▶ 0:20:27Chair Risch: Committee of the united states senate will come to order. Welcome, everyone. We have a good hearing this morning on a very important issue, some great would assist to testify. We will have a spirited discussion on this. To those of you have joined us this morning, thank you so much. This is an open hearing. Always glad to have you come and watch the proceedings but not participate.
▶ 0:20:55Chair Risch: We have zero tolerance of any attempts to contact or influence anybody at the dais or the witnesses. And the usual rules will apply. You will be immediately arrested and banned from the committee for a year. So hopefully we will not have to do that. It is only been on rare occasion that we have and that is a good thing. With that, we are want to talk about arms-control and I want to thank our witnesses, Mr.
▶ 0:21:20Chair Risch: Billingslea and miss gottemoeller to be here to discuss what could be defined as one of the most existential issues of our time. Both of you have been doing this for a long time and advised us on both sides of the dais of this issue. America is currently experiencing an unprecedented increase in nuclear threat posed by our adversaries around the world.
▶ 0:21:42Chair Risch: For the first time in our history we face two nuclear powers in russia and china but also threats from multiple smaller, unstable nuclear powers north korea and aspiring nuclear powers like iran. What has suspended its new obligations, it continues to develop weapons.
▶ 0:22:04Chair Risch: Russia's nuclear triad in nuclear capable strategic bombers is nailing -- nearing full modernization. Russia has failed to comply with nuclear agreements and instead uses arms-control to constrain U.S. policy towards russia and pursue concessions on issues beyond just nuclear weapons.
▶ 0:22:28Chair Risch: It used the strategy successfully on president obama with new start, on biden in the strategic stability dialogue in the lead up to russia's invasion of ukraine. Russia tried and failed to pull the same tricks on the trump administration. We can be sure the russians will try again, endangering the safety of the american people and further eroding global stability. Meanwhile, china's and the midst of a dramatic nuclear buildup and has the fastest growing nuclear arsenal of any nuclear state.
▶ 0:22:58Chair Risch: While china races to nuclear parity with the U.S., it shows little to no interest in arms-control talks. As troubling as these developments are, we cannot take our eye off rogue states with nuclear ambitions. President trump took action to destroy iranian nuclear facilities earlier this year.
▶ 0:23:20Chair Risch: By doing so, he prevented a dangerous, ideologically driven islamic autocracy from acquiring a nuclear weapon that could threaten the U.S., israel, and others around the world but the iranian regime will not stop there. Like his neighbor in china, kim jong-un has rejected talks on denuclearization even as he pursues full-scale expansion of north korea nuclear strike capabilities.
▶ 0:23:49Chair Risch: In return for north korea's direct support for russia's war in ukraine, russia likely providing technical expertise on advanced keep abilities that will boost north korea's nuclear ambitions. To quote the congressional commission on the strategic posture of the united states on which both are witnesses have served, we are in a decisive decade in regards to our nuclear future. Let's be clear.
▶ 0:24:19Chair Risch: He cold war nuclear arms control paradigm is dead. Our adversaries have ensured this outcome. This decade, we will have no choice but to confront the reality that the old arms-control architecture is gone. It allows russia and china to exploit our goodwill. As president trump has said many times, our goal is peace through strength. Under the biden administration, the U.S.
▶ 0:24:44Chair Risch: Extended existing nuclear agreements like new start without attempting to improve them or even enforce them, only to have russia suspend its commitments after invading ukraine. With new start expiring in february, we must seize this opportunity to lead on any new arms-control negotiations with russia. It is time to move beyond blind faith in putin and take the reins on our nuclear future. To counter china, we must modernize and rebuild our nuclear arsenal.
▶ 0:25:14Chair Risch: For too long, underinvestment in our nuclear triad has only created greater insecurity. It is time we modernize the triad and reestablish strong, credible deterrence. Mr. billingslea, Ms. gottemoeller, I look forward to your thoughts on how we can take on this decisive decade and shape it to protect the future generations of the nuclear aggression from competitors.
▶ 0:25:45Chair Risch: With that, I will refer to the distinguished ranking members.
▶ 0:25:50Sen. Shaheen: Thank you, Mr. chairman, and welcome to both of our witnesses. This hearing comes at a moment when nuclear risks are rising on several fronts. Russia is modernizing its arsenal with unconventional delivery vehicles. China is seeking to triple warheads over the next 10 years. North korea and iran continue to present a dangerous threat and these challenges are converging at the new start treaty, the last legal restriction on russian nuclear weapons, is about to expire.
▶ 0:26:21Sen. Shaheen: Across both parties, there are leaders who recognize the gravity of this moment. That includes president trump, who has a long track record of concern about nuclear war. Despite his recent comments, he called nuclear war the ultimate catastrophe as far back as 1990. This year, president trump said, there is no reason for us to be building new nuclear weapons. We already have so many.
▶ 0:26:49Sen. Shaheen: The real question is how do we reduce the nuclear threat without handing strategic advantage to russia or china? Restarting nuclear testing is not the answer. Simply building more weapons will only trigger another arms race. Even the most expensive missile-defense would fail to stop everywhere had and destabilize the nuclear balance. The only option with a tracker -- track record of success in reducing the risk has been arms-control.
▶ 0:27:18Sen. Shaheen: We faced more than 40,000 russian nuclear weapons at the height of the cold war. Today, the number has fallen to less than 2000 deployed strategic warheads. There's reductions were not charity. They were hard-nosed, strategic wins for the united states. Limiting adversary capabilities and increasing our visibility into their programs are they were achieved with leaders who, like putin today, could not be trusted. That is why verification matters.
▶ 0:27:48Sen. Shaheen: Arms-control is not based on trust but on inspection that protects american interests. We would all sleep better if we were conducting the most advanced, intrusive inspections modern technology allows now on russian and chinese and iranian weapons programs. So I hope we will hear you both discuss how we can modernize those inspections and update our own nuclear forces through the challenges ahead.
▶ 0:28:14Sen. Shaheen: Today's nuclear environment includes ai enabled systems and cyber threat technologies that shrink decision time and magnify the risk of miscalculation. None of this matters of america's commitment are not believed ukraine is the clearest example of that. Some of us are member the budapest memorandum when ukraine agreed to give up its nuclear arsenal in return for security guarantees.
▶ 0:28:43Sen. Shaheen: If we allow russia to swallow sovereign ukrainian territory, other nations will draw the obvious conclusion. They need nuclear weapons to be safe. That is a deterrence failure that we cannot afford. That is why we must continue pressing for bilateral nuclear limits, where doing so strengthens U.S. security even in this period of heightened tension. This requires consistent attention and disciplined leadership.
▶ 0:29:13Sen. Shaheen: I look forward to hearing from both of you your views on how we meet this challenge and what steps congress should think about. Thank you.
▶ 0:29:22Chair Risch: We will hear first from Mr. marshall billingslea, a senior fellow at the harsh -- marshall institute -- hudson institute who served as envoy for arms-control. He led arms-control negotiations on behalf of the U.S. government, work with allies and partners in europe and asia on develop and and deployment of defensive capabilities.
▶ 0:29:46Mr. Billingslea: Chairman risch, ranking member shaheen, it is great to be back in this committee room where I got my start in washington in the 1990's as a staffer on this committee. When I last reefed this committee in 2020 in classified session on this topic, as the envoy, I provided details on what these two adversaries were doing.
▶ 0:30:10Mr. Billingslea: I discussed any problematic things russia was pursuing and its arsenal of unconstrained nuclear weapons. Five years later, the assessment I gave this committee seems to have been optimistic. China has proceeded at breathtaking pace.
▶ 0:30:34Mr. Billingslea: I would ask that my full remarks be included in the record and I will skip through the threat assessment part of my testimony because you have that there for your perusal. Suffice to say that china is on pace to deploy as many operational nuclear weapons, strategic nuclear weapons, as the united states by 2035, if not sooner.
▶ 0:31:00Mr. Billingslea: They are going faster than previously briefed. They are going faster than the strategic posture commission was briefed. It is alarming. The russians continue to expand their nuclear weapons capabilities, which are not subject to the new start treaty. What should be done in light of this dangerous turn of affairs?
▶ 0:31:28Mr. Billingslea: For the first time since the dawn of the atomic era we will soon face two nuclear adversaries who have the potential to engage in simultaneous, coordinated, or opportunistic aggression against us. A large number of our assumptions and plans need to change as a result. The posture commission, which I stand by, was bipartisan and animus in all its recommendations. It recommended a number of things for us to focus on.
▶ 0:32:00Mr. Billingslea: We saw this coming. One of the first things we recommended is we need to prepare to upload some or all of our hedge warheads. We need to plan to deploy the sentinel icbm. We need to increase the planned number of bombers. With long-range standoff ordinance for bombers. We need to increase the plan production of the columbia class and trident ballistic missile systems.
▶ 0:32:30Mr. Billingslea: We need to look at fielding a mobile icbm. We need to be prepared to put a portion of our bomber fleet on continuous alert status and to develop plans and procedures to reconvert submarine tubes that were filled with cement in order to comply with the new start limitations. And to reintroduce trident missiles into those tubes.
▶ 0:32:55Mr. Billingslea: We are going to have to prepare to keep the ohio class submarines operating longer than planned. What should not be done? An arbitrary political extension of the new start treaty. Many of the measures that I just enumerated, which are supported unanimously by the posture commission, are not built to us if we are bound by the new start treaty.
▶ 0:33:24Mr. Billingslea: We cannot reconvert those ohio class submarines. We cannot walk -- rewire our b-52 fleet where we took the antennas away to denuclearize this platforms. There are so many things we will be precluded from doing. Just reconversion of the ohio class summer rains will take two to three years from when we start. Even how long the delays aren't how long it takes to get the ohio class in.
▶ 0:33:52Mr. Billingslea: We do not even have procedures available for have to pull the cement out of the summary and spirit so another year of living under new start limitations will preclude us from rising to the fast-moving chinese challenge and the fact that russia continues to further expand its arsenal.
▶ 0:34:11Mr. Billingslea: New start does nothing with regards to nonstrategic theater nuclear weapons, which russia has an overwhelming number of more than half the russian arsenal falls into that category and is not treaty constrained. This committee was clear when it ratified the new start treaty that it expected president obama to engage the russians to secure an agreement to rectify this massive disparity in these theater nuclear weapons, but that never happened.
▶ 0:34:39Mr. Billingslea: I note the committee has taken the long-standing position that militarily significant agreements such as any extension of the new start limitations should be considered only as a treaty and cemented for advice and consent under the constitution. Your resolution of ratification is expose it on this point where you state that you expect that anything that extends the mandate would be cemented as a treaty.
▶ 0:35:05Mr. Billingslea: What can be done in the field of risk reduction and arms-control is not negligence. I believe the secretary and I will agree on a number of things. We should continue to operate the nuclear risk reduction centers and provide launch warning notifications. We should examine the feasibility of agreeing with the russians not to impede national technical means.
▶ 0:35:30Mr. Billingslea: We should agree with the russians as possible not to field missile launched fractional orbital bombardment systems, which are dangerous, decapitating first strike weapons, so there are things we can do. I believe we need to reset our thought process for arms-control and look at mechanisms that will address the entire russian arsenal and the chinese. Inc. You.
▶ 0:35:57Chair Risch: Ms. gottemoeller is a research fellow and formally served as undersecretary for arms-control from 2012 to 2016. Prior to this, she was the assistant secretary of state verification and compliance and the chief negotiator for new start with the russian federation. Ms. gottemoeller, we would like to hear from you appearing -- from you.
▶ 0:36:27Ms. Gottemoeller: Good morning. It is a distinct honor to testify to you today about the grave challenges facing us in the nuclear realm. This hearing was called to reflect on the advent of an arms race 2.0 and it is a welcome opportunity to explore the fundamentally different nuclear threat environment confronting the united states. If I may, I would like to summarize some key points and place the rest of my testimony on the record.
▶ 0:36:56Ms. Gottemoeller: I would like to welcome the presence at this table of a distinguished colleague and counterpart, marshall billingslea, with whom I have worked and sometimes disbarred for many years. I believe I first encountered Mr. billingslea when I testified to then chairman jesse helms before this committee in the 1990's.
▶ 0:37:15Ms. Gottemoeller: In 2022-2023, we had a chance to work together on the strategic posture commission, a study that brought together eminent colleagues from both sides of the political aisle to examine the increasingly aggressive behaviors of russia and china over the years since the previous strategic posture commission published its report in 2009.
▶ 0:37:34Ms. Gottemoeller: The report had not even touched on china as a strategic threat to the united states, but in ensuing years the situation has changed dramatically with china's buildup of conventional and nuclear forces. This dire situation, combined with russia's aggressive behavior against ukraine and the united states, forms the basis of a remarkable consensus among different members of the commission.
▶ 0:38:03Ms. Gottemoeller: I was proud to join with my colleagues in approving the final report. The commissioners described the threat mac stark terms, to which you have already referred. The united states will face two nuclear adversaries for the first time. The united states must make difficult decisions to meet these evolving deterrence requirements and I welcome's the committee willingness to grapple with these issues.
▶ 0:38:31Ms. Gottemoeller: Your work will be a vital contributor to these efforts. I would like to begin with a few topline messages. The first step we must undertake is to keep our eye on the prize of our nuclear triad modernization to ensure that it is completed on time and within a protectable budget. These are difficult challenges in themselves, which is why the implementation must be a top priority.
▶ 0:38:58Ms. Gottemoeller: While we are completing this modernization work, we must be taking steps to address the worst case of a chinese rush to 1500 deployed warheads or more, which may happen by 2035, but the decade between now and then gives us opportunity to work the problem. You called it a decisive decade, and I agree. It gives us time to work the problem.
▶ 0:39:22Ms. Gottemoeller: To my mind, the most urgent step is to decide what should be done to respond to president putin's proposal to extend the limits of new start by one year before the treaty goes out of force on february 5, 2026. The new national security strategy points to the value of the president's unconventional diplomacy, which is important and valuable. President trump could gain an easy win in agreeing with president putin to extend the limits of the new start treaty by one year, but he should do one better.
▶ 0:39:52Ms. Gottemoeller: He can improve putin's offer by proposing the united states and russia returned to full implementation of the treaty for its remaining time in force. The two countries are able to exchange data and notifications and conduct on-site inspections, it will ensure that we and they have the most up-to-date information about our respective nuclear triads, providing a real-time status of nuclear forces to the two signatories as the treaty ends.
▶ 0:40:22Ms. Gottemoeller: Such a one-year extension would not prejudice any of the vital steps the united states is taking to respond to the chinese nuclear buildup. We must continue to plan against it and work to determine what capabilities will be needed, including in the realm of warheads. The period will buy extra time for preparation without the added challenge of a russian federation newly released from limitations embarking on a rapid upload campaign. That would not be in U.S.
▶ 0:40:52Ms. Gottemoeller: Interest. My bottom line is that it does not serve U.S. national security interests to plan and prepare for the chinese worst-case scenario while simultaneously facing a rapid russian upload campaign. The russians have the capacity and experience to succeed in such a campaign, which we have pointed out in the strategic posture commission findings.
▶ 0:41:18Ms. Gottemoeller: It would be better for us to keep them limited for at least another year while we continue to plan and prepare for the chinese threat. Remaining under new start limits for a year does not prejudice planning and preparation to upload. Most importantly, the hiatus will provide president trump time to pursue his instinct to control nuclear weapons at the negotiating table.
▶ 0:41:42Ms. Gottemoeller: The president has agreed with vladimir putin and xi jinping to meet in 2026 and the summits will be an opportunity for him to strike nuclear deals with his counterparts. In the interest of U.S. national security and the service of peace and stability. I look forward to your questions.
▶ 0:42:02Chair Risch: Thank you to both of you. We could not have two more experienced people in this theater than the two of you. It has always amazed me, and I appreciate your observation, we spar back and forth. You and I have done that over the years, but what has always struck me about this particular subject is when we are sparring we almost never differ on the bottom line of what we are trying to get.
▶ 0:42:32Chair Risch: Our problem is getting there and I think a lot of it has to do, our disagreements have to deal with the fact of what we are dealing with, putin, and what we can count on him for or not count on him for. I'm interested in your suggestion that new start be continued for an additional year .
▶ 0:42:56Chair Risch: I was opposed to it in the start and all the way along and I guess my initial inclination is, as we prepare for this hearing, to not extend it the year because of all the cheating that russia has done. That is the problem. We are doing what we are supposed to do. They will not do what they are supposed to do.
▶ 0:43:21Chair Risch: We wind up tying our hands behind our back and I guess my question to you is, and I will let you take a run at this also, why would we do this given the nonsensical approach that russia has taken to everything when it comes to security? Your thoughts?
▶ 0:43:47Ms. Gottemoeller: I am aware of these compliance problems and violations because, as assistant secretary of I was responsible for doing the compliance report so it was very much before me at every moment, so I agree with you that russia has been a serial violator of a number of treaties.
▶ 0:44:05Ms. Gottemoeller: But I really reflect and it is clear in my longer testimony, the history of the first strategic arms reduction treaty, which came into force in 1994, the treaty negotiated by president bush and the new start treaty negotiated by president obama.
▶ 0:44:24Ms. Gottemoeller: When it entered force in 1994, we had 12,000 deployed warheads on each side and over the course of these three treaties we have managed to bring that number down to 1550 deployed warheads, so the point is that the treaties have played a role in russia has abided by the strategic arms reduction treaties with all the problems in other treaty arenas. They have abided by these.
▶ 0:44:52Ms. Gottemoeller: It has brought the number of deployed warheads down and kept them under control in this period of terrible war of aggression in ukraine so I do believe we have to look carefully. Ronald reagan said trust but verify. I agree with that.
▶ 0:45:08Ms. Gottemoeller: We have to look carefully and watch what they are up to and if they are abiding by a treaty, as they have complied with start and new start, I think we need to pay attention to that and think clearly about what is in our national security interest. That is the most important issue.
▶ 0:45:25Chair Risch: Thank you. Are you in agreement about the extension with conditions that Ms. gottemoeller recommended?
▶ 0:45:36Mr. Billingslea: I would recommend against that for a variety of reasons. Russia is a serial treaty violator. They are in violation of the new start treaty. They have precluded on-site inspections and so on and so forth. They are in the process of developing a nuclear weapon to put in orbit in violation of the outerspace treaty. They are in violation of the chemical weapons convention. They have used an assassin agent.
▶ 0:46:06Mr. Billingslea: There violation of the nuclear testing pledge -- we know they have been doing supercritical tests at their test site. What we need to do is first determine as a nation what our requirements are for our nuclear arsenal in this rapidly changing and dramatically worsening threat environment. Once you know what the requirements are, you can then move out to negotiate.
▶ 0:46:33Mr. Billingslea: You know the parameters are for your negotiations, but we haven't yet done that. The biden administration did not come to terms with this worsening equilibrium and this administration has not yet done nuclear posture review, so we urgently need that nuclear posture review, which will help fashion and guide our negotiators to what we want to achieve with regard to the russians. And the chinese.
▶ 0:46:56Mr. Billingslea: If you simply extend the new start treaty, what you do is you further postpone all of the other things I enumerated in my testimony that we need to do, like beginning to reconvert the ohio class some marines. We will not be able to do that if we extend new start. You take pressure off the russians if you give them another year and we do not address their nonstrategic nuclear weapons.
▶ 0:47:21Mr. Billingslea: They have no incentive to either come to the table on those topics, on skype on poseidon, or to help us get the chinese into negotiations. For these reasons, I thick it an ill-advised move.
▶ 0:47:34Chair Risch: As usual, I find myself on your side rather than Ms. gottemoeller's. I thought I coined the term serial treaty violator sometime in the past. Thank you. It is appropriate. Ms. gottemoeller, one of the things I think we can all agree on is the observation that Mr. billingsley made at the beginning.
▶ 0:48:01Chair Risch: We are sitting here talking about the constraints on these kaiser weapons but at the same time there are no constraints on the theater-based weapons and to me, if anybody was ever inclined to use a nuclear weapon, it would probably be that as opposed to an intercontinental strike.
▶ 0:48:27Chair Risch: There are no constraint on that, and I guess we cannot go into the setting -- it is not a classified setting. We cannot go into the position of each party and numbers and that sort of thing, but we are not in good shape in that respect. I guess I am -- one of the things that gets me to the point where Mr.
▶ 0:48:47Chair Risch: Billingsley is is that we are just spinning our wheels without having constraints and then overlying all of this is that russia is a serial treaty violator. They just do not keep their word. I will give you the last shot. >> thank you for the opportunity. I did want to agree with my colic that the russians are violating the new start treaty by seizing implementation. This was determined by the biden administration.
▶ 0:49:17Chair Risch: There is not any treaty language that would allow them to stop implementation, but I did want to refer you to the compliance report from 2024 that stated the united states assesses with high confidence that russia did not engage in any large-scale activity above the treaty limits . We do not yet have the 2025 compliance report, but I refer you to that comment, so what I mean is air keeping to the warhead limits of new start as far as we --
▶ 0:49:48Chair Risch: Those are only deployed warheads.
▶ 0:49:52Ms. Gottemoeller: Of course. I'm coming to your question about nonstrategic warheads and I was very much admiring the move of the trump administration during his first term in office when president trump got president putin to agree to a freeze on all warheads. Deployed and nondeployed, strategic and nonstrategic. This was a vital first step in negotiation we all needed to see happen and that was the one to follow new start. Mr. billingslea already referred to this.
▶ 0:50:23Ms. Gottemoeller: Line reboot and would not come to the table. President trump -- with Mr. obama. But president trump had him coming to the table to talk about this freeze in warheads, which was a vital first step in controlling warheads and I thought that this was responding to the top priority we laid out in the resolution of ratification of new start, that we needed to go after the russian systems and after russian nonstrategic and strategic warheads so we have that important precedent.
▶ 0:50:56Ms. Gottemoeller: I hope the trump administration will move forward now with restoring that idea of a freeze on warheads with the putin kremlin and move forward then to constrain these warheads. It is the next priority for negotiations and it is one we all agree on.
▶ 0:51:12Chair Risch: Senator shaheen.
▶ 0:51:14Sen. Shaheen: Thank you, Mr. chairman. Ms. gottemoeller, you referenced the national security strategy. Were you surprised it does not make more notice of the nuclear threat that we are facing, not just from russia and china, but also from iran and north korea?
▶ 0:51:34Ms. Gottemoeller: I read the national security strategy as being very much focused on regional defense issues. You can see how it is structured with a focus on the various regions and so I was a bit surprised given the president's stated interest in this matter that they did not cover it a bit more. He did talk on several occasions in the national security strategy about restoring strategic stability with russia.
▶ 0:52:03Ms. Gottemoeller: So I take that to mean that there is continuing interest in the oval office in moving forward with nuclear negotiations russia, but at this time I must say that they are not yet focusing in their stated documents much on the nuclear questions. We do have, in addition to national security strategy and national defense strategy coming out soon, perhaps that will say more.
▶ 0:52:33Ms. Gottemoeller: There has not been a nuclear posture review yet, so I think we just have to see these documents being prepared and rolled out for further details. >> you have both negotiated directly with russia. You have spoken in support of ukraine. What do you think the implications are for the nuclear arms race of russia is allowed to be successful in taking significant territory in ukraine and not being forced to pay any price, any accountability?
▶ 0:53:06Mr. Billingslea: I think we are at a very dangerous inflection point particularly with regard to the matter of extended deterrence. The unites states has long offered its nuclear umbrella to our allies and that has been important to our nato alliance and to our asian allies.
▶ 0:53:30Mr. Billingslea: It is essential that we continue to afford that a -- guarantee in order to assure our allies and dissuade them from feeling that they need to move forward with acquisition of their own nuclear capabilities. I am following the discussion in poland closely. I find some of what is being said very worrisome. I do not believe in the concept of friendly proliferation.
▶ 0:53:56Mr. Billingslea: I think that is inevitably going to lead to the elimination of the nuclear nonproliferation treaty, which is in our national interest, the collapse of the safeguard regime, and it will make it harder to constrain countries like iran if we allow these concerns among allies to precipitate the acquisition of nuclear weapons. For this reason, I believe we ought to, for instance, create a warhead storage area in poland.
▶ 0:54:26Mr. Billingslea: We ought to bring poland into the burden staring -- sharing agreements and provide them with f-35's to join the nato nuclear capability club as a way of showing them that they are protected and that they -- that our umbrella will continue to watch over them.
▶ 0:54:43Mr. Billingslea: I think a similar argument can be made with regard to a warhead storage area in south korea so these are very complicated matters but I would urge that we continue to emphasize the value of extended deterrence within our alliances.
▶ 0:54:58Chair Risch: Secretary gottemoeller, do you agree with that? Is there not a connection between allowing ukraine to -- forcing ukraine to have to give up much of its territory, its ambitions to join nato? And any negotiated settlement? And the connection to what happens with the nuclear arms race?
▶ 0:55:29Ms. Gottemoeller: I have long felt on nuclear negotiations should exist in a realm where we focus on nuclear negotiations in our national interest and think about them in that way. During the cold war, we had many disagreements with the ussr but still continues to pursue nuclear negotiations in our national interest. I think they should not be linked together.
▶ 0:55:58Ms. Gottemoeller: But let me state my opinion on what is happening with negotiations in ukraine. I have been concerned there could be some requirements that ukraine give up its eastern provinces and I do not believe that is in anybody's interest, first and foremost ukrainians', but it sets a terrible precedent for the future of response to aggression around the world and we need to be clear eyed about that.
▶ 0:56:25Ms. Gottemoeller: To fecteau, there may be some time when ukraine must see its eastern provinces in crimea not entirely under his control, but I think about this again with the history of world war ii before us and the federal republican of germany was separated from its eastern provinces for decades until the end of the cold war and germany was reunited.
▶ 0:56:50Ms. Gottemoeller: I think about those precedents when I think about where ukraine is today and I do hope and believe there can be a fair and equitable outcome for ukraine, including resources lay down for its reconstruction because it has been suffering from this terrible aggression for four years.
▶ 0:57:17Ms. Gottemoeller: >> thank you to both of our witnesses. Great testimony. Last week my colleagues on the committee had an insightful hearing that was focused on countering china's challenge to american ai leadership. One topic that did not come up that I would like to address is integration of ai into all phases of nuclear command control.
▶ 0:57:46Ms. Gottemoeller: Its evolving role in all phases of strategic arms, intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance, threat detection, and decision-support processing. It is likely to have a positive and negative ramifications for global stability between nuclear weapons states, so we start with the first question to you, Mr. billingsley. -- billingslea.
▶ 0:58:12Ms. Gottemoeller: He described russia's -- can you describe russia's posture with regard to ai integration and advise the trump administration how to address this in limitations for ai and negotiations with moscow and beijing?
▶ 0:58:33Mr. Billingslea: It is inevitable that ai will and already is being integrated into various aspects of the process, the intelligence cycle, able to do things like coherent change to texture now in and on a that took human analysts peering at changes in imagery weeks sometimes to discover patterns of behavior.
▶ 0:58:57Mr. Billingslea: The biden administration -- the state department under the biden administration promulgated a series of best practices or principles for ai in military matters which I think -- we looked at that and I believe you and I agreed on this that it was a prudent set of measures. It basically boils down to the concept that there needed to always be a human in the loop when it comes to actual employment force.
▶ 0:59:26Mr. Billingslea: I am very concerned about what the chinese may be doing in particular. My concern is even heightened more because china is moving to a launch on warning posture and the potential for miscalculation with that posture and the fact that china has none of the risk reduction capabilities or measures that we do have today with the russians really does create a hairtrigger kind of environment which ai, if not controlled fully by humans,
▶ 0:59:58Mr. Billingslea: Could cause real problems.
▶ 1:00:00Sen. Mccormick: Ms. gottemoeller , is there anything you would like to add to that point?
▶ 1:00:05Ms. Gottemoeller: Just one note that is that president biden with xi jinping when they met together, they did come to the agreement that there should always be a person in the loop, a man in the loop as Mr.
▶ 1:00:21Ms. Gottemoeller: Billingslea said for nuclear command and control decision-making and that was in a port a step forward and beginning to talk about this with our chinese counterparts and I do hope the next phase of diplomacy and negotiation will take us in the direction of fleshing out exactly what that means because technically it is a difficult matter to sort out.
▶ 1:00:44Ms. Gottemoeller: The other thing I would point to, and I am concerned about it, is that the ussr and russian federation have long had a predilection of doing some automatic decision-making in their so-called dead hand system, which is a -- in theory a nuclear command and control decision-making system that would enable launch activity to occur even if there were no people still left alive.
▶ 1:01:10Ms. Gottemoeller: And I think that was and could be a grave danger going forward so it is necessary also to engage moscow on this key issue of keeping a person in the loop for nuclear command and control decision-making.
▶ 1:01:24Sen. Mccormick: My other question you touched on briefly, which is the prc. For the most part, they have rebuffed attempts for the U.S. to engage on nuclear arms control and risk reduction while initiating a massive buildup. What do you think is going on here? What are their motivations? What, if anything, should united states be doing to try to get a longer and more productive engagement with china?
▶ 1:01:52Ms. Gottemoeller: I do agree and it has been frustrating for U.S. negotiators but also I think for U.S. leaders, because the chinese have been very -- they have obviously been modernizing and building up but they have not been willing to talk about it and discuss or engage in negotiations. They are active in multilateral settings night -- like the nonproliferation treaty not on a bilateral basis.
▶ 1:02:21Ms. Gottemoeller: I see some signs this could be changing. I refer to Mr. biden's ability to meet and agree with xi jinping on this step. That is an important first step and they also agreed at that time to embark on strategic stability talks, which they were not able then to convene afterward, but I do believe, based on a number of phenomena, including the fact that president xi agreed with president trump to meet two
▶ 1:02:53Ms. Gottemoeller: Times in 2026, this present opportunity is now for engaging them in the door seems to be beginning to crack open on engagement, so let us see what we can accomplish. My own feelings in this regard are instinctual at this moment from being involved in a number of discussions with the chinese when they are beginning to talk now about their rationale for modernization and we are all concerned about launch on warning.
▶ 1:03:23Ms. Gottemoeller: So I hope going forward they will be willing to open up more and talk to us about what their nuclear modernization is about.
▶ 1:03:32Sen. Mccormick: Thank you.
▶ 1:03:37Sen. Kaine: Thank you. This is a hearing about arms control. When we talk about arms control, we typically think of nuclear weapons and things like that but today threats can come from a lot of places. I want to follow up on senator mccormick. High-tech chips are typically reviewed for export control authorizations by the commerce department. Yesterday, the president made an announcement that surprised a number of us about the transfer of nvidia chips to china.
▶ 1:04:10Sen. Kaine: The details on this are being worked out by the commerce department. These chips have a national security application and -- in the way that senator mccormick mentioned. He is a cosponsor of a bill filed last week called the safe chips act that would make it difficult for the distaste to transfer chips of this kind.
▶ 1:04:34Sen. Kaine: The chips in that legislation are not named by a brand name but the qualities of those chips that would be subject to national security review before transfer. I support this legislation filed last week. I'm seeking to be added as a cosponsor.
▶ 1:04:49Sen. Kaine: The question I want to ask you is, should the state department and other natural security agencies have a greater say in decisions like this, the transfer of high end chips that could reduce our edge over china, including in sophisticated national security technology? Why should commerce be taking the lead without the involvement of national security agencies and should we seek to change that?
▶ 1:05:21Ms. Gottemoeller: Thank you for the question. I come at this having been the under secretary of state for arms control and international security with responsibility for political military affairs. We did make critical decisions that were related to arms transfers and sales and licensing done related to qualitative military edge in the case of israel so I can see a rationale for the state
▶ 1:05:53Ms. Gottemoeller: Department, as was the defense department, being involved in such decision-making and we are concerned about such chips affording a country like china a military edge. I do see a rationale for that. I will say I'm not familiar with the act and draft and legislation you've discussed but that is my initial response.
▶ 1:06:16Sen. Kaine: I'm asking questions about your safe chips act that you filed with senator coons and that I would like to be added to a cosponsor to when you're ready to add cosponsors. Shouldn't the transfer of technology like this that has such significant national security implications be reviewed by national security agencies and not simply by the commerce department?
▶ 1:06:41Mr. Billingslea: I am unfamiliar with the chip and I am not qualified to speak on that particular matter. Looking at senator shaheen's senior staffer behind her, he and I worked together for years on that when he was on the house foreign affairs committee and I was on the senate foreign relations committee on this matter of proper jurisdiction for licensing decisions on the munitions list by the hartman of state or over under the export
▶ 1:07:13Mr. Billingslea: Administration act with the apartment of commerce and we had in those days often widely differing views with the clinton administration at the time and between committees and members of congress over proper jurisdiction over certain exports.
▶ 1:07:29Mr. Billingslea: That is a long way of saying that, if you believe a particular technology has direct military applications of significance, probably the apartment of state we need to be involved in that process as well as the department of defense.
▶ 1:07:46Sen. Kaine: Ai capacity ties in with nuclear command and control, so it is connected to important military technology and U.S. military vantage. One of the things about the report of the transfer of these chips that is complicated is the U.S. has taken an ownership interest in nvidia. The U.S.
▶ 1:08:06Sen. Kaine: Has said to these particular transfers to china will get a 25% stake in the revenue, so we have a revenue upside to transfer technology to china, the transfer of which could degrade our national security edge over china. There has been reporting that the ceo of nvidia made a large contribution to the construction of the ballroom currently being built on the white house. Is this transfer being done out of a financial interest?
▶ 1:08:32Sen. Kaine: To undercut america's national security posture? This is something we have to analyze and the fact this announcement came sort of out of the blue yesterday after months of lobbying by nvidia I think indicates the wisdom of the legislation and the need for there to be a review of this kind. The last I will say is ran into a similar issue during covid.
▶ 1:09:00Sen. Kaine: We had defined national security items in a narrow way and suddenly we found even gloves could be a national security item when you really need them.
▶ 1:09:14Sen. Kaine: I think advanced chips are a national security -- they are not a nuclear weapon, but they have a huge impact on tomorrow's defense needs and we may need to broaden the aperture and how we reveal transfers on technologies. >> it is not just nuclear weapons when it comes to chips. It is everything. Senator ricketts, you are up.
▶ 1:09:41Sen. Ricketts: Thank you to our witnesses here today to talk about this important issue. Ambassador billingslea, talk to me about what is going on with regard to communist china and their buildup of nuclear weapons? My understanding is they are experiencing nuclear breakout. Is that accurate?
▶ 1:10:01Mr. Billingslea: Yes.
▶ 1:10:03Sen. Ricketts: Are they seeking to get parity with the united states or to pass us? Do we know?
▶ 1:10:09Mr. Billingslea: At a minimum, parity. I believe they intend to surpass us given the pace at which they are moving.
▶ 1:10:19Sen. Ricketts: What about on tackler nuclear weapons?
▶ 1:10:24Mr. Billingslea: That is an area where in closed session more could be discussed but suffice to say that china has ensured that virtually all its missile systems, intermediate range, ballistic, and cruise missiles, our dual capable so they have built in functionality to deploy a large number of theater nuclear weapons, should they so choose. They were never precluded under the treaty from having these kinds of missiles. We were. Russia cheated and blew up the treaty.
▶ 1:10:53Mr. Billingslea: We are now building these weapons but the chinese have built thousands of the systems.
▶ 1:10:58Sen. Ricketts: For the first time, the united is facing two peer nuclear powers. That is the first time in our history we have had to do that. So when we are talking about the new start treaty and whether to extend it for a year, is there any incentive now for communist china to limit themselves in any way? Is there any way they would have incentive to do that?
▶ 1:11:23Mr. Billingslea: No. We take further pressure off of them if we simply extend the treaty for another year. We are kicking the can down the road by perpetuating a bipolar cold war construct that makes no sense in a world where there are three peer nuclear adversaries. We need a different approach and different formula.
▶ 1:11:45Mr. Billingslea: As I have indicated, further extending the only cripples our ability to begin to re-modernize and expand nuclear forces to meet this rising chinese challenge.
▶ 1:11:59Sen. Ricketts: To cover this again, with regard to russia, you mentioned they were cheating. Do we have verification now that russia would be following the treaty?
▶ 1:12:09Mr. Billingslea: We haven't had on-site inspections in russia in five plus years. Yet our confidence -- we are highly confident that we know what the russians are doing, which tells you the on-site inspection regime associated with the treaty is actually not the key ingredient for our insight into what they are actually doing. It is our national capabilities that provide that insight, not the treaty.
▶ 1:12:36Sen. Ricketts: What are the things we ought to be doing with regard to getting prepared to deter two peer nuclear powers? If you are recommending do not do the new start treaty, what should we be doing?
▶ 1:12:47Mr. Billingslea: We need to start with identifying and defining requirements. We need a nuclear posture review to be conducted. It should include the entire interagency and help then drive and understand -- drive in understanding what we seek to achieve through negotiations with the russians and chinese. That is the place to start.
▶ 1:13:04Sen. Ricketts: How do we get the russians and chinese at the table to talk about it?
▶ 1:13:09Mr. Billingslea: If you give the russians another year free of new start, you will not get them to the table for another year.
▶ 1:13:16Sen. Ricketts: So given that the chinese want to get to parity with us and they are racing to do that now, how'd you get the chinese and russians to the table?
▶ 1:13:27Mr. Billingslea: The strategy we employed was having results. I was in camino case and with the chinese, the we were negotiating over future negotiations at that stage and they were biding their time but they were talking to us.
▶ 1:13:43Mr. Billingslea: What was getting to them was the blue medic campaign we malted -- mounted to expose what they were doing and get friendly foreign defense ministers and heads of state to call them out for this behavior and to castigate the chinese for failing to adhere to their obligation to negotiate in good faith. They have that obligation peer they are not obligated to agree to anything, but they are obligated to negotiate in good faith and china is not doing that.
▶ 1:14:14Sen. Ricketts: Would what we are doing to replace with the sentinel, which we partially based in nebraska, is that something need to continue to pursue and what are the dangers if we delay the recapitalization of nuclear forces?
▶ 1:14:32Sen. Ricketts: We have deferred modernization to the point where we are at grave risk. We have just-in-time delivery approach to rapidly aging systems that we cannot allow to to slip further, so the cost overruns with sentinel are worrying but you cannot life extend the minuteman three passed a certain point. It is one of that we get on with this. The capabilities and I think about of the chinese the most, however, are the columbia class submarine and to be 21 bomber.
▶ 1:15:03Sen. Ricketts: Moreover, the army's inf-type missile systems, the so-called titan system, clearly has the file's attention. That is a conventional missile system but it's the kind of capability if we further fielded and proliferated to friends and allies, at least a joint appointment with them, this certainly gets the chinese attention and build pressure on them to want to come to the negotiating table.
▶ 1:15:29Sen. Ricketts: Part of what we do is not only recapitalize our nuclear weapon system but also build on our conventional weapons facilities, do joint exercises, for example, with allies like the philippines, to put pressure on the communist chinese to come to the table.
▶ 1:15:46Mr. Billingslea: Perhaps not necessarily just allies, what about vietnam?
▶ 1:15:51Sen. Ricketts: Interesting idea. I have run over my time. Thank you.
▶ 1:15:56Chair Risch: A chairmen is always gracious. Senator van hollen.
▶ 1:16:03Sen. Van Hollen: Thank you. At the outset I want to second what senator kaine said regarding the concerns over the nvidia h200 chip transfers to china that the administration announced yesterday. These are highly advanced chips. Anybody concerned about china being able to take our technology and strengthen their military capability should be worried about this.
▶ 1:16:30Sen. Van Hollen: In the appropriations committee yesterday, senator moran and I had a hearing with the ambassador greer, trade ambassador, who said very clearly, and I agreed with him, that we should not compromise national security as part of any trade deal. This decision this administration made compromises U.S. national security, in my view, and it comes on the heels of the president waving what was known as the affiliates rule.
▶ 1:16:58Sen. Van Hollen: The trump administration at the beginning of this year closed a loophole to make sure that if we transferred -- we have an entities list that says let's not transfer technology to certain companies like huawei. The affiliates rule is signed to make sure you cannot create a subsidiary and get around the rule. When president trump met with president xi in korea, south korea, he postponed that.
▶ 1:17:28Sen. Van Hollen: They have also put up the diffusion rule which is designed to prevent our ai and advanced chip technology that we provide to certain countries from them getting into the hands of china. I think all of us should be wary worried about the pattern we are seeing here. Thank you both for your testimony. Secretary got moeller, thank you for your longtime service.
▶ 1:17:52Sen. Van Hollen: Back in the 1980's, I was a staff member on this committee, worked on the inf treaty at the time. One of the other big issues than was the sti initiative, star wars. It was reagan's plan to create a golden dome, as president trump likes to call it now, that would make sure the united states was impenetrable when it comes to nuclear weapons.
▶ 1:18:21Sen. Van Hollen: After over 400 billion dollars expended, taxpayer money, it is clear that sdi could not meet those promises. In fact, I think it's been well demonstrated that it is easier and cheaper for an offense to overwhelm a defense. And it creates instability. Part of the conversation is about renewing the new start agreement, may be entering into an arms control china.
▶ 1:18:53Sen. Van Hollen: What is your view, secretary got moeller -- gottemoeller, of moving forward and spending a lot of money on a golden dome system in terms of capability but also whether it would trigger another arms race, and how it factor into russia and china's decisions to negotiate limits on offensive capabilities , nuclear capabilities.
▶ 1:19:23Ms. Gottemoeller: Thank you, senator van hollen. Great pleasure to see you. I will make two points here. First of all, we have a general missile proliferation problem. We can see it in the war in ukraine. Integrated air and missile defense will be critical but only for us before our allies. Our urge our allies in europe and asia to be think hard about what they need to do to cope with this general proliferation of missiles in the short to eat immediate ranges.
▶ 1:19:56Ms. Gottemoeller: As to systems in the strategic ranges, we have long acknowledged there is an interrelationship between strategic offense and defense, and up have to think carefully about what is required to ensure the continuation of a reliable offensive deterrent force. That is also a key question.
▶ 1:20:16Ms. Gottemoeller: As far as golden dawn is concerned, I will say I'm a bit concerned that we are focusing, I believe will be investing a great deal of money and basically space-based interceptors, at a time, when we have been discussing at this morning's hearing, the russians have produced a range of exotic systems that are not at all ballistic systems.
▶ 1:20:43Ms. Gottemoeller: They are exotic cruise missiles, some of them nuclear propelled, torpedoes. The space-based intercept layer is to go after ballistic missiles. I am wondering if we are missing once again a major threat to the united states in terms of air breathing systems, classic cruise missiles, then these new russian exotic systems that we will have to defend against. It's a question once again as to how we will spend our scarce resources.
▶ 1:21:10Ms. Gottemoeller: I do believe we need to be looking at integrated air and missile defense to defend some critical targets in the united states, as well for our allies. They need to be focused on that. Whether a major kind of investment of the type that has been put forward will serve our interests going forward, I don't know. The russians have a lead on us in terms of these exotic systems that are not holistic in nature.
▶ 1:21:36Sen. Van Hollen: Thank you.
▶ 1:21:39Chair Risch: Senator barrasso.
▶ 1:21:44Sen. Barrasso: Thank you, Mr. chairman. Mr. billingslea, discussing golden dome, can I get your assessment?
▶ 1:21:50Mr. Billingslea: Senator, one of the things that we agreed upon, again in a unanimous and bipartisan way on the strategic posture commission on which we both served, was that the united states should develop and field integrated air and missile defense give abilities that can deter and defeat coercive attacks by russia and china.
▶ 1:22:12Mr. Billingslea: To the extent the golden dome initiative in its early increments would afford such protection, I think we should be supportive on a bipartisan basis. One other comment. When reagan launched the strategic defense initiative, supercomputers didn't have the processing power of this smartphone. A lot has changed since the initial vision was elaborated for a missile shield.
▶ 1:22:43Mr. Billingslea: The technological evolution makes missile defense, particularly space-based missile defense, highly feasible at this stage. Expense, cost is an issue, but at a minimum, we should agree on a bipartisan basis, as the commission did, that we need to not be vulnerable to coercive threats by russia or china and attacking.
▶ 1:23:03Sen. Barrasso: Do russia and china use this as an opportunity to increase their production of, expand their nuclear?
▶ 1:23:12Mr. Billingslea: They are already doing it. Not only that, they themselves are making significant investments into capabilities. Russia has long had nuclear tipped anti-ballistic missile systems. Moscow has given the x.500 system a significant missile defense capability. China is pursuing the same.
▶ 1:23:36Sen. Barrasso: Compared to what we heard from your colleague, the different kinds of weapons systems that are being devised, what is your assessment?
▶ 1:23:43Mr. Billingslea: We should be careful about feeding vladimir putin's ego with his bugaboo strange, sky fall systems. Sky fall has already killed more russians in his testing and development that will probably ever harm americans. That said, there is no reason why we should tolerate the development of these kinds of weapons.
▶ 1:24:08Mr. Billingslea: In further discussions and dialogue with the russians -- and I worry a little bit about mimicry from the chinese in these areas. We should make it clear in any future arms-control negotiations, these kinds of capabilities need to be worn. I mentioned earlier, any kind of missile launch a bombardment system of the kind of china actually tested a few years ago. These are not helpful. Like I said, these are strangelove tech capabilities.
▶ 1:24:36Sen. Barrasso: How strange is a collaboration we see between china, russia, north korea, iran, whether it is nuclear, missiles, drone capabilities, what do you see happening there?
▶ 1:24:49Mr. Billingslea: The collaborations between the russians and the chinese is worrisome. In particular, the most significant thing that should concern us is that russia is enabling china to obtain the fissile material necessary for its buildup. We should also be concerned about what russia has been willing to furnish to the iranians in exchange for the drones and other systems iran has provided. North korea is a bit of a black box.
▶ 1:25:21Sen. Barrasso: Sanctions, working, not working, they all get the opportunity to try to evade sanctions.
▶ 1:25:27Mr. Billingslea: Before I was the nuclear and boy I was assistant to the secretary of treasury for sanctions. What I would say is sanctions do work, they can be incredibly effective, but they are not a substitute for strategy. You also cannot do sanctions piecemeal. You have to have a conference of approach to how you apply them, and you have to be unrelenting in enforcement.
▶ 1:25:53Sen. Barrasso: In terms of china's ai capabilities, and we see them making advances there, it is our intelligence able to keep an eye on exactly what they are doing?
▶ 1:26:04Mr. Billingslea: Senator, I'm not privy to current intelligence on that matter. We may or may not agree on this, but I don't think we arms-control our way out of ai. I think we have to ensure that we maintain dominance in ai. That said, we need to be prudential and how we incorporate ai into our military systems.
▶ 1:26:24Sen. Barrasso: And we need adequate energy in the united states.
▶ 1:26:27Mr. Billingslea: Which lead you to small nuclear modular capability and other things.
▶ 1:26:32Sen. Barrasso: The effort of the nato countries, commitment to go to 5%, how significant is it?
▶ 1:26:38Mr. Billingslea: It's a really big deal. I would urge the committee keep its eye on the three point five out of five. The 3.5 number is the real hard spending on defense capabilities, but that is a big deal, big accomplishment.
▶ 1:26:52Sen. Barrasso: Thank you.
▶ 1:26:54Chair Risch: Thank you, senator. I had I thought that I would like your comments on, they thought that I've had for a long time. We are going to have a hard time getting china to the table until they believe they have reached parity with us. Do most of you agree, disagree with that?
▶ 1:27:14Mr. Billingslea: I think that is their plan. That poses a real problem for us in negotiating an arms-control treaty that basically puts two enemies at parity with us, single numerical parity.
▶ 1:27:29Mr. Billingslea: That is why we went down the road in the first trump administration of pursuing a freeze on all warhead production, because we wanted to lock the russians in, stop the continued buildup by the russians in their theater, not strategic capabilities, and set a framework where we could stop the chinese from tipping the apple card over. Unfortunately, that ship may have sailed.
▶ 1:27:54Ms. Gottemoeller: I do agree, Mr. chairman, that it's been a bear to try to get the chinese to talk about their nuclear modernization, try to engage on these issues. I do put a good deal of stock into president trump's stated desire in the coming year to talk to both his russian and chinese counterparts about controls on nuclear weapons.
▶ 1:28:16Ms. Gottemoeller: Often times, there has to be a breakthrough at the highest level, presidential level for the governments to be willing to move forward in these discussions. The president has stated his intention. Certainly, president xi, no doubt this will be on the agenda for their two meetings in 2026.
▶ 1:28:37Chair Risch: Senator shaheen.
▶ 1:28:39Sen. Shaheen: Mr. billingslea, when you were talking about the russian and chinese new weapons that they have developed, you said that we should make it clear that these weapons are not acceptable. How do you propose that we make it clear that they are not acceptable, and what is this administration doing to make that point? Do you know?
▶ 1:29:03Mr. Billingslea: The second half of the question, I'm not privy to those discussions.
▶ 1:29:08Sen. Shaheen: Are you aware anything is happening to make it clear that the weapons are not acceptable?
▶ 1:29:13Mr. Billingslea: I believe there have been conversations. Excited that Dr. ya will hopefully be concerned for arms assistant secretary before the christmas break because he needs to get on that mission right away. He is a phenomenal nominee. I will say that our plan in the first administration was to incrementally extend the new start treaty and extract concessions from the russians at each stage.
▶ 1:29:43Mr. Billingslea: Had we been able to continue the process, even under the biden administration, but they chose not to, a requirement for cessation of rdt&e on these weapons is something that we would insist on.
▶ 1:29:59Sen. Shaheen: You both mentioned the importance of a nuclear posture review. I'm not aware that one is ongoing. Are either a are either of you aware that that is under works right now under this administration?
▶ 1:30:15Ms. Gottemoeller: Man, I'm far away in california. I have not seen any indication that one is ongoing. Mr. billingslea might know better.
▶ 1:30:24Mr. Billingslea: I live just down the street and I haven't seen any indications either.
▶ 1:30:29Sen. Shaheen: What are the implications of that? You talk about the importance of assessing our needs in determining what our priorities are. If we are not, almost a year into this administration and they have not started that kind of review, what are the implications for having a real strategy with respect to how we address nuclear weapons and future buildup, when we are
▶ 1:30:59Sen. Shaheen: Going to pursue any kinds of arms-control, what our priorities are?
▶ 1:31:04Ms. Gottemoeller: Senator shaheen, perhaps I will start. Mr. billingslea went through a long list of ideas. Which the strategic posture commission laid out in detail. If there was any criticism of the report, it was that we laid out so many priorities. The united states of america must choose among them because of other demands.
▶ 1:31:30Ms. Gottemoeller: By the way, I would like to say, one of the most important race is going on is not a nuclear arms race 2.0, it is the ai race. There are so many other areas of our national security that we also have to be investing in. So it's going to be really important to spend smart.
▶ 1:31:49Ms. Gottemoeller: For that reason, I think we can look at that long list of priorities, we can lay them out against the requirements, the threats we see, requirements that our government lays down, and figure out what will be marked spending to respond to these nuclear threats now emanating from both beijing and moscow, but it will be important for us to set our priorities carefully on the basis of requirements that would be agreed.
▶ 1:32:20Ms. Gottemoeller: Frankly, we have important other areas where we need to spend our defense resources, including on the conventional side. We really need to figure this out in a careful way.
▶ 1:32:27Sen. Shaheen: I am on the armed services committee, and I could not agree more with that. That is why I'm asking the question because it is very concerning we don't have this kind of review underway. I would ask both of you, do you think we are facing a nuclear threat from latin america?
▶ 1:32:46Mr. Billingslea: No, not currently. I believe the threat posed by iranian systems in venezuela is highly unappreciated.
▶ 1:32:58Sen. Barrasso: Ms. gottemoeller.
▶ 1:33:00Ms. Gottemoeller: I don't think we face from a latin american countries per se. What I'm concerned about, and Mr. billingslea also talked about the fobs test of china, we could face a nuclear attack coming at us from the southern hemisphere, and that would be from systems deployed by russia and china. There are lots of reasons to be concerned about this matter and to try to get these systems under control.
▶ 1:33:27Ms. Gottemoeller: The fobs ban, I agree with that idea, as well as a recommitment to a band of nuclear weapons in space. That is part of the outer space treaty. We are all concerned that the russians are proceeding in that direction. I think it will be very important to also think about some threats we have not been concerned about probably since the 1970's or 1980's. We have to think about know how to place a barrier in their way.
▶ 1:33:55Sen. Shaheen: I agree completely with both of you. Unfortunately, I don't think we have any sort of strategy or planning underway that would address the concerns that you raise. Thank you, Mr. chairman.
▶ 1:34:10Chair Risch: Thank you, senator shaheen. I want to appreciate both of you for being here today. This is an important subject, we spent time on, colleagues opted to spend any time on this. It's important that we support this for america. We really appreciate your years of service, both of you. As I've said, we don't always agree on the way to get to a point, but we pretty much agree on what the point is.
▶ 1:34:42Chair Risch: We need to all redouble our efforts to try to get there. I am about to leave the record open. By the way, I will put in the record your full remarks, as both of you have requested. Important for people to have those. Secondly, for the information of the members, I will keep the record open for questions for the record until close of business tomorrow, december 11. If you get questions, I would appreciate if you give answers to those questions as quickly as you could.
▶ 1:35:15Chair Risch: Again, we sincerely appreciate that. With the thanks of the committee, this committee is now adjourned.