▶ 0:03:07Committee on Foreign Affairs will come to order. I'd ask that everybody rise. Join me in reciting the Pledge of
▶ 0:03:18I pledge allegiance to the flag of the United States of America and to the republic for which it stands, one nation under God, indivisible, with liberty and justice for all. Yes, we the purpose of
▶ 0:03:48today's hearing is to engage with under secretary for arms control and international security to examine current US policies and strategies on arms control, non-prololiferation and international security and to provide oversight of all bureaus under the under secretar's authority including bureaus of arms control and non-prololiferation political and military affairs emerging threats counterterrorism and international narcotics and law enforcement affairs I now recognize the chairman of the
▶ 0:04:18subcommittee on Europe representative self for any opening statement he may have
▶ 0:04:24uh thank you Mr. Chairman, today this hearing focuses on international security and arms control matters that are crucial to US foreign policy. We will hear how the State Department under the Office of Under Secretary of Arms Control and International Security, also known as the T family, manages a range of key bureaus and offices to confront evolving security threats, uh, strengthen deterrence and advance US foreign policy. Secretary Dano.
▶ 0:04:51Secretary Rubio's recent reorganization of the department has brought new alignment across the T family and represents a positive step toward improving efficiency at Foggy Bottom. As these changes continue to take shape, we would welcome a renewed focus on ensuring consistent communication with Congress. Members of this committee are awaiting information for the Bureau of Political Military Affairs on security cooperation that was due three weeks ago.
▶ 0:05:17Uh, in addition, it would be helpful to ensure that the Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs provide this committee with a requested briefing on narcotics trafficking in Asia by the end of the month. Uh, we would appreciate your assistance in keeping these efforts moving forward and keeping communications with Congress on track.
▶ 0:05:35Returning to the broader realignment across the T family, the department merged the Bureau of International Security and Non-Proliferation with the Bureau of Arms Control, Deterrence, and to form the new Bureau of Arms Control and Non-Proliferation or ACN. This change brought together the team that negotiates arms control treaties with the team that works on treaty verification mechanisms where they are previously housed in separate bureaus.
▶ 0:06:03This is just one example of the common sense benefits of the reorganization. In addition, several bureaus, including the political military affairs, counterterrorism, international narcotics and law enforcement affairs, and the newly established bureau of emerging threats, now report directly to you, the under secretary of arms for arms control and international security. These changes streamline decisionmaking and enable faster, more efficient responses to both ongoing and emerging threats.
▶ 0:06:32The new structure positions the under secretary to tackle these challenges, including the question of strategic stability and the next era of arms control. As under secretary Dano emphasized in February before the conference on disarmament, arms control must evolve to be verifiable, enforcable, and responsive to technological change and strategic The need is urgent.
▶ 0:06:59Russia continues to deploy advanced nuclear systems including the RS28 Serott ICBM, the Poseidon nuclear torpedo, the SSCX9 Skyfall cruise missile, and the Avanguard hypersonic glide vehicle. In addition to the challenges the US is uh facing from Russia in this field, China is rapidly expanding its own nuclear arsenal. The Pentagon projects it will reach 1,000 warheads by the end of the decade, up from just 600 in 2024.
▶ 0:07:30For the first time in the nuclear age, the US faces two nuclear peer adversaries, Russia and China, while also confronting rising threats from smaller unpredict unpredictable nuclear powers, including North Korea, which continues developing its own strategic and tactical nuclear During under secretary Danano's address to the conference on disarmament, he provided details about China's history of nuclear weapons testing in 2020.
▶ 0:07:58The US detected a nuclear explosion near the Lapure underground test uh site as at a magnitude of 2.7 seismic event identified through seismic data from primary seismic station 23 of the international monitor monitoring system network at Mukanchi, Kazakhstan. This information shines light on China's nuclear activities and helps spur a critical international discussion on responsible nuclear testing.
▶ 0:08:27Modern arms control must account for such behavior to maintain peace and stability. At the same time, we are entering an era of fifth generation grayzone warfare. Adversaries including Moscow and Beijing exploit hybrid tactics to undermine the US and its allies. Across Europe, we see threats once unimaginable.
▶ 0:08:48Airspace violation, weaponized mass migration, infrastructure sabotage, cyber intrusions, all blurring the lines between war and peace. This type of warfare blends military and non-military means, overt and covert, to destabilize societies and threaten US interests across the globe.
▶ 0:09:07These tactics intersect directly with the T family's duties and responsibilities complicating the strategic environment that we must To address these challenges, I introduced the strategic hybrid activities defense and operations of the west act or the shadow act which establishes the state department's first ever coordinator coordinator for hybrid warfare.
▶ 0:09:30accountability to align our diplomatic inter agency and allied efforts enabling better information sharing, clearer attribution, coordinated responses, and stronger resilience across NATO. I also introduced the biodfense diplomacy enhancement act which strengthens US diplomatic engagement with allies and partners in the areas of biodense, biocurity and biotechnology. I look forward to the committee markup of these bills tomorrow.
▶ 0:09:58There is no doubt that the threat threats we face are interconnected and fastm moving spanning nuclear deterrence, terrorism, transnational crime and emerging technologies. This hearing provides an opportunity to examine how the T family organizes and prioritizes its efforts across the department and inter agency. Specifically, we will discuss the Bureau of Arms Control and Non-Proliferation. It negotiates and enforces arms control agreements.
▶ 0:10:27The Bureau of Political Military Affairs manages a broad range of strategic cooperation and assistance programs with our partners and allies. The Bureau of Counterterrorism serves as a central hub for US diplomatic efforts to combat terrorism abroad. The Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs leads efforts to counter transnational crime, combat uh drug trafficking, and coordinate with international law enforcement.
▶ 0:10:52Finally, the Bureau of Emerging Threats focuses on some of the most cutting edge and forward-looking security challenges facing the United States, including lethal autonomous weapons and risk and undersea and outer space domains. Let me be crystal clear. Our adversaries are developing and deploying advanced technology in dis uh disruptive ways that threaten our core national interests.
▶ 0:11:16It is therefore essential to to sustain a bureau of emerging threats that can anticipate and address these risks. In conclusion, this hearing is an opportunity to examine how the T family aligns resources to address both enduring and emerging threats advancing uh US security and diplomacy. I thank you under secretary for joining us and I look forward to the substantive discussion that we will have with you today.
▶ 0:11:44how you how to uh how you strengthen your department's effectiveness and how Congress can support it in delivering results for the American people. Mr. Chairman, I yield
▶ 0:11:55Thank you, Chair. Now, I recognize the ranking member from New York, Representative Meeks, for any opening
▶ 0:12:01Thank you, Chairman Mast, and thank you to our witness for joining us today. Mr. Mr. Secretary, your work and the work of the many diplomats you oversee informs the United States response to nearly every single foreign policy and national security crisis in the world today.
▶ 0:12:20Russia's unprovoked illegal war of choice against Ukraine, countering terrorist threats from al-Qaeda and the Islamic State, disrupting the flow of deadly narcotics, preventing the proliferation of weapons of mass destructions, and much, much The T family's work is also proactive, promoting US energy interests and supporting and equipping allies and partners with
▶ 0:12:50the weapon systems that they need to defend themselves. It includes strengthening institutions for our allies and partners so that they are more resilient and more reliable. These are serious matters that require serious oversight from this committee.
▶ 0:13:08So, I think you can understand my frustration that this committee is expected to address all of these matters in one single hearing. All while Chairman Mazd has yet to hold a single not one, on the most urgent matter of international security before us today, the war that Donald Trump chose to
▶ 0:13:39start in Iran, which is now in its 26th day. We've not heard public testimony on this administration's goals. We've not examined its strategy.
▶ 0:13:52We've not had the opportunity to ask why the administration is funding both sides of this war, lifting sanctions on Russia and Iranian oil simultaneously, even as it prepares to ask American taxpayers to foot a $200 billion bill. The American people have not had the opportunity to hear public testimony at this committee. Why?
▶ 0:14:18Because my Republican colleagues, I believe, are scared to let the American people see the truth of what underpins this war. The American people deserve transparency and accountability on a conflict of this magnitude, and this committee has the to provide it. The consequences are real. Tens of thousands of American service members are deployed halfway around the world.
▶ 0:14:48Americans are glibly told to skip a coffee run so they can afford gas to get work to get to work. And America's closest partners are absorbing costs for a conflict that they were never consulted about. Some are having their infrastructure attacked. Regional is growing. The pattern extends far beyond Iran.
▶ 0:15:16The chairman has similarly failed to hold a single hearing with the administration on Russia's unprovoked war against Ukraine, which is now in its fifth year, or on the status of negotiations that will shape its outcome. The chairman has failed to hold a hearing on the expiration of the New STAR treaty, a cornerstone of nuclear stability, for decades. and what comes next.
▶ 0:15:44That issue alone warrants sustained attention. No one has benefited from Donald Trump's decision to start this war in Iran more than Russia. This administration's decision to ease sanction on Russian oil to offset skyrocketing gas prices that have increased because of Trump's own policy is helping fuel Putin's war in Ukraine.
▶ 0:16:10Beijing couldn't be happier to watch the United States strain its alliances, destabilize energy markets, and direct its attention away from the Indo-Pacific. Both China and Russia demand serious sustained focus, not least from the bureaus you oversee, given the urgent need to address arms control and non-prololiferation. Mr. Under Secretary, with the expiration of New Start, I expect to hear from you today.
▶ 0:16:39what plan, if any, this administration has for putting constraints back on the world's most destructive weapons. And I'm grateful to our witness for his presence here today. The under the secretariat you are leading manages a range of important issues, non-prololiferation, arms control, regional security and defense relations, and arms transfers and security assistance.
▶ 0:17:03All these issues touch upon the war on Iran, but your testimony alone will not give us a complete picture of this war and its justification. We have many outstanding questions, and if this committee cannot hold hearings on a war involving US forces, the diplomacy around it, and its impacts on our allies and partners, then we are not meeting our most basic oversight responsibility. Not because of you, Mr.
▶ 0:17:32under secretary is that the majority refuses to give these consequential matters the time and security they demand. We must do better so that so with that, Mr. Chairman, pursuant to clause 2M of House Rule 11, clause 2K6 of House Rule 11, I move that this committee issue subpoenas to compel the testimonies of Secretary Marco Rubio, of Mr. Steve Wickoff and Mr.
▶ 0:18:02Jared Kersher as at a public house foreign affairs committee hearing before the end of April 2026 so we members of Congress and the American people can hear from them directly on the most pressing international security matter facing Americans today. President Trump's war of choice in Iran. And with that, I yield back.
▶ 0:18:42The motion will be held held in obeyance until the end of this hearing. We will have a vote at that point. I would say you're going to need a number of hearings to go through all of my faults and flaws. Uh so you can ask for a few more. Maybe you can make motions for those as well. I would encourage you if you want to know more about what's taking place with the the activities in Iran or anywhere else, feel free to attend any one of our flyin day classified briefings, which you basically don't attend at all. And we had a classified briefing just last week with INR.
▶ 0:19:12You showed up 45 minutes late to that. Had you been on time, you might know a little bit more. I'd also encourage you that when we have uh the classified briefings with Secretary Rubio, Secretary Hegsth, uh General Kaine, Director of the CIA, John Radcliffe, which we've had numerous ones with, you might want to take a few notes because clearly you're forgetting every single thing that they've told you, which has been every detail that you want to know about this conflict. So, that would be my advice for
▶ 0:19:37have not been numerous. There's been
▶ 0:19:39That's numerous.
▶ 0:19:40One with the I need to get you a dictionary. I can use my phone and
▶ 0:19:43I was not at the gang of eight. One meeting with the gang of eight.
▶ 0:19:46You're in the gang of 16.
▶ 0:19:47One meeting with the gang of 16 and one with the full committee. And we did not get answers there.
▶ 0:19:52Yeah. You getting answers every time.
▶ 0:19:54And this committee has the responsibility of oversight and having hearings in the committee so that the American people can hear clearly what the reasons, what's the rationale. Oh,
▶ 0:20:06you want a good YouTube video. You want a good Facebook video. You should pay attention to what
▶ 0:20:11I just want you to do your job. I just want you to do your job. You might want to go to the classified briefing.
▶ 0:20:15I want you to come the American people can hear.
▶ 0:20:19I want the American people. Every time that I've been in this committee for a long time, we've always had when it's a matter of war, there's been public hearings in the foreign affairs
▶ 0:20:30You might want to go. We've not had any. You might want to do your job.
▶ 0:20:33Very important information.
▶ 0:20:34Do your job and lead this committee and let the American people and have some
▶ 0:20:38Just just so you know, standing every week that we fly in here,
▶ 0:20:41you need some transparency for the American people. We need to have public
▶ 0:20:44goes on every week. I can let you know when it happens in advance. You can put it on your calendar and you'll know. Hey, the day we
▶ 0:20:49have not had any public hearings briefing. Classify.
▶ 0:20:52What do you want the American people to
▶ 0:20:54You have a hearing going on right now. You have
▶ 0:20:55What do you want the American people? And I'm going to
▶ 0:20:58I've not had the three people that have been doing all of the information, all of the negotiating is Mr. Kushner, Mr. Whit, and we need the Secretary of State. And those are the individuals that need to be here.
▶ 0:21:09You'll see. And those individuals should be subpoenaed here. And that's why I'm asking to have a subpoena to have them in this room so the American people can see them and hear them and they can get questions asked by Democrats and Republicans. That's who we are. That's the that's the responsibility at our classified briefings that you must have forgot about.
▶ 0:21:27That's the the American people need to have public hearings. You know, Coen Power and every other administration has had he their people top people here to testify in the public to justify a particularly a war. You should be
▶ 0:21:42You should be thankful we have under secretary Dano. I don't know if you remember Bonnie Jenkins who was under the Biden administration, but probably one of the dumbest witnesses we've ever had in Congress.
▶ 0:21:50I know I know that you want to protect the president and the way you want to protect him is by not calling his people president. You just want to give him a check just like the Dumas does for Vladimir Putin. No responsibility, no oversight, no public oversight. It's time for that to stop.
▶ 0:22:06I would again I'd encourage you attend the hearings and the briefings that we have. you'd learn quite a bit and even consider showing up on time. You you'll learn a lot.
▶ 0:22:14Covering up for the administration and do your job as a as the chairman of this committee for oversight of the executive branch of government and don't be a rubber stamp.
▶ 0:22:24You have somebody here before you. I'd encourage you, you know, ask some questions there.
▶ 0:22:27I will ask him some questions.
▶ 0:22:29I'll look forward to hearing it. I'm sure we all will.
▶ 0:22:31Very good. And again, I'll make sure to update you on when our classified briefings are every time that we fly in public hearings so that you know when they are. I want transparency.
▶ 0:22:41Hopefully, we don't see any more excuses of why you don't show up to classified. Do you believe in transparency?
▶ 0:22:45They're pretty important. Do the lot of great information at classified
▶ 0:22:49Does the American people deserve transparency? They deserve to know that anybody involved in their national security apparatus is actually paying attention to the issues instead of I sitting their office fundraising and things like that. Whatever you're doing instead of instead of showing up you're asking the the president going to be asking the American people. Do they deserve transparency to know how they taxpayer dollar?
▶ 0:23:11Sounds like you're coming up with numbers that they haven't asked for. But you president has said he wants $200 billion. Are you paying attention to
▶ 0:23:17there's no request that's come in?
▶ 0:23:18Are you just rubber stamping what
▶ 0:23:20you haven't seen a request come in, right? You're just
▶ 0:23:22I've heard the president I heard the president say certain things in his bone. I want them in here
▶ 0:23:26and I would encourage you again show up to our classified briefings so that you can feel public transparent hearings for that's a part of the national security apparatus that you basic function you should show up
▶ 0:23:39beyond anything. Do you respect the American people?
▶ 0:23:41We the people of the United States deserve transparency deserve every bit
▶ 0:23:46Do you believe that the American people deserve transparency
▶ 0:23:49but they also know that loose link
▶ 0:23:50Do you believe the American people
▶ 0:23:52two things that sink ships most United States Navy number one we sink a lot of Iranian ships but loose lips and that's why you don't get all
▶ 0:23:59what I believe what I believe is that the American people deserve transparency. The American people deserve to know what their government is doing. The American people needs to know why the president
▶ 0:24:09I'm being very transparent and letting them know you don't show up to classify.
▶ 0:24:12I'm being transparent and they can see that you're trying to hide the truth from the American people.
▶ 0:24:17I'm not trying to hide it from public hearings and you don't show up to important that they know you're not showing times. I can tell you those some of those hearings
▶ 0:24:28that you're having I've already know about it in the press
▶ 0:24:32and you hear nothing more than that. Unless the American people have You ready?
▶ 0:24:38I'm ready. As soon as you stop, you're the one that started the the conversation. I just asked for a subpoena of those three individuals.
▶ 0:24:44Okay, let's do it. Anything else to point at?
▶ 0:24:47You good?
▶ 0:24:48Very good. All right. Other members of the committee are reminded that opening statements may be submitted for the record. We are pleased to have Under Secretary for Arms Control and International Security Thomas G. Dano before us today. You are infinitely better than the last under secretary for international security that we had before who could not answer basic questions like you know what is something objective. Uh that was an embarrassing hearing for us all.
▶ 0:25:14Uh your full statements will be made a part of the record and I'll ask you to keep your spoken remarks to about 5 minutes in order to allow time for member questions and I now recognize you for any opening statement that you may have. Chairman Mast, Ranking Member Meeks, and distinguished members of the committee.
▶ 0:25:33Thank you for inviting me to testify before you today on the T family of bureaus, what we do to advance US national security and the challenges we we face in today's ever complex security I am honored to be the first under secretary appointed to lead what is known as the new expanded T family since the State Department was reorganized in July of 2025.
▶ 0:26:01The reorganization consolidated the department's international security functions, expanding the T family from three to five bureaus and assigned three offices to our broad portfolio. The T family includes the Arms Control and Nonproliferation Bureau, Political Military Affairs, the Counterterrorism Bureau, International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Bureau, the New Emerging Threats Bureau, and our Augustus Coordination Office.
▶ 0:26:32As under secretary, I serve as the senior adviser to the president and Secretary of State for US policies on non-prololiferation, arms control, and international security. Our team works on critical national security matters ranging from preventing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction to countering terrorism in international drugs to approving arm sales and security assistance to US partners and allies worldwide.
▶ 0:27:03As a nominee almost a year ago, I committed to seeking verifiable and enforceable arms control agreements that enhance America's national security. I have used each day of my first months as under secretary to advance that very Perhaps less publicly known than other State Department roles are the vast responsibilities that fall under the office of the under secretary.
▶ 0:27:31We oversee nuclear, chemical, biological, and conventional weapons Oversee export controls, sanctions enforcement, and treaty verification. We manage security assistance programs worldwide to counterterrorism into international narcotics trafficking.
▶ 0:27:47We drive inter agency policy processes, coordinate with the War Department and other federal agencies, and represent the United States in bilateral and multilateral diplomatic settings, including the critical trilateral office arrangement between the United States, United Kingdom and Australia. T family personnel largely consist of civil service experts.
▶ 0:28:14Our staff possess deep knowledge and technical competence relevant to a vast range of international security concerns. We leverage our in-house expertise of technologists like seismologists, nuclear physicists, counter drone experts, aviation experts to fulfill an extensive array of Tf family We also negotiate, implement, and rigorously verify an array of international arms control and disarmment agreements on behalf of the Secretary of State
▶ 0:28:44and President Trump. One such arms control treaty at the top of mind is NewArt, which expired last month. The treaty was ineffective and only constrained the United States while allowing Russia to build a and maintain a vast rangranged nuclear arsenal.
▶ 0:29:02New start was a bilateral treaty that had no we impact on the nuclear weapons programs in China or other nation New start no longer served the national interest of the United States and its exploration opened a new era for us to pursue President Trump's vision for improved and modernized agreements.
▶ 0:29:24Although the work of our team may often be invisible to the public, our wide-ranging responsibilities are essential to keeping Americans safe at home and abroad. The T family implements President Trump's national security strategy to protect the homeland, support US industry, and prioritize US security interests worldwide.
▶ 0:29:48We work day in and day out to make America safer, more prosperous, and more secure by modernizing arms controlling, arms control, countering adversaries, and protecting American technological and military advantages. We will continue deliver to deliver measurable results to the American people. I look forward to your questions.
▶ 0:30:14Thank you, Under Secretary Dano. I now recognize chairman of the Europe subcommittee, Mr. Self, for five minutes of questions.
▶ 0:30:21Uh, thank you, chairman. Um, in your written testimony, uh, you stated that, uh, the Bureau of Political Military Affairs is responsible pre for preserving the United States technolog technological advances uh, advantage through rigorous enforcement of export and acquisition controls as well as defending our technology from exploitation, diversion, or misuse.
▶ 0:30:48So now that we are selling AI chips to China, can you tell us your role in preserving our technological advantage in AI chips specifically and how do you interface with BIS uh in safeguarding this very vital
▶ 0:31:08Uh thank you Congressman for the question. Um um as you as you probably know, the uh the administration's AI dominance uh plan uh and program calls for u for the US to maintain an economic advantage over um our adversaries. Uh I think what you're referring to is the uh direction that we received uh from the president uh to support sales of H200 chips to China.
▶ 0:31:36Um um part of that direction that we received to the from the president was to ensure that there are strong national security controls in place. Uh and that's exactly what we do inside uh our non-proliferation bureau. Uh we review every uh uh license application. Uh uh we review uh extensive potential derogatory information.
▶ 0:32:02uh and uh effective uh essentially oversee that there the there are the appropriate national security guard rails in place.
▶ 0:32:11So so how do you do that? How do you ensure an in enduser of these very advanced microchips uh once we sell them into China? Yeah, look, there's an extensive vetting process uh um that that we go through before we would uh again we're part of the licensing uh uh process to answer your question on BIS.
▶ 0:32:34We work very very closely with them day in day out um at the at the working level and also my counterpart at the commerce department I'm am actively in touch with again they're the uh final decision maker but uh we have access to all the information intelligence on each applicant and any information that we would be concerned about we absolutely flag uh as part of that process.
▶ 0:32:56Okay. So, uh, I I have a bill that would codify the Department of Commerce's affiliates rule, uh, that ensures, uh, subsidiaries of blacklisted companies cannot evade restrictions designed to protect national security. You have sometimes have to go four levels deep to figure out, uh, who owns 50% of any company, as you well know.
▶ 0:33:17How do you work with the How does the T family work with BIS, the Department of Commerce, uh to make sure that we go that deep to stop the to to make the affiliates rule
▶ 0:33:29Uh thank you, sir. Um look, I I don't know the specifics of your bill. I I' I'd welcome to look at the details of it, but again, I um we work extremely closely on the day-to-day uh uh with the uh with BIS. Uh and again, it it runs all the way up the chain.
▶ 0:33:45again my my counterpart under secretary Kesler uh we're on the phone all the time I was exchanging emails with him again uh u the last couple days so it starts at the top this sort of integration um and really working into the uh the analyst teams also work very closely together and I think at the core of of what you're getting at is having uh as much better and more information intelligence uh whether it's open source or through uh acquiring through classified ways so that we have better derogatory information
▶ 0:34:15so our analysts can make better decisions.
▶ 0:34:18Okay. So, we we are in hybrid war today. We're in grayzone war today uh with Russia and China both and and and more. But uh with your new bureau of emerging threats, how are you going to participate in countering hybrid warfare which Europe and I chair the Europe subcommittee is involved in every single day uh through the mass migration that I mentioned in my opening remarks.
▶ 0:34:44Cyber attacks uh hybrid war is real and active in Europe. How are you going to work through the Bureau of Emerging Threats to counter that?
▶ 0:34:52Yes, sir. Uh thanks for the question. And I I I noticed in your in your opening statement uh the notion of the fifth fifth generation gray zone uh you know battle space. Um uh Admiral Carell in front of the Armed Services Committee last week talked about uh the advanced threats even though uh they might not may not be new uh in the sense of cyber threats aren't new. They are advancing. They are more complex. Uh there are multiple new actors not necessarily nation state.
▶ 0:35:19Uh the emerging threats bureau's job would be to to interface uh in and provide the diplomatic overlay so that any of this type of information next generation threats that we work very closely with our partners in the intelligence community that that information is shared uh across our alliances and partnerships. Again, at the the State Department, our our goal is diplomacy uh in in managing those alliances.
▶ 0:35:45Uh and the other piece of that is to acquire information from overseas, whether it be in research labs or or different parts of our uh partners and allies. Uh those alliances, share that information back to the United States so that we can address these fifth generation, these next generation
▶ 0:36:03Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.
▶ 0:36:05Ranking member Meeks.
▶ 0:36:08Mr. Secretary, you know, I'm just looking and I think that President Trump is picking up right where he left off in his first term by walking away from existing arms control frameworks without a viable plan to replace them. He allowed New START to expire without even attempting to negotiate a successor. He refused to maintain nuclear limits on Russia.
▶ 0:36:29And he's threatened to resume reckless and unnecessary nuclear I think the president is plunging us back into the darkest, most dangerous days of the Cold War and another costly and reckless arms race. In Trump's first term, the push for a trilateral agreement with China failed in part because China refused to participate.
▶ 0:36:54And today, we appear to be heading down the same path with even higher stakes. So, in the time that we have, the shortness of time, I got a few yes or no questions that I want to ask you. Um, has the administration formally invited Russia or China to talks on frameworks for strategic stability on arms control?
▶ 0:37:20Uh, thank you, ranking member. Uh, we have an ongoing arrangement uh uh multilateral arrangement uh through no process. Just just a yes or no. Has has the administration formally invited
▶ 0:37:33It's not China.
▶ 0:37:35Sorry, I'm happy to answer your question, but it's it's it the context is important. If I could just answer
▶ 0:37:40Well, the first is answered. Yes. Are there going to be talks or no, there's not going to be talks?
▶ 0:37:44Uh uh again, we have ongoing engagements uh through uh again through the P5 process which is ongoing. uh we do have uh uh sensitive ongoing uh diplomacy that uh u probably isn't appropriate to talk about in an open forum uh because that is ongoing. But I I I will say that uh uh our engagements with both the Russians and Chinese again as well as the the our P5 partners that's an ongoing process.
▶ 0:38:13We met the P5 met several months ago. Uh I think it has to be more effective. I think we need to
▶ 0:38:18I just want to know sir because these agreements many of them like new start has expired and so my question is Are we or are we not having some of these dialogues about that with Russia or China? let let me let me move on since she's not answering that one.
▶ 0:38:46Has anything about China's disposition toward multilateral arms control substantially changed since 2020? Yes or no?
▶ 0:38:59Uh so again, it's it's not a yes or yes or no question. So and again, I'm happy to answer.
▶ 0:39:03It either changed or it didn't.
▶ 0:39:05Uh it uh again, if you'd like me to answer the question, I'm happy to answer it, but I'm not going to answer it. So you're saying you can't say whether it changed or you can't say whether
▶ 0:39:13what I can what I can tell you is that our our approach has clearly evolved as you pointed out. Um the president is calling for multilateral uh arms control. Um and the and I think the other important point here uh about new start new start expired uh because the the the the date had expired. There was no extension available to the United States and Russia bilaterally.
▶ 0:39:36We could negotiate. Well, let me Is there any evidence, sir, that would suggest that China will accept any additional arm constraints? So, uh again, China was uh present at the P5 several months ago. We expect that they'll be there again. Uh there's another engagement, I think, next month. Uh so, we continue to engage with Russia and China um as part of our multilateral uh really course of business at the P5.
▶ 0:40:05Um, and I think it's important to note that uh the P5 is a multi multi multilateral body that will use uh
▶ 0:40:12So, China is going to be involved in multilateral talks again. Is that what you're telling me?
▶ 0:40:16They currently are through the P5
▶ 0:40:18Uh, well, will you pursue also bilateral talks with Russia and China separately?
▶ 0:40:23Uh, we've not full we've not closed the door on any option to implement the president's vision uh of a new and better treaty. I I I think it's important again in perspective that although new new start expired and we can talk about I I mentioned in my opening statement the the deficiencies of new start
▶ 0:40:41um that the president at the same time that new start expired called for a new
▶ 0:40:47this is why this is difficult will there be bilateral
▶ 0:40:50talks with Russia
▶ 0:40:52uh again sir it's a it's an ongo yes or no is there going to be answer yes or no sir I'm happy to answer your questions
▶ 0:40:58you're not answering my questions
▶ 0:41:00I am sir If you'd let me, I I'm happy to do it. Um,
▶ 0:41:04do you know if bilateral direct conversation is if the United States is going to sit down with Vladimir Putin and have a conversation again about arms control?
▶ 0:41:19Uh, sir, again, when I when I
▶ 0:41:21or China, will that be part of the conversation when the president meets uh President Xi?
▶ 0:41:26Again, I can't speak to what the president will or won't say to President Xi. Again, I I don't think uh it'd be appropriate for us to discuss those type of details here. What I can tell you and I'm happy to commit to is that if there are and we plan on having these engagements that those engagements in a in a more private setting, we'd be happy to come back and talk to the committee about what that what happened. Uh and uh you kind of answered the question. You said if they are
▶ 0:41:53gentleman's time is expired.
▶ 0:41:54That means you don't know whether they're going to have it or not. We went over this already though. He doesn't really prefer to have conversations in classified settings. So, Representative Wilson is recognized.
▶ 0:42:09Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for your leadership standing uh firm with our president. Additionally, uh Mr. Secretary, thank you for your service. And I am concerned that uh transparency could be unintentionally uh con construed as revealing to war criminal Putin and the murderous Kumeni the plans of America and Israel to courageously respond to 47 years of war against Western civilization.
▶ 0:42:36President Trump is succeeding, uniting our Arab allies to support President Trump in denying Iran a nuclear capability to vaporize Americans and Israelis. This is a war to today that began 47 years ago, not last week. Uh and and now we have a president who is courageous to stand up and promote ultimately peace through strength. And you're part of that team. And so thank you very much.
▶ 0:43:03With that in mind too, uh, since the beginning of the second Trump administration, the State Department has worked tirelessly to secure new partnerships around the world for US civil nuclear companies, creating new jobs at home and abroad, securing American energy dominance internationally. This includes one, two, three agreements which enable the exploitation of US or nuclear material to partner countries.
▶ 0:43:31In 2025, the President Trump signed an executive order tasking the State Department to formulate 2023 agreements by the end of the 2028. And I'm really pleased because I represent Savannah Riverside and I see the opportunities for small Mars reactors. As China Russia seek to expand their ability in commercial small reactors, we must be working together.
▶ 0:43:55With that in mind, what is the status of the 123 agreement with our valued ally Saudi Arabia as you work carefully with Senator with Secretary Marco Rubio?
▶ 0:44:05Uh uh thank you Congressman for uh uh for the question. Yes. So uh uh the requirement is to to try to sign 2023 agreements. Uh we think we have uh uh an active uh and good plan to to get through them. We have uh uh one that's been uh signed and four that have been initialed.
▶ 0:44:27Um specifically to the uh Saudi Arabia agreement that's been initialed uh I I can't disclose the details of that because the president hasn't signed it. um as you know uh consistent with the Atomic Energy Act once that signature uh the president signs it again which he hasn't um all of those details um will required to come to Congress and I'm happy to when that happens if that happens happy to come back and share all those details but I just can't get into the details because
▶ 0:44:57he hasn't signed it they're not
▶ 0:44:58well we wish you well and indeed another country that is taking a lead is Romania and so again I hope uh as we work with different countries around the world. What this can mean for energy independence around the world. Uh also, Mr. Secretary, uh you have an incredible challenge of arms control. America's enemies see negotiations as an opportunity to have time to regroup, rearm, and advance technology.
▶ 0:45:24Sadly, the USSR, Russian Federation, and War Colonel Putin, from my view, have never lived up to any agreement. years ago, I visited Chayabinsk, the sister city of Columbia, South Carolina in Siberia, which had been a secret city uh surrounded by secret unnamed research cities to develop nuclear capabilities. Can you identify any agreement upheld by the dictators in Moscow who oppressed the people of Russia?
▶ 0:45:53Uh, Congressman, thanks thanks for that. Just real quick before I answer your question, I met with the energy minister of Romania two weeks ago. uh it's extremely high priority for us u and um uh we talked extensively about the about the program there so I just wanted to mention that uh look you're you're right about the uh the serial violations um I think the answer to that needs to be uh a verification mechanisms that work um new had some verification mechanisms um in in my view they
▶ 0:46:23weren't robust enough but I I think there are some things there that that we can build on uh should the opportunity present itself. Uh but again, it's not just nuclear arms control, as I'm sure you know. Um uh chemical weapons convention, the biological weapons convention. We have problems uh with the Russians across the entire array. Of course, their their commitment uh to the uh the moratorium on uh nuclear testing uh we've been very public.
▶ 0:46:50Uh actually back to 2019, General Ashley, the then head of uh DIA came came out and talked about that. I was with him when he made that announcement. Uh so it's an it's an ongoing problem. Uh we have to continue to uh engage where the opportunities present themselves. We must have verification mechanisms that work in a
▶ 0:47:09Well, you you've got an incredibly difficult job. We wish you the best for success. Thank you.
▶ 0:47:13Thank you, sir. Representative Keading. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Uh thank you for being here. uh the current war and it is a war in Iran uh is uh bringing many things to light that we knew and lessons that we learned in Ukraine. Under your agency, you fund uh mobile fire teams. You fund support for mobile fire teams in Ukraine. I've been there as many of our colleagues have been. I've seen what they do.
▶ 0:47:42I've seen what a handful of people uh just given meager uh support are able to do with their guns or machine guns or drones. They're taking down these Russian drones that are killing thousands and thousands of Ukrainians a week, including innocent civilians and children. Uh so I've seen the effectiveness of this, but yet you are not giving that the support it needs.
▶ 0:48:08you're not giving them the support that they need to continue to expand and to move forward in this very cost-effective way. And at the same time, Ukraine uh despite what the US is doing with Russia and perhaps I'm sure you know that the president has taken the sanctions away from Russian oil and that amounts to several billions of dollars a month a month for Putin's war war machine.
▶ 0:48:38very much against our own interests as well as Ukraine. So, we have a very effective uh agency here. And you know what they're doing? In spite of what President Trump is doing, fueling Russia's war machine and Putin's war machine, they've agreed to help us in Iran.
▶ 0:48:55So they're taking the expertise uh that they have from these mobile fire teams and other things and they're taking that training, that expertise, and they're helping the US fight in this war to try and save the possibility of American lives being lost any more than the 13 that have been tragically lost now. So why aren't you doing more uh to Why aren't you doing more to support this kind of effort uh in Ukraine?
▶ 0:49:25uh that is coming back not only to help defeat Russian aggression and illegal war there uh but helping us in now in
▶ 0:49:35Um thank you representative for the question. Uh the United States uh continues to maintain a tremendous amount of uh uh resources and support to Ukraine. Um I just met with Ukrainian ambassador a few weeks ago uh to make sure that our uh that um the programs that we have in place continue. Um specifically to your comment about supporting the theater of operations in the Iran area. Um, I'd have to uh refer you to Admiral Cooper in the war department. I'm not
▶ 0:50:06It's public. It's not in a classified session. Yes, sir. And we can talk about it because we weren't in the classified session perhaps those of us that didn't go or weren't invited. So, we can have this discussion now for the American public. But, I want to just tell you, you answered the question the best you could and you were telling me what you couldn't answer. So, let me deal with another issue because my I have 1 minute and 54 seconds. Okay.
▶ 0:50:26Please, I apologize to cutting you off, but this is important, too. You're also
▶ 0:50:30uh the support we have for the general prosecuting Ukraine that's prosecuting war crimes. Is Vladimir Putin a war criminal, sir?
▶ 0:50:38Uh sir, um again, that's that's well outside my purview as the T under
▶ 0:50:43Well, what? No, no. How about as an
▶ 0:50:45no. As an American person and a citizen.
▶ 0:50:49Yes, sir. And someone cares. Is Vladimir Isl Vladimir Putin a war criminal?
▶ 0:50:53I I understand that on both.
▶ 0:50:54No. Yes or no?
▶ 0:50:55No, sir. I'm not going to answer yes or no. I'm gonna
▶ 0:50:57No, sir. I'm not going to answer yes or no. That's quite an answer.
▶ 0:51:00Yes. That's right.
▶ 0:51:01Yes. Oh, yes. No, it's yes or no or yes. You can't even ask a simple question like that. We have to know because we have cut under your agency, sir. You're cutting support for the prosecutor general. And you know what that support has been doing?
▶ 0:51:15It's been preserving evidence and training. So these war crimes, including sexual assault of young girls in front of their parents and grandparents by Russian soldiers, which which is tens of thousands of young people being taken from their families, maybe never to come back and put in Russian families. Definite war crimes.
▶ 0:51:34We are supporting that and you're cutting that support in the guise of reorganizing for the prosecutor to preserve the evidence and to move forward on these war crimes, these horrific, heinous war crimes that Russia is committing. So what I want to ask you, sir, this is under your
▶ 0:51:53You should be doing more.
▶ 0:51:54No sir, it's not.
▶ 0:51:55Yes, it is. By the way,
▶ 0:51:57not you do not understand prosecutor general's office is by the way it. I know everything's new to you. No, no, it's not actually new to me, right? Uh that uh
▶ 0:52:06you have funds to help train and move forward with the prosecution and help the uh prosecutor general in Ukraine.
▶ 0:52:13If if there is a specific program that uh you feel or that you know that
▶ 0:52:19funded a legal adviser in the office.
▶ 0:52:22Uh I don't know about any specific
▶ 0:52:24then you should know about it. With all due respect, I've got 8 seconds. Do your homework. Come back here.
▶ 0:52:31Mr. Under Secretary, would you like a little bit of time to correct the record about what the Trump administration is doing to uh to to uh assist the Ukrainian resistance?
▶ 0:52:41Uh uh well, sir, uh thank you for the opportunity. Um I'm not sure there was a question embedded in there, but um if there is a program that we're funding that has been cut, I'm more than happy to to address it and go back to it. I oversee thousands, billions of dollars of programming, hundreds of programs, thousands of federal employees. Um, so if there's a specific example, um, I'm happy to look at it.
▶ 0:53:06Uh, but obviously, uh, the administration continues to support in in a robust, uh, fashion, uh, the Pearl initiative, uh, to support, uh, the Ukrainian government. As I began to say, um there are a tremendous amount of work streams inside uh the administration supports inside uh with Ukraine.
▶ 0:53:27Um I think one of the most compelling meetings that I had was with the ambassador to Ukraine uh where she handed me a uh uh it was actually turn she turned it into a keychain. It was actually a part of a Russian cruise missile. And with that piece, she also handed me a stack of, you know, legal paper with all the western parts embedded inside Russian cruise missile.
▶ 0:53:52So where I sit as the non-prololiferation executive, as the under secretary, those are the programs that I oversee that we need to do better at, right, to deny our adversaries western technology. again if there's specific programs on the on the security assistance that uh that that we need to
▶ 0:54:11security but the bottom line Mr. Under Secretary security assistance continues to flow through the Ukrainians. Thank you. You say in your testimony that the president has been incredibly clear and consistent on his ultimate objective of a world with fewer nuclear weapons. Although um some of my colleagues on the other side of the aisle may uh want to deny this. Epic Fury has been objectively an extraordinary success in degrading the military capabilities of the Iranian regime.
▶ 0:54:39And President Trump has taken decisive action against uh the most dangerous country uh that has aimed completing a nuclear weapon for over 40 years and has stated numerous times that Iran will never have a nuclear weapon. Uh to the extent you are able, Mr. Under Secretary, in this unclassified and public setting, can you offer the State Department's current assessment of Iran's nuclear infrastructure?
▶ 0:55:04Uh, well, sir, that that would be beyond my purview as the uh under secretary.
▶ 0:55:10Well, Midnight Hammer, Epic Fury, what what we see is uh a nuclear infrastructure that's under rubble. Can can you what I think is most important to point out is that the president's policy did not start three weeks ago. He laid out as soon as he took office very clearly the nuclear policy of the He laid out a policy that Iran's nuclear program and nuclear capable missiles pose an existential threat to the United States.
▶ 0:55:40That is from as soon as he was sworn in NSPM2. That's exactly what he's executing against today. And what is the State Department's assessment in terms of the extent to which epic fury and midnight hammer combined have degraded the nuclear infrastructure and capabilities of the regime? Yeah. Again, sir, that would be outside of my outside of my purview as the as a managing the the programs that I oversee.
▶ 0:56:04I think uh you you may have uh or there is an intelligence office, the INR bureau would would be the best state department office to to offer the state department position. I'm not trying to avoid your
▶ 0:56:16Understand understand it's really not my
▶ 0:56:18I I I um I think I think Congress will continue to want to know um once this operation concludes uh uh and with no boots on the ground, what will be the diplomatic work of the State Department with the IAEA uh to make sure that the enriched uranium of the plutonium facilities within Iran are never
▶ 0:56:41Yes sir. Um I think we can speak to that, right? uh when and uh hopefully soon uh combat operations cease, we would uh the non-prololiferation bureau is the policy office that works very closely with uh with the IEA. Uh I met with uh um uh Director General Gross uh two weeks ago um to make sure that we uh maintain that close connectivity. We share information.
▶ 0:57:07Uh we fund the IEA through our arms control non-proliferation bureau. So we have a a a ongoing uh we have a a permanent representative ambassador level uh executive uh in Vienna as the who who will be the liaison there uh currently have a charge in place. Uh so we have the infrastructure the diplomatic infrastructure and uh again once the theater of operations transfers from sentcom uh our diplomatic footprint
▶ 0:57:34well my my time has expired but I think objectively we can say the world is a much safer place today because Iran's nuclear infrastructure is buried under rubble. Thank you. President Trump agree sir. I yield back. Representative Barah.
▶ 0:57:51Thank you Mr. Chairman. um as a ranking Democrat on East Asia, spent a lot of time with our um allies in in Korea talking to the the Korean National Assembly, their government um and others. One thing that's been concerning um over the last few years has been the sentiment within the Korean public about obtaining their own nuclear deterrence.
▶ 0:58:14Um, you know, you see polls that show over 60% perhaps sometimes over 70% of the public um being concerned about obviously the threats from North Korea stability on the the new um on the Korean peninsula.
▶ 0:58:29It's part of the reason why I was very supportive of um the Washington declaration um under the Biden administration, which did step up um our rotations of um nuclear armed submarines um and other assets to reassure the Korean public about um our commitments and um our deterrent strategy. Mr.
▶ 0:58:49Under Secretary, could you give me an update on the status of um our commitments under the Washington declaration, if we still um are seeing those rotations of nuclear armed submarines and and our commitments for nuclear deterrence both on the Korean Peninsula, but also in East Asia with our Japanese allies?
▶ 0:59:05Uh yes, sir. Uh thanks for the question. Uh so uh as I'm sure you know the Trump administration's uh and the president's visit there laid out uh a comprehensive uh set of policies across uh economics uh the military as well as uh civil nuclear cooperation uh specifically my role uh um to your question on I think extended to China's commitments um to the point about the uh sort of the potential chatter or rumors about
▶ 0:59:36uh or discussions uh of uh the ROK having their own nuclear deterrent. The strongest way that that we can prevent that is by being committed to the US extended deterrence.
▶ 0:59:50So, you're reassuring me that our commitments to extended deterrence to peninsula are as ironclad as they have ever been.
▶ 0:59:57Well, sir, I mean, take the president's word for it. I mean, uh you know, we do we do that and I
▶ 1:00:02Another question. the president's um the Koreans have asked for the ability to have their own um nuclearpowered submarines. I think um the president has u addressed that in the affirmative that he's willing to work with the Koreans to um create some of the the nuclearpowered submarines um as part of our alliance. Um can you give us an update on that? And you know um
▶ 1:00:28uh yeah ju just just real quick back to extended deterrence and I'll just get to the second question. U the president himself uh on the peninsula uh was very clear in his commitment to US extended deterrence umbrella. So there can be no clearer message. Okay. Uh one other point there uh is I as under secretary uh uh uh I'm planning a trip uh uh that we continue um to engage with the Koreans. Uh and you can't just say it once and walk away. Uh we have to continue to work on it and we do.
▶ 1:00:59uh specific to nuclear submarines as as part of the uh joint fact sheet. Uh we're going through uh pretty extensive uh process inter agency is very active on on uh building teams who would go uh what our deliverable deliverables would be because they're extensive. Uh one work stream there is nuclear submarines.
▶ 1:01:21uh that's a really a shared uh responsibility more so the war department on the on the infrastructure uh on the actual you know that the the state department piece of that my piece of that would be on the uh any potential nuclear fuel
▶ 1:01:35and again I' um if you can keep congress in informed on the progress of those talks obviously it's important for us to continue to support our Korean allies um and continue to have those those assets
▶ 1:01:46capability it's very robust it's ongoing and uh we're we're switching to um your INL role in um international narcotics. I have spent a lot of time in the Pacific Islands and um did not expect one of their biggest concerns at this point is um narcotics that are you know coming from um you know the west coast on its way to Australia particularly methamphetamines and and seeing some of the real challenges they've been in Fiji been in Tonga um can you give me a brief
▶ 1:02:16update on um how your um bureau is interacting in the the Pacific Islands to um combat the the NAR narcotics trafficking that is starting to impact those islands and how we in Congress could work together and and would love for you to come brief the Pacific Islands Caucus on um things that we could do to support them.
▶ 1:02:36Yes, sir. We actually just had some uh uh some senior folks from INL out in the region. Um and I'd happy to have them come up and and talk to you some of the details on on what what we found. Um and I think it was exactly what you're pointing out. I'd also point out our deputy secretary was just there and had extensive conversations about maritime domain awareness, other law enforcement support, which would be an potential INL programming.
▶ 1:02:58Uh so that's uh uh uh again I'm happy to to share any of that, but there's the these are very ongoing active discussions and very very recent. So um would happy to come back.
▶ 1:03:10So we'll make that request.
▶ 1:03:11Yes, sir. Happy to do it.
▶ 1:03:14Representative Boland.
▶ 1:03:16Thank you, Mr. chairman and thank you for holding this hearing on arms control and international security. I appreciate my colleagues questions as well regarding the Pacific Islands. Mr. Secretary, I represent Guam, the most western part of the United States, closest to these aggressors that we're trying to uh make sure we're way ahead of the game. I want to really thank you and the T family for doing the best that they can regarding the terrorism and the drugs and the news, all that responsibility that you have to do.
▶ 1:03:47Uh Guam follows these uh situations really really closely. Uh nor North Korea, Russia and and China, we're a target no matter what. So your your success is so important to us of course the first island chain and the territories in the second island chain.
▶ 1:04:11So, under secretary, uh, the Congressional Strategic Posture Commission of 2023 reported focused on the unique challenges of deterring both Russia and China as nuclear peers. While this dynamic composes new challenges for arms control not present during the cold war, what new opportunities now exist for arms control in current security
▶ 1:04:39Uh, thank you for the question. Uh, Congressman, uh, look, uh, I made a comment earlier. I think it's appropriate, you know, certainly, uh, as, uh, officials inside the administration, uh, listen to the president. I mean, he he he couldn't have been clearer, uh, um, just before, uh, uh, I went to the conference on disarmament uh, in the, uh, run-up to the new start expiration, uh, that, uh, he wants to see a new agreement.
▶ 1:05:06Uh, in fact, he he he said he wanted to see a a a better agreement in a new treaty. Uh, so the president himself sets the direction, sets the policy, commander-in-chief. Um, and those opportunities come from that sort of commitment. Um, again, not necessarily coming from me, but when it comes from him personally, um, adversaries and allies listen. Uh, and it has tremendous credibility, uh, and it's tremendous forcing function.
▶ 1:05:32So, I think uh the world's on notice that he's serious about it. Um I don't remember a president in my lifetime that has been more passionate or clear about his desire to see fewer nuclear weapons in the world. Uh and that comes right from the top. So, the opportunities comes from that from his commitment and obviously uh my role is to try to bring a uh something um to bring that to life.
▶ 1:05:59Thank you. Also, Mr. Mr. Secretary, I introduced a uh a measure, the China AI Power Report Act to establish regular process for monitoring and reporting on the advanced artificial intelligent capabilities of China. How do you think improved clarity on China's AI capac capabilities could shape policy making in the future?
▶ 1:06:24Yeah, it's a great question. Thank you, sir. Uh I think one of the uh AI is present across every single program that I run and probably don't run uh whether it's through uh extensive discussions on uh um um someone mentioned laws right autonomous weapon systems uh cyber uh advanced persistent threats in space the uh uh again the uh stratcom commander talked about and I think this is one of the reasons why it really made sense to try to
▶ 1:06:54have a hub for for us to get at the national security implications uh around artificial intelligence and this was some of the thinking behind this emerging threats bureau that uh if we have sort of onesies and twsies spread out across the government it's really hard to make progress but I think having the new bureau where we have a senior executive who' be in charge of an assistant secretary uh overseeing a specialized team uh again our role at the state department is diplomacy uh so we would work very closely with the operational components of the
▶ 1:07:24military as well as our foreign partners to try to uh identify those those risks and then introduce them into perhaps as an export control program uh that mean you know inside the bureaus that I run or a program at the war department or cyber command. So I think part of the reason to get out is you have to organize yourself to to address the problem and I think that's really what we've been trying to do around around AI. I thank you for about 20 seconds left here.
▶ 1:07:52Uh sir, can you please tell us how important your job is for the first and island chain and the deterrence of what the CCP wants to do to Taiwan and the protection of US soil in the Pacific.
▶ 1:08:08Um also my you know again I'm only part of a much bigger machine here. I think again leading the uh the the nuclear diplomacy is important. One of the prior questions was about uh our commitment to our extended deterrence commitments. Number one, I think allows the war department uh to show some sort of flexibility in how they address force posture uh in and around uh that theater of operations.
▶ 1:08:33Uh so again again my role as the uh chief diplomat if you would in the nuclear role is to uh
▶ 1:08:40Thank you, Mr. Secretary. I'm out of time, but I appreciate
▶ 1:08:42Okay. Thank you.
▶ 1:08:43Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Representative
▶ 1:08:45Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Uh, good morning, Mr. Secretary. How are you? I'm Meline Dean from suburban Philadelphia. An issue I care deeply about, uh, and I believe this administration cares deeply about is stopping the flow of illicit drugs into our country. As we all know, there was a chaotic reorganization at the State Department. You now oversee the Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs.
▶ 1:09:13It worries me a little that in your conversation with Mr. heating it didn't seem like INL was uh on your radar. Uh and that is some of the questions that I have. Uh so number one, INL is responsible for developing implementing international narcotics control activities, supporting international criminal justice objectives abroad, and combating transnational crime.
▶ 1:09:39Given the many changes made at INL over the past year, I have some questions about its current operations. How is INL supporting partner governments uh in identifying and dismantling illicit financial networks tied to drug trafficking? What are you doing?
▶ 1:09:56Uh thank you for the question. Uh um first of all uh I'm not sure I agree with your premise about uh a chaotic uh activities at the department. What I what I can tell you is that
▶ 1:10:10what are you doing specifically on tracking the financial piece of illicit drug trafficking?
▶ 1:10:16Number one, we uh had a comprehensive security assistance review that normalized both our counterterrorism funding and our counter drug funding uh rep prioritized into dismantling criminal drug cartels. That is the number one focus of the INL bureau.
▶ 1:10:34That review, you want to share that with us? Number two,
▶ 1:10:37do you have that review and could you share it with us?
▶ 1:10:39Uh, I'm I'm happy to do it. Good. Yeah. I mean, I I don't think there's a a piece of paper I can share, but I I'm happy to come up and
▶ 1:10:45the review was not documented in any
▶ 1:10:48I I don't have a report to share, but I'm happy to come back and tell you
▶ 1:10:51somebody in the room taking notes.
▶ 1:10:53Oh, I'm sure there were. Yeah, I'm sure.
▶ 1:10:55People take lots of notes at the State
▶ 1:10:57Well, great. Share those notes with us if you would.
▶ 1:11:00Would you want notes or briefing or
▶ 1:11:02We'll take a briefing.
▶ 1:11:03Yes, I'm happy to do it.
▶ 1:11:04We'll we'll take both.
▶ 1:11:04Yes, ma'am. How is INL supporting judiciaries in countries where democratic institutions are under threat to ensure that behind illicit uh drug trafficking is being prosecuted? And I'll tie to that what data, what evidence do you have about these so-called drug trafficking in the speedboats that the administration has been murdering people, blowing up the boats uh when we know it's not fentinel. What data do you have on that? And what are you doing uh with other countries?
▶ 1:11:33Uh let me uh address uh what are we doing with other countries? Um INL has a worldwide footprint. Um and just to your earlier comment I think I think I need to address um about not doing enough with INL. I spent uh hour and a half or hour yesterday with all the INL country directors uh personally u uh understanding what their programs do uh understanding uh uh how I can help them do their job better.
▶ 1:12:02So, I reject your premise that I am not doing anything to support INL. These people are among some of the most talented uh creative uh uh
▶ 1:12:13I I trust that
▶ 1:12:14federal employees that I've worked with. Now, hold on. Let me let me
▶ 1:12:18No, I trust that, but the time is mine. So, please
▶ 1:12:20I understand, but but the answer is mine. In the six months that you have been uh at the helm here, including at the helm of INL, we haven't seen a press release about any of these reviews or high level meetings, nothing, which is evidence of showing the American people you care about this. So, we haven't seen any evidence of that. You're having hour and a half conversations. That's great.
▶ 1:12:42Better staff work.
▶ 1:12:43Uh, thank you. Um, give me the information on the drug boats, the speedboats. What evidence do you have?
▶ 1:12:52Yes, ma'am. So, uh I think to put in context is most important. Um since President Trump took office, uh designating criminal cartels.
▶ 1:13:05I I'm aware of that. What evidence do you have? I don't need the context. I need the evidence. What evidence do you have that fentinel was on these boats where you murdered people? Uh uh well first of all uh uh the answer is well outside of my purview as the under secretary uh for arms control and international security. The any that operation was run by the war department these organizations instead of being
▶ 1:13:31the state department has the data.
▶ 1:13:33Instead of being treated as a criminal problem the administration the president rightly treated them as a terrorist problem. We have designated 15 foreign
▶ 1:13:43Mr. Under Secretary, I'll just make a
▶ 1:13:46Would you please somebody speak to the president and remind them that it's not fentinel in those boats and it's not fentinel coming to the United States. That was all a false set of premises. We all know it. And the fact that you're trying to put it under the Secretary of Defense, it's not the Secretary of War. It's the Secretary of Defense is just wrong. You can't hide it in a war that is not existent. So, thank you. I yield
▶ 1:14:15Representative yields back. I don't know if you have or have not attended uh or missed the same classified briefings as the counterpart to my left, but you have been briefed on the numerous triggers that have to be met uh for interdiction versus law enforcement activity versus a strike uh as it relates to drug boats. You've been briefed on it numerous times. I would encourage you to attend those classified briefings if you have not, but they have been invested.
▶ 1:14:42And I would also point you to the fact that uh if you're looking for documentation of questions about INL, it was in his written testimony about all of the INL helicopters in Colombia, Costa Rica, Panama, Peru that have interdicted tens of thousands of acres and hundreds of metric tons of cocaine and other things. It's all very clearly written in the testimony. If you didn't read it, you can go back and read it.
▶ 1:15:05Mr. Chairman, I thank you for your
▶ 1:15:07I now recognize Representative Heisenga.
▶ 1:15:10Uh, thank you, Mr. Chairman, and Mr. Under Secretary. Appreciate your time today. Uh, the missile technology control regime is, in my opinion, an antiquated cold war era agreement that imposes a presumption of denial on certain types of technology. Unfortunately, as our defense technology has advanced, our laws have failed to keep up.
▶ 1:15:30Last year, I introduced HR 3068, the Missile Technology Control Review Act, which would allow the United States to more easily share defense technology with our AUS partners by creating an AUS exemption to the MTCR. Uh, unfortunately, not a single one of my Democratic colleagues voted for that bill during markup. Uh, there is an April 9, 2025 executive order that required a review of the MTCR.
▶ 1:15:55And last week, the principal principal deputy assistant secretary for political mil military affairs testified before this committee that the state department continues to review the missile technology control regime as part of the arm sales reform process. So yesterday you testified before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee that you are personally overseeing the MTCR review within the department. uh could you please elaborate on the progress of the review and what role should Congress play in codifying the results of that
▶ 1:16:25Uh thank you Congressman for the uh for the question and for the work that you're doing around this. Uh I can tell you in the almost six months that that I've been in this job. Uh this is probably one of the most important things that we can do. Uh I I I think in the broader sense as you know and I agree with everything you said in the preamble in your in your preamble um these are mechanisms the MTCR is is 40 years old 1987
▶ 1:16:52and and and our relationship with Russia is now very different and our relationship with other countries is
▶ 1:16:59so so uh again and we're modernizing right we are uh uh we need to modernize our non-prololiferation architecture the same way as we're modernizing uh our nuclear deterrent for example. Um so I think uh the MTCR um uh there's a good it's a good start some of the policy reforms. Uh there's a
▶ 1:17:18where are we on the review?
▶ 1:17:19Uh so the review u actually uh the the political military bureau it the arms control non-proliferation bureau manages that specific program. We just met last week um and went went through sort of the sort of next next steps. We we'll meet monthly. Um I just recently assigned another a senior executive to kind of oversee that at the at the staff level to make sure that that we have ongoing progress here. I think the you know one of Go ahead, sir.
▶ 1:17:49Well, would you do you see any problem with having an Augustus carveout in this? Does that cause any concerns? I mean that that was that was what was expressed by some on the other side of
▶ 1:18:01I don't think it goes far enough. Uh I agree with with with with your going in assumption uh that we have to do a toptobottom review of understanding what what the anti what problem are we trying to solve if we're trying to solve for missile technologies and prevent the technology from getting into our hands of adversaries. We haven't done a very good job. Um, I think the challenge and as you point out, the the presumption of denial has turned into a policy of denial.
▶ 1:18:28Um, and we can't get uh let anything get in the way of equipping our allies uh with these sort of uh systems, ballistic strike, um, uh, UAVs. Uh, so that the this AUS experiment is good. It's important. It's a good first step. Um uh I I think there's a recent CI CSIS report that talks about a good first step is is great, but we really need to be sprinting here. So
▶ 1:18:53So what what does that sprinting look like? You had said earlier that you didn't think it went far enough. Um and so I mean I'm hearing that you don't think there's going to be any significant negative impacts uh if we were to do that. But you had also mentioned it didn't go far enough. What what does that look like? Yeah, look, I I think we need to uh first of all, I don't I don't want to presume the outcome, right? I want to I want to go through a little bit of a process here.
▶ 1:19:19Um and and understand uh uh that I'm sure there are things that we need to continue to preserve, but again, trying to take a 2026 or 2030 problem set and stuff it into a 1987 mechanism, you know, the business model is wrong, right? And so, uh, are we trying to modernize something that's not fixable? Do we need a new regime? So,
▶ 1:19:44would it would it make sense to do some sort of periodic review? In other words, have I don't want to say sunset
▶ 1:19:52but something that would cause and trigger uh a a review, in-depth review that would allow us to modify it so that we don't find ourselves stuck in this, you know, loop of 40 years and and having to battle through uh the politics of who happens to be in the in in the executive mansion.
▶ 1:20:12um it seems more makes more sense to me to have a a cleareyed view that we need to review these these parameters on a on a reasonable amount of time.
▶ 1:20:23I agree with that statement, sir.
▶ 1:20:25Okay. Well, uh with that, Mr. Chairman, I appreciate your time here today and I'll yield back.
▶ 1:20:31Representative Mume.
▶ 1:20:37Thank you, Mr. chairman and ranking member for holding this hearing. Obviously, its importance is underscored by the sort of questions and inquiries that have been coming from members here on both sides of the aisle trying to get information that um is not always forthcoming. Um, Mr. Mr.
▶ 1:20:57Honor Secretary, uh, in your testimony, you mentioned efforts to combat malicious uses of artificial intelligence, uh, technology and other sort of emerging threats. Can you take a minute to talk about that?
▶ 1:21:13Uh, yes sir. U, thanks for the question. uh um I think trying to start to get at the problem of uh artificial intelligence really um impacts uh across uh almost all of the the bureaus and offices that I oversee.
▶ 1:21:31Um um I think one of the challenges that we have is that there's uh the efforts are spread across uh the government and one of the reasons uh so I think number one we have to organize ourselves to address the problem.
▶ 1:21:47What what is your assessment of the biggest AI related threats? I don't have much time so I want to specifically narrow in on a couple of things.
▶ 1:21:55Yeah I I I look I don't think I can answer this threat versus that threat. The point I was trying to get at earlier is we have to organize ourselves to address the problem and and one of the things that we have done in the Trump administration is organizing ourselves into this new bureau so that there is a central locus of expertise uh that that is has that has staying power that
▶ 1:22:18right but wouldn't you wouldn't you also prioritize what are the most malicious threats if you're going to organize that way how would you know where to go? Uh sir, my I I don't think my job would be to pri to to give you today a list of prior prioritized threats one versus the
▶ 1:22:34Well, it's it's not but it is the expectation of the American people that if you are focusing in on malicious threats that you have some sort of priority as to what the most important ones are that affect this country and affect the the people who live here and who expect some sort of ranking. You're saying you don't have that. No one has has put that together. provide you a ranking of of AI threats to the United
▶ 1:22:57I would assume that that's what you would be doing.
▶ 1:22:59I I I can I'm more than happy to to have a organized process by which to do that.
▶ 1:23:06So, let me let me try to answer your
▶ 1:23:07No, no, no, no, no, no. I I appreciate it, but you're not going to filibuster on the filibuster.
▶ 1:23:12Well, if I had more time, I would try to indulge some of this. I'm trying to get to specific points. You have these emerging threats, but you don't know what order or priority uh they are most
▶ 1:23:22I'll give you one. Let me let me This is my time. With all due respect as part of Secretary Rubio's question, Sir, this is my time and I reclaim it.
▶ 1:23:29Yeah, you can.
▶ 1:23:30I reclaim it.
▶ 1:23:31I'm reclaiming my answer.
▶ 1:23:32You do not have the right to do that.
▶ 1:23:34Yes, sir. I want
▶ 1:23:35No, sir, you don't. Mr. Chairman, this is my time. I reclaim it.
▶ 1:23:39Last week, sir, at the Senate Army
▶ 1:23:42this is my time and I hope that it's not counted against me.
▶ 1:23:45Yeah, that the clock has stopped.
▶ 1:23:47Thank you. So, this is what I mean about filibustering my time. I reclaim it and I'd like to proceed with the clock Mr.
▶ 1:24:02Under Secretary, although it's been US policy to avoid civilian deaths while conducting military strikes, there have been repeated and credible accusations that US allies around the globe have used our weaponry to attack innocent civilians and carry out human rights abuses. That kind of senseless violence is something that weakens our foreign policy. I'm going to ask you a series of yes or no questions. I would appreciate a response.
▶ 1:24:33Do you agree that US partners should not use our weaponry against innocent civilians? Yes or no?
▶ 1:24:42Of course. Of course. What?
▶ 1:24:47You asked for yes or no. I gave you an
▶ 1:24:48You said of course. That didn't say yes or no. Is it of course yes or is it of course no?
▶ 1:24:53We would never do that against innocent
▶ 1:24:56Do you agree that if US partners
▶ 1:24:58question sir? Do you agree if US partners are using our weaponry against civilians in ways that violates US law that our government should know that these incidents have occurred? Yes or
▶ 1:25:09Uh the government does have a process by which we would uh certify that any programming wouldn't violate uh uh administration policy and law. Do you agree that our government should have a formal system to report, review, and prosecute cases in which US arms recipients are using weaponry that violates US and international law? Yes or no?
▶ 1:25:33US conventional arms transfer policy is
▶ 1:25:35yes or no
▶ 1:25:36that requires
▶ 1:25:37yes or no.
▶ 1:25:39It's amazing that you can't answer these questions with a simple yes or a simple no. I yield back because I don't have any more time left, but I am absolutely shocked that in your role you want to play this game with this committee and with me, sir. Thank you.
▶ 1:25:55Representative Kim.
▶ 1:25:57Thank you, Chairman Mass, and I want to thank Under Secretary Dano for testifying today. The fiscal year 2024 NDAA directed the secretary of state to designate a senior adviser to oversee and coordinate the implementation of the AUS partnership. And the senior advisor is charged with aligning both pillars of AUS with the state uh department's broader arms control and security cooperation uh architecture.
▶ 1:26:28So can you describe the senior advisor's unique role at the state particularly how it differs from the parallel aus implementing counterparts at the departments of war and energy and can you walk us through the current inter agency coordination process for executing AUS activities?
▶ 1:26:51Uh thank you for the question. Um uh the office senior adviser uh reports to me as the under secretary. Um he is uh the the program office uh uh is extremely active.
▶ 1:27:06Uh uh I was just with our director uh a week two weeks ago in the United Kingdom where we met with uh our counterpart the Augustus coordinator in uh the UK and just this past week we met with the Augustus coordinator for Australia. Uh so the the coordinators themselves have a very very close uh engagement.
▶ 1:27:29uh to answer your specific question on how we work work with the war department uh daily uh I look at the AUS engagement uh as a critical canary in the coal mine if you would on our broader uh defense industrial base and and FMS reform efforts. Um and as we go through the process, there was earlier questions about MTCR.
▶ 1:27:52Uh you know, we continue to sort of run into some of these the the these knots and problems and if we can sort of disentangle them or get identify them through the AUS
▶ 1:28:04But can you talk about the performance metrics uh that the senior advisor's office is using to track the progress of the AUS pillar one, pillar two?
▶ 1:28:13Yeah. So um I can tell you certainly um I think the most important metric uh is the president himself uh I think I think uh full steam ahead right I I think was what he said uh very recently um we've had uh so that again and again I answered an earlier question when the president himself gives that sort of guidance to the inter agency uh the inter agency moves out extremely smartly so pillar one and pillar do
▶ 1:28:44uh uh we're uh extremely optimistic. This is a lot of some of these decision processes uh lie in the war department um that so for example uh uh the capability
▶ 1:28:56talk about uh some of the reforms that have been taking place since we um created the office of a senior adviser uh for specific to implement the office. Um can you talk about the additional authorities or resources whether it's in personnel regulatory flexibility or more that is needed at the state department to accelerate the AUS pillar one and pillar two?
▶ 1:29:22Well, I think you know I think one one example u is the uh the US uh Australia UK ITAR exemption uh that that um there are there are other uh specific examples of regulatory reform. I was I mentioned earlier on on uh MTCR where we now treat um unmanned aircraft, heavy drones as uh manned aircraft instead of into an MTCR1 uh capability.
▶ 1:29:53Um that that alone uh u will allow us to try to get more capabilities out to both um uh both partners in the US and UK. So those are those are two specific regulatory pieces. But the point I think is really important to make is the more we wait into this. I don't want to uh you know this is not going to be easy and it's not going to take uh it's not going to happen in in weeks or months.
▶ 1:30:19Thank you. Let me let me just uh talk about quick uh demining uh issue. Bureau of Political Military Affairs, Office of Weapons Remover and Abadement has a proven track record of conducting rapid and targeted conventions, weapons clearance operation in high threat environments while maintaining the strict humanitarian and non-prololiferation safeguards and the US mission to the UN recently hosted security council session on the importance of locating and destroying the remnants of Syria's chemical weapons arsenal.
▶ 1:30:49The session end noted that the active minefields and unexloited conventional weapons are currently preventing chemical weapons inspectors from gaining access to keys site. So how does the department plan to leverage the expertise and resources of the office of weapons remover and abainment to support the clearance of the landmines and other conventional explosions in Syria that would uh enable inspector access?
▶ 1:31:14Uh uh thanks for the question. Look, I I think that specific question highlights why it makes sense to have our political military bureau uh aligned with our uh non-prololiferation bureau um in the in the new expanded uh T family. So the uh both of those offices work underneath my purview and would work hand in hand. Um uh we work very closely with the OPCW.
▶ 1:31:38We have extremely robust program uh to address specifically uh what you raised and uh certainly the landmine issue uh uh the the political military bureau and the non-prololiferation bureau would work seamlessly. I mean the these are these these are neighbors these are colleagues uh so that uh I would expect that to be a seamless integration.
▶ 1:31:59Thank you. My time's up. I yield back.
▶ 1:32:01Representative Vesky.
▶ 1:32:04Thank you chair mast. Ranking member Meeks. Uh thank you to the under secretary for your presence. Um want to reinforce that we are having this conversation now four weeks into a war with Iran and this committee still hasn't had a dedicated public hearing on a war that's costing both American lives and tens of billions of taxpayer dollars. We still don't even know what exactly the actual goal is. So my constituents are frustrated and so am I.
▶ 1:32:34We have a lot of unanswered questions. But what is clear is that Iran's nuclear capabilities are a central issue of the war. Sometimes we're told by this administration the nuclear threat was imminent. Other times we're told that it was obliterated. Just this week, US officials reportedly said we're now unlikely to put a nuclear weapon permanently out of Thran's reach. The president, Secretary Hegsth, Secretary Rubio, Steve Witoff, all of them have found plenty of time to go on television to discuss the war and negotiations.
▶ 1:33:05That's why they should be willing to come and speak to Congress in public, not only on the state of Iran's nuclear program, but their plan for what comes next. Because even in classified settings, such a plan is murky at best. That's probably being very generous.
▶ 1:33:24Under Secretary, pivoting more specifically to your work, you are on the front lines of a new reality where energy infrastructure and fuel flows fuel flows have become primary targets and a pressure points and crisis. We're seeing that play out today. Disruptions in the straight of Hormuz have caused a historic energy crisis and China's maritime militia have threatened to blockade Taiwan using energy dependence as leverage. I want to focus on that today.
▶ 1:33:51When I visited Taiwan last year, I saw how critical reliable energy is to the island security and economic stability. Taiwan imports more than 95% of its energy and has very limited on island storage. That means the PRC could threaten Taiwan's resilience long before any shots are fired. Although Taiwan shut down its last nuclear power plant last year, it spent decades developing advanced civilian nuclear energy expertise.
▶ 1:34:16As Taiwan works to diversify and stabilize its energy supply, it's worth revisiting how modern nuclear technology together with other energy sources can strengthen the island's energy resilience. That's why I'm proud to partner with Reps Herrian and Lawler to introduce the Taiwan Energy Security and Anti-Embargo Act to strengthen that energy resilience by diversifying US energy exports and encouraging greater cooperation on civil nuclear energy.
▶ 1:34:44I hope that work complements uh that work on that bill complements your efforts under secretary, particularly the vision you outlined at the nuclear energy summit in Paris a few weeks ago where you emphasized America's readiness to lead in advancing nuclear power in partnership with our allies. With that in mind, I wanted to ask how you see Taiwan fitting into this broader agenda that you outlined in Paris. What would effective civil nuclear cooperation with Taiwan look like and how can it enhance its energy resilience?
▶ 1:35:14Uh thank you for the question. Uh Congressman um as I laid out the president's energy dominance uh strategy uh I think is worldwide. Um we're working on uh again we have a goal I mentioned earlier of having 2023 agreements. Um, we've got five initial uh specific to the Taiwan, what our engagement in there is. Uh, I would imagine that would be consistent with our policy. You'll have to forgive me that the the details of our engagement there.
▶ 1:35:44I don't have at my fingertips, but I'm more than happy to come back to you and talk to you about that. I just don't have all those details.
▶ 1:35:50No. And that's fine. We would we would welcome that as a follow-up. We can have our office follow up you. I appreciate that. Um, second question is the World Nuclear Association reports that 35 countries are considering, planning or starting nuclear power programs. Russia and China have capitalized on this with aggressive statebacked export programs. Um, so the real question is not whether these countries will choose nuclear power, but which partners they'll choose.
▶ 1:36:12Um, so I'm just curious if you could speak a little bit to the State Department's plan to ensure the US remains a partner of choice for those countries seeking reliable, transparent nuclear energy partnerships.
▶ 1:36:22Yeah, thank you for the question, sir. It's a really good question. Um, uh, I think part part of the challenge is that, uh, you know, the Russians and Chinese, uh, do have extremely active diplomacy, in some cases coercive diplomacy, um, to maintain, uh, the partner of to be the partner of choice, we need to be able to provide capability quickly. Um, and I know there's been a lot of regulatory across the government. Uh, not strictly a state department piece to this.
▶ 1:36:49again uh I would own the uh sort of the further down the road on the 123 agreement uh in moving those faster. We've uh got a very efficient uh team that does that work. But the other parts of the government, we work very closely with the Department of Energy. I was just in Paris as you pointed out with my colleagues from the Department of Energy as well as uh uh folks from the White House, the chief technology officer of the White House. So it has a lot of attention in in the administration.
▶ 1:37:13Uh and just just one uh additional data point uh moving quickly also means we have to move safely. Uh and again these these are uh we we can't sacrifice one for the other but the commercial benefits uh um are tremendous uh and they're tremendous instrument instrument of of state power.
▶ 1:37:34I appreciate that. The techn is important, the partnerships are important. I hope this committee keeps that in mind as we do our work and think about um our engagements around the world. I thank you for your time and uh with that, Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
▶ 1:37:45Uh I now recognize a representative from Washington, Mr. Bombgardner.
▶ 1:37:51Uh thank you, Mr. Chair, and uh thank you for being here. You have a very uh important job. Um, I'm a new member of Congress and I, uh, things I'm sort of always find interesting is that sometimes these types of conversations do a little better when they are in the classified briefing just because there's no television cameras and seem to have more substantive debate and less performance in some. But, uh, in any event, I want to, uh, ask you about, uh, arms control and specifically related to to China.
▶ 1:38:22um what needs to happen in your view to get uh to increase leverage on China so that they would enter into more meaningful arms control discussions in the in the nuclear space. You know, countries don't do things because they're altruistic. They do things that are in their national interest. Uh China doesn't feel it seem to feel it's in their national interest at the moment. So, uh what would it take to make it in their national interest to be to be involved in meaningful arms control in the nuclear space?
▶ 1:38:48Uh thanks for the question, Congressman, and welcome to Congress. Um uh look I I think number one I answered this question a different question the same way earlier uh when the president himself uh makes very clear that he's committed uh to a certain outcome uh both adversaries and allies listen. Um so I think his personal commitment again um uh has been very clear to to me to me and uh that he wants to see this happen. Number one.
▶ 1:39:17Number two, uh the Chinese do have an obligation uh to negotiate in good faith under the non-prololiferation treaty article six. Um they uh um so um it's their obligation. We have a review conference on the committee uh the treaty actually uh next month and we'll be talking to them about that. So uh as part of being a responsible actor of being a nuclear weapons state, this is uh certainly requirement.
▶ 1:39:43Uh and three the other leverage points probably outside rest outside my responsibilities of the state department and rest in the war department. Uh and I know uh strapcom commander was up in front of the armed services committee last week and laid out a very detailed plan about a modernized deterrent uh that the United States will vigorously compete uh and that uh we will not negotiate from a position of of weakness.
▶ 1:40:08Uh so that again that's slightly outside of my remmit but we are very closely with the war department. Um so I think there's a there's a couple of leverage points there. U and and again we we expect them as part of their obligation under the MPT uh to negotiate in good faith.
▶ 1:40:25Thank you. Uh about well little less than 20 years ago I was a contractor in Afghanistan on an INL funded uh Afghan government counternarcotics team in place called Lashkagar Helmond and uh would would love to and to share some of the experiences uh from that. Obviously uh that phase of our war in Afghanistan was a little uh different and quite ex expeditionary.
▶ 1:40:52Uh I have a a real interest in uh trying to see state department develop uh more educa expeditionary in and counterinsurgent type capabilities uh maybe outside the remmit of of traditional FSOs and I think our traditional FSOs do a fantastic job.
▶ 1:41:11So don't want to lose that capability but you know we weren't uh as an institution I don't think state was well prepared for where it found itself uh in the after the immediate invasion of of Iraq and Afghanistan and I think there's going to be uh more challenges like that ahead. So would like to talk to you at some point about about that uh about that experience. I I just wonder if you have a comment about about INL and in in the future on on on some of these uh more challenging uh uh
▶ 1:41:41Uh I'd love to hear that feedback at some point um in figure out if there's a if there's a place in our programming. Um uh regards to INL uh you know we we we have we did go through a pretty comprehensive review.
▶ 1:41:54I think it had lost its u u sort of laser focus on uh law enforcement support and started to get into um places that this administration didn't feel was appropriate for uh for a war against cartels uh both uh you know terrorists and criminal cartels. So are are refocusing on core capabilities to dismantle uh cartels. Now that's not strictly in uh South and Latin America.
▶ 1:42:22I think that's important even though we rep prioritize it doesn't mean we dep prioritize or unprioritize if you would. So we still have a robust and critical uh uh engagement in in in that part of the world uh as well as in sort of the uh you know east Asia Pacific uh as well.
▶ 1:42:40So the uh as I said earlier the uh I met with the country directors of INL yesterday uh worldwide we have a footprint and uh they are our eyes and ears uh again having targeted security assistance that that that we think meets the America first uh security assistance objectives that doesn't go wayward into diversity programs or gender programs. U again rep prioritizing laser focus on dismantling cartels and again it's worldwide is what those folks do and they're they're terrific.
▶ 1:43:09Thank Thank you for your service. The dewokifying stuff is fantastic. We just need to think about expanding the toolkit for challenging places.
▶ 1:43:17Yes, sir. Look forward to it. Okay.
▶ 1:43:21I now recognize the representative from Illinois, Mr. Jackson.
▶ 1:43:25Thank you, Chairman Sil and Ranking Member Meeks. Uh we convene today under the banner of securing the future. A phrase that invites both ambition and sobriety. Because the truth is the future is not secured by aspirations alone. It is secured by clarity of purpose, strategic purpose, discipline, vision, and a willingness to confront um what we wish to be.
▶ 1:43:55Arms control at its best would lead us make sure that our idealism is not detached from power. It has been about managing power, ours and our adversaries in a way that reduces risk without indulging illusions. It is not an act of trust. It is an act of verification. And yet we find ourselves in a moment where the architecture that once provided a measure for predictability for treaties, norms, guard rails is eroding.
▶ 1:44:24Not accidentally but deliberately. Russia China expands. Rogue states observe and learn. The result is not stable and equilibrium but a gathering instability. We must therefore ask ourselves um are we adapting to this new strategic environment or are we clinging to frameworks built for a world that no longer exists? Because arms control without enforcement is theater.
▶ 1:44:53agreements without consequences or invitations to cheat, to advance, and to dominate. At the same time, abandoning arms controls altogether would be equally reckless. The absence of structure does not produce freedom. It produces chaos. The task before us then is not to choose between strength and restraint, but to integrate the two. To pursue arms control that is hardheaded, verifiable, and rooted in American strength.
▶ 1:45:22This requires our investing in relationships, negotiating from a position where our adversaries understand that non-compliance carries real cost. It also require intellectual honesty. Not every adversary seeks stability. Not every negotiation leads to peace and not every agreement serves our interest. If we are to secure the future, we must first abandoning abandon the comforting fictions of the past. Um, Mr.
▶ 1:45:52Under Secretary, given the repeated violation of past armed controls agreements by major powers, what specific enforcement mechanisms is the department prepared to pursue to ensure that future agreements are not merely symbolic but binding in practice?
▶ 1:46:09Thanks for the question, uh, Congressman. Uh look, I've been I've been crystal clear uh since my since uh I've taken this job and also in my my my prior service that any arms control agreement has to be enforceable and verifiable. Uh one of the challenges I think we had with NewATAR, as you point out, the Russians were serial violators. Um and I think the verification regime was not strong enough. Um it had some some pieces that I thought were good and predictable and and that's all good.
▶ 1:46:38Uh but that was a treaty signed in 20 2011 and uh uh simply not appropriate for the security environment of today and at the end of the day uh you know the as that treaty expired the president called for a new one uh so uh a modernized one that meets all of those thresholds that I've laid out about uh enforcability verifiability and has to contribute to the security of the United States.
▶ 1:47:03Thank you. Can you provide any additional insight how in our current conflict in Iran, I believe we've declared an act of war without the Congress's approval, how the most sanctioned part of the earth uh that the military of the Republican um the Iranian Guard can have some of the most advanced weapons? How were they able to acquire this material without our military's knowledge? Or did we simply underestimate them?
▶ 1:47:34Uh thanks for the question, sir. Uh uh I think I agree with the premise of your question. As I mentioned earlier in the in the hearing, our our non-prololiferation regimes uh although may have uh slowed our adversaries weapons programs uh and arrested them, they certainly didn't stop them. Um and I think we had to have a a cleareyed honest conversation on how we improve them.
▶ 1:47:57Um but to do that uh again I think it's across um as I mentioned earlier the nuclear suppliers group is from 1974 the MTCR as I mentioned earlier is a is a is a framework uh established in 1987 uh um the Australia group I think in 1985. So these are these are modern day problems that uh we have an a sort of generational architecture problem and I think we absolutely have to look closely at how we modernize it.
▶ 1:48:26how we apply technology so that we deny our adversaries uh precisely the capabilities I think you're talking
▶ 1:48:33Thank you for your time. Thank you for presenting before the committee today. I yield back chairman self.
▶ 1:48:40Uh thank you and now recognize the representative from Illinois, Mr.
▶ 1:48:44Uh thank you, Mr. Chairman. And uh before I I begin, I know it's been brought up uh by others, in particular the ranking member. Uh this is not a hearing about the war with Iran, but it is a the war is something that this committee needs to should be has to to talk about. It'd be nice if we were doing it now. Um we need to understand what is the the goal of the war. What are we trying to achieve? What's the strategy for achieving those goals? What's the endgame? Uh and what's the offramp?
▶ 1:49:14All of which is important to the American people. Uh, as we speak, American service members, including every enlisted sailor who comes through my district at Naval Station Great Lakes for basic training, our sailors, our soldiers, our marines, our our airmen, all our service members are part of a military campaign against Iran, putting their lives on the line on behalf of our nation. And as they carry out their dangerous mission, we owe it to them.
▶ 1:49:43Not only our gratitude and prayers, but a clear integrated strategy for what comes next. Why are they there? Why are they taking this risk? We must always pray for their success in their mission and their safe return home. Among that mission obviously is Iran's nuclear program. And this hearing today is about arms control and international security.
▶ 1:50:06And in that co context, I want to focus on on the Iran Iranian nuclear program specifically, not just the goal, but the imperative to first block and then ultimately permanently close Iran's nuclear program and end Iran's nuclear ambitions.
▶ 1:50:23Uh the international legal framework already exists, the nuclear non-prololiferation treaty, Iran's comprehensive safeguards agreement, and the additional protocol which authorizes the IAEA inspectors to verify declared material and detect undeclared nuclear activities. These tools were built precisely to stop the kind of breakout we fear from Iran, but they only work when they are enforced.
▶ 1:50:47Iran suspended the additional protocol 5 years ago in 2021, expelled designated inspectors, and has long restricted access to key The June 25 strikes and the intensified US-Israel campaign that began last month have further degraded Iran's nuclear infrastructure. Yet, they've also deepened the verification progress process.
▶ 1:51:11As the IEA's February 27th report made clear, the agency has been locked out of affected facilities at Natan's Foro and Isvahan. It cannot confirm the current size, composition, or location of Iran's enriched uranium stockpile, nor verify whether enrichment has indeed resumed. That is a proliferation emergency in the middle of an act of war. The hard numbers are sobering.
▶ 1:51:35Before the June 25 strikes, the IAEI verified that Iran had accumulated more than 440 kg of enriched uranium to 60%. 60% represents roughly 99% of the work necessary to separate and achieve weapons grade uran uranium and is theoretically enough for about 10 nuclear devices. Much of that enriched uranium is believed to remain underground at Isvahan.
▶ 1:52:03IAEA Director General Graci has stated that to the best of the AY's knowledge, the stockpile has not been moved. But impressions are not verification, especially amid ongoing strikes and rubble at these sites, every additional day without inspectors on the ground heightens the risk of diversion, the loss of continuity of knowledge or even unintended radological consequence. This cannot be handled by the US alone.
▶ 1:52:28Our European allies, our Gulf partners, and the IAEA board of governors must be central to any solution from the outside outset. The E3 has already triggered the snapback of UN sanctions, providing important leverage. But sanctions and air strikes are merely tools, not the permanent answer. We need a coordinated, verifiable plan to secure or neutralize that highlyenriched uranium, whether through removal, down blending under IE supervision, or verified conversion. while the military campaign continues.
▶ 1:52:58So, Secretary Dano, what is the administration's plan for locating, securing, and ne neutralizing Iran's stockpile of 60% enriched uranium?
▶ 1:53:10Uh, thank you for the uh question, Congressman. Um, look, I think it's important that we understand that the policy of the United States um since February 2025 is to deny Iran a nuclear weapon. and it's in in an intercontinental ballistic missile plan.
▶ 1:53:29Uh currently uh uh the uranium uh that you refer to is uh and decisions being made around that would lie with the um combatant commander Admiral Cooper in uh um in in the area of operation. Are you saying
▶ 1:53:51it's outside of my purview as the under?
▶ 1:53:53General Cooper is the one driving the strategy. It's not coming from the administration directly or coming from your office.
▶ 1:54:00The my role uh that decision process is outside of my purview as the under secretary for arms control and international security. um the existing
▶ 1:54:11doesn't nuclear material fall under your
▶ 1:54:13it currently and I confer with my war department colleagues often on this specific issue uh the Admiral Cooper would be the in as the combatant commander uh giving the ongoing hostilities um um when the uh in the event of sessation of hostilities um our office as a liazison to the IE
▶ 1:54:36has he been given orders to secure the nuclear material. I We're talking about enough material for 10 nuclear weapons. Is it time responsibility to secure?
▶ 1:54:47Sir, I I'm not trying to dodge your question, but you really would need to I'd have to refer you to the War
▶ 1:54:52General Gentleman's time is expired. I
▶ 1:54:54yield back, but not satisfied from South Carolina, Miss Biggs.
▶ 1:55:00Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you, Mr. Dano, for for your testimony this morning. is very important to all of us. Last September, President Trump stood before the United Nations General Assembly and called for the permanent elimination of biological weapons development worldwide. His words are on call to action in the face of growing threats to our national security.
▶ 1:55:27While the United States ended its biological weapons program over 50 years ago, we cannot ignore the reality that state and non-state actors around the world continue to pursue these capabilities.
▶ 1:55:42Most concerning is the PRC's rapid advancement in biotechnology, including gene editing synthetic biology and dual use technologies that pose significant threats to our national security and military superiority. That's why I will be introducing legislation to counter biotechnology threats from China that would require our government to take these threats seriously.
▶ 1:56:08China's military civil fusion strategy deliberately integrates civilian biotechnology research with military applications enabling the development of enhanced soldier capabilities, boweapons and other threats against the United States.
▶ 1:56:26We cannot allow China's dominance in global biotechnology supply chains and strategic investments in American biotechnology firms to undermine our innovation, our security and access to critical resources. So my first question, what concrete steps is the State Department taking to to fulfill President Trump's call for eliminating biological weapons development globally?
▶ 1:56:57Uh thank you very much for uh the question. Uh look I um uh obviously the president's uh commitment as I've said a couple times in the hearing uh today uh helps jumpstart the inter agency and also sends a message to our partners and allies. Uh that message was extremely wellreceived in Geneva where the biological weapons convention uh secretariat is housed.
▶ 1:57:21Um so uh our job uh is to try is to try to make that treaty has had a lot of challenges. It's very difficult to verify. Um it has some structural problems. Uh the review conference next year uh we look to uh hopefully bring the tools that the president outlined at a at a high level uh to bear.
▶ 1:57:43There are some things through technology, right, through AI that uh that we're working uh in the inter agency and not just the state department uh with our colleagues at HHS uh as well as the war department. Uh we had a whole team go out there to address the biological weapons convention uh so that we can begin to identify perhaps vulnerabilities in the supply chain or d use technologies uh that we that we currently don't have our arms around and be able to use the treaty mechanism.
▶ 1:58:11it would actually be through article 10 to share that information through all states parties. So the treaty mechanism is one point was one part of it. The sort of the other side of the arms control piece here I think is important is the non-prololiferation side. U as an aside I think that's also sort of you know one of the reasons why we merged the non-prololiferation bureau and the arms control bureau. In my prior years at the state department those were separate in separate bureaus answering to separate uh executives. Now they emerged.
▶ 1:58:40So the non-prololiferation arms control have to work hand in hand. I think one of the challenges again I mentioned earlier uh and I'm I'm really interested in your in your legislation and your thinking on this is uh again the Australia group uh again I know they do a lot of really good work but these are mechanisms from years ago uh I think the Australia group is 1985 right so you know basically you know my entire adult life uh are we trying to fit a modern 2026 2030 problem into an outdated non-proliferation architecture and it's not just
▶ 1:59:10bio right across the WMD spectrum across dual use technology spectrum. So uh we again we have we have a robust ongoing programs. Uh again my concern is that we're we know what we know. Uh and h how do we how do we turbocharge these? How do we enable them with AI that the president called for or other tools or technologies?
▶ 1:59:29I think that's one of the reasons why the emerging threats bureau to have you know specialists that really follow the next generation technology and so that we can try to update our uh our programs right the government tends to sort of slow laboriously and stove pipes and I think some of these reforms organizing ourselves to get after the problem is uh is a big part of it as well. I hope that answers your question.
▶ 1:59:52Thank you. I would uh love to continue our conversation. I'm out of time though so I yield back Mr. Chairman, thank you.
▶ 2:00:00Now recognize the representative from Texas, Mr. Castro.
▶ 2:00:04Uh, thank you, Chairman. Under Secretary Dano, I wanted to follow up on some questions that Representative Snyder asked. This war has a nuclear dimension that we have to address and that the committee and the Congress can't avoid. In the first week of the war, the United States and Israel struck Iran's nuclear enrichment facility at Natans. Last week, Iran claimed that a projectile hit a structure about a thousand feet from Iran's nuclear power plant at Brashier.
▶ 2:00:31The IAEA director general called it quote the reddest line of nuclear safety. And just a few days ago, Iranian ballistic missiles struck the city of Deona, injuring more than 180 people, penetrating Israeli air defenses near Israel's main nuclear research facility for the first time. Iran said explicitly it was targeting the NGV nuclear research center in retaliation for Natans. And yesterday Iran claimed that their nuclear power facility at Brashier was hit again.
▶ 2:01:01Nuclear facilities on both sides have been targeted. That's where we are in this war and that's how far it's escalated. If a nuclear reactor like Brashure were hit, there's a significant risk of a meltdown and release of extremely dangerous radioactive materials that would affect all countries in the region. and of course millions of people including Americans and American service members. You are the main government official overseeing non-prololiferation and arms control for the United States government.
▶ 2:01:29If there were a nuclear emergency, you would play a leading role in the international diplomacy to address that emergency. My question to you is, what is the administration's assessment of the risk of nuclear escalation or radiological disaster in this war? and what steps is the United States taking to prevent it?
▶ 2:01:49Uh thank you, Congressman. Uh um as I answered earlier, those uh operational questions uh specific uh to the theater of operations would rest with uh Admiral Cooper. Um I I will tell you that all resources inside the non-prololiferation bureau uh would be made available um uh and are available uh should they warrant it.
▶ 2:02:13I've had conversations with my colleagues in the War Department specifically to this issue and uh operationally the War Department would address the type of things um that that you're getting at and I appreciate that, but I mean you're the main person in the government in charge of non-prololiferation and overseeing nuclear weapons. Do they not share this information with you?
▶ 2:02:35Uh well, no. Again, sir, the uh
▶ 2:02:38I know you said they're responsible for generating it, but do they share it with you? Can you share it with us
▶ 2:02:42in in in the current in the current situation? Admiral Cooper would be the decision maker on how that would be any uh hypothetical situation um would be addressed. They have uh they have the resources and again I had this conversation with my counterpart at the War Department um to let them know that the non-prololiferation experts would be available should
▶ 2:03:03Well, let me let me ask you a follow-up question. The United States is currently engaged in a major war against Iran. Of course, a war that clearly already has nuclear consequences and I don't believe that you've adequely addressed the nuclear risks here. So, let's take a step back and establish some basic facts. The administration has said that Iran is or was close to developing nuclear weapons, but we they haven't discussed what Israel's capacity or capabilities are. So, I want to ask you, does Israel have nuclear weapons?
▶ 2:03:33Uh I'm not prepared to comment on that
▶ 2:03:38You're not prepared to comment on it? It's a very basic question. We are with an ally conducting a war against Iran. We all know what American capabilities are. The US government has spoken about what Iran's capabilities are. Can you tell us what Israel's capabilities are? The consequences, as you know, are grave. This war continues to escalate.
▶ 2:04:05Tell us as Congress as the oversight body. What is Israel's nuclear capability in terms of weapons?
▶ 2:04:13I can't comment on on on that specific uh question. You'd I'd have to refer you to the Israelis on that.
▶ 2:04:23Does that mean you don't know?
▶ 2:04:25Uh I can't comment on that, sir. Under Secretary, you're the main person in charge of knowing this and understanding it. Will you not give us an answer? I I don't understand why this issue is so taboo when it's a basic question and we're in a war alongside Israel against Iran. We're dealing with the potential for nuclear fallout and you won't answer this basic question.
▶ 2:04:56Uh well again it would be outside of my purview uh as the arms control and armed proliferation under secretary um to discuss that specific
▶ 2:05:06Sir, that is a dereliction of duty. I yel back.
▶ 2:05:11Uh Mr. Secretary, I'll help you with that. The official Israeli position is they neither confirmed nor deny uh any existence of nuclear weapons. Now recognize the representative from Florida, Mr. Mills.
▶ 2:05:25Thank you, Mr. Mr. Chairman, uh, thank you so much for being here. Under secretary, can you tell me what your involvement is or your oversight of the, uh, director of defense trade controls,
▶ 2:05:36of DDTC?
▶ 2:05:39Yes. Thank you. So, uh, DDTC is, uh, uh, is a the licensing office that rests in the political military bureau, which would be under my purview. And it is my understanding a few years back when they brought in the DDTC hotline that this was to try and ensure that the processing of DSP83s, DSP5s and other such paperwork was going to actually be done in an expedited manner to guarantee that we can meet the challenges or the requirements that are necessary
▶ 2:06:09in supporting American business but also helping with security cooperations around the globe. Is that correct?
▶ 2:06:17Uh it it's uh yeah I don't have a reason to dispute that. Um I could I could comment on it but go ahead sir.
▶ 2:06:24So the the reason I bring that up is prior to coming into Congress obviously I had served as a US Army combat veteran. I'd served with the state department and I had also helped with uh other agencies as well as uh was part of the administration previously but I owned a defense company and know very well kind of the ins and outs of how DDTC handles things.
▶ 2:06:43And what I watched is that American businesses and I hear this you know obviously as a member of the armed services committee I hear many times where there's either a continuation of RWAs which is return without actions after 6 months of sitting with no reasoning justification or it sits for a year to 18 months while either the terrorist organization continues to thrive grow or in some cases the country who actually needs the certain
▶ 2:07:13defense mechanisms never receive them. What are we doing to improve DDTC to guarantee the necessary licensing can come forward and that American businesses and other nations are able to defend themselves?
▶ 2:07:27Uh thanks for the question sir. You you probably know some of the more details better than I do. Um but I think at a macro level it's important to understand sort of my view here is uh first of all any of those sort of instances of things being delayed or months or years you got to let us know. I can't fix what I don't
▶ 2:07:47Thank you for that.
▶ 2:07:47Number one. Number two just because we move faster in a broken system
▶ 2:07:53isn't the right answer either. Also
▶ 2:07:56So the uh and and I think we're doing that. I mean, we do a tremendous amount of uh outreach and customer service. Um uh and there's been a tremendous amount of work done both uh at the State Department, DDTC and other offices as well as the War Department. Um this is a huge priority for the administration. We just released our second uh executive order. Um deregulating uh getting more capabilities faster, the right capabilities into the right allies um uh can really help.
▶ 2:08:26Again, the America first arms transfer strategy, I think, is a really interesting and innovative approach on that. Not every partner ally needs Patriot uh or F-35, right? And that those cases that just can sort of build the backlog.
▶ 2:08:41it might be a a partner, a lesser capability, but more importantly or as important is aligning that capability with our regional interests um so that our arm sales uh approach is is normalized to support American foreign policy as well as our partners and allies. Um it's a it it's a huge priority. I work very closely with my counterpart at the War Department.
▶ 2:09:04uh we we currently uh meet quarterly which uh again a lot of the uh not to uh come I'll come back to DDTC but the war department are making extraordinary uh changes to align uh DSA DSCA some of the things the offices I think you're referring to underneath the under secretary for acquisition uh as well as some of the service acquisition executives so there's a tremendous amount of work being done there but on our side as well uh uh again modernizing mundane things,
▶ 2:09:34our IT infrastructure, our website, how we uh process cases, uh all of that sort of nitty-gritty work needs to get done to modernize the process. Uh it's not going to happen in three weeks or three months. Um it's a lengthy process, but uh I I appreciate your question.
▶ 2:09:52Well, I'd love to be able to kind of uh be able to sit down with your others to look at what we can do to not only reform this program because as you know, one of the things you talked about was aligning to the actual counterterrorism strategies or security strategies of the region and also things and I'm very familiar with the United States munition list 151 and what has or has not been sanctioned and not sanctioned and how we look at even supporting nations that have been sanctioned previously if they're doing things like for example fighting against dash or they're trying to actually prevent further terroristic expansion.
▶ 2:10:21And so I'd love to go into further detail uh at your leisure so we can help try and get this done. So thank you so much for what you're doing. I'm glad that you're in this position. It's it's a much needed upgrade and uh I look forward to working with you. With that, I yield back.
▶ 2:10:33Thank you.
▶ 2:10:33And now recognize the representative from Rhode Island, Mr. Emma.
▶ 2:10:37Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Uh thank you for being here, Under Secretary. Uh, under secretary uh Dano, your purview includes overseeing the office of the AUS senior adviser. The Australia, United Kingdom, United States Security Pact, also known as AUS, is a historic defense cooperation agreement critical to maintaining free trade and security in the Indo-acific by enabling coordination on sensitive defense technology.
▶ 2:11:04AUS grows our national security capabilities and creates opportunities for our domestic defense industry to collaborate with our allies supporting domestic manufacturing and goodaying jobs here at home. I'm glad you've acknowledged the importance of AUS and explained how AUS implementation is moving forward after last year's review. I'm also glad that you are working to remove the red tape that makes AUS collaboration difficult.
▶ 2:11:28Now, while AUS is supposed to make collaboration easier, red tape slows down technology transfer uh and makes it difficult to collaborate on sensitive technology. That's why I was proud to lead the AUS Improvement Act with Chairman Emiritus uh McCall uh which passed into law last year. Our law removed duplicative approval requirements for AUS coordination, but there's still work to be done to ensure AUS procedures are streamlined and free of unnecessary delays. So, Mr.
▶ 2:11:58Under Secretary, could you describe how you and the office uh of the AUS senior adviser are collaborating with our allies and domestic manufacturers to cut red tape and facilitate AUS collaboration? How are you ensuring that more efficient collaboration doesn't threaten our most sensitive
▶ 2:12:17Uh, thanks for the question, sir. Uh, well, let me first address the allied piece. Uh just last week I met with our ARUS coordinator with the Australian Accus Coordinator. We had a a very lengthy and robust exchange about sort of some some details program milestones integration. Uh two weeks before that I was in the UK uh with our ARCS coordinator. I met with the uh UK coordinator. So this notion of collaboration is you know you actually have to show up and do it.
▶ 2:12:47Uh and that's what we do. I mean at the core of what this our mission at the state department is is diplomacy. Um but tied to this to the regulatory piece I think um I look at AUC as the canary in the coal mine. If we can uh find out ways and there there should be we should not be denying uh capabilities uh with our closest allies. I mean both the UK and Australia are uh the US extends our nuclear deterrence umbrella.
▶ 2:13:15there can be no closer ally. Um yet um you know I I think uh decades of of of uh I guess red tape was the was the term used uh we need to really dig into it and pull it apart. Uh and I can tell you uh even in some of the reforms that would that I think were really good for for first start um as we as we get into it we find it's you know sort of like a fishing knot. The more the more you pull it apart you realize there's more problems inside it.
▶ 2:13:44And that's I think systemat systematic problems inside our regulatory uh regimes.
▶ 2:13:50Great. I I know I have a little bit of time left, but I'm I'm glad that you're digging in. I'm glad that you're taking steps uh to ensure the AUS runs efficiently. And I hope you continue to take, you know, thoughtful steps that balance our need for coordination with the protection of our sensitive technology. And I'll come back to you. I I know you're still digging in uh and uh I'm I'm grateful that you're working towards uh the shared aims that I I believe we have there.
▶ 2:14:15Now, while I'm glad you're working on implementing AUS, I'm also troubled that the Trump administration lacks a plan for other areas of our arms control and international security. Uh there is no plan for nuclear arms control. Uh Trump allowed the New START treaty to expire without even attempting to negotiate a new treaty to contain and constrain uh Russia's nuclear weapons. There is no plan to prevent terrorism before it starts.
▶ 2:14:45Secretary Rubio eliminated the office of countering violent extremism. It seems like that's an important place to be invested right now. And more importantly, and a clear illustration of the lack of planning is the lack of plan for President Trump's catastrophic war of choice in Iran.
▶ 2:15:02His short-sighted war has already cost 13 American service members lives, tens of billions of taxpayers dollars, and is pushing the world closer to an oil crisis every single day that the Strait of Hormuz remains closed. So, look, I echo the voices of other Democrats uh on this committee. uh we must have a dedicated hearing with senior administration uh witnesses to explain the plan for Iran and the decisions that led to this point.
▶ 2:15:32It's good that you're here uh but it's not enough. And so I hope that's a message that resonates because we need to hear from the administration uh on this war of choice that is causing havoc for the American people. With that, I yield back.
▶ 2:15:46I now recognize the representative from California, Mr. Isa.
▶ 2:15:50Thank you. It's amazing. My colleague is asking for a hearing, but he didn't listen. Um, is there a plan? He implied a question, but he certainly didn't ask you to answer. Do you believe the president is working toward counting countering terrorism? And if so, you you want to go over briefly some of the
▶ 2:16:09Uh, thanks for the question, sir. Uh um well very quickly I think probably uh some of the most consequential things that our counterterrorism bureau does is we've designated over 30 close to 30 foreign terrorist organizations. 15 of those are narotist groups.
▶ 2:16:27Uh so uh and this has enabled us to uh open up an entire suite of tools both at the state department and law enforcement and military uh to uh really the declaration of war against the cartels.
▶ 2:16:42So, it's just fair to say just the opposite of what the gentleman implied that in fact the president is expanding uh anti-terrorism including for example not just Hezbollah as a terrorist group but Hezbollah is a drugdeing cartel working terrorist group that trades arms and drugs around the world. So, um, as as we do that, I I have a question.
▶ 2:17:05Um, under the May 2025 State Department, uh, notification of reorganization, the T bureau, which was a is a major consolidation, would you would you give us how far along that's gone and what the benefits are uh to efficiencies and effectiveness of that consolidation?
▶ 2:17:24Uh, yes, sir. Thanks for the question. Uh, I mean, I haven't heard anyone say that thought it was a bad idea. I think it's a great idea. I just, you know, I'd like the followup because I think
▶ 2:17:34our terrorism bureau, the INL bureau, as well as our non-prololiferation bureau, uh, and our political military bureau, all the security assistance bureaus were in the same place. Uh, that alone is it's obvious and long overdue. Um, number two, uh,
▶ 2:17:52you do know that some might say, well, you were closing down all these bureaus rather than consolidating, make them work together, make them interoperative, and make them more effective.
▶ 2:18:01Uh, no, sir. I mean, uh, that that's just not true. Um, I I can tell you that we went through a lengthy process and a detailed process of looking at our security assistance programs. uh and where we didn't think they worked or they weren't measurable, we didn't find there was an outcome, uh we we chose not to do it anymore. I mean, I think that's the responsibility of every everybody. I I I think uh Congress would un you know, of course, understands that our priority is to make sure that we're getting value for the dollar.
▶ 2:18:30Um so not only the effectiveness of the programs, the right policy direction to address the administration priorities and not some of these other things that uh were not were outside of uh again our core national security responsibilities. So it's is it fair to say that if you don't bring together all of the powers, military action where appropriate, pressure on governments to cooperate in the intelligence communities to identify them and then in fact
▶ 2:19:01dry up the money that funds them. If you don't do all of that, you're really just creating nice to have organizations rather than countering terrorism.
▶ 2:19:09Uh yes, sir. I I'd agree with that assessment. Uh again broadening the authorities again target you know implementing uh 15 FTO designations against terrorist cartels uh is extremely effective tool um and is uh the number one priority again for the administration in the hemisphere is to dismantle the drug cartels and we're doing it
▶ 2:19:32now uh staying on our hemisphere and with the limited time I have left the president is facing uh a history of uh naroterrorism being allowed in our own at our own border in Mexico almost taking over the government. U a Venezuela that clearly uh was hostile to us but not to uh to to drugs and others.
▶ 2:19:57A Colombia that that has gone has slipped backwards uh and other countries that have been uh weak or ineffective. What can we do and how can we work together to live up to the president's agenda of really bringing that around? We've seen what he did in Venezuela that can make a real difference.
▶ 2:20:17But where is the congressional followup uh needed for this committee to help you and the u rid South and Central America of these uh cartel and particularly staying on drugs to a certain extent but it's not limited to drugs.
▶ 2:20:35um how do we how do we work together to uh find a way to um to follow up so that we really can help those countries be independent, free and no longer represent a potential threat for through terrorism to us.
▶ 2:20:49Uh yes, sir. Just just quickly, I I I think the notion of uh uh uh drug cartels and terrorism where they merge and blend into this notion of uh uh transnational organized crime and I again I back to the your first question of how we organize ourselves that both the counterterrorism bureau and the counter drug bureau working hand inand to dismantle cartels again through various uh authorities which we've leveraged u I think continue to support those programs commun to demand integration.
▶ 2:21:20It's the challenge that we have I have as kind of overseeing the the the dollars and uh program effectiveness. We have to make sure that our dollars are returning uh value to the American people.
▶ 2:21:31Well, you've done a great job of that and I want to commend you and thank you for being here today and I yield back.
▶ 2:21:36Now recognize the representative from Arizona, Mr. Stanton.
▶ 2:21:39Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for the witness for being here today. There's no more urgent matter for this committee than the ongoing war in Iran. Trump took this country to war. Wasn't Congress, wasn't our allies. The president alone made this choice. Nearly a month in, 13 American service members have died. Thousands more American service members are on their way to the Middle East.
▶ 2:22:07Tens of billions of taxpayer dollars have been spent. And we're hearing that the administration will be asking Congress for 200 billion more to pay for the cost of the war. This war is destabilizing the entire Middle East. It's putting Americans here and abroad in danger. It's driving up cost the cost of living for our fellow Americans at home. Gas prices nearing $5 a gallon uh in my home state of Arizona.
▶ 2:22:35Not to mention, the administration is going back on years of bipartisan consensus to limit Russia's oil revenue, lifting sanctions on Russian energy sales uh over Moscow's ongoing full-scale invasion of Ukraine. That's hurting the effort in to to support Ukraine. Ukrainian President Zilinski said it best. The boost in revenue gives Vladimir Vladimir Putin the confidence to continue the war in Ukraine indefinitely.
▶ 2:23:04I hear from my constituents every day. They are furious. You don't want to be dragged into another forever war. Neither do I. To date, this administration has offered no strategy, no clear objectives, no credible plan to end this conflict, nothing. Um, are these rumored negotiations real? Are they just a stall tactic for the next full-scale attack? We don't know. President administration has not come before Congress or the American people uh to make the case.
▶ 2:23:32That is the reason why Secretary Rubio must appear before our committer committee. He must make the case to Congress and to the American people why we're in this war, what winning looks like, and how we get out of this uh of this war. Uh M under secretary, the administration made a choice not to come to Congress to make the case for the war in Iran.
▶ 2:23:56Do you agree with that Uh, sir, I'm here today to talk about the programs I oversee. I'm happy to answer questions about that.
▶ 2:24:05I appreciate uh that. Um, this Trump's uh war in Iran has significant ramifications around the globe. So many of them been covered by my colleagues.
▶ 2:24:25So I don't want to repeat the point, but at the very least to start a war of choice in Iran has sent mixed signals to our partners in the Indo-Pacific, most notably Taiwan. The longer the war continues, the more we will burn through stocks of munitions critical for any regional conflict, and the longer we will spend once again bogged down in the Middle East instead of focused in on China.
▶ 2:24:49I'm particularly concerned that not only do US arm sales to Taiwan fear face severe delivery backlogs, but the more than 13 billion dollars in sales to Taiwan were stalled as a reported quote diplomatic maneuver unquote ahead of the anticipated summit between President Trump and Xi That summit has now been postponed. what states what steps can you take to faster for faster delivery of these muchneeded platforms to Taiwan?
▶ 2:25:21Um, thank you congressman for the question. I mean I think at a at a macro level uh most importantly uh we've we've been extremely forwardleaning uh on modernizing the defense industrial base that uh not only includes uh the war department but uh the regulatory uh framework that I oversee at the state department to make sure that uh uh we have more capabilities faster uh really across uh across the world uh not not just to to to Taiwan
▶ 2:25:51and other partners and allies Um we just imp implemented our second uh executive order. Uh the American first arms transfer strategy as I mentioned earlier I think uh uh is extremely uh creative framework so that we don't continue to uh sort of contribute to the problem of backlogs and that we look to uh other capabilities uh help with demand signals to industry so that uh those support uh our foreign policy objectives worldwide really.
▶ 2:26:20Yeah. The Congress has not received a significant or serious explanation as to why there was uh the stalling of the 13 billions in arm sales to our critically important arm sales to Taiwan. This committee will take up the Porcupine Act soon, which defines Taiwan as a NATO plus 5 country, meaning shorter approval timelines. Uh is the administration supportive of Congress enacting legislation to make sure Taiwan receives the same treatment as members of the NATO plus 5?
▶ 2:26:47Again, I'm not familiar with your with your bill. I'm happy to look at it and talk to your team uh about it.
▶ 2:26:53Um I'm surprised you haven't heard of it because obviously it's it's uh seems to be right up your alley, if you will, at the area.
▶ 2:26:59Have a large alley, sir.
▶ 2:27:01Fair enough. But uh you're the one in charge and so you should be in full command of the of the issues underneath your purview. Um so I look forward to this committee taking up Porcupine Act and supporting. It's critical for our support of the critical support of
▶ 2:27:14Happy to look at it and get back to you.
▶ 2:27:16Thank you so much.
▶ 2:27:16Thank you.
▶ 2:27:17I yield back. Now recognize the representative from Tennessee, Mr.
▶ 2:27:23Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, brother, for being here. You um I think you've probably lost about 15 pounds of getting chewed on up here. Every time I come in here, somebody's yelling at you or something. So, I'm just going to ask you some simple questions. All right? Maybe give you some answers. Um and thank you. I really do appreciate you being here. What's your plan to reduce international commitments um that do not advance our national interests? These are kind of broad questions, but but they're leading as well. So, uh, no. Well, no, sir. I'm happy to answer it.
▶ 2:27:53Uh, we've already gone through a and continue to go through a lengthy process to re assess our our security assistance programs uh to realign them to laser focus on uh dismantling terrorist networks and uh and uh cartel networks. Um when we started the foreign assistance review, the the security assistance review uh slightly before I I I got into office, um there were hundreds of programs that we shut down.
▶ 2:28:21Um again, rep prioritized, make sure that they were measurable, uh that we could actually get a return and really focused on specifically dismantling cartels and uh making sure that no terrorist attacks could emanate uh again from foreign shores and impact the United States. I'm the um 435th most powerful member of Congress. So, and I'm usually the last one to ask ask questions. So, when I ask these questions, the the first response should be that's an incredibly uh intelligent
▶ 2:28:51Oh, thank you. There you go. Little late now, but that's all right.
▶ 2:28:54Do you think our European allies are contributing equally equally um to our shared international security initiatives? Uh uh well certainly under the president's leadership uh really started in his first term uh and I think into the now well into the second term the the NATO 5% commitments uh I think were probably unheard of certainly uh five years ago. Uh we also have an extremely uh talented and uh ambassador to NATO ambassador Whitaker who's driving that change. Uh so the Europeans are doing more.
▶ 2:29:25Uh I think we they need to continue to do more. uh and we challenge them uh you know daily u and it's not just strictly NATO spending uh a burden sharing uh burden shifting really across the world uh through our security assistance programs. Let me let me ask you.
▶ 2:29:42I' I've had this conversation with the president and I' I've said that one of the most powerful things that he utilizes is his background in business and the fact that a lot of these wars have been ended without firing a shot and he's said we're going to shut y'all down and then we're going to shut these people down who are supplying you. We're going to shut them down as well. And he does it economically and he has that stroke. I would you care to comment on that?
▶ 2:30:07I I agree with you. I mean again I've mentioned several times here uh um we follow his lead and I think the world follows his lead again whether it's to arms control uh again so one one area that that I'm focused on um and he sets policy and that's refreshing uh that uh the inter agency uh our job is to implement his policy as commander-in-chief uh chief diplomat as well um so I agree with you sir
▶ 2:30:32what do you think
▶ 2:30:33great question
▶ 2:30:34what thank you um what can we do to make sure that these terrorist organizations don't have access to our sensitive material, our weapons, and maybe even our technology.
▶ 2:30:45Uh not take not take our eye off the ball. I think I think one of the challenges with uh you know rep prioritization and I think we learned this in 911 uh um is that we have to continue to be diligent across the world. Uh the bad guys get a vote. Um so uh again we have a we have a broad portfolio of security assistance and we need to leverage limited resources uh burden share right ask others to to you know share the bill here with us and not take our eye off the ball.
▶ 2:31:14Great. Last question. Do you think um or do you know if any of our adversaries are actively pursuing chemical or biological weapons and what do you think our our um plan is to counter those initiatives? I know you can't talk about too much outside of a secure setting as we like to say,
▶ 2:31:31but so yes, um we we will report to Congress uh in the coming weeks uh both an open report and a classified report, what we call the compliance report, which lays out our views um uh as soon as that report's sent up, I happily come back to talk to you about it uh in both open and classified settings.
▶ 2:31:52I would do that. Name's Tim Burchett. I'd appreciate if you you could or send somebody by. That'd be great.
▶ 2:31:57I'd happily do it.
▶ 2:31:58All right. Now, you see how easy it was, Mr. Chairman, to ask him a question without opening up with a crazy insult that he, you know, he can't answer. And see, I've got what, 15 more seconds, and I yield them back to you.
▶ 2:32:11Uh, thank you. Now recognize the representative from California, Mr.
▶ 2:32:16I want to pick up in Mr. Mfumi was talking about artificial intelligence. the world including us is spending trillions of dollars to make artificial intelligence more powerful. We are spending virtually nothing to try to make sure it is controllable.
▶ 2:32:30I chaired hearings of 15 years ago in the subcommittee of this committee uh on uh on whether there should be international limits on artificial intelligence or at least efforts to make sure that artificial intelligence does not develop awareness self- ambitious self- ambition in its direction. Uh Mr.
▶ 2:32:53assistant uh or under secretary uh uh has the United States proposed any international uh conferences or agreements uh to limit artificial intelligence and make sure it doesn't for example uh take over the world
▶ 2:33:09uh thanks for the question uh sir
▶ 2:33:12I'm not aware of any are you
▶ 2:33:13uh we are actively engaged in multiple diplomatic engagements around artificial intelligence we were engaged back in the first Trump administration on artificial
▶ 2:33:23Are any of them going to prevent artificial intelligence from developing
▶ 2:33:28I'm sure they can. That's why we do it. That's why we show and well the first administration and all the other
▶ 2:33:33I mean, I was there for it. I went through it.
▶ 2:33:35Excuse me. Reclaiming my time.
▶ 2:33:37Go ahead, sir.
▶ 2:33:38Uh because we now have to shift to something else and that is uh a Saudi nuclear weapon. Um, I wrote what became section 6 uh 1264B of the uh NDAA of 2020 that required you to provide notices in advance of sending a Saudi nuclear cooperation agreement that failed to have safeguards in it.
▶ 2:34:03Uh on November 1st, uh the uh president uh provided uh such notice to the chair but not the ranking member of the committee. Is it a practice of the State Department when required to file a notice that you file it only to Republicans and Dem Democrats don't become aware of it?
▶ 2:34:21I'm sorry, sir. I'm not familiar with exactly what you're talking about
▶ 2:34:25Okay. I'll ask in general when the State Department is supposed to file a report with Congress or a notice to Congress, say of an arms export or in this case uh a non-conforming nuclear cooperation do you break with what every other administration has done and just tell the Republicans about it and say, "We've notified congressional Republicans.
▶ 2:34:49We don't have to notify the chair, the ranking member of this committee." Uh, look, sir, my view is whether it's the ranking member or the the chairman, uh, we I respect your oversight role, if that's what you're getting at,
▶ 2:35:00do you tell Democrats or just
▶ 2:35:02Look, I'm I'm I don't
▶ 2:35:04You don't know.
▶ 2:35:04I'm not sure what you're getting at, sir. I'm
▶ 2:35:06Okay. When we pass a law that says you're supposed to notify Congress before you do something, is it sufficient to notify only Republicans and not to in uh inform the ranking member of this committee? I don't know the answer to your question. I'm not sure what you're getting at here. I'm I'm happy to
▶ 2:35:26I'm getting to the answer that when you're supposed to notify Congress, you can't just notify half of Congress. You have to notify Democrats, too. So, let's go on and talk about uh the substance of this. Uh because of the war in Iran, it's not moving forward right now. But in November, the president wanted to move forward with a nuclear cooperation agreement without safeguards in it.
▶ 2:35:49Now, I'll point out that we once had the most powerful monarch in the Middle East, was once a great friend of the United States in 1978, and every weapon system the Sha had in 78 was in the Ayatollah's hands in 1979.
▶ 2:36:05Does this administration believe that if MBS gets nuclear weapons, they are certain that Saudi Arabia will not be governed by hostile forces a year or two Uh sir that that sort of hypothetical uh
▶ 2:36:21that's not a hypothetical. You have to deci sir you have to decide whether to give a green light to MBS to develop a nuclear weapon. when you decide
▶ 2:36:30to decide that what I don't know.
▶ 2:36:32Well, the president filed with the Republicans on this committee on November 21 an intention to enter into a non a uh uh a a nuclear cooperation agreement without safeguards for the Sa Saudis. It concluded that it would not contribute the the president's signature is right here saying it's not going to contribute to proliferation of nuclear weapons. Uh because you trust NBS. Is NBS gonna be running Saudi Arabia or not
▶ 2:37:01in future decades? Neither one of us
▶ 2:37:03I can't speculate on that.
▶ 2:37:05But you but the president speculates on it and says it's just fine to have Saudi Arabia have nuclear weapons.
▶ 2:37:10I've never heard that.
▶ 2:37:12Because they're such wonderful folks. Uh are we concerned about a Saudi nuclear uh we'd be concerned about any nuclear weapons program outside of the
▶ 2:37:25or an uncontrolled uh nuclear energy program that didn't have safeguards in it would be
▶ 2:37:32any nuclear energy program I think you're referring to 123 would be compliant with the atomic energy act
▶ 2:37:37well I hope that you'll use the UAA agreement the gold standard agreement as a model and arms control includes controlling the development uh of nuclear uh weapons thank you I yield I now recognize a representative from Ohio, Mr. Davidson.
▶ 2:37:53Chairman, thank you for this timely hearing today. The Bureau uh uh for arms control and international security really is the centerpiece of what an American first foreign policy should look like. Uh we don't need more woke and weaponized nation building efforts from these self-licking ice cream cone uh USID, you know, had some essential functions uh but they didn't even steer. They didn't even do they were focused on all kinds of things.
▶ 2:38:21And I just want to thank Secretary Rubio, President Trump, and frankly, Secretary, your leadership for reforming that. What a radical notion that America's resources should be focused on advance advancing America's interest. So, I think the direction is going great.
▶ 2:38:39Uh I want to applaud uh those efforts and the org chart change, the willingness to put uh America first with our foreign policies and just set aside this radical left ideology that Democrats used the last administration in particular to kind of force down our allies uh through us. So couple things, Mr. DeMarco. I'm currently the chairman for national security and elicit finance uh which is actually in the financial services committee.
▶ 2:39:06There's obviously a lot of overlap with the work we do here in the foreign affairs committee. Cyber scam centers based out of Southeast Asia have become an enormous threat to America's financial well-being. Annual losses are in the tens of billions of dollars. Uh and you have nation states. I mean the the scam center in Cambodia was you know a significant portion of Cambodia's uh GDP you know like 25% of GDP uh size scam center.
▶ 2:39:34So, uh, we need a whole of government approach to dealing with that. Um, so can you tell us, uh, what the bureau is doing to counter this scourge with scam centers?
▶ 2:39:45Uh, so I, uh, I think you're referring to some of the programming that our INL bureau uh, that mission set. Uh, we have an extremely, uh, worldwide footprint. Uh, um, and I think you're referring to the the cyber crime initiatives.
▶ 2:40:00Yes, there's an there's an ongoing uh cyber crime uh sort of you know policy process PCC process um that our INL team is leading on behalf of uh u you know our equities at the security assistance side of the house. there are other pieces of the state department that are involved with that.
▶ 2:40:18Uh and obviously um the larger operational law enforcement agencies would work very closely with um so um again DHS uh justice department some of the other uh FBI that have a you know more operational footprint um but they're very involved uh we had a team I think uh uh in Vienna recently on a on a big cyber crime initiative so there's a tremendous amount of uh international and diplomatic engagement that the the INL bureau would lead We're very involved
▶ 2:40:49with that.
▶ 2:40:49Yeah. Thank you. And speaking of INL um you know and and the reorganization, I'd like to give a shout out for moving the Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement to the T family where the agency can be better mission aligned with our securityities interests. Uh I introduced the Narco Act in 2025 to codify this move to the T family.
▶ 2:41:10My bill also asked the state department to move away from uh nation building exercises of the past to embrace a more focused mission of countering international crime uh all the illicit activities these transnational criminal organizations are engaged in uh fentanyl drugs illegal immigration all the uh streams of money that the cartels now properly designated as terrorists and enemies of our country.
▶ 2:41:37Can you give us an update about how the shift of mission focus at INL uh and the structural changes help have helped fight the
▶ 2:41:45Uh thanks for the question. I didn't know about your bill, but looks like we listen, right? Um uh INL, as I said, uh went through we went through an extensive security assistance review and it canceled hundreds of programs. Uh they weren't policy aligned necessarily and others that we didn't find uh gave us the right metrics and oversight that we felt that we were really getting a return. uh number one. Number two, the laser focus on dismantling the cartels.
▶ 2:42:10It's the it's the number one priority uh uh of the INL team uh and as well uh our counterterrorism team uh also that merging that security assistance programs normalizing them. This is a process. It's not easy uh of how we um for example by designating uh cartels terrorist organizations that opens up the an entire programming from our CT bureau. So normalizing that's a uh tricky. It's work in progress, but we're making a lot of progress.
▶ 2:42:39Um but most importantly, I think to your to your point and and your bill, having them in two separate sort of, you know, operating independently made no sense. Now they're operating independently. Now we're uh organizing and driving programmatic integration. Make sure there's no overlap. Um uh and I think a much much uh common sense approach.
▶ 2:43:00Yeah, thank you for doing that. I hope we can formalize it with this legislation and frankly I thank you for the uh efforts of the state department to align with a very thoughtful national security strategy and uh kudos on your efforts. I yield back.
▶ 2:43:16And now repres uh uh recognize the representative from Washington, Miss
▶ 2:43:20Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you for being here. Uh your appearance is timely. I think we're at a moment when the risks of nuclear conflict feel closer than it has in decades. Um, and instead of moving in the direction of nuclear disarmament and arms control, we've continued to spend billions to modernize our nuclear stockpiles and have allowed key disarmament tactics to lapse. Nuclear weapons are not an abstract tool of deterrence. They are actually instruments of catastrophic indiscriminate harm.
▶ 2:43:50Their use would devastate civilian populations, wreak havoc on our environment, and risk escalation beyond our control. As we saw during the Cold War, the temperature for nuclear war is only rising as President Trump is launching the US into an illegal and unconstitutional war of choice with Iran. Mr.
▶ 2:44:08Dano, after the June 2025 strikes on Iran during Operation Midnight Hammer, is it your understanding that the United States obliterated Iran's nuclear enrichment thanks for the question. The uh policy of the United States um is laid out 14 months ago uh vis Iran is to deny Iran a nuclear weapon.
▶ 2:44:35Did we obliterate I'm asking for the results of those strikes. Did we obliterate this is directly under your
▶ 2:44:41I there's been my job here today is not as an as an intelligence official to give the
▶ 2:44:46I'm not asking about intelligence. I'm asking if we No, I'm asking if it's your assessment. I don't I would not assess that, ma'am. That's
▶ 2:44:55Well, let me let me say President Trump said in June following the strikes, quote, "Obliterated is an accurate
▶ 2:45:01And in her sworn testimony, Director of National Intelligence Tulsi Gabbard stated that quote, "There have been no efforts since then to try and rebuild their enrichment capability." So, I'm asking you, do you agree or disagree with those statements of the president and the director of national
▶ 2:45:16Yeah, again, I'm I'm not here as an intelligence official. I I'm a policy official that oversees five US based on the policy you have to develop, you must understand what the intelligence is. But let me ask you if it is it your understanding that Iran would have developed a nuclear weapon within two weeks if Trump hadn't conducted additional strikes in operation epic
▶ 2:45:39So intelligence is designed to inform policy makers and the policy maker here is the president of the United States. He laid out a policy framework.
▶ 2:45:48But you oversee, don't you oversee these things? I oversee the the non-prololiferation bureau and I'm happy to talk about how the
▶ 2:45:55but I'm asking you about nuclear arms in these countries.
▶ 2:45:58Yes, ma'am. But not a non again the programs that I oversee. Um I I think the question that you're asking would probably be better provided to our INR our bureau.
▶ 2:46:07Well, actually we we had those folks in here and they they said the same thing. Apparently nobody seems to understand that there is actual information that has to be looked at. It's not a judgment that somebody makes without the information. And the job of you all in your departments is to make these assessments to then provide. And it seems like nobody wants to answer the
▶ 2:46:29That's what that's what intelligence officials do. Ma'am, I'm not an intelligence official.
▶ 2:46:33But you're overseeing
▶ 2:46:34I oversee programs based on intellig I look at intelligence that would in
▶ 2:46:38So I'm asking you for your assessment based on the intelligence for the programs that you're
▶ 2:46:42that would inform the the broad range of security assistance programs. How we target security assistance as I mentioned earlier. how we would target a a a WM uh non-proliferation risk. Um again, we have extensive sanctions that our non-prololiferation bureau has been active in implementing the president's policy, but the specific question that you're driving at the intelligence assessment based on the
▶ 2:47:06No, I was asking you whether it was your
▶ 2:47:09I can't give you it's my my job. I'm a policy official. I look I I think the American people are going to watch these hearings and they're going to feel like you along with everybody else is obfuscating on the actual information.
▶ 2:47:21My job is to
▶ 2:47:22it's I'm going to take my time back. It it you're obiscating on the actual information that the American people want to know. We are the representatives of the American people and they are asking these questions. We are asking you these questions. And I want to remind people that the only reason that Iran was able to enrich uranium to such levels in the first place is because President Trump pulled out of the JCPOA. That was the Iran nuclear deal in his first term. And now we're seeing the same thing happened with Russia.
▶ 2:47:52Trump has allowed the New START treaty with Russia to expire without even attempting Noa to negotiate a successor agreement. But let me ask you this. When was the last time there was no treaty bound cap on let me ask you when was the last time there was no treatybound cap on strategic nuclear weapons between the United States and Russia? So, as you know, the treaty expired. We had no ability to legally extend the treaty. At
▶ 2:48:17you know the answer to when when there was the last
▶ 2:48:19Let me finish. At the same time that the treaty expired, we had no legal tool to extend it. We had a 10-year treaty. The Biden administration exercised one five-year option that was available. President Trump at the expiration of that treaty called for a new one to seek a new treaty. That's exactly what we're trying to Do you know when the last time was that the that the treaty bound cap on strategic nuclear weapons?
▶ 2:48:45I'm sure you're gonna tell me.
▶ 2:48:46I am. 1972.
▶ 2:48:48Thank you.
▶ 2:48:49Um I I wish we could get more answers. My time's expired. But I thank you for being here. I just wish that people would come here and actually answer the questions we have because I think the American people deserve to know why we are in this senseless, unauthorized war of choice that the Trump administration has dragged us into. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back. I now recognize the representative from Indiana, Mr.
▶ 2:49:13Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and uh thank you, Under Secretary Dano, for being here. We appreciate it. Uh you know, I frequently get asked back in the district uh why diplomacy matters, why there's such a focus in DC on the national security. The bureaus under leadership under your leadership are a prime example of how diplomacy and state department programs directly translate to safer communities back in Indiana.
▶ 2:49:43You and the staff under your leadership are the diplom diplomatic front line between the US and the Iran having a nuke. So between the US and Chinese developed technology or surveillance capabilities and also narot terrorists smuggling fentanyl and cocaine in the United States. In your testimony you spoke about implementing American civil nuclear in allied nations and the importance of 123 agreements a mechanism to build these relationships.
▶ 2:50:14And there is another civil nuclear energy program called the foundational infrastructure for responsible use of small modular reactor technology program or first for acronym. The first program uh supports the deployment of American small modular reactors in developing regions and that's to uphold the American standards. So what threats are posed by China and other adversaries? This is my question.
▶ 2:50:44What threats are posed by China and other adversaries being allowed to implement nuclear energy in developing countries without guard rails or with proper oversight?
▶ 2:50:55That's the question.
▶ 2:50:56Thanks for the question, sir. Uh uh look, the first program is important. Uh the SMR deployments are important as well as sort of the uh you know the the one two three targets that we've set are very ambitious. uh um I think specifically uh the first program the challenge and I I think this gets to your question uh uh would make the United States the partner of choice um uh obviously it's a much lower proliferation risk if it's a US provider a US overseen
▶ 2:51:27uh non-prololiferation agreement 123 agreement to your point uh so the the the the benefits go up and the risks go down uh if we can uh bring that program in for a landing there's a lot of challenges uh we need a technology we can actually deploy there's a tremendous amount of front-end work to be done uh with partner and allied nations uh I was just in Paris a few weeks ago uh an international conference uh extensive engagement
▶ 2:51:58diplomacy uh I I think hopefully your folks back home uh would realize that we're trying to advance American industry and interests uh by making sure that the United States is the partner of choice, not the Russians or the Chinese.
▶ 2:52:13Well, thank you for that and the folks back home appreciate those kinds of input. Uh, you know, I'm going to switch to another area. um and it's it's one that's really perpetrated by the Chinese Communist Party and that's in the export and the trafficking of precursor chemicals from China uh to both Central and South America for manufacturing fentanyl and the synthetic drugs.
▶ 2:52:37So my question is what progress has the department made towards stopping China's manufacturing and export of precursor chemicals for fentanyl production?
▶ 2:52:48Um thanks for the question sir. I think uh I think the best example of progress uh is I think just overnight the last couple days uh the FBI announced uh u arrests against uh cartel de Gulfo u designated terrorists that were attempting to bring enough fentinel into the United States to kill 70 million people.
▶ 2:53:13So, uh, I could tell you about the executive order we implemented, which is, you know, sort of Washington speak, but most importantly, that's the result, right? A war against the cartels to stop fentinel from poisoning American cities and killing American kids.
▶ 2:53:30Well, I certainly agree with that. The number of people and number of young Americans that have been killed with this pentanol is unbelievable. So, appreciate your work in that regard. With that, I yield back, Mr. Representative McBride.
▶ 2:53:44Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Uh, thank you, Mr. Under Secretary, for joining us As I see it, the administration is trying to tell our allies with our foreign policy, defend yourselves and increasingly do so on your own. And what the administration is trying to tell our adversaries is if you pursue a nuclear weapon, you do so at your peril. I I get that. But that is not happening in a vacuum.
▶ 2:54:13This administration is clearly seeking to usher in a new global order. When the administration degrades international norms and rules and collective defense alliances, that has fostered the longest period of peace between great powers in at least modern history.
▶ 2:54:30And when the president thrusts our world into a new might makes right global order, when all of that is happening, I fear that it might actually be the perfect recipe for nuclear When you look at the world over the last few decades, a clear pattern has emerged. Countries that give up their weapons, take for example Ukraine, or never develop them, like Taiwan, have found themselves vulnerable to the world's nuclear powers, whether that's Russia or China.
▶ 2:54:58And you when you look at our own foreign policy, the only country within the axis of evil outlined by President Bush after 911 that we've not initiated military action against is the only one with nuclear weapons, that's North Korea. In fact, the United States has never conducted direct strikes on a country with nuclear weapons.
▶ 2:55:18And I fear that as countries think of how best to protect themselves in this new might makes right global order, the conclusion that they will draw is not only yes, they should invest in conventional and asymmetrical capabilities, but that they will decide that the ultimate insurance policy against aggression is a nuclear weapon of their own. And that raises for me a serious concern.
▶ 2:55:42What happens if countries aren't deterred, but instead feel pushed to pursue nuclear weapons, perhaps even secretly outside the international oversight regime that we've created? What's our strategy then? Are we compared to confront are we prepared to confront every country that goes down that path? Or are we heading toward a world with more nuclear states and less transparency? President Mcronone said it plainly this month.
▶ 2:56:08He said, quote, "The next half century will be an age of nuclear weapons." I don't want him to be right, but we have to be cleareyed about whether our current approach is reinforcing that vision, even if unintentionally. So, Mr. Under Secretary, if we are inadvertently incentivizing proliferation rather than intimidating countries away from it, what is the administration's plan? What is your plan to grapple with that kind of world? Uh, thank you for the question, Representative.
▶ 2:56:38I'm not sure I agree with the premise of your question that we are driving uh, allies away. Um, as you as you were asking your question, I was just making a list of the NATO allies that I've been engaged with over the last just few weeks. I just got back from the UK and France where we had an extensive nuclear dialogue with the French. We had a full day, let me finish if I might, on precisely on what you're talking about, what the what the French announcement was and how we would integrate with NATO.
▶ 2:57:05The most powerful tool we have for non-prololiferation is UX US extended deterrence commitments. The president has been crystal clear. U that's part of my job. And again, the list of countries here, I I'll spare you the list.
▶ 2:57:18Sure. that that's just I I agree that NATO continues hopefully undegraded. Um and I agree that there are actually opportunities for Europe to increase their investment in their own capabilities, perhaps even nuclear. My concern is adversaries receiving the wrong message from us that the only way to protect themselves from us is to pursue a nuclear weapon. I know we're in Iran right now hoping to intimidate other countries into not pursuing nuclear weapons.
▶ 2:57:47But if you look at the trend of countries that we have gone after or that other nuclear powers have gone after, it's non-uclear states and in a might make right global order. If countries are concerned that in international rules and top territorial integrity no longer matters and that the only way to protect yourself is absolute strength and the epitome of absolute strength is a nuclear weapon. Your job then will have to be to grapple with that downstream consequence even if the administration's policy. But
▶ 2:58:17let me ask let me ask your concern. I think it's a legitimate one.
▶ 2:58:20Uh number one I mentioned earlier in the hearing. I think we have to modernize our non-proliferation approach. Uh the not the nuclear suppliers group again they do a lot of good work that was organized in 1974. Um uh the NPT review conference is next week. I think the NPT needs to modernize and understand that there are limits to what treaties and non-prololiferation programs can do.
▶ 2:58:44We need to make them more effective uh to prevent precisely the type of proliferation I think you're getting at whe uh whether it's sort of you know friendly which again I I I don't I already talked about in this notion of adversary pursuing weapons. We have to strengthen our our regimes and modernize them. Well, I'm out of of time and I'm concerned that the rest of the administration's foreign policy undermines that goal. I'll yield back.
▶ 2:59:09Representative McBride, you brought up some points that I want to continue on a little bit. Not exactly in the same way that you did, but as you can imagine, but you phrased it in a way that I think is very important. And you said adversaries receiving the wrong message. I'm on my own time now. I'm not adversaries receiving the the wrong message. and you know allies being told defend yourself and do so on your own. Those are important statements I think for people to understand.
▶ 2:59:36And so I want to bring up something that I don't think's been really brought up yet and and that is the emergency foreign military sales notifications that have come through. And before I ask you a question that I want to say, you know, I get to have these meetings day in day out, week in week out, uh, with the leaders of every country.
▶ 2:59:58And what every country very literally without pinpointing them precisely and and who I spoke with, every one of them at the highest level is realizing is absolutely how much of an imminent threat Iran was to them where they were told in the last week, the last month, the last year, the last 10 years by Iran very specifically, "No, we would never target you. No, we would never target your civilian infrastructure.
▶ 3:00:26No, we would never target your oil and gas facilities. No, we would never under any circumstances target your ships. No, we would never do any of these things. Told over and over again in the last some of them in the last week, some of them in the last month, the last year, and so on. And all of them realizing that they have been long-term pre-calculated targets of Iranian aggression. and and that is what every one of them across the board is realizing.
▶ 3:00:57And so as we go to those emergency uh the emergency authority to which you've used to notify Congress about these sales, what are those sales accomplishing for our allies? What what is it that they're doing for them? Why do they need those that weaponry? What is it doing?
▶ 3:01:13Uh thank thanks for the question, Mr. Chairman. Uh number one, I think it's important to to point out, excuse me, um uh during my confirmation process, I was clear um and recognize the role of of of Congress uh and respect the the role um whether it be tier review and notifications. So we are not reestablishing a norm. Number two, um it's clearly an emergency.
▶ 3:01:39Um, I don't think uh there could be a clearer emergency uh to uh prioritize uh capabilities to our partners and allies that are under the exact pressure and uh and threats and attacks that we're seeing today in Iran. And and I think to the to the to the last point of your question, there's there's a combination of things. One, what capabilities become available immediately? Number two, how can we expedite contracting and begin the important process, sometimes a long process?
▶ 3:02:09And number three, there are long leadtime capabilities that uh that we need to start the process down the road. Do you know who in this room has to sign off on foreign military sales? Go ahead, sir. Myself and the ranking member. We have to sign off on all foreign military sales.
▶ 3:02:32For the last year, my ranking member has been withholding these sales to UAE and Israel. Billions and billions of dollars of sales. So, uh, one side of the mouth saying, "Oh, we need to do all these things to support our allies." and at the exact same time literally being one of the four corners holding up all of these sales to Israel and UAE and and other countries.
▶ 3:03:02That is why these emergency notifications took place because these were being held up very directly by the person that sits directly to my left. That is an example of sending the wrong message to our adversaries and sending the wrong message to our allies as well in the midst of conflict in the midst of protecting Americans in the region or allies in the region.
▶ 3:03:28And it's unconscionable to me that that is what's taking place and what has taken place. And that's why I suspect there will be in the future continued emergency notifications. I wouldn't be surprised if there's another emergency notification that takes place in the future because my colleague has been unwilling to support our great allies in the region, Israel and and others and and that is a very serious issue. Uh so I thank you for your time today. I think we're going to go to Representative Titus next.
▶ 3:03:59Dena,
▶ 3:04:00thank you, Mr. Chair.
▶ 3:04:01Floor is yours.
▶ 3:04:02I very much appreciate that, Mr. Secretary. Um, I represent Nevada, so I want to ask you some kind of questions that relate to Nevada, but have consequences far beyond our state boundaries. Would you say that the US has the capacity to ensure the security and effectiveness of our nuclear weapons systems without having to do subcritical my role at the state department wouldn't be able to I'd have to defer
▶ 3:04:32the department of energy on the technical abilities of of what happens at uh Nevada test site. My role in testing issue is to conduct the international diplomacy to ensure that our adversaries uh do not uh that meet their international obligations regarding testing limitations.
▶ 3:04:51So you don't know if it's effective or not. Is that what you're saying? We don't know. We don't know if that's working or not.
▶ 3:04:57You'd have to ask the uh the energy department on the technical piece.
▶ 3:05:02Well, you said let's go do a little history and look at something that you said in your role that you apparently maybe do know something about. on February the 6th, the day after New Start expired, you gave a speech to the conference on disarmament in Geneva, and you unveiled new specifics about US concerns over China's nuclear testing.
▶ 3:05:25And uh indeed, you know, if we do nuclear testing, we can start another arms race like we had during the Cold War. But uh and it if they are continuing to test these nuclear weapons, you said it's critical that the administration engage immediately to constrain these activities. Now, apparently the president didn't take your advice because he didn't talk about constraining.
▶ 3:05:52He foolishly promised to resume nuclear testing on an equal basis and that does put us on that collision course. I don't know how you in your role of doing diplomatic relations are dealing with that contradiction, but it'd be curious to hear about it.
▶ 3:06:10Now, if we start nuclear testing again, uh critical testing, not the subcritical testing that they're doing at the test site at this point underground and uh algorithms and methods and not actually blowing up the bombs like they did over 900 times in the desert uh outside Las Vegas, then you're not only going to start an arms race again like the Cold War, but you're going going to put people
▶ 3:06:40in Nevada in danger. You exposure to radiation. You got plutonium in the drinking water. You've got downwinders who are exposed. We don't want to go back to that. In fact, in the study, 73% of Neadans say they're opposed to explosive nuclear weapons testing of any kind. Now, President Trump must think testing is going to make us safer, but in reality, it's going to put the whole world in jeopardy. What's your role in all of this?
▶ 3:07:08Since you are trying to deal with the diplomacy side and you want to constrain the activities of China, I don't know what you're doing about Russia and it's contradictory to what the president's saying and doing.
▶ 3:07:23Uh thanks for the question. I think there was one in there.
▶ 3:07:27I'm sure there was. If you were listening, maybe you could find it. Uh number one, let me address uh I have been in no discussions that uh entertained uh the notion of atmospheric testing which I I think that's what you were referring to. So I've been in no discussions about that capability. The president was very specific and talked about uh testing on an equal basis.
▶ 3:07:55uh there have been no decisions made u and that what that would look like uh if the president decides to pursue that would be appropriately uh answered by the energy department. My role to your point at the conference on disarmament was to point out that both the Russians and the Chinese are in violation of their international obligations uh in uh against uh testing at yield or low low yield testing.
▶ 3:08:23Um so as you know in 19 they do not adhere to their international obligations. My role at the conference of disarmament was to make new information available that we received from the intelligence community that was an extremely closely held information that wasn't just downgraded but was declassified so that we could share it with the world that this is not a regime that is doing what they say they're going to do and they're not meeting their obligations.
▶ 3:08:51That's my role here and that's why I went to the conference on disarmament. The
▶ 3:08:55So, in other words, the right hand doesn't know what the left hand's doing when it comes to nuclear weapons
▶ 3:09:00I'm not sure what you're getting at. I don't understand.
▶ 3:09:02I'm getting very clearly you you're doing something. The president's doing something else. Department of Energy is doing something else. Test site's doing something else. You're not in the meetings. You're not aware of Representative Fine is recognized.
▶ 3:09:13I appreciate
▶ 3:09:14the left hand and right hand.
▶ 3:09:15Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Um,
▶ 3:09:18the Arms Export Control Act allows the president and the State Department to sidestep Congress uh during a crisis. Congress can review all arms sales, but the president can directly conduct them during a crisis. Um, just about a week ago, um, I read an article that I want to share with you about an arms sale to the United Arab Emirates, Kuwait, and Jordan encompass 11 arms orders. and and apparently it was held up here because people had had some issues when the chairman was asked for comment.
▶ 3:09:48I'm just going to read the article. Um uh he said that the ranking member was holding up the sales um because of need of weapons to Israel as well as some of our Arab partners in the region. Um when comment when asked for comment by the media, the ranking member said quote he supported quote our partners' ability to defend themselves but added quote that support does not give this administration a blank check to ignore the law or congress. I I would agree no one should ignore the law or congress.
▶ 3:10:17So I wanted to ask your perspective in the past and whether this has been a concern to Democrats in the past. In 2022, the Biden administration authorized billions of in arms sales to Ukraine to counter the Russian invasion. They leveraged the Arms Export Control Act and they bypassed standard congressional reviews to expedite deliveries. They declared it a crisis.
▶ 3:10:40Um are you aware of at the time of efforts by Democrats to talk about Biden breaking the law ex you know calling a crisis not a crisis in order to do that or is or did that for whatever reason not happen in that
▶ 3:10:54Uh sir I wasn't in the government at that time.
▶ 3:10:57Do you remember I mean do you know I because what I'm trying to get at is is this sort of a newfound concern or is this s is consistency because inconsistency bothers me greatly. So, are you in your records as you've taken over, have you seen any concerns we don't want Joe Biden to quote unquote uh ignore the law or Congress? Was there any of that at the time that you're aware of?
▶ 3:11:18I understand the prior administration used the authorities in the arms control
▶ 3:11:22Okay. Um in in late 2023, the Biden administration authorized emergency arm sales to Israel. They bypassed Congress twice to transfer over $250 million in tank and artillery ammunition during the Gaza conflict. One was $147.5 million in fuses, chargers, and primers. Another included $155 million in artillery shells.
▶ 3:11:46Were you are you aware again as you've taken over from the prior administration of of of Democrats having concerns about the administration having a quote unquote blank check or ignoring the law or Congress? I'm aware of what you're referring to.
▶ 3:12:01Okay. So, you know what? It seems to me um that those situations were considered emergencies and these situations are considered emergencies as well. Obviously, the conflict in the Middle East is heating up. Iran is intentionally targeting civilian infrastructure in Israel and the Gulf States. They're all our allies and partners. Do you consider the current conflict that we're in a crisis?
▶ 3:12:23Yes, sir.
▶ 3:12:24Okay. So since it's a crisis, the State Department under this administration has the authority to bypass Congress and expedite shipments of weapons to our allies and partners just as Joe Biden did in Ukraine as well as Israel in 2022 and 2023. Is that your understanding as
▶ 3:12:41Uh yes sir. I also think it's important uh as I mentioned a little bit earlier that we're not trying to establish a new norm here and uh respect uh the role of Congress in this process.
▶ 3:12:51Yeah. So, you know, my concern in a lot of this is is hypocrisy. That if it's okay when one administration does it um but then all of a sudden we lose our minds when another administration does it. Is the concern actually legitimate and straightforward or is the issue um um others? I think you all are doing a great job. I just want to be clear. I appreciate that Secretary Rubio making the department leaner and more efficient to meet today's challenges because the challenges of today are complicated.
▶ 3:13:21We've got we've had terrorism, drone warfare, proxy warfare, AI, things that probably the State Department couldn't have considered um 10 or 15 years ago. And so I just want to say I think those were emergencies. I think this is an emergency and I would hope that everyone can be consistent moving forward in how we look at all of these situations. With that, Mr. Chairman, I yield back. Very good. I thank the under secretary for his valuable testimony and members for their questions. Members of the committee may have some additional questions for the under secretary.
▶ 3:13:51We will ask you to respond to these in
▶ 3:13:55I'm sorry. I would like to Can I take this five minutes as I said too late?
▶ 3:14:00Are you requesting to
▶ 3:14:02I would like to use have my time and yield to the my ranking member.
▶ 3:14:05Very good. Uh you didn't you were not already recognized.
▶ 3:14:10Very good. doing.
▶ 3:14:11Thank you. I'd like to yield to uh ranking member Meeks.
▶ 3:14:15Yeah. I just want to record to be clear. I'm holding in my hand right now, Mr. Fine, uh a article in Politico where it says when Biden was the president that says the headline is a disservice to the American public, Democrats rip Biden over weapon sales.
▶ 3:14:37And it says, "Representative Gregory Meeks, the ranking member of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, said emergency sales like the one the administration approved for Israel should go through Congress. I have been absolute on that. It should go through Congress.
▶ 3:14:57the power of Congress and what our Constitution gives us, whether it's a Democratic president or a Republican president, it's about the authority that we have as members of Congress. And I also just want to say because I know that the chairman uh just had something to say about me. I know he's infatuated, you know, I think about me. He wants to make this about me, but I just want to make sure that the public knows because, you know, the chairman is the chairman and I respect that because that's what this is. So this is not personal for me.
▶ 3:15:26not personal at all about me. This is about the American people and I have to explain to my constituents and I think we all as members of this committee will have to explain to our party what this is about. It's explaining to them why gas prices has gone up over a dollar in the last month. It's to explain to the American people why uh the negotiations failed. It's explain to the American people why 13 Americans have died.
▶ 3:15:55is to explain to the American people why the $200 billion dollars that the president's asking for, why are we going to spend it? So, this is about the American people. And my passion is not personal. My passion, anybody that knows me is not about it's about my passion for the American people and transparency so that they have the right to know whether it's a Republican administration, whether it's a Democratic administration, this and us and this institution which was given article one authority in the constitution
▶ 3:16:26how important it is. We should give no president a check and a balance. That's what Russia is all about. That's what Putin has the opportunity to do. Not here. This is not a a a a parliament. This is a Congress. It was set up for Congress to be an oversight, a separate but equal branch of government.
▶ 3:16:47And we should have our opinion and government and the and the president and the executive session should come to us and two individuals who've been all involved in all of this really have not been cleared by the Senate or anyone. That's why I want to subpoena them.
▶ 3:17:02Steve Wickoff and Jared Kushner, they're doing all the negotiations, whether it's Russia, whether it's Venezuela, whether it's uh Iran, whether it's no matter where it So, they should come to Congress and tell us what's going on. And that's what this is about. It's about the transparency. It's about American people. It's about them having the information. It's about how we spending their taxpayer dollars. That's what this is about. And I'm passionate about that. This is I took her off of office.
▶ 3:17:32I swore that I would do uphold my duties and my responsibilities and when I become chair again, I don't care whether it is a Democrat or Republican, you dag on believe the administration will be here in a public hearing or they will be subpoenaed. Now, I assume that they're going to go to they're not going to do anything today. They're going to try to table it or something of that nature. But when I become chair, Democrat, Republican, they're going to come in this committee. We're gonna have an open hearing and the American people will get transparency.
▶ 3:18:06Thank you. I have nothing more to say because you said it all.
▶ 3:18:10Thank you.
▶ 3:18:11I think this is something we've all been asking for. In fact, I was sitting here talking with my colleague about the exact same thing I was hearing from you. I I think we all on this side, I think the American people feel your frustration. ranking member. People just want answers. People want to know why the gas is too high.
▶ 3:18:35People want to know why this administration doesn't seem to care about rising costs and yet is sending our men and women into a war that hasn't been authorized. And we want to know why we're not getting answers out of this committee. We should be meeting robustly every single week and every single member of this administration under over which we have jurisdiction should want to be here answering our questions.
▶ 3:19:05You should want more time than we have to give to answer our questions because our questions are the questions that the American people are asking and the American people deserve answers. And with that, I yield back.
▶ 3:19:20Gentle lady's time is expired. Thank you everybody for your testimonies. I appreciate it. Thank you to the witness for your testimony. I would simply say there is a reason that the exemption exists for the administration and that's so political activists can't hold up weapon sales in emergency situations. I take all of those things very personally. I think maybe that's the difference as somebody that's put their life on the line for this country. All those things that my ranking member said he doesn't take personally, I take them extremely personally.
▶ 3:19:52Anytime Americans are put in danger, I take it personally and especially personally when it's because an American is not getting the weapons needed into the hands of our allies or our fellow Americans. In that, I thank the under secretary for his valuable testimony and members for their questions. The members of the committee may have some additional questions for the under secretary and we will ask you to respond to these in writing. Under secretary Dano, thank you for appearing today. You can now leave so that the committee can conduct further business.
▶ 3:20:21The committee will stand in recess for a couple of moments while everybody gets their uh voting remotes and then we will reconvene. Committee stands in recess.
▶ 3:24:08Committee will now take up motion offered by ranking member Meeks. Is there any discussion on the motion? Representative is recognized.
▶ 3:24:20Mr. Chairman,
▶ 3:24:21I'm making this motion to subpoena because I believe we need to hear from key administration officials in a public setting on the Iran war. Now, I appreciate you've scheduled this hearing on arms control and other issues within the T family, but it is deeply concerning that this committee has still not held a public hearing on the war in Iran with administration witnesses.
▶ 3:24:45The administration has offered shifting and at times conflicting justifications for this war, ranging from nuclear concerns to missile threats to broader strategic aims. Yet none of these explanations has clearly established an imminent threat, nor demonstrated that serious, sustained diplomatic options were fully pursued.
▶ 3:25:09This war carries profound consequences for the safety of the American people, for the stability in the Middle East, and for global energy markets that directly impact families here at home.
▶ 3:25:22Congress has both a constitutional obligation and a national security imperative to understand how this conflict began, what diplomatic efforts were undertaken, and what alternatives were considered, and what planning preceded the use of force. Yet, despite these requests, this committee has not held a public hearing with key administration witnesses like Mr. Wickoff, Mr.
▶ 3:25:51Kersner as well as the Secretary of State. Oversight during a time of war is not partisan. It is And Steve Wickoff briefed the Senate just last week. He's done several media interviews as well.
▶ 3:26:12And so the administration answering Congress fulfills its role on in our system of checks and balances. If the administration is confident in its decisions, it should welcome the opportunity to explain them to Congress and most importantly in the open to the American people.
▶ 3:26:38I have repeat repeatedly requested that the administration make Steve Witco available dating back to February of 2025 and I've raised this directly with you Mr. Chairman including as late as last week's hearing. We are now in a war with American lives lost and the prospect of significant additional resources of $200 billion dollars being requested from Congress.
▶ 3:27:06At a minimum, this committee and the American people deserves answers and they need hear from the individuals who have been involved in negotiating and making decisions on this conflict. And so for these reasons, I encourage all of my colleagues to support my motion to subpoena the witnesses, Mr. Kersner, Mr. Whit, and Mr.
▶ 3:27:32Rubio, to appear before the House Foreign Affairs Committee and an open hearing transparently for the American people to know why gas prices have gone up $1 in less than 30 days.
▶ 3:27:49why uh that um the negotiations uh failed, why and what the plan is uh to get uh to end this war or when it it does, and why should we appropriate $200 billion uh to further this war. So, for these reasons, uh I think that we should subpoena these witnesses and I yield
▶ 3:28:13Gentleman yields back.
▶ 3:28:15Mr. Chairman,
▶ 3:28:16gentleman is recognized. Uh, I move that the committee order the previous
▶ 3:28:21The question now occurs on the motion to order the previous question offered by Representative McCll. All those I recommend an I vote. All those in favor signify by saying I. I.
▶ 3:28:32All those opposed signify by saying no.
▶ 3:28:35The chair, the eyes have it.
▶ 3:28:36Ask for a roll call vote.
▶ 3:28:38Roll call vote has been requested. Members will record their vote utilizing the electronic voting system.
▶ 3:28:56On the previous question,
▶ 3:28:59everybody hold the appropriate vote is not up yet. On the previous question.
▶ 3:29:08on the previous question. He agrees with me. Mr. Rogers agrees with me.
▶ 3:29:39He wants more questions, too.
▶ 3:29:41I didn't get to see this.
▶ 3:29:49I'm sorry. Your time is expired. Question occurs on the previous question. Utilize the electronic voting There will be one more vote.
▶ 3:30:23Have all members voted? Does any member wish to change their vote? Clerk will close the vote and report the On this vote, the A's are 24, the NOS are 22. Previous questions ordered.
▶ 3:30:53Question now occurs on the motion offered by ranking member Meeks.
▶ 3:30:57I recommend a no vote. Members will record their vote utilizing the electronic voting system. Have all members voted? Does any member wish to change their vote? Clerk will close the vote and report the tally.
▶ 3:31:29On this vote, the yays are 22, the nos are 24.
▶ 3:31:32The motion is not agreed to. All right.
▶ 3:32:05opening arms.
▶ 3:32:19Committee stands adjourned.