talk about the the thousands of miles of line in rural areas that we support, that challenge, uh, becomes a vulnerability and a resilience challenge. Uh, from a cybersecurity standpoint, uh, you know, really the best way to help us increase our collective defense is through projects, uh, or programs like the rmcc program. Uh, it allows us, uh, you know, with those $250 million to help protect many co-ops in our system, many co-ops nationwide.
▶ 4:53:21And at a broader level, nreca through project guardian can help provide self-assessment tools, tabletop exercises, information sharing and training. It becomes a high impact, low regret investment that helps us raise our bar. >> good. Okay. Um. Another question. We'll include your doctor and then miss little. And I'll have you go first. Ladies first. As Mr.
▶ 4:53:42Allen said, um, I'd like to follow up on an issue I discussed with the undersecretary during this morning's first panel hearing last year, newark released a reliability insight report on the interconnected gas, interconnected gas and electric systems.
▶ 4:53:58While this report focuses on the physical and operational threats and concerns to the interconnected gas and electric systems, the paper notes ensuring the resilience of natural gas storage pipelines, compressor stations and liquefied natural gas facilities is essential for the electric industry to meet its reliability obligations.
▶ 4:54:21Doctor welby it's my understanding that dairyland power portfolio includes several natural gas facilities that generate well over 1000mw of power. After miss lotto. Could you also miss doctor welby? Can you discuss the impacts to your customers and your operations? If bad actors were able to take out significantly reduce the delivery of natural gas to power plants and end users and dairyland footprint, it might be easier for you to answer first.
▶ 4:54:51Doctor I apologize, miss lotto. So. >> uh, so I'll just be very clear, sir, um, I'm an expert in technology. I'm a chief information officer. Okay? And to my knowledge, dairyland does not own pipeline ourselves. Uh, but we recognize that those pipelines are important for the operation of our plants that use natural gas. >> thank you. I appreciate that, Mrs. lotto. >> uh, as we've spoken about earlier today, the grid is an interconnected system.
▶ 4:55:18So anything we can do to enhance the coordination between our natural gas plant facilities that may or may not be, may or may not be owned by, um, different. It depends on where you are in the sector, but by electric utilities, um, and, and ourselves, um, epa is fully supportive of. So, um, just understanding the threats against all all of our critical infrastructure is critically important.
▶ 4:55:41And we're very grateful at epa to have a good relationship with the onc sec and are regularly invited to attend their meetings as well. >> all right. Thank you very much. Thank you all for being here today. Yield back, Mr. chairman. >> thank you. The gentleman yields back. The chair now recognizes the gentlelady from tennessee's first district. Five minutes for questions. >> boy, tom, that perfectly. >> thank you all for being here today. Um, I want to start with, uh, Mr.
▶ 4:56:09Aaronson, how quickly can itac analyze and distribute information in response to acute threats? >> so I am not intimately familiar with their operations, but, um, I will say a couple of things. The industry and government sitting side by side allows them to be incredibly nimble.
▶ 4:56:33And there have been examples, uh, as I said in my opening testimony, with respect to the beginning of the russia ukraine war, uh, some of the other, um, uh, incidents that have generated some concern about potential risk here at home, uh, for hunt guides and mitigation strategies, uh, coming out of government based or coming out of itac based on government intelligence very, very rapidly.
▶ 4:56:56So I would say quickly for some information and then developing some just exquisite capabilities over the course of a little bit of time. >> okay. Thank you sir. Um, miss lado, uh, well, you mentioned there's still work to be done that can be supported by the rmcc program. Uh, can you tell us what the members would like to see accomplished with this reauthorization? >> thank you for the question. Certainly.
▶ 4:57:23So, um, as I mentioned in my written testimony, we are waiting to negotiate an additional $2 million award with the department. That award alone would help 19 public power utilities provide and, uh, create cyber incident response capabilities so that, uh, not if but when a cyber incident attack occurs, they'll be able to provide reliable service and restore power as quickly as possible.
▶ 4:57:48Um, in addition, the work is already ongoing now to conduct cyber risk assessments at a number of public power utilities. And that's critically important so that we can identify where the resources are needed. And then apa working with our members and the doe, um, uh, doe itself and the national labs can create resources to help public power utilities mature in areas of cybersecurity. So the rmcc funding is greatly helpful. >> okay. Thank you. Ma'am.
▶ 4:58:17Um, doctor melby, we heard last month about how, um, electric co-ops are working to secure the grid and the importance of the rule in municipal utility cybersecurity program. Can you tell us how dairyland and other electronic or electric cooperatives are using the rule and municipal utility cybersecurity program to improve their cyber defenses? >> uh, yes. Congresswoman, thank you for your question.
▶ 4:58:45Uh, so of the $250 million program, dairyland power cooperative has been awarded $3.5 million and with that $3.5 million, 20 of our member distribution cooperatives will be implementing advanced technology that will help us provide advanced cyber defenses.
▶ 4:59:02Uh, those collective technologies are things like, uh, intrusion prevention, managed detection and response capabilities, the ability to do vulnerability assessments and essentially to give us visibility across that entire footprint so that we can have real time situational awareness of the threats that we're facing and help us have a more rapid, uh, better response to those threats. >> yeah. >> it's amazing. You don't know what the threats are when you go to some of these nuclear facilities, things like that, trying to get in as a feed.
▶ 4:59:32But it didn't used to be that way. It's a little bit crazy. Um, miss o'neil, our energy technologies manufactured in the us, um, including battery energy storage systems, less vulnerable to cyber threats and technologies manufactured by foreign adversaries. >> thank you for that question. I'm I'm very aware that there's been some some excellent work to document, not just assembly but manufacturing.
▶ 5:00:00Uh, and the entire supply chain for devices, everything from drones, all components of the grid. And then to understand the cyber implications and vulnerabilities of those systems. So, uh, you know, the department of energy is invested in american made, uh, equipment as well as even just sort of, uh, fundamental electrochemistry. How do we build those at home in order to be less reliant on the chinese, uh, supply chain? >> uh.
▶ 5:00:28>> you know, I've asked, uh, I'm in tennessee, where tva is at, and you walk into some of their dams to look at, uh, some of those facilities, and I'm like, are you emp proof? They're like, well, some places you could walk right in. So but I know that it's the only place in the country, if everything goes to pot, you can look down in one place and see the lights on. So with that, Mr. chairman, I yield back. >> thank you.
▶ 5:00:53The gentlelady yields back in the chair now recognizes the gentleman from pennsylvania's 13th district for five minutes for questions. >> thank you. Chairman and ranking member castor, for continuing this important hearing. Thanks. Thanks to our witnesses for being here today. As we examine this set of timely and necessary legislation to improve security across our energy infrastructure. Earlier, we heard from Mr.
▶ 5:01:18Fitzsimmons on how the federal government can work in coordination with local stakeholders to help mitigate the resource gap faced in rural areas. Rural areas like I represent in central pennsylvania.
▶ 5:01:32Now, I would like to focus on how federal programs can be responsive to the good work that rural utilities and cooperatives are already doing, and work to aid ongoing efforts, rather than prescribing a one size fits all approach, which all of you have testified will not work.
▶ 5:01:50Doctor melby, as it is currently organized, does the rmcc grant and technical assistance program effectively coordinate with rural electric co-ops in order to provide the most relevant technical assistance? >> yes. >> do you see any opportunities for improvement? >> from a programmatic standpoint? I think that it's addressing the right things. So I do not.
▶ 5:02:19I think that it is important for us to make sure that those funds are available to us to be able to implement the technologies that we've applied for. >> do you feel that the technologies that are applied, that you have applied for that with appropriate funding, that you can keep up? Yes. How does the technical and the financial assistance provided by the program allow for necessary security upgrades? Talk to us.
▶ 5:02:45Get into the weeds that the security is so necessary while protecting affordability at the same time for the customers? >> yes. Uh, so as a not for profit at cost utility provider, um, everything that we spend money on comes out of the pockets of our members. And so we are known for doing a lot with what we have and making making do with what we have available to us when it comes to cyber security, uh, there is a baseline that we need to maintain. And all electric cooperatives are not created equal.
▶ 5:03:15All electric cooperatives do not have the same, uh, fiscal capabilities. >> so that one size fits all does not work. >> that is correct. And we, um, one size fits all does not work. Um, but if we can allow them the means to, uh, raise the bar to the same collective level so that we can achieve that baseline together, we will be successful together.
▶ 5:03:40>> so by seeking out more opportunities to leverage public private partnerships, the federal government can be a partner, a partner in keeping the costs down while securing the grid, especially in rural areas. As I mentioned earlier, south central pennsylvania rural electric co-ops like the adams electric co-op work hard to provide safe, reliable power at competitive rates, and I look forward to working with them and with this committee to help bolster their great work.
▶ 5:04:11Thank you all again for being here today. Mr. chairman, I yield back. >> well thank you. The gentleman yields back the balance of his time in seeing no further members wishing to ask questions. Questions to our witnesses. I want to thank you all again for appearing before us today. You can all tell from the your just that your testimony, but also the questions that were asked by the subcommittee members how important this is. So we really appreciate your your your testimony today.
▶ 5:04:38And members may have additional written questions for you, which I'm sure they will. And I want to remind members that they have ten business days to submit additional questions for the record. And I also ask the witness to do your best to get those responses back within ten business days.
▶ 5:04:54Upon receipt of the questions, uh, the chair would ask unanimous consent to insert in the record the documents included on the staff hearing documents list and those that were included earlier, and also the statement from the gentleman gentlemen from, um, uh, north carolina's ninth district. So for his statement that he has, without objection, so ordered and without objection, the subcommittee is adjourned. Thank you so much.
▶ 5:05:58>> for.